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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
 
Overview 
The terms resilience and adaptive capacity are gaining traction across disciplinary 
boundaries as a means of potentially realizing a community’s capability, based on assessment of 
its performance, to survive and remain viable under changing and uncertain conditions. As 
complex systems, communities are subject to a variety of hazards in the form of acute shock and 
chronic stress. Hazards can result in immediate harm, as well as longer-term harm due to disruption 
of critical community functions that can threaten survival, well-being, and long-term viability. 
While it is expected that disruption of some kind will inevitably occur, there is increasing 
uncertainty regarding the frequency, severity, and duration of future hazards, as well as uncertainty 
regarding where, when, how, and to whom harm will occur. Changes in population, urbanization, 
climate, and potential interactions exacerbate uncertainties, making it difficult for communities to 
effectively operationalize assessment practices that can lead to sound planning and prioritization 
of actions required to safeguard a community’s future. This dissertation seeks to address gaps in 
current knowledge regarding key concepts that affect community performance (vulnerability, 
resilience, sustainability, and adaptive capacity), determine how they may be combined to better 
assess current community states and future trajectories, and provide an example by which this 
process can be operationalized for use by a community.  
In general terms, a community is a complex, social-environmental system, consisting of 
groups of people and necessary life-supporting systems, sub-systems, and networks in a place often 
defined by boundaries, where common interests are linked to collective action. Life-supporting 
systems can be seen as the set of critical resources (social, economic, and environmental capital) 
that makeup and maintain societal function and integrity over space and time. As there is no single 
definition of a community, there is also no formally accepted definition of what constitutes a 
resilient, sustainable, or adequately adaptive community. However, literature provides evidence 
that the concepts of vulnerability, resilience, sustainability, and adaptive capacity are firmly linked.  
Each concept can be generalized as follows: 
 2 
 vulnerability - the likelihood of experiencing loss due to hazard as a function of 
exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity;  
 resilience – ability to resist disruption, recover, adapt, and/or transform given a 
hazardous event in order to maintain desired system performance; 
 sustainability - long-term ability to operate without failure through balanced 
management of critical social, economic, and environmental capital; and 
 adaptive capacity - the ability to cope with, recover from, and adapt/transform in 
response to hazardous events. 
 
While it is clear that the concepts are related (e.g., resilience can be constrained by adaptive 
capacity, which in turn, can be restrained by lack of sustainability capital), there is general 
confusion and lack of consensus on the nature of causal relationships between concepts and how 
they collectively respond to change over time to determine performance. Both natural hazard and 
climate adaptation literature appear to recognize adaptive capacity as a common and critical factor 
in achieving resilience and sustainability, yet, there is no dominant framework that links all of the 
constituents together in a dynamic setting. This is an apparent gap in the collective ability to 
understand and measure what it means to achieve desired community performance outcomes 
implied by each concept, making the act of planning for and achieving outcomes an increasingly 
uncertain task with many unknowns for communities already encumbered by prioritization of 
limited resources needed to address known challenges. Gaps in resilience and adaptive capacity 
research continue to frustrate efforts to bring greater understanding of assessment processes into 
mainstream practice. The most predominate of these gaps include: i) continued confusion about 
the conceptual relationships between vulnerability, resilience, sustainability, and adaptive 
capacity; ii) lack of an assessment framework that can account for multi-scalar and dynamic 
processes related to all of these interdependent concepts, iii) lack of consolidation and 
classification of existing indicators and metrics for measuring performance related to resilience 
and adaptive capacity of communities, and iv) lack of validation of community-based case studies 
to operationalize concepts and practices.  
It is important for communities to understand how interactions between vulnerability, 
resilience, sustainability, and adaptive capacity can create possible trajectories for states of 
performance over time. Analysis of how these concepts can be combined to better assess and make 
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decisions regarding current and possible future community states is needed. Additionally, 
communities need an integrated framework that allows for dynamic monitoring of significant 
shifts in critical components to help inform decision making processes such as policy, planning, 
and resource allocation efforts. The use of such a framework should not be limited to researchers, 
but should be operationalized for use by practitioners within any community jurisdiction. In order 
to operationalize the assessment process, means of measurement need to be made more 
understandable and accessible to the public. This requires review, consolidation and structuring of 
indicators and metrics, definition of relationship to an assessment framework, and access to 
information to aid indicator selection and application. Finally, the concepts and framework should 
be applied within an appropriate context to a community (or community system) to determine 
impacts to sustainable resilience under risk scenarios and thresholds. In this research, the context 
of flooding under extreme precipitation conditions shall be applied to flood protection 
infrastructure (subject system) within the City of Nashville, and local thresholds will be used to 
determine possible impacts to the sustainable resilience of the subject system within this 
community. 
This dissertation contributes to the state-of-the-art by addressing the four gaps mentioned 
above. The primary goal of this research is to develop and demonstrate methods that enable the 
assessment and validation of qualities that influence the survivability, well-being, and long-term 
preparedness of communities subject to climate hazards in order to provide communities with 
strategic tools to improve adaptive capacity and resilience. As a secondary benefit, this research 
will build theory on adaptive capacity and resilience, providing information relevant to evaluation 
of current and future states of community performance through a robust policy lens in order to 
gain comfort in dealing with uncertainties associated with possible climate futures and potential 
hazards. The methods employed to develop worst-case scenarios for evaluating future sustainable 
resilience are not meant to predict or to represent the probability of extreme events, but to 
demonstrate the plausibility of such events in future planning horizons. While this research focuses 
on a single community (Nashville, TN) and a specific hazard (hydrologic events and impacts on 
flood protection infrastructure), the methods developed can be generalized and applied to any type 
of system, hazard, or risk-based environment to better understand performance over time.   
The tools and methods provided herein are a starting point intended to increase 
understanding and access to needed definitions, an assessment framework, a set of indicators and 
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metrics, a new way of looking at data to elicit plausible risk scenarios, and illustration of how each 
of these items may be employed. The intended audience for tools and methods provided is one that 
has sufficient information and understanding regarding how to employ and constructively use 
information and processes, or an audience that can be educated sufficiently to employ them. 
Ideally, it is hoped that any audience desiring to understand the concepts provided can have access 
to both the tools and the training needed to operationalize resilience assessment. 
 
Outline of Dissertation 
The format of the dissertation is a compilation of peer-reviewed papers that build upon one 
another to achieve a full set of objectives. Chapters 2-5 are individual papers as submitted in 
manuscript form. Each paper contains its own literature review and set of conclusions. For this 
reason, the review of literature appears sequentially in the progression of papers with a final set of 
references at the end of the document. Each paper builds from the prior paper as follows: chapter 
2 creates the conceptual foundation for sustainable resilience (a new concept developed in this 
work) needed to build the novel assessment framework; chapter 3 develops the assessment 
framework for sustainable resilience and explains how it can be used; chapter 4 identifies and 
organizes indicators and metrics from literature using a novel classification system that is specific 
to sustainable resilience, and provides a non-duplicative set of indicators and associated metrics 
for use in assessing sustainable resilience for communities; and chapter 5 provides an assessment 
of flood protection infrastructure (dams and levees) in the U.S. and implications for future 
sustainable resilience, where results are applied to a specific levee in Nashville, TN using both 
local data and General Circulation Models (GCMs) via CMIP5 under a worst-case scenario (RCP 
8.5) to develop recommendations to increase sustainable resilience and adaptive capacity of the 
affected community. Each of these chapters is summarized below. 
 
Chapter 2: 
Gillespie-Marthaler, L., Nelson, K. S., Baroud, H., Kosson, D. S., & Abkowitz, M. (2018). An 
Integrative Approach to Conceptualizing Sustainable Resilience. Sustainable and Resilient 
Infrastructure, DOI: 10.1080/23789689.2018.1497880. 
“Vulnerability, resilience, and sustainability are three concepts commonly used in 
assessing the quality of a variety of systems. While each can be applied 
independently when performing risk analysis, there is growing interest across 
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multiple disciplines in understanding how these concepts can be integrated when 
considering complex adaptive systems, such as communities. In this paper, we 
identify issues related to the use of these respective concepts in assessing complex 
adaptive systems, and describe how these issues may produce imbalanced results 
and maladaptive outcomes. We identify five critical areas where alignment and 
integration across concepts can lead to improved system assessment. As a result, 
we introduce a new paradigm, sustainable resilience, in which these concepts are 
integrated to enable alignment of adaptation and transformation strategies with 
desired resilience outcomes. This work provides the foundation for the 
development of an integrated assessment framework to help guide informed risk-
based decision making for sustainable and resilient systems.” 
 
Chapter 3: 
Nelson, K. S., Gillespie-Marthaler, L., Baroud, H., Abkowitz, M., & Kosson, D. S. (2019). An 
Integrated and Dynamic Framework for Assessing Sustainable Resilience in Complex Adaptive 
Systems. Sustainable and Resilient Infrastructure, DOI: 10.1080/23789689.2019.1578165.  
“Growing awareness of climate change and resulting impacts to communities have 
generated increasing interest in understanding relationships between vulnerability, 
resilience, sustainability, and adaptive capacity, and how these concepts can be 
combined to better assess the quality of complex adaptive systems over time. 
Previous work has described interactions between these concepts and the value-
added should they be integrated and applied in a strategic manner, resulting in a 
new understanding of system quality defined as sustainable resilience. However, a 
framework for explicitly integrating vulnerability, resilience, and sustainability 
assessment to develop understanding of system sustainable resilience has yet to be 
proposed. This paper presents a high-level, integrated and dynamic framework for 
assessing sustainable resilience for complex adaptive systems. We provide a set of 
functional definitions, a description of each step in the proposed assessment 
process, and walk through an example application of the framework, including a 
discussion of preliminary analyses, technical methodologies employed, and 
suggested future advances.” 
Chapter 4: 
Gillespie-Marthaler, L., Nelson, K. S., Baroud, H., Abkowitz, M. (2019a). Selecting Indicators for 
Assessing Community Sustainable Resilience. Risk Analysis (Submitted following second review) 
“Communities are complex systems subject to a variety of hazards that can result 
in significant disruption to critical functions. Community resilience assessment is 
rapidly gaining popularity as a means to help communities better prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from disruption. Sustainable resilience, a recently 
developed concept, requires communities to assess system-wide capability to 
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maintain desired performance levels while simultaneously evaluating impacts to 
resilience due to changes in hazards and vulnerability over extended periods of 
time. To enable assessment of community sustainable resilience, we review current 
literature, consolidate available indicators and metrics, and develop a classification 
scheme and organizational structure to aid in identification, selection, and 
application of indicators within a dynamic assessment framework. A non-
duplicative set of community sustainable resilience indicators and metrics are 
provided that can be tailored to a community’s needs, thereby enhancing the ability 
to operationalize the assessment process.” 
Chapter 5: 
Gillespie-Marthaler, L., Baroud, H., Abkowitz, M. (2019b). Failure Mode Analysis and 
Implications for Sustainable Resilience of Flood Protection Infrastructure in the U.S. (Submitted 
to Safety Science) 
“Root cause (failure mode) analysis is conducted to identify primary and secondary 
modes of failure for 779 dam and 1,160 levee failures. Overtopping and breach due 
to an extreme hydrologic event is determined to be the most significant cause for 
flood protection infrastructure failure (dams and levees) in the U.S., presenting a 
threat to sustainable resilience for both infrastructure and communities. High risk 
scenarios based on most significant failure modes are developed and examined to 
aid in understanding implications for future sustainable resilience of flood 
protection infrastructure. Use of local data and General Circulation Models 
(GCMs) via CMIP5 under a worst-case scenario (RCP 8.5) suggests that extreme 
hydrologic events (in the form of precipitation at or greater than the 95th percentile) 
are likely to increase in both frequency and magnitude over the remainder of the 
century. Results are applied to a local community and compared to a record flood 
event to demonstrate potential impacts to sustainable resilience for flood protection 
infrastructure and communities under the projected worst case.”  
Chapter 6 is the conclusion of the document, providing a summary of contributions resulting from 
the collective effort and directions for new research. These contributions include both those from 
each of the individual efforts, as well as cumulative contributions to the state of research in fields 
of resilience, sustainability science, natural hazard mitigation, and community planning.  Future 
research ideas to further expand the concept of sustainable resilience and its use are also discussed. 
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CHAPTER II 
An Integrative Approach to Conceptualizing Sustainable Resilience 
 
Introduction 
There is increasing focus on understanding individual and combined impacts of 
environmental stress, extreme events, and human development on communities and the 
environment.  As collective understanding of the dynamic nature of human impacts on the 
environment and environmental impacts on human society has grown, greater effort has been 
placed on engineering systems that are able to maintain quality, withstand change, and minimally 
impact the surrounding environment. Vulnerability, resilience, and sustainability are three 
concepts that have emerged from ecological, engineering, and social science disciplines as criteria 
to meet these goals.  
Each of these concepts is suited to assessing different aspects of system quality (e.g., 
exposure to harmful events, ability to resist disruption, expected lifetime of a current system state 
based on critical resources), each concept is typically utilized at different points in planning and 
decision making processes. Yet, these concepts ambiguously share many terms and attributes 
associated with a common foundation in risk assessment, management, and communication. 
Identification of gaps and linkages across each concept, and their relationships to the ability of 
current and future systems to adapt and/or transform are therefore needed (Adger, 2006; Bahadur 
et al., 2010; Upadhyaya et al., 2014; Bocchini et al., 2014; Minsker et al., 2015).  
To date, there has been a paucity of literature devoted to how these concepts are used to 
assess dynamic system quality (Adger, 2006; Fiksel, 2006; Turner, 2010; Engle, 2011; Ahern, 
2011; Miller et al. 2010; and Bocchini et al., 2014; Minsker et al., 2015). Moreover, while 
approaches for combining aspects of resilience and vulnerability (Cutter et al., 2008; Cutter et al., 
2014; Frazier et al., 2014; Lam et al., 2015; Mayunga, 2007; Manyena, 2006), or resilience and 
sustainability (Ashley and Carney, 1999; Turner et. al., 2003; Wilhelmi and Hayden, 2010; 
O’Connell et al., 2015; Minsker et al., 2015) frameworks have been developed, to our knowledge, 
a framework explicitly combining all three concepts based on critical evaluation of framework 
linkages and interactions has yet to be proposed.  
In this paper, we review the individual concepts of vulnerability, resilience, and 
sustainability, as well as existing efforts to develop integrative frameworks. We then identify and 
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illustrate critical linkages among concepts, and provide analysis of value added through strategic 
alignment.  We then introduce a new concept to achieve this alignment that reflects the desired 
end-state for dynamic integrated system assessment, which we term “sustainable resilience.” This 
work forms a necessary foundation upon which a framework for dynamic assessment of 
sustainable resilience can be formed. Critical concepts and terminology used in the analysis are 
italicized within the text and defined in Appendix A. 
 
Background and Literature Review 
Risk 
Decision making under uncertainty is an inherent part of any complex adaptive system, 
where a range of outcomes are possible. In the context of this paper, we define a system as a 
collection of components that provide specific and related functions that are combined to serve a 
common purpose (Bossel, 2001). Across all lifecycle phases of social, engineered, or coupled 
systems, decisions are made that result in impacts across time and space, creating a set of dependent 
responses that ultimately affect quality and performance (e.g., the system’s ability to serve 
society). The term social-environmental system is used in this paper to describe linkages between 
humans, human systems (engineered and/or social), and the surrounding environment (built and/or 
natural).  This term is intended to include socio-technical systems, a term widely used within the 
literature. Our intent is to encompass linkages and interactions between humans, natural systems, 
engineered (built) systems, socio-technical (technology & infrastructure) systems, and socio-
economic systems. 
Risk differs from uncertainty through inherent association with the concept of harm and 
resulting consequences (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981). It can be argued that the concepts of 
vulnerability, resilience, and sustainability all fall under the umbrella of risk management as each 
involves the identification and characterization of potential performance degradation and 
mitigation opportunities to reduce negative consequences. To better understand goals associated 
with each concept and how they relate to varying applications of risk, a review of each concept is 
provided below.   
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Vulnerability 
Vulnerability is described as the extent to which a system is likely to experience losses 
from a hazard (impactful event), and as such, it is a universally negative quality (Turner et al., 
2003).  Vulnerability assessment has evolved along two dominant tracks in the natural hazards 
community and the social science community. In the natural hazards literature, vulnerability 
employs a risk-hazard model, where vulnerability is defined as the combination of a risk factor 
and the potential for loss in the system at risk (Turner et al., 2003; Eakin & Luers, 2006). In the 
social science community, vulnerability traditionally focuses on inequities in sensitivity and 
exposure (social equity), resulting from social-structural characteristics such as socioeconomic 
and/or political status; governance; and community cohesion (Adger, 2006; Cutter et al., 2003; 
Turner et al., 2003; Eakin & Luers, 2006). Here, less emphasis is placed on physical damage 
incurred by a specific hazard while a greater emphasis is placed on identifying who is vulnerable 
and why they are vulnerable. Foundational application of the social sciences approach (Adger, 
2006; Cutter 2003; Eakin & Luers, 2006) remains widely used in current applications within 
literature (Cutter, 2016a; Cutter, 2016b). In both cases (risk-hazard and social science 
applications), imbalanced assessment can occur through over-emphasis of either the physical or 
social aspects of vulnerability, leading to an incomplete understanding of system vulnerability. 
A more recent approach to defining vulnerability attempts to merge both perspectives by defining 
vulnerability as the, “state of susceptibility to harm from exposure to stresses associated with 
environmental and social change and from the absence of capacity to adapt,” (Adger, 2006). We 
defer to this definition, which includes three components: exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive 
capacity. Exposure is the magnitude and extent to which a disruption (hazard event) or stress is 
experienced, sensitivity is the expected degree of impact from a disruption or stress given 
exposure, and adaptive capacity is the ability to prepare for and respond to disturbance and is 
dependent upon the ability to effectively access and use necessary resources (Adger & Vincent, 
2005; Adger, 2006; Engle, 2011).  
Despite the breadth in definition, little consensus exists on the appropriateness of different 
methods for measuring or characterizing vulnerability across social-environmental systems. This 
is in part due to continuing challenges in the ability to operationalize different components of 
vulnerability and how to account for differences between short-term and long-term vulnerability 
(Engle, 2011; Gallopin, 2006; Fekete, 2012; Fussel, 2007; Eakin & Luers, 2006; Hinkel, 2011). 
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For example, it has been noted that overlap exists between sensitivity and adaptive capacity, as an 
indicator of sensitivity at one time scale (e.g., poverty may be an indicator of sensitivity during an 
active emergency as fewer resources are immediately available to respond to the crisis at hand), 
yet may be an equally valid indicator of adaptive capacity at another time scale (e.g., poverty may 
also be an indicator of adaptive capacity as fewer resources are available to adequately prepare for 
future emergencies) (Frazier et al., 2014). Differences in operationalizing vulnerability are also 
obvious when considering the numerous variations in defining adaptive capacity, examples of 
which include coping capacity, coping ability, and capacity of response (Gallopin, 2006). In some 
cases, these terms refer to characteristics that exist before a harmful event occurs and impact 
outcomes in the short-term, while in others they refer to processes such as social learning that 
produces impacts in the long-term (Adger et al., 2004; Fussel, 2007; Gallopin, 2006; Keck and 
Sakdapolrak, 2013; Turner, 2003). 
Vulnerability assessments are often used as a pre-event planning tool or for post-event 
analysis, and are typically conducted using indices that represent various attributes and properties 
of sub-systems or system components in order to evaluate exposure to harm and possible 
distribution of impacts. There are few examples of vulnerability assessment that adequately 
balance all aspects of social-environmental system components (e.g., human, engineered systems, 
social systems, natural systems) and consider their cross-scalar interactions (Engle, 2011; Adger, 
2006; Fussel, 2007). Difficulties in addressing multi-scalar interactions may reflect the typical 
micro-scale lens employed in vulnerability assessments. While analysis at this scale can be a 
strength when identification of critical sub-systems/components or social justice issues within a 
system is needed, emphasis on the micro-scale can provide an incomplete picture of impacts at the 
system level (Miller et al., 2010). Current frameworks for vulnerability assessment do not 
adequately address dynamic temporal changes in vulnerability, critical thresholds, and/or multi-
scalar interactions (Engle, 2011; Hinkel, 2011; Fekete, 2012; Miller et al., 2010; Frazier et al., 
2014). As a result, imbalanced vulnerability assessment can provide discrepant and/or 
contradictory conclusions which may lead to adoption of inefficient and/or ineffective strategies 
to improve system quality and performance.    
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Resilience 
The concept of resilience originates from ecological science, where it was defined as a 
system’s ability to, “absorb changes of state variables, driving variables, and parameters, and still 
persist” (Holling, 1973). Resilience in this sense is a property that results in a system’s level of 
persistence. A commonly accepted definition of resilience is the, “capacity of a system to absorb 
disturbance and re-organize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same 
function, structure, identity and feedbacks” (Folke, 2006). This definition considers both system 
persistence and adaptability within the context of complex system interactions such as cross-
scale dynamics, dependency, multiple equilibria, and feedback loops (Folke, 2006; Turner et al., 
2003).  
Recent definitions of resilience associated with social and economic systems incorporate 
the concepts of coping, adaptive, and transformative capacities (Engle, 2011; Keck & Sakdapolrak, 
2013), and the ability to adapt or reconfigure to achieve strategic goals (Martin, 2012). For 
example, a community that is able to minimize physical flooding, has proactive emergency 
communication systems and sufficient emergency response infrastructure, and that is able to learn 
from flood events and take action to improve the outcomes of future flood events could be 
considered to be resilient. Doorn et al. (2018) go a step further and combine resilience with a 
capability approach that links social justice and well-being to infrastructure damage and recovery, 
highlighting interactions between social and physical coping and recovery processes. Resilience 
can also be viewed as a process that includes planning, preparation, monitoring, and learning to 
respond to change in order to achieve desired long-term goals (Godschalk, 2003; Ahern, 2011; 
Davoudi et al., 2012; Wilkinson, 2012; Desouza & Flanery, 2013; Sharifi & Yamagata, 2014; Arup 
and The Rockefeller Foundation, 2014) that are often associated with urban planning.  
Among these resilience definitions are a number of common attributes: i) most refer to the 
ability of a system to absorb and adapt to disruptive events, ii) recovery from disturbance is 
considered a critical component, iii) some require a return to a steady or pre-disturbance state, 
while others allow for system degradation or the possibility of an enhanced or transformed state, 
iv) many include emphasis on preparedness and recovery activities (Hosseini et al., 2016; Koliou 
et al., 2018), and v) the attainment of resilience is often linked to achieving desired levels of system 
performance (Bruneau et al., 2003).  In the case of social, engineered, or coupled systems, 
resilience is typically associated with attaining some combination of achieving social health and 
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wellbeing and infrastructure/environmental stability and function (Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013, 
Meerow et al., 2016a).  
Defining resilience is an ongoing process as systems characterization and risk identification 
evolve. Resilient systems are also characterized by system attributes that impact different 
components of resilience, such as robustness, redundancy, reliability, preparedness, rapidity, risk, 
vulnerability, sustainability, and adaptive capacity (Bruneau et al., 2003; Rose, 2009; Keck & 
Sakdapolrak, 2013; Hosseini et al., 2016). The terms preparedness, rapidity, and recovery are often 
associated with community and infrastructure resilience, and are related to the ability to anticipate, 
plan for, and respond to disruption in ways that minimize injury and loss and allow for timely 
recovery of functions (Godschalk, 2003; Vale & Campanella, 2005; NIAC, 2009; Bozza et al., 
2015; Minsker et al., 2015). Recovery itself is a complex term, especially for communities and 
associated infrastructure systems, where prevention of future loss and injury may require 
significant change or transformation involving multiple subsystems, objectives, and tradeoffs 
(replace, retreat, or relocate) rather than a return to pre-disturbance conditions (Vale, 2014). 
Uncertainty is also an important attribute associated with resilience, requiring an uncertainty-
robust adaptation approach to manage lack of homeostasis and the need for flexibility when 
considering strategies for climate change (Wardekker et al., 2010).  
Growing appeal and multiple definitions make resilience susceptible to criticism and point 
to a need for caution in its application. Davoudi et al. (2012) warn practitioners to carefully 
translate the use of resilience from one discipline to another and to avoid creation of a catch-all 
approach that is so malleable as to be “indefensible”. Meerow & Newell (2016b) also caution 
against a “one-size-fits-all” approach by emphasizing a need to question how resilience is to be 
applied, or more specifically, “resilience of what, to what, for whom, where, when, and why?” The 
nature and specificity associated with these questions is intended to avoid inconsistent, unintended, 
or maladaptive outcomes that can be associated with improperly scaled or incompletely informed 
decisions and associated trade-offs in planning processes to achieve resilience.  
In contrast to vulnerability assessment, resilience assessments are often conducted in a 
dynamic way at multiple stages within a system planning and/or event response and recovery 
process, seeking to evaluate performance-based measures in response to systemic stress and 
disruption. Resilience assessments are often applied to relatively short-term events, one exception 
being the assessment of resilience to climate variability, which can cover a much longer temporal 
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horizon. Complex coupled systems often require identification and use of indicators and metrics 
to represent specific performance objectives and use of statistical methods or network models to 
evaluate assessment outcomes (Baroud et al., 2014; Bozza et al., 2015; Linkov et al., 2014; Lam 
et al., 2015).  
The exact nature of relationships between resilience, its multiple components, and various 
system attributes are often variable and not well defined. For example, Doorn (2017) provided a 
review of resilience in disaster management and found that different disciplines use varying 
definitions and relationships to describe resilience and vulnerability, and that distributive issues 
(e.g., access to resources, harmful impacts, etc.) are not well addressed in the literature, making it 
challenging to determine standards for social equity both before and after a disaster. As a result, 
difficulties can arise in aggregating measures across coupled systems where components or sub-
systems may have differing levels of resilience, while taking into account the linkages between 
different system characteristics. Inadequacies in resilience assessment can lead to: i) short-term 
solutions that give the appearance of resilience, ii) poor strategies for reducing the severity of 
anticipated impacts and inadequate recovery planning that can lead to rebuilding the same set of 
conditions that resulted in system failure in the first place, and 3) failure to effectively use available 
resources and adaptation strategies (Vale, 2005; Masterson et al., 2014). For this reason, it is not 
always desirable to return to a pre-disturbance state, but rather to consider achieving an altered or 
transformed state through incremental adaptation, partial transformation or complete 
transformation.  
In today’s world, physical, social, and economic systems are increasingly interconnected, 
resulting in complex interactions, which impact system performance in the presence of disruption. 
Koliou et al., 2018 provides a timely review of applications in resilience assessment for a variety 
of complex system types. The review finds a general lack of resilience assessment frameworks 
that are able to consider the multi-functional dynamics of complex systems (natural, built, social, 
and economic components and their interdependencies), and states that attempts to aggregate 
results from single-system analyses has contributed to confusion and inconsistency in the 
collective ability to understand and apply concepts (Koliou et al., 2018). While static levels of 
resilience may appear high (based on immediate availability of resources for response and 
recovery), long-term resilience is driven by sustained levels of availability and access to resources 
needed to fuel adaptation/transformation strategies. Current definitions and analytical frameworks 
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do not account for all of these aspects, resulting in potential discrepancies in the assessment of 
resilience to inform decision making for critical resource allocation before, during, and after a 
disruptive event (Hosseini et al., 2016; Minsker et al., 2015). 
 
Sustainability 
Much of current sustainability literature defers to the Brundtland Report definition of 
sustainable development that includes trans-generational (long-term) equity by requiring that 
development be able to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs (WCED, 1987). The concept of recognizing present and future 
needs is related to understanding the interdependence between critical human-centric and 
ecological-centric resources (coupling), as well as overall social dependence upon both types of 
resources necessary to sustain development over time. In the literature, a sustainable social-
environmental system is sometimes characterized as a system with the ability to provide sufficient 
resources to the human population without endangering the viability of the natural system, it is 
essentially concerned with addressing “threats to provisioning society and to maintaining life 
support systems,” (Turner, 2010) through management of critical resource capital. Critical 
resource capital, or sustainability capital, must be managed strategically over appropriate spatial 
and temporal scales to ensure future viability (Berkes & Folke, 1998; Kates et al., 2001; 
Marcotullio, 2001; Fiksel, 2006; Dietz & Neumayer, 2007).  This includes managing both risk and 
opportunity to provide desired outcomes and overall system performance (Pope et al., 2004).  
In this sense, “capital” refers to the quality and abundancy of a critical resource (social, 
economic, or environmental) that may be available at a point in time (Alberti & Susskind, 1996; 
Pickett et al., 2004; Mayunga, 2007; Wilson, 2010; Bettencourt & West, 2010; Mori & 
Christodoulou, 2012; Hiremath et al., 2013; Vanegas, 2003). These can broadly be described as 
follows: 
 social - people, skills, health, and broad governance (provision of services, political 
capacity, law, and justice, among others); 
 economic - employment, income levels, market diversity, tax base, business growth, 
and internal/external funds, among others.; and  
 environmental – (natural and built) air, land, water, food, energy, ecosystem health, 
facilities, and infrastructure systems, sub-systems, and supporting networks.  
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Sustainability seeks to achieve environmental equity, long-term allocative efficiency, and 
distributive efficiency (Bithas & Christofakis, 2006) across sustainability capital in order to 
maintain system viability and well-being. Issues of finite supply, non-substitutability, and tipping 
points are also encompassed in the concept of sustainability. The concept of “strong” sustainability 
prohibits substitution of one capital for another (e.g., economic growth for environmental health 
or social equity) (Finco & Nijkamp, 2001; Dietz & Neumayer, 2007), as opposed to “weak” 
sustainability, where some trade-offs are allowable in order to maintain a combined capital stock 
under general limits of growth and capacity (Nourry, 2008). Growth is ultimately limited by the 
availability of capital and the capacity for assimilation of waste through sinks across various 
systems (with overriding limitations imposed by planetary carrying capacity) (Berkes & Folke, 
1998; Fischer et al., 2007; Rockstrom et al., 2009). Without sufficient quality and quantity of 
critical resources (e.g., skilled labor, money, water, land, energy, etc.), referred to herein as 
sustainability capital, or the ability to change to address deficits in sustainability capital, system 
quality may be challenged. An understanding of thresholds and limitations at various scales 
(global, regional, local) is necessary in order to manage and employ capital when and where it is 
needed to enable resilience through capacity for change (Folke et al., 2002; Folke et al., 2003; 
Longstaff et al., 2010; Engle, 2011). 
The challenge in seeking and maintaining sustainability lies in the balance between trade-
offs among capital and the ultimate risk of exceeding acceptable thresholds for consumption and 
degradation, resulting in the possibility of irreversible damage or failure (Moldan et al., 2012; 
Botero et al., 2015). Like resilience, sustainability (or more specifically, sustainable development) 
can also be viewed as a process, in addition to a normative state, and can require iterative steps of 
assessment, planning, monitoring, and re-assessment to achieve desired long-term goals linked to 
system integrity, livelihood sufficiency, opportunity, resource maintenance, and adaptation (Adger 
et al., 2005; Gibson, 2006; Rosales, 2011; Boyko et al., 2012). Recent planning goals to achieve 
sustainable cities have been developed within the U.S. and abroad (UN, 2015; NAS, 2016).  
In contrast to traditional use of vulnerability and resilience assessment, sustainability 
assessments are typically carried out prior to system development and are not often reassessed 
throughout a system’s lifetime. Sustainability assessments typically focus on risk in terms of a 
system’s impact upon its critical resources (sustainability capital), in order to achieve a long-term 
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balance between the availability (access to needed quality and quantities) of resources and the 
system’s ability to provide desired services to society. Assessments can be conducted proactively 
based on desired achievement of sustainability goals and objectives for a future system (reduce 
risk and associated consequences), or reactively to assess sustainability for existing systems 
relative to an established baseline and future goals/objectives. Timing of assessments can impact 
the degree of trade-offs that may be possible when considering impacts to different sustainability 
capital categories, with greater constraints placed on reactive assessments (Pope et al., 2004).   
When used to characterize system quality, sustainability assessment without adequate 
consideration of changes to sub-system/component vulnerability and system resilience can lead to 
sub-optimal system performance (Minsker et al., 2015). Where specific applications of 
sustainability assessment may require that a system is optimized to reduce material flows, the same 
system may also require an increase in materials to achieve decreased vulnerability and/or 
increased resilience through protective measures such as increasing robustness and adaptability 
(Bozza et al., 2015; Ahern, 2011; Bocchini et al., 2014). This is especially true over time and under 
changing circumstances that may not have been fully anticipated, or may not be fully definable 
without a high degree of uncertainty (Linkov et al., 2014; Minsker et al., 2015), such as climate 
change. Current analytical frameworks do not adequately address these issues by broadening the 
scope and objectives to account for critical system properties such as its vulnerability and 
resilience that are not included in typical sustainability assessments (Bocchini et al., 2014). While 
sustainability is inherently multi-generational in scope, typical sustainability assessments offer 
only a snapshot in time related to a specific set of resource trajectories (Mori & Yamashita, 2015). 
In addition, current frameworks do not adequately address dynamic system changes and resulting 
sustainability impacts over time (Minsker et al., 2015). This does not allow for evaluation of long-
term sustainability. Such limitations highlight the need for iterative and multi-scenario approaches 
to assessing system sustainability.   
 
Adaptive Capacity 
Each of the aforementioned concepts (vulnerability, resilience, and sustainability) are 
related to a system’s ability to adapt and/or transform. The concept of adaptive capacity, as 
previously stated, is commonly understood as the ability to prepare for and respond to disturbance 
(Adger et al. 2004; Adger, 2006; Engle, 2011). This concept is less developed than the concepts 
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of vulnerability, resilience, and sustainability, and not widely utilized by practitioners in the form 
of assessment techniques. However, it is gaining traction in social-environmental system 
assessment as it is commonly recognized as playing a vital role in both vulnerability and resilience 
concepts (Engle, 2011). In addition, it is widely recognized that the adaptive capacity of a system 
is dependent upon the resources available to that system, critically linking it to the concept of 
sustainability via availability and use of sustainability capital to affect positive change (Adger et 
al., 2004; Adger & Vincent, 2005; Engle, 2011; Turner, 2010). Whereas sustainability relates to 
the balanced management and interactions between forms of capital, adaptive capacity relates to 
the ability to effectively apply forms of capital to realize desired change (reduce harm, increase 
benefit), often through social structures and governance processes (Folke et al., 2002). 
While the concept of adaptive capacity is not one of the primary concepts commonly used 
in complex system assessment today, it is implicit within any assessment oriented towards 
understanding the quality and performance of adaptive systems, and plays a key role in linking the 
three aforementioned concepts of vulnerability, resilience, and sustainability (Engle, 2011). Much 
work remains to be done to understand the nature of interactions between vulnerability, resilience, 
sustainability, and adaptive capacity, and how to avoid maladaptive outcomes over time and space 
(Romero-Lankao et al., 2016). 
Used independently, each type of assessment discussed above produces a characterization 
of risk from an internal or external perspective over varying spatial and temporal scales that can 
be used to inform future actions to increase system quality and performance. However, when 
applied independently, they may not effectively or efficiently account for dynamic interactions 
across varying perspectives (impacts to systems or by systems), scales (temporal and spatial), and 
dependent systems (social, ecological, engineered, and coupled social-environmental). In 
recognition of limitations in using only a single concept to assess system quality and performance, 
efforts have been made to combine aspects of concepts with varied results. For example, the 
Disaster Resilience of Place (DROP) model (Cutter et. al., 2008), and SERV (Spatially Explicit 
Resilience-Vulnerability) model (Frazier et al., 2014) both integrate vulnerability and resilience 
yet lack robust consideration of sustainability. On the other hand, the Resilience Adaptation 
Transformation Assessment and Learning Framework (RAPTA) integrates concepts of resilience 
and sustainability yet does not explicitly account for vulnerability (O’Connell et al., 2015). While 
there are examples of frameworks that integrate two concepts explicitly and the third concept 
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implicitly, to our knowledge, no framework has yet been described that explicitly accounts for all 
three concepts (vulnerability, resilience, & sustainability) with appropriate linkages to adaptive 
capacity, and associated interactions between concepts. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Evaluation of Concepts 
A review of existing efforts point to a need to strengthen areas of perceived weaknesses in 
the ability to assess complex system quality absent consideration of all three assessment types. In 
this section, we examine these weaknesses in the context of suggesting areas of added value that 
could be produced by more comprehensive integration of the concepts.  For the purpose of this 
discussion, we utilize the following definitions, i) vulnerability is the likelihood of experiencing 
loss due to hazard as a function of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity; ii) resilience is the 
ability to resist disruption, recover, adapt, and/or transform given a hazardous event in order to 
maintain desired system performance; and iii) sustainability is the long-term ability to operate 
without failure through balanced management of critical social, economic, and environmental 
capital.  Additionally, adaptive capacity is defined as the ability to cope with, recover from, and 
adapt/transform through effective use of available sustainability capital in response to a hazardous 
event at a point in time.  
Table 1 below, presents a summary of strengths and weaknesses of individual concept 
application in complex systems assessment.  Differences in perspective and scale across individual 
concepts produce strengths and weaknesses, and imply a need for further analysis regarding areas 
of convergence and divergence that help to identify where and how integration may lead to greater 
understanding of system quality.  In the following section, we examine the relationships between 
concepts through comparison of goals, focal lens, scale (spatial & temporal), and metrics to 
identify linkages and interactions among concepts.  
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 Strength of Individual Concept Weaknesses (Gaps) in Current Application 
V
u
ln
er
a
b
il
it
y
 
Identification and assessment of sub-
system/component: 
 Risks 
 Weakest points  
 Means to reduce severity of 
harmful impacts to specific sub-
systems/components within current 
system constraints 
 Balance across social-environmental components 
(human, engineered systems, social systems, natural 
systems, among others) 
 Consideration of interactions with and impacts on, 
sustainability capital and long-term viability 
 Sub-system/component interactions with system-wide 
performance and quality, particularly in relation to 
critical thresholds 
 
R
es
il
ie
n
ce
 
Identification and assessment of 
system-wide:  
 Performance related risks 
 Plans for reduction of harmful 
impact and severity 
 Recovery and adaptation strategies  
 Transformation needs associated 
with system operations  
 Balance across social-environmental components 
 Consideration of sub-system/component level 
variations and their impact on system-wide 
performance and quality over time 
 Consideration of impacts on sustainability capital 
resulting from implementation of adaptation or 
transformation strategies and resulting changes in 
adaptive capacity 
S
u
st
a
in
a
b
il
it
y
 Identification and evaluation of multi-
scalar critical resource capital: 
 Deficiencies and/or opportunities  
 Long-term system-wide viability 
and wellbeing  
 Consideration of critical system and sub-
system/component properties given hazardous event 
scenarios 
 Consideration of dynamic system changes over time, 
including the impact of adaptation or transformation 
strategies 
 
Table 1. Strengths and Weaknesses (Gaps) of Individual Concept Application in Complex 
Systems Assessment 
 
Divergence, Convergence, and Interactions 
Depending upon the framework used and the context of application, the concepts of 
vulnerability and resilience can be seen as inversely related, interdependent, or intersecting (e.g., 
vulnerability as a part of resilience or resilience as part of vulnerability) (Engle, 2011; Turner 2010, 
Lam et al., 2015, Gallopin, 2006; Bahadur et al., 2010). In some cases, a direct decrease in 
vulnerability is considered to be an approach to increasing resilience (Sahely et al., 2005, Cutter 
et al., 2008; Bahadur et al., 2010). Whereas some argue that resilience is a subset of vulnerability, 
and therefore increasing resilience can be seen as a way of decreasing vulnerability (Gallopin 2006, 
Turner et.al. 2003; Adger, 2006), others consider vulnerability a subset or factor in resilience 
metrics (Henry & Ramirez-Marquez, 2012; Baroud et al., 2014). In other cases, resilience is 
characterized as a component of, or contributor to, sustainability, where sufficient ability to resist 
disruption is required to ensure self-regulated operation over multiple generations (Fiksel, 2003; 
 20 
Mayer, 2008). 
Increasing adaptive capacity is considered a means of both increasing resilience and 
decreasing vulnerability (Burch & Robinson, 2007; Engle, 2011; Romero-Lankao et al., 2016).  
Through “sustainability science,” resilience and vulnerability are regarded in a manner which 
implicitly links adaptive capacity to the availability and effective use of resources (Turner, 2010). 
While it is sometimes assumed that increasing resilience and/or decreasing vulnerability will 
increase sustainability and vice-versa, this is not necessarily the case. The focal lens of each 
concept, if improperly balanced, can lead to superficial consideration of related concepts and a 
failure to examine trade-offs, resulting in seemingly competing or misaligned goals and 
unsustainable outcomes (Mori & Yamashita, 2015).   
In addition, dynamic environmental conditions, such as changes in climate, resource 
availability, and underlying control variables that impact system risk, lead to increased uncertainty 
in maintaining long-term resilience and sustainability.  A system’s ability to remain viable in the 
long-term is a function of its ability to adapt over time to changing circumstances. In this respect, 
system performance needs to be re-examined within and across interdependent systems using not 
only averages, but with consideration of extremes, infrequent events with severe consequences 
(Minkser et al., 2015). Whereas a conventional sustainability assessment may seek to minimize 
resource consumption in the development and operation of a system, this effort can undermine 
essential components of robustness and redundancy that are critical to resilience.  Likewise, a 
conventional vulnerability or resilience assessment may not assess impacts to critical resources at 
spatial and temporal scales necessary to identify possible shortfalls in future availability of 
resources needed to support sustainability and fuel adaptive capacity (Mori & Yamashita, 2015).  
Analysis across all three concepts, perspectives, and scales is necessary to determine sufficiency 
in resource use and restoration/replenishment, as well as trends in increasing community 
performance over time (Milman & Short, 2008; Upadhyaya et al., 2014).  
We assert that improved understanding of the nature of linkages and interactions is critical 
to enabling strategic integration of concepts, rather than a simple combination of terms. A detailed 
understanding of the interactions between concepts can highlight areas where a strategic approach 
to balanced integration and alignment of vulnerability, resilience, and sustainability goals may lead 
to an improved method for assessing the performance of any complex system (including 
communities), as well as improved ability to strategically build adaptive capacity, thereby 
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strengthening long-term sustainability and resilience. The review of in-practice and conceptual 
literature on vulnerability, resilience, and sustainability presented earlier reveals at least five 
critical areas where conceptual interactions exist between assessment types: goals, focal lens, scale 
(spatial & temporal), and key measurement and practice terms. Table 2 presents a comparison of 
each concept across these critical areas.  
From examination of the Conceptual Definition Terminology and Key Measurement and 
Practice Terms in Table 2, it can be seen below that economic considerations (cost, effectiveness, 
efficiency) are common across the concepts; considerations of equity-related diversity and 
susceptibility are common across sustainability and vulnerability concepts; aspects of system 
performance such as robustness, reliability, and thresholds are common across sustainability and 
resilience concepts; the abilities to cope/resist and adapt in response to disruption are key 
components of both vulnerability and resilience; and sensitivity is a common concern (although at 
different levels) across all three concepts. Comparison of the scale of assessment indicates that 
shared consideration of the ability to cope/resist or adapt across vulnerability and resilience occurs 
at the component-scale for vulnerability, while resilience is reflective of coping/resisting and 
adaptation capability within and across linked systems. In addition, terms such as exposure and 
sensitivity can be seen to be key components of conceptual definitions of vulnerability, but not of 
resilience. However, measurement of sensitivity and exposure are common in resilience 
assessment, suggesting that the conceptual components of resilience are dependent on exposure 
and sensitivity. Consideration of terms such as resourcefulness and preparedness in vulnerability 
and resilience assessment imply that levels of coping/resisting and adaptive capacity over time 
depend on availability of sustainability capital, where long-term coping and adaptive capacity are 
dependent on the equitable distribution of resources over system lifetimes or generations.  
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Focal Lenses Goals Spatial and 
Temporal Scale  
Conceptual 
Definition 
Terminology  
Key Measurement and Practice 
Terms 
V
u
ln
er
a
b
il
it
y
  What can happen to the 
system?  
 What is the impact to the 
system?  
 How equitably are the 
impacts distributed? 
Mitigate impacts to 
the system and 
improve survivability 
and/or well-being of 
entities within the 
system under the 
influence of stress 
and/or shock. 
Spatial: Micro (sub-
system/ component). 
 
Temporal: Short to 
mid-term.  
 Adaptive Capacity 
 Coping/Response  
 Exposure 
 Sensitivity 
 
 Cost 
 Density 
 Diversity 
 Extent 
 Duration 
 
 Effectiveness 
 Efficiency 
 Preparedness 
 Resourcefulness 
 Susceptibility 
 Impact 
R
es
il
ie
n
ce
 
 How did the system 
respond?  
 How will the system 
recover? 
Maintain system 
performance and 
functionality in the 
presence of change, 
minimize periods of 
disruption, and 
recover as well as 
adapt or transform. 
Spatial: Meso 
(system-wide). 
 
Temporal: Mid-term 
(operational 
lifetime).  
 Absorb/Resist/Cope 
 Recover 
 Adapt 
 Transform 
 
 Cost 
 Effectivenes
s 
 Efficiency 
 Exposure 
 Rapidity 
 Threshold 
 Performance 
 Coping/Respons
e 
 Redundancy 
 Reliability 
 Resourcefulness 
 Robustness 
 Sensitivity 
S
u
st
a
in
a
b
il
it
y
 
 How will the system 
impact its surrounding 
environment (across 
social, economic, and 
environmental systems 
and sub-systems)? 
 Will impacts to critical 
resources modify system 
viability? 
Identify and manage 
impacts to connected 
resource systems and 
sustainability capital 
in order to maintain 
indefinite system 
viability and well-
being. 
Spatial: Meso 
(system) with macro 
(beyond system 
boundaries) 
connectivity. 
 
Temporal: Long-
term or strategic 
(life-time and 
beyond). 
 Equity 
 Long term resource 
availability (in 
terms of social, 
economic, and 
environmental 
capital) 
 Resource quality 
and quantity 
 
 Access 
 Cost 
 Diversity 
 Effectivenes
s 
 Efficiency 
 Redundancy 
 Reliability 
 
 Resource 
Demand 
 Resource Supply 
 Robustness 
 Sensitivity 
 Susceptibility 
 Performance 
 Threshold 
 
Table 2. Vulnerability, Resilience, and Sustainability Assessments - Conceptual Linkages and Interactions   
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From the areas of divergence and potential linkages across concepts presented in Table 2, 
we further identify specific areas where strategic integration of concepts can be expected to result 
in greater understanding of system quality over time, which we refer to as “value-added” in Table 
3. A summary of areas of value-added through focused integration of concepts, time-scales, 
systems, and resources is provided in Table 3 below. 
 
 Gaps (from Table 1) “Value-Added”  through Integration to Address 
Gaps 
V
u
ln
er
a
b
il
it
y
 
 Balance between social-
environmental components  
 Consideration of interactions and 
impacts on sustainability capital and 
long-term viability 
 Consideration of sub-
system/component interactions with 
system-wide performance and 
quality, particularly in relation to 
critical thresholds 
 Greater consideration of ecosystem and physical 
infrastructure effects  
 Greater consideration of constraints on adaptive 
capacity imposed by sustainability capital 
 Improved consideration of threshold conditions; 
 Improved consideration of impacts to system-wide 
performance 
 Improved consideration of impacts to system 
sustainability capital  
R
es
il
ie
n
ce
 
 Balance between social-
environmental components 
 Consideration of sub-
system/component level variations 
and their impact on system-wide 
performance and quality over time 
 Consideration of impacts on 
sustainability capital resulting from 
implementation of adaptation or 
transformation strategies and 
resulting changes in adaptive 
capacity 
 Greater consideration of socio-economic and 
socio-political effects 
 Improved understanding of how to reduce severity 
of harmful impacts 
 Improved identification and consideration of sub-
systems/components critical to maintenance of 
system-wide performance 
 Improved identification of adaptation and/or 
transformation strategies that can be effectively 
implemented 
 Improved consideration of effects on system 
sustainability capital in order to maintain long-term 
system viability 
S
u
st
a
in
a
b
il
it
y
  Consideration of critical system and 
sub-system/component properties 
given hazardous event scenarios 
 Consideration of dynamic system 
changes over time, including the 
impact of adaptation or 
transformation strategies 
 Greater consideration of changes in the availability 
of sustainability capital 
 Improved consideration of effect of sustainability 
capital on adaptive capacity 
 
Table 3. Areas of “Value-Added” through Focused Integration of Concepts, Time-Scales, 
Systems, and Resources 
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Conceptual Linkages & Interactions 
While the exact nature of the linkages and interactions between individual assessment types 
is currently debated, it is evident that causal relationships are present at the sub-system/component 
and system-wide level in relation to measurements for vulnerability, resilience, and sustainability 
over time. Conceptual linkages and interactions identified in earlier Tables (1-3) are further 
illustrated in Figure 1 below.   
Figure 1. Assessing System Quality - Conceptual Linkages and Interactions 
 
Overlapping areas indicate strong interdependence between primary and contributing 
concepts (e.g., adaptive capacity is a key component, or contributing concept, to both vulnerability 
and resilience). Primary concepts are represented by bold font. Dashed arrows indicate 
interdependence between concepts. For example, the quality and availability of sustainability 
capital (and ability to harness it to create change) impacts adaptive capacity. In turn, as resources 
may be utilized to create change, sustainability capital may also be impacted based on the degree 
of utilization and impacts to capital stocks. Over-utilization or lack of balanced management can 
render sustainability capital inadequate or inaccessible, thereby impacting vulnerability, adaptive 
capacity, and system resilience to varying degrees. Areas within the blue background refer to 
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dynamic interpretations of concepts, while those outside refer to static interpretations of 
vulnerability and resilience that exist at a given point in time. The static state of vulnerability has 
a direct impact upon the static state of resilience within a system, and these static states contribute 
strongly to dynamic levels of system resilience. Changes in dynamic states are realized over time 
(through adaptation strategies, or lack thereof) via changes in and interactions between 
sustainability capital, vulnerability, and adaptive capacity as described below. 
Within social-environmental systems, vulnerability assessment is typically applied to the 
component/sub-system scale of analysis (Miller et al., 2010). While resilience assessment is 
sometimes carried out for smaller scales of analysis, within the social-environmental system 
literature resilience assessment is typically conducted at the system-wide scale (Miller et al., 2010). 
Vulnerability and resilience are evaluated in both static and dynamic contexts in the literature 
(Cutter et al., 2008; Gallopin, 2006; Frazier et al., 2014).  
Static characterization of vulnerability, termed here as contextual vulnerability in Figure 1, 
is defined as a pre-existing/current state of the system that takes into account exposure, sensitivity, 
and existing plans or capabilities that improve the effectiveness and range of actions available in 
response to a hazardous event (Cutter et al., 2008; Gallopin, 2006; Turner, 2003). This static form 
of adaptive capacity is herein referred to as anticipatory coping capacity, a component of 
contextual vulnerability (Figure 1). The resilience counterpart to contextual vulnerability is termed 
the ability to resist systemic disruption (Figure 1). This ability is based on the expected level of 
impact to critical sub-systems/components given their contextual vulnerability and interactions 
between those components that result in a systemic impact, where the overall system ability to 
either resist or succumb to disruption is also dependent on critical system performance thresholds. 
As contextual vulnerability includes consideration of exposure, sensitivity and, through 
anticipatory coping, adaptive capacity, it can be deduced that the ability to resist systemic 
disruption is also dependent on these components (although considered at a different scale and in 
reference to performance thresholds). Since the ability to resist systemic disruption is a subset of 
resilience, this suggests that resilience is also dependent on exposure, sensitivity, and anticipatory 
coping capacity. These relationships imply that the concepts of vulnerability and resilience are also 
interdependent, and as formulated, are composed of the same basic building blocks. Despite this, 
differences in the scale, resolution, and unit of comparison that define the lenses of vulnerability 
and resilience mean that these concepts are not simple inverses of each other.  
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In addition, both vulnerability and resilience are dependent upon sustainability capital and 
its ability to promote or constrain adaptive capacity through availability and effective use of critical 
resources. The quality and quantity of capital on hand at any time can impact the ability of a system 
to harness needed capital in anticipation of, preparation for, or recovery from disruption. 
Therefore, adaptive capacity essentially functions as a moderator in determining levels of 
vulnerability and system resilience through availability of sustainability capital needed to realize 
change (Engle, 2011).  
Lastly, sustainability is seen to be dependent upon the ability of the system to resist 
systemic disruption, recover, adapt, and transform, which we define as resilience, as these abilities 
directly impact deposits and withdrawals from sustainability capital; suggesting that sustainability 
and resilience are interdependent. Sustainability is also seen to be dependent upon vulnerability, 
as hazard impacts not directly related to system performance are still expected to directly influence 
deposits and withdrawals from sustainability capital. This again suggests that sustainability and 
vulnerability are interdependent.  
 
Sustainable Resilience 
In understanding and assessing the quality of complex adaptive systems over time, with 
the aim of reducing adverse impacts (disruption) to the system over its lifetime, we suggest 
resilience as the focal point for assessment integration. This does not presume that one concept is 
more important than another; rather it requires consideration of balance and alignment across 
concepts to achieve the capacity for long-term resilience. The evaluation of concepts and 
illustration of linkages and interactions as developed and presented (Figure 1), lead us to conclude 
that changes in sustainability capital and sub-system vulnerability can increase or decrease system-
wide resilience over time through moderation of adaptive capacity.  
As it is currently difficult to measure changes in adaptive capacity over time across 
complex systems, we propose that it is therefore critical to monitor significant shifts in both 
sustainability capital and sub-system/component vulnerability over time, and in conjunction with 
development and implementation of adaptation/transformation strategies in order to assess, and 
ultimately manage, current trends and possible future trajectories for system resilience. Given the 
discussed conceptual linkages and the suggested use of resilience as a system assessment focal 
point, we define sustainable resilience as the ability of a system to maintain desired system 
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performance by changing in response to expected and unexpected challenges over time, while 
simultaneously considering intra-system and inter-generational distribution of impacts and 
sustainability capital. Vulnerability is represented within this definition by consideration of the 
intra-system distribution of impacts that result from varying levels of vulnerability within the 
system over time, and sustainability is represented by consideration of distribution of sustainability 
capital over the life of the system. 
 
Discussion 
Critical areas of interaction exist between vulnerability, resilience, and sustainability that 
suggest the need for an integrated assessment framework to better understand and measure the 
quality of complex adaptive systems. However, current literature does not provide a solid 
foundation on which to base integration of these concepts or an obvious focal point for assessment. 
In response to this need, we provide an analysis of linkages and dependencies between the concepts 
of vulnerability, resilience, and sustainability and their relationship(s) with adaptive capacity, and 
identify the value added that integration of concepts might provide to system assessment processes. 
We further develop the concept of sustainable resilience to better communicate the need for 
balance and alignment across concepts to achieve the capacity for long-term resilience.  
A detailed framework to assess vulnerability, resilience, and sustainability in an integrated 
manner that can be adapted to fit a variety of systems and ultimately operationalized has yet to be 
described in the literature.  We suggest that an integrated framework for assessing sustainable 
resilience based on the linkages and interactions between the concepts of vulnerability, resilience, 
and sustainability, as described in this paper, could fill this gap and result in improved ability to:  
 Identify or anticipate significant changes in, or the need to alter, availability of 
sustainability capital through management practices (maintenance, withdrawals, and 
investments) over time; 
 More effectively use sustainability capital to reduce critical sub-system vulnerability 
and improve resilience outcomes through successive monitoring and/or scenario 
development aimed at evaluating the impact of adaptation strategies; and  
 Identify or anticipate when to consider system transformation (adaptation is no longer 
feasible, and transformation strategies may lead to new systems and objectives). 
To further advance the concept of sustainable resilience, forthcoming work will describe a 
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dynamic assessment framework for sustainable resilience that can be adapted to fit a variety of 
systems and that adds value to overall system characterization through recognition of key 
interactions across assessment types.  
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CHAPTER III 
An Integrated and Dynamic Framework for Assessing Sustainable Resilience in Complex 
Adaptive Systems 
 
Introduction 
From a human-centric perspective, the quality of an engineered system can be defined as a 
measure of its ability to serve society. The concepts of vulnerability, resilience, sustainability, and 
adaptive capacity are frequently used to frame assessments related to system quality and are 
frequently invoked within the literature on coupled social-environmental systems (Adger, 2006; 
Folke, 2006; Turner et al., 2003; Minsker et al., 2015). It is widely recognized that these concepts 
are interrelated, and that system assessments that do not consider each of these concepts have 
limitations that may lead to decision-making and planning that result in negative, unintended 
consequences (Gillespie-Marthaler et al., 2018). However, to date, little progress has been made 
in developing operational assessment frameworks that integrate more than two of these concepts 
(Gillespie-Marthaler et al., 2018). Integration of the concepts of vulnerability, resilience, 
sustainability and adaptive capacity in an operational assessment framework has been hampered 
by issues of complexity and conceptual confusion. While definitions and usage of these concepts 
will undoubtedly continue to evolve, the conceptual relationships proposed by Gillespie-Marthaler 
et al. (2018) that are based on current general understandings of vulnerability, resilience, 
sustainability, and adaptive capacity, help to identify potential points of integration.  
In this paper, we introduce a high-level assessment framework based on the conceptual 
relationships described by Gillespie-Marthaler et al. (2018) that explicitly integrates vulnerability, 
resilience, and sustainability assessment within an adaptive cycle. The proposed framework is 
intended to enable the characterization of sustainable resilience, which we define as the ability to 
maintain system performance by changing in response to expected and unexpected challenges 
while simultaneously considering intra-system and inter-generational distribution of impacts and 
sustainability capital. We include a detailed explanation of the framework and assessment process 
to show how sustainable resilience is impacted by changes in vulnerability, sustainability, and 
resulting adaptive capacity at multiple scales and time points through a series of interdependent 
relationships. We further provide a set of functional definitions and an example of an application 
of the framework for an urban community with high flood risk. Key concepts and terminology 
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used in the analysis are italicized within the text and defined in Appendix B. 
 
Background 
Several examples of frameworks for system assessment that attempt to integrate 
sustainability and resilience, or vulnerability and resilience, appear in the literature (Cutter et al., 
2008; O’Connell et al., 2015; Lam et. al., 2015; Mayunga, 2007; Manyena, 2006; Henry & 
Ramirez-Marquez, 2012; Baroud et al., 2014; Turner et. al 2003; Minsker et al., 2015). For 
example, the Resilience Adaptation Transformation Assessment and Learning Framework 
(RAPTA) integrates concepts of resilience and sustainability by defining system objectives that 
guide resilience assessment in terms of sustainability goals through a modular and iterative process 
involving multi-stakeholder collaboration within the Resilience-Assessment-Transformation 
Assessment Framework (RATA) (O’Connell et al., 2015). This framework provides a valuable 
way of integrating sustainability and resilience concepts in a single assessment process focused on 
adaptation and transformation, and does allow for some consideration of vulnerability. However, 
the generality of the framework can obscure linkages between concepts and make 
operationalization difficult.  
Spatial analysis is emphasized as a means of identifying and measuring social vulnerability 
within a resilience frame by Frazier et al. (2014) through use of the SERV (Spatially Explicit 
Resilience-Vulnerability) model, and by Cutter et al. (2014) via BRIC (Baseline Resilience 
Indicators for Communities). These tools tend to emphasize social aspects (age, income, access, 
etc.) in relation to the built environment (often infrastructure systems) without balanced 
consideration of natural systems and processes, thereby providing the potential for an incomplete 
assessment of system quality by failing to account for all critical sustainability capital (Sharifi, 
2016). 
The Disaster Resilience of Place (DROP) model provides a different way of approaching 
resilience assessment, proposing a framework for quantification of resilience through a serial 
assessment process with feedback loops that integrates vulnerability and resilience concepts, but 
with less overt focus on sustainability and environmental concerns (Cutter et. al., 2008). Whereas, 
Lam et al., (2015) take yet another approach and integrate resilience, vulnerability, and adaptive 
capacity concepts by measuring current resilience as a ratio of the other two concepts in the 
Resilience Inference Measurement (RIM) model without fully addressing relationships between 
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adaptive capacity and sustainability.  
The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework focuses on improving capital assets in order to 
enhance disaster resilience (Ashley and Carney, 1999; Wilhelmi and Hayden, 2010).  While the 
conceptual application of this framework is appealing due to its flexibility, operationalization 
remains challenging with respect to defining and measuring progress due to the possible need for 
multiple, dynamic trade-off analyses based on identification of what should be sustained to 
maintain economic viability.  Methods like the Driver-Pressure-State-Impact-Response (DPSIR) 
or enhanced DPSIR frameworks have been shown to aid in decision making by helping to structure 
problems in terms of pressures and responses, and organize indicators in multi-disciplinary 
settings. While the framework has been used to help describe problems in social-environmental 
settings by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), it does not 
directly address the concepts of vulnerability, resilience, and sustainability (Kristensen, 2004; 
Niemeijer & de Groot, 2008; Tscherning et al., 2012). 
These and other approaches provide valuable ways of conceptualizing and interpreting, and 
in some cases operationalizing, complex concepts and their intersections as they apply to solving 
social-environmental system problems. However, there continues to be a call for improving the 
translation of conceptual understanding into operational assessment methods and improving the 
universal ability to practically apply principles of resilience, vulnerability, and sustainability 
(Miller et al., 2010; Biggs et. al., 2012; Minsker et al., 2015; Romero-Lankao et al., 2016). Miller 
et al. (2010) suggest that a first step towards improving operationalization would be to develop 
integrated vulnerability and resilience assessments, whereas Minsker et al. (2015) advocate 
continued effort towards integrating sustainability and resilience.  While some of these frameworks 
integrate two concepts explicitly and may consider the third concept implicitly, to our knowledge, 
no framework has yet been described that explicitly accounts for all three concepts (vulnerability, 
resilience, and sustainability), their interdependencies, and their linkages to adaptive capacity. 
Examination of the conceptual relationships between vulnerability, resilience, 
sustainability, and adaptive capacity proposed by Gillespie-Marthaler et al. (2018) (Figure 2) 
suggests that one possible focal point for operationalization of integrated system assessment 
centers on the evaluation of resilience as it relates to changes in vulnerability and sustainability.  
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Figure 2. Assessing System Quality - Conceptual Linkages and Interactions (reproduced from: 
Gillespie-Marthaler et al., 2018) 
 
Changes in sustainability capital may result in changes to system-wide adaptive capacity, 
which can alter the vulnerability of critical sub-system and components. This, in turn, can impact 
system-wide resilience over time and further impact development and selection of 
adaptation/transformation strategies needed to reduce harmful impacts associated with hazards 
and enable avoidance of systemic disruption and/or systemic failure. We suggest that it is necessary 
to monitor shifts in both sustainability capital and vulnerability as they relate to resilience in order 
to assess and manage the sustainable resilience of social-environmental systems (Gillespie-
Marthaler et al., 2018). Below, we present a framework that integrates the aforementioned 
concepts via a dynamic assessment process, in order to characterize sustainable resilience.   
 
Methodology 
Overview of the Sustainable Resilience Assessment Framework 
The sustainable resilience assessment framework is intended for application to complex 
adaptive systems, specifically social-environmental systems. Like any system, social-
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environmental systems are defined by both their function and structure. As complex adaptive 
systems, social-environmental systems are expected to be subject to multi-scalar relationships 
between the system, sub-systems, and external systems, where direct and indirect causal 
relationships, both physical and non-physical in nature, can result in impacts to overall system 
performance. Complex, coupled social-environmental systems undergo adaptive cycles, where 
change is triggered by disruptive events (Adger, 2006; Engle, 2011). These systems are generally 
assumed to be metastable, in that adaptive cycles often lead to changes that do not significantly 
alter the state of the system as defined by its objectives and functional relationships (Adger, 2006; 
Engle, 2011). However, it is possible that significant change, resulting in transformation, can 
redefine the system objectives or functional relationships of the system (Engle, 2011; Martin, 2012; 
Keck and Sakdapolrak, 2013).  
The proposed framework uses a serial and cyclical process, allowing users to assess 
baseline conditions, predict hazard-related impacts, simulate potential costs and benefits 
associated with various adaptation and transformation strategies, and evaluate system-wide 
resilience with respect to trends in vulnerability and sustainability over time.  This process is 
displayed at a macro-level in Figure 3.   
 
Figure 3. Macro-level Diagram of the Sustainable Resilience Assessment Process 
 34 
A more detailed representation of the process for assessing changes in sustainable 
resilience appears in Figure 4. It begins with a baseline system definition, followed by an 
assessment cycle. The assessment cycle begins with identification of risks and creation of hazard 
scenarios. Following these steps, a contextual vulnerability assessment (representing pre-
existing/current conditions at the critical sub-component level) is conducted and used to estimate 
impacts in an assessment of the system’s ability to resist systemic disruption. Following the 
evaluation of the system’s ability to resist systemic disruption, a re-evaluation of macro-scale, 
long-term sustainability is conducted, taking into account the effects of the hazard on critical 
sustainability capital. Information resulting from this sustainability assessment is used to inform 
the development of adaptation or transformation strategies.  
Adaptation strategies may include incremental, and in some cases temporary, changes that 
do not substantively alter the system (e.g., constructing a flood wall), while transformation 
strategies would result in large changes, culminating in a new system state (e.g., facility 
relocation). If systemic failure is expected to occur (multiple system objectives are severely 
disrupted or critical resources are depleted and cannot be sufficiently recovered without 
intervention), the development of transformation strategies may be prioritized over adaptation 
strategies. However, the decision to choose adaptation or transformation strategies is dependent in 
part on the willingness of system stakeholders to accept a certain degree of system failure or 
resource depletion, also known as risk appetite or risk tolerance. After adaptation or 
transformation strategies have been proposed, the cycle repeats for a subsequent time period. If 
adaptation or transformation occurs, it is assumed that the system definition is updated to reflect 
changes due to implementation of developed adaptation and/or transformation strategies (shown 
as “Define System” in Figure 3).  
In order to estimate changes in sustainable resilience over time, the assessment cycle 
should be repeated several times, where the time interval between repetitions may be based on the 
type of hazard scenario, estimated recovery time, estimated strategy implementation time, and/or 
strategic planning updates. In each cycle, sustainability should be reassessed regardless of whether 
or not a systemic disruption has occurred, as sustainability capital can be altered by even minor 
hazard events that may not exceed system disruption thresholds. If used for planning purposes, it 
is recommended that a comprehensive update of an assessment be conducted on a decadal basis to 
coincide with long-term, strategic, system-wide planning and goals. During comprehensive 
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updates, consideration should be given to instances where changing conditions (e.g., climate 
variability and cross-scalar impacts) create a need to reassess expected return periods and/or 
severity of natural hazards, related consequences, or the need to evaluate the potential for new 
hazards that have not been previously considered. 
The framework can be used to assist in making decisions regarding the prioritization and 
selection of adaptation or transformation strategies (if used for planning purposes), or to evaluate 
the effectiveness of an implemented strategy or set of strategies (if used for post-hoc analytical 
assessment).   Rather than providing merely a snapshot of system conditions at any specific time, 
the framework is intended to allow comparison of the system’s expected performance over time, 
providing a way to estimate possible resilience trajectories given different hazard-response 
scenarios. The use of a serial assessment process aids operationalization of the framework by 
dividing assessment tasks into manageable units, and provides a model for dependency between 
vulnerability, resilience, and sustainability concepts. [Note added after publication: The 
framework also allows for cascading effects whereby a system may transition from adaptation to 
transformation in two primary paths: i) a sudden, catastrophic event moves the system from 
incremental adaptation to sudden transformation via irreparable destruction or lack of desire to 
return to a prior state (e.g., a community such as Mexico Beach, Florida decides to rebuild further 
from the shoreline after massive destruction following Hurricane Michael in 2018); and/or ii) a 
slower, chronic event or set of events creates a situation where adaptation is no longer feasible and 
transformation must be pursued (e.g., incremental loss of beachfront material due to multiple 
events that result in a need to relocate development and zoning boundaries over time)]. 
 
Navigating the Framework 
Figure 4 provides a detailed illustration of the sustainable resilience framework. Below, we 
discuss each step in the framework in detail.  
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Figure 4. Sustainable Resilience Assessment Framework for Complex Adaptive Systems. [Operations associated with sustainability 
are shown in green, operations associated with risk and vulnerability are shown in orange, and operations associated with resilience 
are shown in blue. White indicates operations associated with all three concepts.]   
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System Definition (SD): 
In order to account for the many possible system dynamics, it is necessary to accurately define the 
system and its critical relationships. Broadly speaking, system definition should include: i) 
identification of system objectives and values; ii) development of a conceptual diagram or network 
model of the interacting nested system(s); and iii) identification of controlling variables and 
thresholds. For the framework to fully function according to its intended purpose, the identification 
of the objective(s) and values of the system, as well as identification of thresholds, should ideally 
include multiple stakeholder participation and perspectives to reflect the diversity of values 
connected to the system (Bossel, 2001; Cumming et al., 2005; O’Connell et al., 2015). 
Recommended steps that can be included in the system definition phase are provided below.   
System definition should begin with participatory identification of the system objectives 
and values, followed by development of a conceptual diagram of the system. When developing 
this diagram, it is necessary to include consideration of not only the primary system of interest 
(subject system), but also other related systems where dependency exists (e.g., critical and/or 
shared resources that may be impacted by growing or competing demands over time). This 
includes the nature of linkages and interactions (critical versus non-critical; acute versus chronic 
or cumulative effects) (Bossel, 2001). Whereas the failure of a single sub-system (e.g., a protective 
infrastructure asset such as a dam or a levee) may immediately jeopardize the subject system, long-
term depletion or degradation of one or more sub-systems (e.g., surface or groundwater resources) 
can also result in potential for systemic disruption or systemic failure over time. Understanding of 
system interactions (dependencies and interdependencies) should extend beyond basic economic 
and physical relationships of the subject system to include linkages with environmental and social 
aspects across critical sustainability capital.  
Once a conceptual diagram of the system has been developed, its spatial and temporal 
bounds and its interaction with related systems should be established in order to determine the 
extent to which interactions should be monitored. Performance measures or indicators that can be 
used to quantify system performance objectives should be selected (Bossel, 2001). Thresholds for 
acceptable performance levels, including allowable duration for disruption at varying scales (e.g., 
power outages, loss of transport), should be established using input from multiple stakeholders in 
order to reflect variations in risk perception and risk appetite, as well as expectations for recovery. 
Key controlling variables (direct and indirect) that relate to performance measures should also be 
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identified. Finally, the system definition should include an accounting of the pre-hazard 
availability of critical sustainability capital and definition of critical resource levels by conducting 
a baseline sustainability assessment.  
 
Risk Identification (RI): 
Upon defining the system, identification of risks in the form of hazard scenarios is 
conducted. We adopt the definition of hazard from Turner et al., (2003), where a hazard represents 
any threat to a system, either a perturbation or a stressor. The likelihood of their occurrence should 
be used to develop a suite of hazard scenarios against which the system will be evaluated. Ideally, 
these scenarios should consider both high exposure, low frequency and low exposure, high 
frequency perturbations and stressors. The framework is intended for cyclical evaluation over time, 
allowing users to deliberately assess projections and possible outcomes related to climate variation, 
future development, and associated resource demands. When the framework is used for post-ante 
assessment, the risk identification step may simply involve description of a known and recorded 
hazard. This activity serves as the basis for establishing exposures used in the next step, contextual 
vulnerability assessment.  
 
Contextual Vulnerability Assessment (V): 
Following risk identification, the contextual vulnerability of critical system components to 
a hazard scenario is assessed. Contextual vulnerability is a static interpretation of vulnerability at 
a specific moment in time and operationalizes the concept of vulnerability by focusing on pre-
hazard characteristics of sub-systems/components that describe the extent to which they may be 
expected to experience negative impacts of a hazard (Cutter et al., 2008; Gallopin, 2006). 
Assessment of contextual vulnerability should include evaluation of the exposure, sensitivity, and 
anticipatory coping capacity for each sub-system/component of the system (e.g., city block, road 
segment, social group, business sector, etc.). This static scale of vulnerability assessment makes 
use of the ability of vulnerability analyses to identify intra-system disparities and areas of critical 
concern. 
Evaluation of exposure should include consideration of the magnitude (severity) and extent 
(spatial extent and temporal duration) of a hazard. Sensitivity evaluation should include 
consideration of the innate characteristics that influence the degree to which impacts will be 
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suffered given a certain level of exposure. In order to distinguish sensitivity from coping capacity, 
we suggest that sensitivity include variables related to structure, such as societal factors that 
influence and limit a system’s or component’s set of possible actions (e.g., social class, cultural 
acceptance, aesthetic norms), as well as intrinsic physical characteristics (e.g., physical design, 
structural integrity, code/legal requirements). Evaluation of anticipatory coping capacity should 
include consideration of existing plans or capabilities that improve the effectiveness and range of 
actions available in response to a hazard. Variables used to represent anticipatory coping capacity 
should reflect the ability of the system to survive and adjust during a hazardous event via individual 
actions/choices or systematic policies and programs in place at the time of the disturbance (e.g., 
flood insurance, emergency notification system, evacuation or shelter-in-place plan, property 
protection plan) (Adger et al., 2004; Gallopin, 2006; Turner et al., 2003). 
We suggest that expected impacts and the severity of consequences to the system are dependent 
on the vulnerability of individual system units (sub-system/components), and that an assessment 
of vulnerability at any discrete point in time (contextual vulnerability) can be used in a subsequent 
step to provide an approximation of the expected impacts to system performance measures.  
 
Assess Ability to Resist Systemic Disruption (R): 
Following contextual vulnerability assessment, an evaluation of the degree to which 
hazard-induced impacts to the system do not result in disruptions in system service (e.g., the ability 
to resist systemic disruption) is conducted. Ability to resist systemic disruption can be 
operationalized as the difference between estimated impacts of a hazard scenario on a performance 
measure (based on contextual vulnerability assessment) to the established threshold for that 
performance measure (Luers et al., 2003; Luers 2005; Cutter et al., 2008). The thresholds, as 
identified in the system definition stage, define the point at which a performance measure no longer 
provides an acceptable level of service and may be considered to be “disrupted.” Assessment of 
ability to resist systemic disruption can indicate potential for disruption through critical lifeline 
impacts, or through cumulative/cascading impacts.  
The impacts of a hazard scenario on a system may be estimated using a variety of 
quantitative and qualitative assessment methods. In quantitative methods, physics-based, data-
driven, or simulation models can be used to evaluate the impact of hazard scenarios on the 
performance of system. While physics-based models can present limitations in accounting for 
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uncertainty (Balica et al., 2013), data-driven methods such as regression models (Gidaris et al., 
2017), tree-based methods (Mukherjee & Nateghi, 2017), and Bayesian analysis (Baroud and 
Barker, 2018) provide flexibility in modelling, interpretation, and prediction. Quantitative methods 
require that observational data be available for the system of interest. However, these methods 
readily allow for consideration of direct relationships between controlling variables used in 
vulnerability assessment and system performance measures. In order to account for indirect 
relationships such as cascading effects of hazards to other interdependent systems, inoperability 
economic modelling can be used to assess, for instance, how a disruption to an infrastructure 
cascades to different sectors in the economy (Baroud et al., 2015). For systems lacking 
observational data, simulation methods based on behavioral rules, such as agent-based modelling 
(Dawson, Peppe, & Wang, 2011; Hou, et al., 2017), or physical dynamics models (Huang & 
Hatterman, 2018; Lu, et al., 2018; Masoomi & van de Lindt, 2017) may be more applicable. 
Alternative approaches for cases with limited local data may employ use of well-documented 
national or state-level thresholds for impact severity, or use of participatory expert solicitation 
methods to generate qualitative estimates of severity based on vulnerability scores (Abkowitz et 
al., 2017).  In the case where an actual hazard event has occurred, the impacts of the hazard on 
performance measures, as moderated by vulnerability, could be analytically estimated post-event 
assuming the availability of adequate event data. While these post-event, historic relationships 
between hazard, vulnerability, and impacts may not necessarily hold constant throughout the 
lifetime of a system, they can serve as a baseline for projected impact estimates.  
 
Sustainability Assessment (S): 
The primary purpose of sustainability assessment within this framework is to provide 
planners and decision makers with a measure of the availability and quality of critical sustainability 
capital needed in order for a system to function and survive. Sustainable development should 
maintain the desired level of system service without compromising trans-generational equity in 
the availability of three key resources: i) social - people, skills, health, and broad governance 
(provision of services, political capacity, law, and justice, among others); ii) economic - 
employment, income levels, market diversity, tax base, business growth, and internal/external 
funds, among others.; and iii) environmental – (natural and built) air, land, water, food, energy, 
ecosystem health, facilities, and infrastructure systems, sub-systems, and supporting networks. By 
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this, we refer to a need for informed and balanced assessment across long-term social, economic, 
and environmental resources in order to avoid short-term gains in one resource at the expense of 
another (Westerink et al, 2013; Schewenius et al., 2014; Haaland & van den Bosch, 2015). As an 
example, short-term economic gains associated with rapid growth may fail to account for long-
term impacts such as water demand, gentrification, transportation, and impacts to flooding due 
densification and loss of permeable area (each of which can contribute to future sources of 
vulnerability and risk).  
Within the construct of the sustainable resilience assessment framework, a sustainability 
assessment involves a macro-scale inventory of currently available capital, evaluation of the 
relative health of resources, and an estimate of projected future resources given a continuation of 
the current system trajectories and resource use (including depletion/and or replenishment rates). 
Methods and tools for sustainability assessment can be scaled based on the intent of application, 
ranging from data intense lifecycle analysis to indicator-based approaches for communities (Singh 
et al., 2009; Sala et al., 2013). For the purposes of this framework, mixed method approaches that 
allow for use of qualitative and quantitative data such as multi-criteria decision analysis (Cinelli 
et al., 2014), urban frameworks (Adinyira et al., 2007), and packaged tools (Ness et al., 2007) are 
available. The sustainability assessment should not only provide an estimate of the funds and 
environmental resources available for implementing adaptation strategies, but also an estimate of 
the expected effectiveness of implementation via social capital constraints (e.g., governance) that 
influence organizational efficiency and strategy acceptance, and should adjust the baseline 
sustainability assessment to account for impacts to resources that may occur as a result of the 
hazard.  
The new/revised sustainability assessment provides an estimate of resources currently 
available and expected to be available in the future for implementation of system 
adaptation/transformation strategies. If the sustainability assessment indicates that resources have 
been depleted beyond critical resource levels defined during the baseline sustainability assessment, 
a transformation of the system is recommended. It should be noted that while the linear projection 
of resource consumption recommended above is a positive first step in considering long-term 
resource use, it does not account for non-stationarity and rapid changes in population shifts and 
market shifts that can have significant, unexpected and cascading impacts upon critical resources 
over relatively short periods of time. Therefore, it should be acknowledged that these linear 
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projections may provide an overly optimistic view of future resource availability, and conservative 
definitions of critical resource levels should be used to offset some of this uncertainty.  
 
Develop Adaptation or Transformation Strategies: 
The sustainability assessment anchors the subsequent development of adaptation or 
transformation strategies, recognizing that these strategies are limited by the ability to effectively 
implement them, and are dependent on the available social, economic, and environmental capital. 
We view adaptation as a process that includes incremental, and in some cases temporary, changes 
that do not substantively alter the objectives, values, and functional relationships of the system. 
Transformation, on the other hand, implies large and sudden changes that may result in a new 
system state. In the case where the system is expected to experience mild to moderate systemic 
disruption, adaptation strategies are typically developed. However, if the system is expected to 
experience systemic failure or if critical resources are expected to be depleted/non-recoverable, 
transformation strategies should be developed. When transformation occurs, the system should be 
appropriately redefined, and the process re-initiated with a new set of objectives (Walker et al., 
2004).  The development of adaptation and transformation strategies to evaluate is an activity 
which should be carried out as a participatory process with significant, inclusive stakeholder input. 
 
Adaptation (A  AS): 
If the system experiences mild to moderate disruption, adaptation strategies that have the 
potential to improve future system quality should be developed. These adaptation strategies should 
aim to modify exposure, sensitivity, anticipatory coping capacity, and/or sustainability capital 
availability. Once a set of strategies has been proposed, the assessment cycle should be repeated 
for a future time-step, where the length of the time-step could be based on either scheduled 
planning updates, estimated recovery time, or the estimated time to implement the developed 
strategy.1 In this cycle, implementation of one or more of the adaptation strategies developed 
should be assumed, and controlling variable values and performance measure thresholds should 
be updated based on both adaptation strategy-based and time-based changes to reflect conditions 
                                                 
1 In situations where the framework is used to evaluate strategies that have already been selected and/or 
implemented by the system of interest, the development of strategies may be skipped and the process should move 
directly to repeating the assessment cycle for an additional time step assuming strategy implementation. 
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of the adapted system. Note that if no feasible adaptation strategies are developed, the system still 
undergoes recovery, and the assessment cycle can still be repeated for subsequent time points.  
 
Transformation (T TS): 
In the case where system transformation is deemed necessary, developed strategies should 
lead to a new system definition (i.e., the system may have different objectives and values that 
imply changes in hazard-based risk and variables that control performance measures). Potential 
new system objectives that reduce or eliminate sustainability capital intensive activities, high 
vulnerability areas, and/or critically impacted system objectives can be proposed. Finally, 
sustainability capital and time needed to modify the system for each new system arrangement 
proposed should be estimated. The assessment process should then return to the system definition 
stage and repeat the assessment cycle described above for the expected transformed system 
conditions for a future time step whose length is based on the estimated time to reorganize the 
system.  
 
Assessing Trade-offs and Changes in System Quality: 
If using the framework for planning purposes, once the cycle has been conducted through 
at least two assessments of R for each hazard scenario and identification/development of 
adaptation/transformation strategies for each scenario, the adaptation and/or transformation 
strategies that are expected to result in the best overall improvements in system performance 
should be selected for actual implementation or further evaluation. In order to determine the 
strategies with the optimum effect on system performance, the trajectories of V, R, and S over the 
time period for which assessment cycles were completed should be examined in parallel. As 
analyses of V, R, and S will each entail examination of multiple variables, the creation of 
composite indicators that reduce each of these multidimensional concepts to a single value will 
assist with evaluation and optimization of V, R, and S trajectories. In the case of composite 
indicators for V and S which may be evaluated using dimensional variables with varying units of 
measure, these variables should be transformed into dimensionless standardized or normalized 
variables, prior to employing a variable aggregation scheme. For example, Cutter et al. (2003) 
employed principal components analysis, which standardizes and groups variables into factors, 
then aggregated factors scores using a linear additive combination. Other composite indicators 
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have employed normalization of variables to system totals, z-score standardization, and min-max 
normalization to nondimensionalize variables, and used weighted and unweighted linear 
combinations, averages, and Pareto ranking schemes to combine these dimensionless variables 
(Tate, 2012). For V assessments, which are variable across the system for each time point being 
considered, the spatial distribution of the composite V indicator must be further aggregated for 
comparison with S and R, which are represented at the system level.  The type of aggregation that 
is most appropriate will vary across systems, but example aggregation schemes could include 
taking the sum of all V composite indicator scores across the system, the median score, or the 
lower tenth percentile. In the case of aggregation of indicators for R, when R is evaluated as the 
estimated impacts of a hazard event in reference to thresholds to system performance (i.e., as a 
ratio), the variables should be dimensionless and the aggregation schemes employed for V and S 
may be used to reduce R to a single value. 
In order to achieve equitably distributed and long-term improvements in system 
performance, the optimum balance between increases in R and S and decreases in V is needed. For 
example, a multiobjective optimization algorithm can help identify the amount of resources that 
will improve R and S while decreasing V. Although lacking, various modelling approaches can be 
developed or extended to achieve such balance; a few studies have aimed at optimizing for at least 
two of the three. Examples of such models include multiobjective mixed-integer linear 
programming to assess trade-offs between resilience, reliability, and vulnerability of water supply 
reservoir operation where the maximum shortfall affects vulnerability while maximum lengths of 
deficit affect the resilience of the system (Moy et al., 1986). Other examples include a resource 
allocation model that maximizes recovery while minimizing losses of the Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill (Mackenzie et al., 2016). Accounting for stakeholders preferences in achieving such balance 
is critical, especially when multiple infrastructure systems are involved. Optimization algorithms 
can be extended by adding a societal layer to systems performance to account for the preference 
of the decision maker and the community in the recovery of infrastructure systems (Bedoya et al., 
2018). Other options include the incorporation of a multicriteria decision model where attributes 
are weighted according the decision makers’ preferences (Peters et al., 2018). By referring to 
Figure 2, it can also be inferred that changes to the system that lead to increases in S will build 
adaptive capacity that may be utilized to develop further adaptation strategies.  
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Illustrative Walkthrough of the Framework 
In this section, we outline how the framework may be applied to a social-environmental 
system, an urban community subject to flooding. While the framework can be used for more 
complete and interconnected systems, in order to provide a brief and illustrative example, this 
walkthrough focuses on a subset of the social-environmental system and a single hazard type. We 
discuss how the framework can be utilized to guide a set of analyses of this system, describe a set 
of analytical methods employed in these analyses, and present a subset of preliminary results from 
the analyses. In addition, we provide suggestions for methods and resources that may be used to 
extend this work by accounting for the many facets of the sustainable resilience assessment 
framework or by enhancing the practical utility of analytical results generated using the 
framework. The approach and analytical methods described are meant to demonstrate the guiding 
capability of the framework as opposed to providing an exhaustive or complete analysis. 
 
System Definition (SD): 
In this example, we examine an urban community that is threatened by extreme 
precipitation events which result in riverine and flash flooding. The city has experienced a large 
number of repetitive losses in urban housing near rivers and streams, and currently seeks to 
minimize future loss. In order to develop an understanding of the critical components and goals of 
the system, we consulted municipal planning documents for the community. As the planning 
documents were developed by the municipal government and were guided by significant 
community input, in the form of stakeholder engagement workshops, the planning document was 
assumed to represent the overall goals of the system. In addition, as the focus of the preliminary 
analyses was on flood hazards, guidance from the municipal water services department was 
solicited. The information obtained from these sources was used to develop a conceptual diagram 
of the system. The bounds of the primary system are defined by the boundary of the county in 
which the city is located, and a starting time of 2007 and time horizon of 75 years were selected. 
System performance measures chosen for consideration included economic losses due to building 
damage and emergency rescue requirements. The value of each performance measure was assumed 
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to be equal to the threshold for system disruption given a known historic flood event.2 A baseline 
sustainability assessment for the community indicated that the community had a moderate amount 
of readily available capital and a minimal amount of natural flood attenuation (in the form of green 
space buffering rivers and streams).3 
 
Risk Identification (RI): 
Within the past 10 years, the community experienced an extreme event in excess of the 
1,000-year flood (measured as magnitude of precipitation over a 3-day, consecutive period). 
Catastrophic flooding resulted in over a billion dollars in private property damage and disruption 
of the local economy. An examination of potential changes in flood risk for the community based 
on variation in the frequency and severity of hazards due to changing climate was conducted using 
downscaled climate model projections and historic precipitation and river stage information.  
To determine the extent to which local riverine flooding is linked to local daily 
precipitation, a lagged regression model (using the optimal lag period returned from a cross-
correlation analysis) was conducted. The model produced an adjusted R-squared value of 0.88, 
and a correlation coefficient of 0.49 is obtained when using de-lagged data at river action stage 
and above with associated daily precipitation values. This suggests that local precipitation is 
significant not only to flash flooding, but also to riverine flooding in the area.  
To assess the possibility of experiencing future precipitation events of similar or greater 
magnitude to the 1,000-year flood, analysis using local precipitation and river stage data with 
downscaled CMIP5 climate outputs for the worst-case scenario under RCP 8.5 (Taylor et al., 2012; 
Reclamation, 2014) was employed.4 Analysis of precipitation anomalies using CMIP5 modelled 
outputs for the region was conducted in a manner consistent with current literature (Gao et al., 
2017; Ryu & Hahoe, 2017). Linear interpolation using locally observed precipitation data and 
anomalies generated for CMIP5 observed data over the same period was employed to extrapolate 
the magnitude of rainfall events associated with anomalies for future periods as described by 
                                                 
2 Ideally, stakeholder engagement would be used to inform threshold selection for measures related to social and 
economic performance measures, while thresholds related to physical, environmental, and biological performance 
measures would be based on empirical and theoretical relationships established in literature. 
3 Note that ideally the sustainability assessment should account for social resources (such as community outreach 
and assistance centers) and should provide a more complete accounting of economic (including consideration of 
tappable debt lines and insurance policies) and environmental resources (such as water management structures and 
infrastructure) relevant to urban flooding. 
4 Full acknowledgment for CMIP5 models and references is located at Appendix H. 
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Gillespie-Marthaler et al. (2019b). Analysis results suggest that events of similar or greater 
magnitude to the 1,000-year flood are increasingly likely over the time horizon of interest with 
maximum projected events exceeding observed events by as much as 8% (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Analysis of Change in Frequency of Heavy Precipitation (modified from Gillespie-
Marthaler et al., 2019) 
 
This analysis suggests that more severe flooding is plausible within the community over 
the next few decades. The preliminary analyses described below uses the 1,000-year flood event 
as a base scenario with results suggesting that future climate conditions may exacerbate flooding 
conditions. [Note added after publication: The methods employed to develop worst-case scenarios 
for evaluating future sustainable resilience are not meant to predict or to represent the probability 
of extreme events, but to demonstrate the plausibility of such events in future planning horizons.] 
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Contextual Vulnerability Assessment (V): 
System vulnerability was characterized using the primary physical assets (location of 
homes and other buildings) and neighborhoods as the units of analysis5. The exposure of physical 
assets was measured as flood depth and was determined by spatial intersection with inundation 
from the 1,000-year flood event. The sensitivity of assets was assumed to be a combination of the 
type of structure (e.g., mobile home, single family dwelling, apartment complex), resident 
population density, and neighborhood demographic characteristics. Anticipatory coping capacity 
was represented by the number of homeowners holding residential flood insurance. Spatial overlay 
of these factors suggested that localized areas of high vulnerability, where multiple negative 
characteristics, such as high inundation depth and high population density, overlap (Figure 6), were 
present throughout the system.  
 
Figure 6. Spatial Distribution of Physical Exposure to Flooding and Resident Population 
(modified from Nelson, 2018) 
                                                 
5 Note that a complete sustainable resilience assessment should incorporate interdependent system assets 
such as energy and water infrastructure. 
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While not completed in the preliminary analyses, a composite indicator could be 
constructed using the vulnerability factors to represent the variation in overall vulnerability levels 
across the system. Common composite indicator construction methods include principal 
components analysis and linear additive combinations of normalized or standardized variables 
(Tate, 2012).  
 
Assess Ability to Resist Systemic Disruption (R): 
The impact to the system is estimated based on the relationship between the identified 
vulnerability factors and system performance measures. For example, in our preliminary analyses 
standard depth-damage algorithms employed in the hazard impact estimation software, HAZUS-
MH, and data on building type, value, and inundation depth, are used to estimate economic 
building damages (FEMA, 2018). On the other hand, the emergency response requirements 
presented by a 1,000-year flood event are related to both the physical and social context of the 
system. In this case, existing information collected from the historic 1,000-year flood was used to 
conduct a regression analysis that relates both localized physical and social characteristics to 
emergency response. Results of a zero-inflated binomial logistic Bayesian spatial model indicated 
that emergency responses were more likely in areas with deeper flood inundation, higher renter 
populations, and with relatively high foreign-born populations.  These model results provide 
information that can be applied to estimation of emergency responses requirements. For the 
starting year of 2007, the cumulative system-wide damage levels are expected to exceed the 
threshold for unacceptable system performance, implying that a system disruption would be 
considered to occur.6  
 
Sustainability Assessment (S): 
System impacts of the 1,000-year flood event scenario result in economic damages that 
require the use of available contingency funds, depleting the immediate economic capital of the 
system. Resources required for immediate recovery are significant, and consist of debris removal, 
repairs to roadways and structures, relocation of displaced individuals, and economic recovery for 
impacted businesses. In our preliminary analyses, the system-wide economic burden is estimated 
                                                 
6 Indirect impacts leading to cascading failures through other interdependent systems would ideally be 
considered to fully account for the cumulative impact of a systemic disruption. 
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as the difference between municipal government revenue and estimated building damages. The 
measure of environmental capital, natural flood attenuation, is not directly impacted by the flood 
event itself and hence remains unchanged. While the system is disrupted, it does not fail, and 
adaptation strategies, rather than transformation strategies, were developed.    
 
Develop Adaptation Strategies (A): 
The community affected by the floods has proposed and begun to implement a home 
buyout program as a way of reducing flood impacts and protecting residents. However, the benefits 
offered by this program and by potential expansion of the program are unknown. As a means of 
identifying the relative benefits of the program as it has been implemented and of further 
expansion, a set of alternative adaptation scenarios were proposed. These included a scenario in 
which no buyout program was implemented and one in which the buyout program was rapidly 
expanded by about 25%. The base scenario, the enacted buyout program, cost approximately 
$38M. The scenario with no buyouts would have no cost, while the expanded buyout program was 
estimated to cost a total of $50M. In cases where adaptation strategies are unknown, it is 
recommended that stakeholder participation be used to identify a set of potential adaptation 
scenarios. 
 
Adapted System (AS): 
For all scenarios, the assessment cycle was repeated for V and R given the same starting 
year of 2007 and at annual intervals for a period of 6 years. As the likelihood and magnitude of a 
1,000-year flood event during this timeframe does not significantly change, the same risk scenario 
was used for all time steps (i.e., RI remained constant). In order to build the contextual data for 
assessments of the adaptation scenarios, spatial analysis was used to simulate removal (or lack of 
removal) of residential buildings through the buyout program. Bayesian spatiotemporal modelling 
was employed to evaluate the potential impact of increasing natural flood attenuation, a side-effect 
of the home-buyout program scenarios, on flood inundation depth using data from the historic 
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1,000-year flood event. Depth to damage curves were used to estimate building damages given the 
1,000-year flood event.7  
Values of system performance measures, vulnerability factors, and sustainability capital 
were plotted for each time point and adaptation scenario in order to provide an understanding of 
the near-term trajectories of V, R, and S. Figure 7 displays trajectories for the number of physically 
vulnerable assets and community residents computed for the various adaptation scenarios, 
suggesting that total physical vulnerability of assets will be reduced under the home-buyout 
program scenarios as long as development restrictions are not loosened and no new homes are 
added to the at-risk areas.  
 
Figure 7. Trajectories for Damaged Property and Exposed Population (modified from Nelson, 
2018) [Black lines correspond to flooded assets and grey lines to exposed population. Solid lines 
refer to a scenario with no home buyouts, dashed lines refer to a scenario with buyouts 
completed by the community, and dot-dash lines refer to a scenario with a rapidly expanded 
home buyout program.] 
 
Figure 7 also indicates that the home-buyout program adaptations will reduce the relative 
physical vulnerability of community residents. However, it is clear that long as urbanization and 
densification continue to occur near riparian areas, the total vulnerable population will continue to 
                                                 
7 While not yet completed, we plan to utilize the previously established relationships between physical 
and social characteristics of the system and emergency responses using historic data to estimate 
emergency response requirements for the adaptation scenarios.  
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increase over time. The trajectories for property damage displayed in Figure 8 indicate that the 
economic building damages measure of system performance will be improved under the proposed 
home-buyout adaptation scenarios, yet also indicates that this particular system performance 
measure is strongly linked to local and national economic trends (Nelson, 2018). 
 
 
Figure 8. Trajectories for Building Damages (modified from Nelson, 2018) [The solid line refers 
to a scenario with no home buyouts, the dashed line refers to a scenario with buyouts completed 
by the community, and the dot-dash line refers to a scenario with a rapidly expanded home 
buyout program.] 
  
The trajectory for natural flood attenuation as shown in Figure 9 suggests that the home-buyout 
program adaptation scenarios slightly increase the environmental capital of the system by 
expanding riparian buffer zones.  
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Figure 9. Trajectories for Riparian Area (modified from Nelson, 2018) [The solid line refers to a 
scenario with no home buyouts, the dashed line refers to a scenario with buyouts completed by 
the community, and the dot-dash line refers to a scenario with a rapidly expanded home buyout 
program.] 
 
While the preliminary analyses described here were conducted for a short time period, more long-
term outcomes could be estimated by conducting a suite of analyses integrating additional flood 
severity and urban development models with precipitation projections. 
 
Assessing Trade-offs and Changes in System Quality: 
Comparison of the trajectories for V, R, and S (Figures 7-9) illustrates the potential for the 
proposed adaptation scenarios to reduce economic losses, physical vulnerability to flooding, and 
increase natural flood attenuation capacity relative to a baseline, no action scenario. However, the 
trajectories also suggest that while the adaptations proposed may improve the relative system 
quality, they are not sufficient to address absolute system quality, which is strongly influenced by 
increasing population and development trends in the community. These population growth and 
associated increased development and increasing property value trends intersect with the flooding 
scenario in such a way that regardless of the proposed adaptation strategies, overall vulnerability 
will continue to increase and resilience decrease in the community. In addition, while local natural 
flood attenuation capacity is increased by the buyout program, the continued rapid conversion of 
green spaces to impervious cover in the urban core is expected to increase stormwater runoff, 
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offsetting the produced benefits of increasing riparian buffer areas and reducing the overall 
sustainability of the system over time.  
 
Discussion 
Given the significant linkages and interactions between the concepts of vulnerability, 
resilience, sustainability, and adaptive capacity, we conclude that a unifying framework is needed 
to properly characterize complex adaptive social-environmental systems and assess their behavior 
in response to short-term disruptions and long-term challenges in the context of decision-making. 
We suggest that when these concepts are considered in an integrated framework, sustainable 
resilience becomes a universally positive system quality, as unit-of-analysis based inequities and 
long-term resource availability are both taken into account, and adaptation and transformation 
strategies are developed within the bounds of pre-defined desired system performance end-states. 
Within such a framework, a system that is persistent and strongly resists change is not necessarily 
considered to be resilient. In order to be resilient, the system must also meet stakeholder 
performance and value expectations, and maintain adequate resource pools to sustain the system 
for future generations.  
The sustainable resilience assessment process proposed encourages consideration of multi-
scalar and dynamic processes by strategically and iteratively considering micro-scale 
vulnerabilities, meso-scale risks, and macro-scale sustainability. The serial nature of the 
assessment framework enables both simplified operationalization, allowing both researchers and 
practitioners the flexibility to utilize relatively familiar assessment methodologies, and also 
provides a simplified path diagram to help explore relationships between concepts. The use of a 
cyclical and dynamic process ensures that decision makers understand how each concept may 
influence the other, therefore allowing for integration and balancing of priorities from different 
perspectives and a more effective allocation of resources. The cyclical process also allows for 
cumulative impacts over time to be assessed and brought to bear in adaptation/transformation 
decision-making processes in order to improve overall ability to: 
 Identify/anticipate significant changes in availability of sustainability capital over time; 
 More effectively use sustainability capital to reduce critical sub-system vulnerability 
and improve resilience outcomes through successive monitoring and evaluation of 
adaptation strategies; and  
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 Identify/anticipate system when and where transformation may be needed. 
 
The proposed framework is not prescriptive in terms of how to conduct individual steps in 
the assessment process, allowing the flexibility to use existing or adapted methods and tools within 
the structure of the framework. It is also flexible with regard to level of complexity and scale, 
giving stakeholders and decision makers the ability to navigate through fundamental concepts of 
system behavior while developing concrete strategies to improve the ability of the system to resist, 
cope, adapt, and/or transform, with the end goal of improving overall system performance and 
achieving sustainable resilience. The development of the sustainable resilience assessment 
framework represents a step forward in terms of enabling integrative assessment for complex 
adaptive systems. However, further advances are needed before practical application of the 
framework can be made a reality. In order to further translate the sustainable resilience assessment 
framework into practice, an effort is underway to classify and map indicators and associated 
metrics (quantitative and qualitative) to the framework. Further work should also explore 
application of the framework for different purposes (post-hoc analysis, planning process), to 
different types of systems, at different levels of complexity, and using different methodologies.  
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CHAPTER IV 
Selecting Indicators for Assessing Community Sustainable Resilience 
 
Introduction 
With a diverse and rapidly growing body of literature related to community resilience 
assessment, researchers and practitioners alike are seeking information on what should be 
measured in order to evaluate resilience, and how measurement (through use of indicators and 
metrics) can be achieved. This poses the following challenges: i) a vast and growing number of 
proposed indicators; ii) redundancy within and across indicators in terms of what to measure and 
how to measure it; and iii) inconsistency in the systems of interest (e.g., some focus largely on one 
aspect of community resilience such as social systems as opposed to other aspects such as 
economic or environmental systems). These challenges generate confusion regarding what should 
be included in a community assessment; how to ensure a balanced assessment across systems and 
sub-systems that make up a community; and which indicators and metrics are most appropriate for 
selection based on community characteristics and needs.  
Recognizing the need for consolidation of indicators (and metrics) within a consistent 
structure that facilitates identification and selection for use in assessment processes, we have 
developed a classification scheme and organizational structure to support the budding concept of 
sustainable resilience (Gillespie-Marthaler et al., 2018; Nelson et al., 2019). Sustainable resilience 
is defined as the ability to maintain desired system performance while simultaneously considering 
intra-system and inter-generational distribution of impacts (resulting from vulnerability) and 
sustainability capital (availability of critical social, economic, and environmental resources). This 
paper reviews current indicator-based community resilience assessment literature from which a set 
of non-duplicative indicators and associated metrics are identified. To facilitate selection from 
among these indicators for community sustainable resilience assessments, a classification scheme 
and organizational structure is developed based on consideration of capital systems, sustainable 
resilience domains, and assessment phases. 
The result is a set of indicators and metrics for community sustainable resilience 
assessment, and a classification system that aids in operationalization of indicator-based resilience 
assessment processes, including the new framework for sustainable resilience. These indicators 
and metrics are accessible through Appendix C (https://blindreview1.shinyapps.io/indicators/). 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows, the background is provided in Section 2 with 
a detailed literature review in Section 3, Section 4 describes the review and classification methods, 
and the proposed final set of sustainable resilience indicators is discussed in Section 5. 
 
Background 
Resilience – An Evolving Concept 
Resilience is an evolving concept, continuing to grow in both theory and application since 
its original use in ecological sciences to describe a system’s ability to, “absorb changes of state 
variables, driving variables, and parameters, and still persist,” (Holling, 1973). The need to better 
understand and evaluate complex system performance in the presence of risk and the consequences 
of hazards or disruptive events (natural or manmade) has contributed to a diverse body of literature 
that includes the fields of engineering, social science, psychology, economics, disaster mitigation, 
and urban planning (Hosseini et al., 2016; Koliou et al., 2018). Resilience is often applied as an 
assessment framework in the presence of disturbance (typically identified through a form of risk 
assessment), where emphasis is placed on system response and recovery processes for 
infrastructure systems and communities (Tierney & Bruneau, 2007; Baroud et al., 2014; Lam et 
al., 2015; Linkov et al., 2018). Resilience in relation to systemic risk, where system adaptation 
and/or transformation are required to achieve acceptable performance, is an increasingly relevant 
body for both research and management (Florin & Nursimulu, 2018; Mochizuki et al, 2018). The 
concept of resilience is also applied as a process-based framework that includes planning, 
preparation, monitoring, and learning to respond to change in order to achieve desired long-term 
goals (Sharifi & Yamagata, 2014; Desouza & Flanery, 2013; Frazier et al., 2014; Cutter et al., 
2014; Arup and The Rockefeller Foundation, 2014; UNISDR, 2017). The role of resilience in 
planning and preparing for the well-being of communities under emerging risks such as changes 
in extreme climate hazard is rapidly expanding as researchers and practitioners seek solutions to 
protect complex systems (Trump et al, 2017; Mochizuki et al, 2018).   
Within resilience assessment research and practitioner communities, greater focus is 
currently placed on operationalizing resilience (Cutter, 2016a; Johansen et al., 2016; NAS, 2017). 
The term “operationalize” refers to the ability of communities to conduct resilience assessment in 
a practical, meaningful, and consistent manner. Authors are now beginning to take stock of the 
growing body of literature on community resilience assessment, and are identifying issues that 
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present a challenge to building a body of common practice. Of note, lack of consistency in applied 
resilience assessment resulting from an overabundance of interpretations and methods for 
measurement appears to be inhibiting evaluation of the effectiveness of resilience as a guiding 
concept for communities (Cutter, 2016a; Sharifi, 2016; Meerow, 2016).  
Key components needed to make resilience assessment more accessible and meaningful to 
communities lie in efforts focused on creating greater consistency in defining and identifying what 
to measure (Cutter et al., 2014; Sharifi, 2016; Cutter, 2016b; Johansen et al., 2016), as well as 
efforts to better integrate social and physical system impacts, and develop improved methods for 
measuring them within a community setting (Koliou et al., 2018; Chuang et al., 2018). While these 
issues are inherently linked to the context of the system for which a resilience assessment is being 
performed, there are similarities across systems with the same general structure that require a 
consistent approach to identification and facilitation of indicator selection. The work in this paper 
addresses these issues and offers an improved method for structuring and selecting indicators and 
metrics for sustainable resilience assessment within community systems. 
 
Sustainable Resilience – A Recently Developed Concept 
Sustainable resilience has recently emerged as a concept and assessment framework that 
allows for the evaluation of baseline and subsequent changes in both sustainability capital and 
vulnerability over time, as well as interactions resulting from implementation of (or failure to 
implement) management strategies intended to improve system resilience. It represents a system 
that seeks to reduce damage and loss over time by strategically monitoring and managing both 
vulnerability and sustainability to achieve desired performance outcomes. As such, a community 
strives to achieve desired levels of performance through strategic and balanced management of 
critical social, economic, and environmental resources and systems that support its capacity to 
overcome adverse impacts. Inherent to the achievement of sustainable resilience is the requisite 
need to measure, monitor, and manage the distribution of impacts across community system(s), as 
well as the distribution of resources over time in order to effectively anticipate, prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from future threats.  
An illustration of the assessment framework is provided in Figure 10. In this framework, 
the baseline/pre-event assessment phase of the system is presumed to describe the current, 
contextual availability of critical resources and ability of a community to absorb shocks and stress 
 59 
that directly affect system outcomes (preparation, planning, mitigation, and adaptation already 
undertaken are accounted for here). The extent of harm experienced can affect the state of 
resources (access, quality, and quantity) available to the community that can be applied to future 
efforts such as recovery, planning, preparation, adaptation, and system maintenance by depleting 
economic resources, impairing physical infrastructure and ecosystems, and/or harming the 
populace of the system. The ability of a community to utilize remaining resources to implement 
recovery and desired change (e.g., adaptation when sufficient sustainability capital is available, or 
transformation when the system can no longer maintain desired performance given available 
capital) then affects future context and thus, future/post-event assessment phase(s) of the system.  
 
Figure 10: Illustration of the assessment framework for sustainable resilience (modified from 
Nelson et al., 2019) 
 
While the framework for sustainable resilience does not attempt to directly measure 
adaptive capacity, the ability to adapt, prepare for and respond to disturbance (Berkes et al., 2003; 
Adger et al. 2004; Adger & Vincent, 2005; Adger, 2006; Engle, 2011), the concept is indirectly 
evaluated as the outcome of adaptation strategies and their impacts upon system contextual 
vulnerability, the ability to resist systemic disruption, and sustainability capital (Folke et al., 2002; 
Folke et al., 2003). The framework for sustainable resilience implies that understanding how 
resilience may be assessed at a point in time, and how it may change over time, depends on the 
ability to evaluate various states of vulnerability and sustainability capital as they relate to 
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outcomes resulting from exposure to hazards. The ability of a system to implement change (via 
adaptive capacity, which may be seen to include any form of positive change intended to reduce 
vulnerability, including mitigation) is the mechanism by which sustainable resilience is achieved. 
Measurement or assessment of sustainable resilience requires the ability to link changes in system 
resources and drivers to possible outcomes affecting adaptive capacity (discussed in greater detail 
in subsequent sections). 
 
Review of Indicators and Metrics in Community Sustainable Resilience Assessment 
Communities & Use of Indicators for Assessment 
Communities can be characterized as socio-environmental/technical systems composed of 
networks that are themselves both socio-environmental (people and natural/built environment) and 
socio-technical (people and technology) (Ernstson et al., 2010). In more general terms, a 
community consists of groups of individuals and necessary life-support systems (land, air, water, 
energy, critical services, infrastructure, commerce, among others) living within a place-based 
entity that is often defined by boundaries, and that share common interests, or common fates linked 
by collective actions (Wilkinson, 1991; Norris et al., 2008).  
Communities must also be considered across varying spatial and temporal scales that can 
be difficult to distinguish due to multiple boundaries (physical and non-physical), system 
interactions (cross-scalar impacts, cascading effects, feedbacks), and consideration of potential 
tradeoffs over time across subsystems and networks (Alberti et al., 2003; Desouza & Flanery, 
2013; Elmqvist et al., 2014). While there is similarity across the structural aspects of a community, 
its ability to achieve survival, well-being, and long-term viability is uniquely constrained by the 
available resources and the ability of the community to use them effectively to achieve desired 
outcomes (Norris et al., 2008, Turner, 2010). These disparities result in variations in vulnerability 
and distribution of harmful impacts across communities (Adger, 2006; Cutter 2003; Eakin & 
Luers, 2006; Cutter, 2016a). Different populations face different challenges in increasing adaptive 
capacity and achieving resilience within the same community, creating an uneven landscape and 
challenging format for assessment, planning, and successful outcomes.  
Improving resilience and sustainability for communities is most meaningful when applied to 
populations within a community that are most vulnerable (e.g., the idea of increasing adaptive 
capacity and the ability to effect positive change for those who need it most). This is in keeping 
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with the view that the poorest and most vulnerable populations within communities are the weakest 
links in achieving disaster preparedness and resilience (Godschalk, 2003; Godschalk et al. 2009; 
Berardi et al. 2011). Regardless of how a community may be defined, they all share a common 
attribute of their exposure to a variety of hazards, which can result in significant disruption to 
critical functions, threatening survival, well-being and sustainable resilience. It is therefore critical 
to understand how community resilience may be measured in order to track trends, monitor 
progress, and identify problem areas well in advance of potential disruption. 
Indicators for measuring aspects of vulnerability, sustainability, and resilience within 
communities are abundant. Indicators are often used to refer to a measurable variable that is related 
to a theoretical (unobservable) variable, and are necessary to reduce the amount of data needed to 
describe a process and communicate effectively to diverse audiences (Kierstead & Leach, 2008). 
We define an “indicator” as a characteristic that is expected to have a simple and direct effect on 
resilience, while reserving the term “metric” for observable and measurable variables that are 
related to resilience indicators. For instance, community health may be identified as an indicator 
of resilience as it is expected to directly influence the ability of the community to withstand and 
recover from hazards. As community health is not directly measurable, it may be assessed based 
on a collection of metrics that can be directly evaluated and combined to characterize aspects of a 
community’s health (e.g., reported infectious and chronic health issues, average life expectancy, 
among others). Metrics used to assess other types of system resilience, such as water infrastructure 
systems, can also be used to characterize aspects of community health and well-being.  
Metrics can be assessed using qualitative (rating scales, categorical, among others) or 
quantitative methods (direct measurement, spatial analysis, modeling, among others), to provide 
information on the state of an indicator. While indicator-based assessments are crucial to 
establishing baselines and future scenarios for communities to enable decision-making, planning, 
and management, their effective use is dependent upon identification, selection, and application of 
useful and meaningful indicators and metrics (Parris and Kates, 2003). Some argue that the 
inability to achieve desired outcomes is directly related to poor selection of indicators, and that 
confusion regarding the multitude of indicators from various sets of indicators poses an obstacle 
to effective assessment and use of results to achieve goals (Briassoulis, 2001; Shen et al., 2011). 
Review of community-based resilience assessment indicators and metrics reveals an abundance of 
indicators, rendering identification and selection of appropriate measures a difficult and likely 
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confusing task for researchers and practitioners (Sharifi, 2016; Cutter, 2016c; Koliou et al., 2018). 
This work builds upon current literature (Johansen et al., 2016) to offer a non-duplicative set of 
community resilience indicators with associated quantitative and qualitative metrics that can be 
used by any community type. As vulnerability and sustainability have an interdependent 
relationship with resilience (Gillespie-Marthaler et al., 2018), discussion on indicators 
representing all three concepts and their intersection with community assessment is provided 
below. 
 
Community Vulnerability Indicators 
Community vulnerability indicators reflect relationships between people and resources 
such as wealth, availability and access to key infrastructure, and services needed to protect 
populations from harm (Cutter, 1996; Cutter, et al., 2003; Chakraborty, 2005; Rygel, et al., 2006; 
Wilhelmi & Morss, 2013; DHS, 2016). Issues of equity, agency, and justice are also included in 
these indicators, but can be challenging to capture and consistently employ (Doorn, 2017). Age, 
gender, income, race/ethnicity, and skill level are often used in social vulnerability indicators, 
which typically rely on census data for consistency and standardization (Azar & Rain, 2007; 
Cutter, et al., 2003; Rygel, et al., 2006; Cutter, 2016a). Within census data, there are a large number 
of measured items from which to choose when constructing an indicator. Consistently available 
and standardized data are generally easier to obtain at larger scales (national, state, etc.) and more 
difficult to obtain as scale decreases to local communities (Mayer, 2008). The number and type of 
selected metrics can vary widely based on the type of assessment conducted and perspective on 
what can or should be measured, with concern cited by researchers regarding the need for more 
explicit relation between indicator selection and the impacts of vulnerability upon society 
(Chakraborty, 2005; Cutter, et al., 2003; Fekete, 2012; Krishnamurthy & Krishnamurthy, 2011; 
Rygel, et al., 2006; Eriksen & Kelly, 2007; Shepard et al., 2012). In some studies, the same 
indicator is used more than once to measure different aspects associated with vulnerability and its 
components (exposure, sensitivity, adaptive capacity) (Frazier et al., 2014), in part due to the 
difficulty in obtaining appropriate independent measures (Hinkel, 2011; Engle, 2011; Fekete, 
2009; Dominey-Howes, 2007). 
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Community Sustainability Indicators 
Sustainability indicators are used to evaluate impacts and intersections between human 
society and the natural and physical systems that society depends upon, and as such tend to follow 
the concept of sustainable development established by the Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987; 
Beatley & Newman, 2013). In particular, sustainability seeks to understand the long-term impacts 
caused by use, overuse, and degradation of critical resources and the resulting impacts to human 
society (Berkes & Folke, 1998; Kates et al., 2001; Marcotullio, 2001; Fiksel, 2006; Dietz & 
Neumayer, 2007). These are often complex relationships between nested systems (humans and 
watersheds, habitats, ecosystems, etc.) that can span multiple boundaries and generations (Bithas 
& Christofakis, 2006), and can be challenging to define and measure.  
Recent compilations of community sustainability indicators exist within literature (Shen et 
al., 2011; Lynch et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2013; Hiremath et al., 2013). Reviews note several 
challenges in the focus, construction, and validation of indicator sets. Mori & Yamashita (2015) 
claim that many appear as though authors are simply making lists of social, economic, and 
environmental factors to cover as many aspects as possible, rather than focusing on means of 
assessment and basis for absolute or relative comparison of sustainability within and across 
communities. Challenges associated with subjectivity in selection, complexity in measuring 
interactions between systems, lack of empirical data, and difficulty with real and implied system 
boundaries are consistently cited in reviews (Shen et al., 2011; Mori & Christodoulou, 2012; 
Hiremath et al., 2013; Mori & Yamashita, 2015). Indicators often characterize capital sources (e.g., 
air, water, energy, land, ecosystems, etc.), the impacts of human development on sources (e.g., 
levels of quality or degradation via pollution or overuse), and resulting impacts to society (human 
health, prosperity, and equity), thereby indicating an overall capacity to adequately support current 
and future growth (Romero-Lankao et al., 2016). Community sustainability indicators are 
particularly challenged by the difficulty in establishing meaningful ranges of performance and 
thresholds for constrained processes (e.g., physical limits on natural and built systems, and limits 
on social and economic equity) without which basis for assessment or comparison is made less 
meaningful (Berkes & Folke, 1998; Mori & Christodoulou, 2012; Hiremath et al., 2013; Mori & 
Yamashita, 2015). It can be difficult to set thresholds, especially in light of different levels of 
acceptable scale for social norms that differ from one place to another, and across temporal scales 
(Graymore et al., 2009). 
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Community Resilience Indicators 
Reviews of indicators for community resilience have been conducted in recent literature 
(Lu & Stead, 2013; Larkin et al., 2015; Hosseini et al., 2016; Sharifi, 2016; Cutter, 2016c; Johansen 
et al., 2016; Asadzadeh et al., 2017; Koliou et al., 2018), revealing an abundance of proposed 
indicators (Sharifi, 2016; Cutter, 2016c). Resilience indicators are focused on enabling 
communities to assess how well they are able to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disaster 
(natural or manmade), and as such, should include the concepts of risk, vulnerability, 
sustainability, and adaptive capacity (Gillespie-Marthaler et al., 2018, Nelson et al., 2018). 
However, many indicator sets are poorly balanced in terms of representing critical facets and 
distribution of social, economic, and environmental capital needed to maintain a community. 
Reviews are consistent in noting lack of representation of indicators related to natural systems with 
greater emphasis being placed on built systems or social systems (Sharifi, 2016), as well as weak 
integration of physical, social, and economic indicators and metrics (Koliou et al., 2018). 
Community resilience assessments use similar approaches for identification and selection of 
indicators to those described above for vulnerability and sustainability (Mayunga, 2007; Sherrieb 
et al., 2010; Sherrieb et al., 2012; Burton, 2012; Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013). Hence, they are 
subject to many of the same issues with regards to potential for mischaracterization as well as lack 
of verification and benchmarking. 
 
Current Challenges 
Aside from challenges mentioned above regarding lack of data at multiple scales and a 
shortage of validation, verification, and benchmarking processes, challenges are posed by the lack 
of balanced representation across social, economic, and environmental systems within 
communities (Sharifi, 2016; Cai et al., 2018). Lack of representation and balance may indicate 
limited system understanding and the potential for poor or incomplete assessment results, 
depending upon the context and intent of assessment. In order to create a balanced set of indicators 
representing social, economic, and environmental (built and natural systems), it is necessary to 
consolidate indicators and metrics from various bodies of literature and sources. Many community 
resilience indicator sets appear sparse regarding inclusion of the natural environment, focusing on 
tree density and impervious surface, and neglecting more complex aspects of community health. 
In a recent review of disaster resilience measures by Cai et al. (2018), environmental and 
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ecological indicators other than land use were found to be applied in six out of 174 reviewed 
articles. Despite growing awareness of long-term resilience and its linkages to the quality and 
maintenance of natural resources (ecosystem services that provide essential lifeline support and 
protection mechanisms such as water quality, flood control, green spaces, biodiversity, etc.), more 
effort is needed to include indicators that help decision-makers relate natural resources to corollary 
social, economic, and built infrastructure in order to achieve multiple benefits across systems 
(Milman & Short, 2008; Srinivasan et al., 2012; Ahern, 2013; Collier et al., 2013; Upadhyaya et 
al., 2014; Koliou et al., 2018).  
Climate change, a component of the environment, is a significant factor that is often lacking 
in current community resilience indicator sets. It can affect both acute and chronic community 
stress (flood, drought, storm, among others), and disturbances related to climate are typically 
accompanied by other types of stress within and across social, economic, and environmental sub-
systems (Coaffee, 2008; Leichenko, 2011; Collier et al., 2013; Hallegatte et al., 2013). However, 
it is necessary to go to sector or site-specific publications (e.g., UK indicators, coastal community 
indicators, and U.N. indicators) to find a robust selection of science-based climate change 
measures (for e.g., changes in salinity, pH, temperature, sea level, subsidence, and greenhouse gas 
emissions) to apply to community resilience assessment (Shaw, 2009; Sempier et al., 2010; Ranger 
& Surminski, 2013; Orencio & Fujii, 2013; UNISDR, 2017).  
Greater attention is also needed in considering indicators within the economic capital system that 
represent capacity associated with use of immediate resources (local) and potentially available 
resources (regional) to respond and recover from hazards (Rose, 2011). Business recovery is an 
essential part of community resilience, which is often overlooked in existing indicator sets (Rose 
& Krausmann, 2013). Like climate change, it is necessary to utilize sector-specific publications to 
identify adequate indicators and metrics for use in assessing community resilience (Briguglio et 
al., 2009; Kern, 2010; U.N., 2015; UNISDR, 2017; Ranger & Surminski, 2013). Rose & 
Krausmann (2013) find many of the components of existing resilience indicator sets to be 
unimportant to the resilience of community businesses and economies due to a lack of focus on 
businesses especially during recovery. Integration of meaningful indicators and metrics requires 
incorporation of microeconomic (individual businesses), mesoeconomic (markets & industries), 
and macroeconomic (all economic entities and networks) perspectives, and the facets of 
preparation & response (business continuity planning), and recovery (financial mechanisms, 
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assistance, and flexible supply chains) to speed return to normal operation (Briguglio & Galea, 
2003; Rose & Krausmann, 2013).  
Communities face a daunting task in terms of prioritizing allocation of sustainability capital 
to meet both current and future challenges. There are no universally accepted sets of indicators 
used by any single assessment concept (vulnerability, sustainability, or resilience), much less an 
integrated assessment concept for communities to reference (Parris & Kates, 2003; Romero & 
Lankao et al., 2016). Rationale for development of a universal set of indicators from a 
sustainability perspective that are easily translated to vulnerability and resilience includes i) 
ambiguity in concepts, ii) plurality of purpose in application of concepts, and iii) confusion 
regarding key terms, relationships, data, and means of measurement (Parris & Kates, 2003).  
This rationale is echoed by recent work from the National Academy of Sciences, which 
finds that despite continued development of assessment approaches and indicators for resilience, 
many communities have not engaged in assessment as a common planning tool, largely due to 
difficulty in understanding how to apply existing approaches (i.e., where to start, what to measure, 
and how to measure it) (NAS, 2017). Implications for assessment of possible future scenarios and 
different courses of action to achieve desired outcomes for communities must therefore be 
informed by: i) greater understanding of conceptual linkages between vulnerability, resilience, and 
sustainability, ii) improved assessment methods that reflect those linkages, and iii) greater ability 
to select and appropriately apply indicators and metrics for assessment. To address the third point, 
we compiled indicators from a review of the literature on indicator-based community resilience 
assessment, including economic, disaster, and climate resilience assessment. Each type of 
assessment includes many indicators that can fall into vulnerability, sustainability, and resilience 
categories. We consolidate the identified indicators from each source and provide a classification 
structure to aid in selection of indicators for community sustainable resilience assessment (per 
Section 2.2). The remainder of this manuscript describes the review, consolidation, and 
classification process, and discusses the findings and their implications for operationalizing 
indicator-based community resilience assessment, with focus on sustainable resilience assessment. 
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Indicator Review and Classification Methods 
Review Method 
This study focused on peer-reviewed publications and practitioner reports on indicator-based 
assessment of community resilience based on the concept of sustainable resilience (Sustainable 
Resilience – A Recently Developed Concept) as applied to communities (Communities & Use of 
Indicators for Assessment). A literature search was conducted in December, 2017 (with an 
additional search conducted in July, 2018 to include new publications). The initial search results 
were generated by using the search terms in Table 4 (as a single search string, where commas are 
equivalent to the operator AND) within the Vanderbilt University Library Catalog search engine. 
The search was limited to documents within the subject areas listed in Table 4 and drew from 
multiple databases (Table 5). No restrictions were placed on publication year, but only English 
language publications with available full-text were included. The database search initially 
provided 712 results (including duplication). Search terms and subject areas are displayed in Table 
4.  
  
Table 4. Search Terms & Subject Areas 
 
Titles and authors of the identified documents were reviewed to remove duplicates.  
Abstracts were then reviewed to provide initial screening for applicability associated with the 
following criteria: i) the term “community” is consistent with section 3.1, rather than focusing on 
an individual subsystem; ii) the term “resilience” addresses multiple risks across community 
systems rather than focusing on a single risk or single subsystem; iii) the term “assessment” is used 
to measure resilience rather than focus on conceptual evaluation or analysis; and iv) individual 
indicators are identified and defined. Removal of duplicates and abstract review yielded 205 
distinct documents for further review. Journal titles for the 205 documents are provided at 
Search Terms                                      Subjects Areas
Indicators, Metrics, Community 
Resilience, Economic Resilience, 
Climate Change Resilience, 
Disaster Resilience, Assess, 
Measure, Define, Identify
Social Sciences, Earth Sciences, Climate Change, Health and 
Environmental Sciences, Resilience, Geography, 
Sustainability, Applied Sciences, Vulnerability, 
Environmental Management, Urban Planning, Vulnerability, 
Civil Engineering, Adaptation, Management, Biological 
Sciences, Public Policy, Public Health, Adaptation, 
Education, Economics, Environmental Studies, Engineering, 
Sustainable Development
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Appendix C. Google Scholar was then used to conduct a directed search for additional material 
not appearing in research databases including articles and reports referenced in the sources found 
in the database search and known foundation (e.g. Rockefeller Foundation) and government 
agency (e.g. Department of Homeland Security) reports. The directed search using Google Scholar 
provided an additional 66 documents for a total of 271 documents selected for full text review. 
Results are shown in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 5. Search Results 
 
The full text of each of the 271 remaining documents was examined and scanned for tables, 
lists, and explicit definition/identification of specific indicators. Remaining documents that 
identified indicators, yet provided no explanation (rationale for use) of the indicators within a 
Search Results (Sources) No.
ABI/INFORM Complete 129
Annual  Reviews 4
Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ) 10
JSTOR Archival 3
MEDLINE/PubMED (NLM) 21
OECD iLibrary 3
OneFile (GALE) 105
Palgrave Connect 9
PMC (PubMed Central) 12
SAGE Knowledge 7
Science Citation Index Expanded (WoS) 87
ScienceDirect Journals (Elsevier) 55
Social Science Premium Collection 95
Springer CrossRef 35
SpringerLink 41
SpringerLink (CrossRef) 35
SpringerLink Book Series 24
SpringerLink Open Access 10
SpringerLink Open Access 10
Taylor & Francis - Online Journals 11
World Bank eLibrary 6
Initial Total (with duplication) 712
Total (after title & abstract review) 205
Google Scholar Directed Search Results 66
Total (full text review) 271
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community setting, were also dropped from further consideration to ensure that only theoretically 
and conceptually justified indicators were included. As a result, an additional 89 documents were 
dropped from further consideration. Of the remaining 182 documents (breakdown provided at 
Appendix D, https://blindreview1.shinyapps.io/search/) meeting specified criteria, a total of 91 
unique references are used in the determination of indicators for community sustainable resilience 
(Appendix C, https://blindreview1.shinyapps.io/indicators/).    
Each explicitly identified indicator within the final set of documents was added to a review 
table that included the following information: indicator name, indicator description, associated 
metrics (where available), and source/publication of the indicator.  The subset of documents 
produced over 1,089 identified indicators (including duplication where an individual indicator may 
appear in more than one document) for community resilience, many of which included an 
explanation for both indicators and metrics (quantitative or qualitative measures). A complete list 
of the sources for retained indicators and metrics is provided in Appendices C and E.  
While the methods employed to identify and collect literature for the review are similar to 
those used by Parsons et al. (2016), Cutter (2016), Sharifi (2016), and Asadzadeh et al. (2017), 
they go beyond the concepts of disaster resilience to encompass a broader set of resources that 
include a more robust selection of indicators for natural systems, climate change, and economic 
resilience that is consistent with the concept of sustainable resilience. Recognizing that the number 
of indicators identified is too extensive to be very helpful, the results were organized into a 
classification structure which is related to the sustainable resilience assessment framework (Nelson 
et al., 2019), and consolidated to help users understand how indicators may be applied within the 
aforementioned framework. 
 
Classification by Primary and Secondary Capital Systems 
The first step in classification of the indicator set was to organize the indicators by capital 
systems. Communities include social and bio-physical sub-systems which are generally considered 
as separate, but related, components of the community for methodological reasons (Hinkel, 2011). 
The literature universally recognizes these two sub-systems and often uses a more detailed 
categorization. Examples of variation in organization can be seen across the literature, depending 
on the nature and focus of assessment. For example, some are focused on social or social and built 
infrastructure factors (Cutter et al., 2008; Cutter et al., 2014; Parsons & Morley, 2017), while 
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others are focused on distinction of rural needs and attributes (Cabell & Oelofse, 2012; McManus 
et al., 2012). Some are directed toward developed communities (Sharifi & Yamagata, 2014; DHS, 
2016, NAS, 2017), while others are directed toward developing communities (UNISDR, 2017).  
Using the construct of sustainable resilience as the basis for organization of indicators, the 
set of basic systems and sub-systems that make up a community can be readily classified according 
to forms of sustainability capital (social, economic, and environmental systems). Social systems 
comprise human-centric attributes (e.g., demographic) and social order (e.g., governance, services, 
policy, and planning) necessary to create and sustain the social fabric of a community. Economic 
systems represent the state, efficiency, stability, and capacity of financial and material transactions 
that make up businesses, industries, and markets necessary to provide employment and generate 
public and private finance to fuel community maintenance and growth. Environmental systems are 
composed of the physical systems that communities depend upon, including built (i.e., buildings 
and lifelines), natural (i.e., water, air, energy, land, food, ecosystems, and biota), and general (i.e., 
combinations of built and natural systems – sanitation, waste, climate, mapping, 
cultural/archaeological sites). 
Columns for primary and secondary capital systems were added to the indicator review 
table and indicators were first assigned to the three primary capital systems (social, economic, and 
environmental) based on intent (e.g., what the indicator is attempting to represent or measure based 
on the indicator description in the review table) as depicted in Table 6. Indicators were then 
grouped by primary capital system and within the group were further organized by indicator intent 
and the type of associated metric (where available). The most common feature of these sub-groups 
was identified and listed as the secondary capital system.  
 
Primary Capital 
System 
Total Number 
Indicators 
Social 671 
Economic 159 
Environmental 259 
Total 1089 
 
Table 6. Assignment of Candidate Indicators to Primary Capital Systems 
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Each secondary capital system defined is one that functionally supports and contributes to 
the parent primary capital system with reasonable consideration for parsimony (each secondary 
capital system is composed of five or more indicators). Table 7 provides a summary of the 
corresponding classification structure, with examples of indicators related to primary and 
secondary sub-systems displayed in 8. While this is by no means a definitive classification, it is 
consistent with system organizational structures in the literature and provides a starting point for 
assessment practitioners to identify indicators that relate to a variety of aspects of community 
systems. 
 
 
Table 7. Primary and Secondary Capital System Classification According to Indicator Intent 
 
Primary/Secondary 
Capital System 
Indicator Intent 
Social 
Community 
Composition 
Populations and their relative abilities to cope with stress within the community 
Governance Leadership, management, accountability, and capacity for response 
Policy & Planning 
Promulgation and implementation of policies and plans to aid communities in 
anticipating, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from hazards 
Services Critical community services needed to sustain healthy, educated, and safe communities 
Economic 
Micro / 
Mesoeconomic 
Efficiency 
Health, preparedness, flexibility, diversity, and capacity of individual businesses, markets, 
and industries within the community 
Macroeconomic 
Stability 
Economic stability, capacity, and growth potential of the internal community and its 
external economic partners (state, regional, national, international) 
Environmental 
Built 
Operation, and maintenance of critical infrastructure and supporting networks, housing, 
shelter, and other facilities needed to support and sustain communities 
Natural 
Availability, quality, and quantity of natural systems and resources necessary to support 
and sustain communities 
General 
Systems that are combinations of built and natural systems needed to support and sustain 
communities 
Primary/Secondary 
Capital System 
Indicator Examples 
Social 
Community 
Relative health of community-led organizations; levels of trust, inclusion, awareness, and 
cohesion; demographic characteristics (population stability, race, household make-up, 
etc.); spatial distribution of populations (access to key services, mobility, etc.) 
Governance 
Institutional character/leadership; accountability & management (fiscal, manpower, etc.); 
participation (integration of efforts and coordination across offices and functions); 
representation (legal, justice, etc.); regional connectivity (collaboration/ partnerships); 
risk-focused (information, communication, etc.); capacity for response (ability to respond 
to crisis or disaster) 
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Table 8. Examples of Indicators by Capital System Category 
 
Consolidation 
Of the original 1,089 indicators compiled from the literature, many were designed to 
measure similar effects. To pare this down to a more manageable set of indicators and metrics for 
community resilience assessment purposes, an iterative process of synthesis and refinement based 
on indicator intent, topic, and associated metric was conducted. Within each capital system 
designation, pairwise comparisons of indicator descriptions were first made. Indicators with 
different names, but with functionally identical descriptions, were given closer examination. If 
associated metrics were available and were essentially the same, the two indicators were combined 
under a single indicator name and any associated unique metrics were added to the metrics list. 
(The source articles for the indicators were also retained and consolidated.) In the case that the 
descriptions were the same yet the metrics were noticeably different, the description of the listed 
indicator was reconsidered. Secondly, within each capital system pairwise comparisons of any 
metrics associated with an indicator were made. In the case that the indicator name and description 
Policy & Planning 
Timeliness and effectiveness of legislation, policy, plans (age, enforcement, etc.); 
existence of hazard mitigation, evacuation, recovery plans & policies (age, access, 
comprehensiveness, etc.); capacity for risk monitoring and assessment (dedicated staff, 
partnerships, etc.); engagement of public in planning & policy processes 
Services 
Availability, quality, quantity of critical services (healthcare, mental healthcare, 
education, training, law enforcement, first responders, etc.); adequacy of funding and 
training for services (salary, staff, equipment, training, etc.); availability of services 
outside immediate community; desirability (relative levels of health, services, and security 
compared to county, state, region, etc.) 
Economic 
Micro / 
Mesoeconomic 
Efficiency 
Wage profiles; workforce profiles; stability of property values, taxes, prices, etc.; stability 
of businesses; diversity in skills; desirability (opportunity for growth and development); 
diversity in livelihoods; availability of local jobs; business continuity planning 
Macroeconomic 
Stability 
Balance in supply/demand; ratio of revenues to debt; economic development planning; 
access to resources and support from partners and suppliers; flexibility and capacity for 
change given worst case economic scenarios for disaster 
Environmental 
Built 
Quality of and access to critical infrastructure and networks (communication, 
transportation, power, etc.); physical safety and security (protective structures; housing; 
building codes; emergency shelter; land use planning and zoning; community 
blight/renewal, etc.) [Information from resilience assessment for individual infrastructure 
systems can be used to help characterize aspects of overall community resilience] 
Natural 
Availability of water, food, energy, land, etc.; changes in land cover; biodiversity; 
ecosystem services; natural buffers; agriculture; resource conservation & protection; etc. 
General 
Access to resource distribution and sanitation/waste management systems (drinking water, 
wastewater, solid waste, etc.); historical and cultural assets; climate change monitoring 
and analysis; mapping and data capabilities 
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were different yet the metrics used were the same, the indicators were combined under a single 
new indicator name with an expanded description. The final set of indicators in each capital system 
was then examined for consistency and compared against the original indicator set for 
comprehensiveness. Through this process, the original set of 1,089 indicators was condensed to a 
final set of 98 non-duplicative indicators with corresponding metrics. In order to further aid in 
operationalization of these indicators, the metrics associated with the indicators were segmented 
into two groups: qualitative and quantitative. This breakdown may assist assessment practitioners 
identify commonly employed metrics that are most relevant to their community data situation (i.e., 
data-rich or data-poor).   
We recognize that there are limitations to the approach used in consolidating and refining 
indicators, as there may be additional opportunity to further consolidate based on focus and intent, 
and a need to continuously update the set over time as new insights within literature are gained. 
However, the current set allows for reasonable consolidation and a much less cumbersome way to 
access and apply indicators and metrics that represent multiple disciplines and considerations 
across the literature. Additionally, the classification of indicators and metrics by capital systems 
offers new insight into the assessment process by allowing researchers and users to better identify 
and understand impacts and linkages across systems given an event or scenario, as well as 
improved ability to track impacts and trajectories across capital systems over time.  
 
Classification by Sustainable Resilience Domains 
Initial classification of community sustainable resilience indicators by primary and 
secondary capital system helps define the basic building blocks of what a community needs in 
order to meet its sustainable resilience objectives. However, there is a progressive, often temporal, 
process of building and maintaining levels of sustainable resilience within a community setting. 
We refer to these levels as domains of sustainable resilience. These domains represent a 
hierarchical set of capabilities that communities generally seek to achieve and maintain, and which 
are necessary in order to ultimately realize sustainable resilience. Sustainable resilience requires 
attainment of survivability and desired levels of well-being that can be maintained over the life of 
the community through systematic and proactive actions (preparedness) to positively address 
distributions of harmful impacts, and access to necessary resources that drive capabilities for 
successful preparation, response, and recovery over time. The time horizon and level of priority 
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associated with these sustainable resilience domains ideally flows from survival (short-term, 
highest priority) to well-being to sustainable resilience (long-term, lowest priority). The basic 
structure of the hierarchy is depicted in Figure 11, which provides examples of both needs and 
temporal horizon for each sustainable resilience domain.  
In order to aid in assessment of community sustainable resilience across different temporal 
time-scales, and in order to aid in identification of high priority areas following an assessment, the 
indicators were classified by sustainable resilience domains i) survival, ii) well-being, or iii) 
preparedness. 
 
Figure 11. Sustainable Resilience Domains - Hierarchical Priorities Needed to Achieve 
Community Sustainable Resilience 
 
In general, communities strive toward survival, increasing levels of well-being (quality of 
life), and preparedness through progression in development across social, economic, and 
environmental systems over time. Survival is an immediate priority, akin to meeting the most basic 
needs of a community (water, food, shelter, energy, safety, etc.). Once conditions ensuring survival 
are met, communities are able to progress to achieve adequate levels of well-being (also referred 
to as quality of life). Indicators within the consolidated indicator set that address availability 
(access, quality, and quantity) of sustainability capital (critical resources) in relation to threshold 
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levels necessary to support and sustain life (e.g., does the community have access to reliable energy 
sources; is there adequate water supply for the next 30 years?) were classified as belonging to the 
survival domain. Metrics associated with these indicators are often evaluated at the aggregate 
community (macro) scale at basic threshold levels to determine sufficiency. 
Well-being is related to a community’s ability to provide physical, emotional, social, 
material, and developmental support that enables them to better cope, adapt, and/or transform 
under stress and uncertainty; contribute to collective goals; and ultimately thrive (Felce & Perry, 
1995; Keyes, 1998; Diener & Suh, 1997; WHOQoL Group, 1995; WHOQoL Group, 1998; Magis, 
2010; Andrews & Withey, 2012; Berkes & Ross, 2013; Birkmann et al., 2013; UN, 2015; NAS, 
2017). Community well-being can be characterized by availability, quality, and equal access to 
services and amenities such as law enforcement, healthcare, education, jobs, and recreation. 
Availability and access are concerned not only with resource availability (e.g., are there enough 
schools, etc.), but also access to resources for all within the community (e.g., do all have access to 
the same quality of school, etc.). Varying levels of well-being are related to community 
desirability, stability, ability to cope, and potential for future growth across all demographics (e.g., 
quality of education and health care service with respect to state or national standards). As well-
being increases, the collective ability to influence future conditions through enhanced coping and 
systematic planning, preparation, and structured approaches can also be expected to increase. 
Indicators related to sub-community (meso or micro) proximity, access, quality, and availability 
of resources to specific groups of residents (e.g., sufficient number of high quality K-12 schools 
available within a specific school zone or neighborhood) were classified as belonging to the well-
being domain. 
Preparedness requires survivability and desired levels of well-being that can be maintained 
under conditions of both expected and unexpected change. Preparedness requires consideration at 
both the aggregate community (macro) and sub-community (meso or micro) scales to determine a 
community’s ability to maintain acceptable levels of performance under plausible scenarios of 
acute or chronic stress (e.g., hurricane, tornado, flood, drought) now and in the future.  Indicators 
that are forward-looking and seek to protect and maintain/enhance desired levels of performance 
under current and future hazard scenarios through systematic processes for anticipation, 
preparation, mitigation, adaptation, planning, and learning were classified as belonging to the 
preparedness domain. This includes indicators related to the adequacy of processes in place to 
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monitor changes in hazard frequency and severity over time, and the need for development of 
partnerships with institutions to share data and develop new methods for mitigation and adaptation.  
While the hierarchical structure provided in Figure 11 may seem to imply that preparedness 
should not be a priority for communities struggling with maintaining well-being, our intention is 
not to suggest that no resources should be expended on preparedness while well-being falls short. 
In many cases, improvements in well-being and survival are not possible without advancing 
preparedness. Instead we suggest that resource allocation across the domains should generally be 
balanced, but with the understanding that benefits from increasing preparedness may take longer 
to accrue than the benefits produced from improving survival, and with recognition that in times 
of extreme stress it may be necessary to prioritize survival over preparedness or well-being.  
 
Classification by Sustainable Resilience Assessment Framework Phases 
The prior two forms of classification allow for identification of sustainability capital 
needed to support communities (primary and secondary capital systems), and how capital may be 
employed over time to achieve varying levels of resilience (resilience domains). However, neither 
of these classifications allow a user to identify the phase of a community’s disaster/stress event 
and response process associated with the indicator. It has been acknowledged within the literature 
that omitting this consideration is problematic as it ignores distinctions between cause and effect, 
potentially biasing results, and providing little information about what variables and processes may 
be driving a system to experience harm (Dietz et al., 2009; Hinkel, 2011). Since there is no 
universally accepted theory that explains causal relationships involving social-environmental 
systems within a resilience framework, we suggest a final classification of indicators based on the 
aforementioned sustainable resilience framework that distinguishes between phases within the 
assessment process. This categorization includes two additional indicator classes (resources and 
drivers), which enable users to distinguish between indicators that represent the state of available 
resources (sustainability capital) and those that represent likelihood of loss (vulnerability).  
Indicators that characterize the state (quality, quantity) and availability of critical social 
(people, services, and governance), economic (income, insurance, trade) and environmental (built 
and natural, infrastructure, land, water, energy) forms of capital are classified as resources (R). In 
general, resource indicators are seen to be positively correlated with adaptive capacity and 
sustainable resilience (e.g., an increase in critical resources can allow for greater flexibility and 
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opportunity for change, whereas degradation or loss of resources can have the opposite effect). 
Indicators associated with potential for loss due to contextual exposure, sensitivity, or ability to 
cope/resist (related to levels of access, preparedness, and awareness) are classified as drivers (D). 
Indicators associated with drivers tend to be negatively correlated with adaptive capacity and 
sustainable resilience (e.g., an increase in vulnerability can lead to decreased flexibility and 
opportunity for change, whereas a decrease in vulnerability can have the opposite effect).  
Whether an indicator is classified as a resource or a driver, or both, depends on the nature 
of operational assessment. For example, measures within the indicator “education and skill level” 
can be used to evaluate both resources and drivers, since varying skill levels and situational 
awareness may impact ability to cope with a hazard (driver), while high education and skill levels 
build social capital and increase adaptive capacity (resource). Outcomes (O) are not associated 
with independent indicators, but may instead be evaluated as impacts to resources and/or drivers 
resulting from the occurrence of change (positive or negative). Differentiation between drivers and 
resources can depend on the nature of the resilience assessment to which the indicators are to be 
applied. The rationale for differentiation between indicators as resources and drivers, and their 
relationship to adaptive capacity and sustainable resilience, is included in the table of indicators 
for community sustainable resilience in Appendix C.  
 
Final Set of Indicators for Community Sustainable Resilience 
Collectively, the classification and organizational structure developed allows users to more 
readily access a consolidated set of options for identification and selection of indicators and 
metrics that can be used in assessing community sustainable resilience. A summary of the 
classification scheme and organizational structure is displayed in Table 9, and an example of how 
classification and organization are applied to a single indicator is provided at Table 10. 
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Primary 
Capital 
Systems 
Social Economic Environmental 
Sustainable 
Resilience 
Domain 
Resource (R) / 
Driver (D) 
Rationale for 
R / D 
Secondary 
Capital 
Systems 
Community 
Composition 
 
Governance 
 
Policy & 
Planning 
 
Services 
Micro / 
Mesoeconomic 
Efficiency 
 
Macroeconomic 
Stability 
Built 
 
Natural 
 
General 
Survival – 
required to meet 
basic needs  
 
Well-being – 
levels of 
services 
(healthcare, 
education, 
safety, etc.) 
 
Preparedness – 
systematically 
maintain/ 
enhance desired 
levels of 
performance 
under current 
and future 
scenarios  
Resource –
characterizes the 
state of 
sustainability 
capital as 
(quality , 
quantity & 
availability) of 
primary and 
secondary 
capital systems  
 
 
Higher levels of 
(R) contribute to 
greater 
flexibility, 
adaptive 
capacity & 
enhance 
resilience; 
Lower levels of 
(R) indicate 
constraint, lower 
levels of 
adaptive 
capacity & 
detract from 
resilience  
Driver – 
characterizes 
vulnerability as 
potential for loss 
(levels of 
exposure, 
sensitivity, 
ability to cope) 
Higher levels of 
(D) contribute to 
greater 
vulnerability 
and detract from 
resilience; 
Lower levels of 
(D) reduce 
vulnerability 
and enhance 
resilience  
 
Table 9. Classification Scheme & Organizational Structure for Sustainable Resilience 
Community Assessment Indicators 
 
 
 
Table 10. Classification Scheme and Organizational Structure Applied to a Single Indicator 
 
Indicator Title Primary      
Capital 
System
Secondary Capital 
System
Sustainable 
Resilience 
Domain
Resource (R) / 
Driver (D)
Rationale for Resource (R) / 
Driver (D)
Research capabilities Social Policy & Planning Preparedness Resource Partnerships with research 
institutions can leverage available 
social and economic resources and 
provide access to extended 
resources that may increase risk 
awareness, improve planning and 
mitigation actions, and increase 
both capacity for response and 
adaptive capacity
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The proposed set of 98 community sustainable resilience indicators and corresponding 
metrics are classified by primary and secondary capital systems, sustainable resilience domains, 
and sustainable resilience assessment phases. In addition, each indicator includes a rationale as to 
its potential impact on vulnerability (changes in exposure, sensitivity, and coping) and adaptive 
capacity (changes in sustainability capital). A breakdown of indicator counts for the proposed set 
of indicators for assessing community sustainable resilience is provided in Table 11.  
 
Proposed Set of Community Sustainable Resilience Indicators 
Primary/ 
Secondary         
Capital System 
Sustainable Resilience Domain Resource (R) / Driver (D) 
Total 
Survival Wellbeing Preparedness 
Resource 
(R) 
Driver 
(D) 
 (R) & (D) 
Social  15 18 11 9 14 21 44 
Community 
Composition 7 5 0 2 4 6 12 
Governance 3 7 1 6 3 2 11 
Policy & 
Planning 0 2 9 1 5 5 11 
Services 5 4 1 0 2 8 10 
Economic 5 16 2 2 5 16 23 
Micro / 
Mesoeconomic 
Efficiency 
2 8 1 0 5 6 11 
Macroeconomic 
Stability 
3 8 1 2 0 10 12 
Environmental 9 19 3 9 8 14 31 
Built 6 10 1 3 7 7 17 
Natural 1 8 0 4 0 5 9 
General 2 1 2 2 1 2 5 
Total 29 53 16 20 27 51 98 
 
Table 11. Final Organization of Indicators for Assessing Community Sustainable Resilience 
 
While there may be additional opportunity to further improve the resulting set of indicators, 
we believe that it is representative of a reasonably balanced perspective across critical concepts 
that is sufficiently non-duplicative to provide a meaningful starting point for use in evaluating 
community sustainable resilience. The full indicator table is provided at Appendix C, and can also 
be found here (https://blindreview1.shinyapps.io/indicators/). The link takes the reader to a web-
enabled tool that allows for searching within the indicator set.  The tool can be adapted over time 
as new indicators and metrics are developed. Care should be taken when using indicators to ensure 
appropriateness, balance, and constructive application in any assessment process. 
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Conclusions 
There is considerable lack of specificity and consistency within indicator-based community 
resilience assessment literature that complicates the ability of practitioners and researchers to 
conduct community resilience assessments. By providing a review of indicators utilized within 
community resilience assessment literature, organizing the results into a classification structure, 
consolidating duplicative indicators, and relating the structure to the assessment process, this work 
addresses “indicator fatigue” (Engle et al., 2014 p. 1302) and enhances the ability to operationalize 
the assessment process. The concurrent development of a web-enabled, online appendix further 
facilitates the indicator identification and selection process. 
The intended audience for tools and methods provided is one that has sufficient information 
and understanding regarding how to employ and constructively use information and processes, or 
an audience that can be educated sufficiently to employ them. Ideally, it is hoped that any audience 
desiring to understand the concepts provided can have access to both the tools and the training 
needed to operationalize resilience assessment. 
While we have focused on how the indicator set can be used within the framework for 
sustainable resilience, it is ultimately intended to assist users with indicator selection for any form 
of community resilience assessment. Future work includes community-based case studies to test 
the efficacy of these indicators and metrics applied to the sustainable resilience framework. This 
is intended to provide a proof of concept, while also helping to delineate those indicators that are 
more likely to be measurable and meaningful in formulating assessment results. Future work also 
entails data driven approaches to further test the efficacy of this framework. Statistical dimension 
reduction and clustering techniques can be applied to the data implicated by the proposed set of 
indicators for the purpose of identifying potential redundancies from an empirical standpoint and 
provide a mapping for translating indicators to metrics and vice-versa. These efforts will help 
further delineate which indicators are measurable and meaningful in formulating community 
sustainable resilience assessments and/or reveal potential gaps in data availability.  
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CHAPTER V 
Sustainable Resilience of Flood Protection Infrastructure in the U.S.: Failure Mode and 
Implications Analysis 
 
Introduction 
Dams and levees are used for a variety of purposes within the U.S., arguably the most 
important of which is protection from flooding through physical safeguarding of human lives, 
property, and commerce. Dams and levees are complex systems, comprised of physical and natural 
components that are themselves linked to other systems (energy production, water supply, 
recreation, transportation, environmental health, and human safety) (Alexander et al., 2012; 
FEMA, 2016; USACE, 2018a). With thousands of these structures in place and subject to 
increasing hazard, new methods are needed to assess flood protection system performance and 
corresponding impact to communities over time (Colten et al., 2008; Colten & Sumpter, 2009; 
NRC, 2012; Walker & Salt, 2012; Joyce et al., 2018). This is especially true under changing 
conditions that can create a set of circumstances capable of producing catastrophic impacts (e.g., 
population shifts, aging-failing infrastructure, and extreme climate events) (DHS, 2013; USACE, 
2014; USACE, 2015a; NOAA, 2018a; NOAA, 2018b; GAO, 2018).  
The concept of resilience has been applied to complex systems in assessing performance 
and the consequences of disruption or failure under uncertainty (Sills et al., 2008; Park et al., 2011; 
Park et al., 2013; Chang, 2014; Baroud et al., 2014; Joyce et al., 2018; Ongkowijoyo & Doloi, 
2018). In this paper, the concept of “sustainable resilience” is used in the assessment of flood 
protection infrastructure, referring to a system’s ability to maintain desired performance by 
changing in response to challenges over time, while simultaneously considering impacts to 
vulnerable populations and critical resources (Gillespie-Marthaler et al., 2018; Nelson et al., 2018). 
In this case, desired performance refers to the system’s ability to prevent flooding caused by a 
release of water considered harmful to social, economic, and environmental (built and natural) 
resources. To illustrate how this concept is applied to flood protection infrastructure, a root-cause 
analysis is performed (identifying both primary and secondary failure modes) for 779 dam failures 
and 1,160 levee failures, in order to develop risk scenarios based on the most significant failure 
modes. Additionally, potential impact associated with extreme precipitation events is evaluated, 
and the assessment is illustrated in a case study involving flood protection infrastructure in 
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Nashville, Tennessee. 
 
Background 
Current Conditions 
A large percentage of the nation’s flood protection infrastructure is suspected to be in 
deteriorating condition. Approximately 90,580 dams exist in the U.S., and like levees, many were 
originally constructed over 50 years ago (ASCE, 2017). By 2030, more than half of the nation’s 
dams will exceed 50 years in age, beyond the originally intended design basis (NRCS, 2003; Lane, 
2008; ASCE, 2017). Many dams were originally constructed in rural areas for agricultural 
irrigation, and since their construction, populations living near dams have increased significantly 
(NRCS, 2003; NRC, 2012). Currently, 17% of existing dams are considered high-hazard potential; 
this percentage is increasing along with an estimated repair and maintenance cost of almost $65 
billion across all dams (ASDSO, 2017; ASCE, 2017).  
Approximately two-thirds of the nation’s population lives in a county with at least one 
levee (ASCE, 2017). Of an estimated 100,000 miles of levee network in the U.S., just under 30,000 
miles are documented; and of the total, only a fraction have been subjected to recent inspection 
and risk-based assessment, leaving the condition of many levees relatively unknown (NCLS, 2009; 
NRC, 2012; ASCE, 2017). The American Society for Civil Engineers (ASCE) estimates that $80 
billion is needed to repair and maintain the nation’s levee portfolio over the next 10 years, while 
USACE expects that $21 billion is needed to maintain its portion of the portfolio, which protects 
11 million people and over $1.3 trillion in property (ASCE, 2017; USACE, 2018a; USACE, 
2015b). Of the levees included in the USACE portfolio, 13% are considered moderate, high, or 
very high risk, with increasing numbers of people and property located behind their walls 
(USACE, 2018a). 
 
Challenges 
In 2012, the National Research Council (NRC) published a study on dam and levee safety 
and community resilience, finding that resilience is obstructed not only by system condition, but 
also by limited awareness and public availability of resilience and risk-related information (NRC, 
2012). A balanced approach to improving resilience should include both structural enhancement 
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and improvements in the integration of information, technology, planning, and education to 
prepare for and communicate both current and future risk across communities (NRC, 2012).  
Lack of funding for maintenance and improvements to both dams and levees poses a long-
term challenge to future flood protection resilience (ASCE, 2017). The U.S. currently operates 
under a policy where the greatest investments are generally made after systems have failed (having 
already resulted in loss of life and property), rendering it difficult to make significant strides in 
preparation, mitigation, and adaptation for future hazards (USACE, 2015b; GAO, 2016; GAO, 
2017). Between 2005 and 2012, the government issued almost $22 billion in post-event 
supplemental appropriations (not part of planned funding) to address levee failures in the aftermath 
of Hurricane Katrina, Midwest flooding, and Hurricane Sandy (USACE, 2015b). Total post-event 
supplemental appropriations for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria are still being tallied, but 
reported by the Government Accountability Office at an estimated $113 billion (GAO, 2018).8  
Continued reliance on federal disaster relief has been a high priority concern for GAO since 
2013 due to increasing frequency of climate-related disasters and escalating magnitude of related 
costs (GAO, 2013; GAO, 2015a; GAO, 2015b; GAO, 2017). While disaster relief may be 
unavoidable in extreme circumstances, future public harm and fiscal exposure can be reduced 
through consistent investments before disasters occur to identify risk, assess community and 
infrastructure resilience, educate vulnerable populations, implement mitigation and adaptation 
strategies, and improve overall resilience of infrastructure and communities (USACE, 2015b; 
ASCE, 2017; USACE, 2018a; GAO, 2015a; GAO, 2015b; GAO, 2018).  
 
Dam and Levee Failure Analysis 
Analysis began with a comprehensive literature review using multiple key words and 
phrases, and a variety of databases and search engines, including Thompson Reuters Web of 
Science (WoS), ASCE Library, JSTOR, SpringerLink, WorldCat, Google Scholar, and Google. 
The search focused on documentation of dam and levee failures that identified root causes and 
included discussion of impacts. Over ninety documents were identified based on these criteria.  
While failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), can be a useful tool in assessing potential 
failures and mitigating future occurrence in design and/or production processes (Sankar & Prabhu, 
                                                 
8 A portion of this amount may be attributed to wildfire activity as well as flooding.  Wildfire-specific appropriations 
were subtracted from GAO totals provided. 
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2001), we do not attempt to employ the FMEA process or the failure mode, effects and criticality 
analysis (FMECA) process. While we recognize that the objectives of FMEA are to identify 
potential failure modes, evaluate the causes and effects of different component failure modes, and 
determine what could eliminate or reduce the likelihood of potential failure (Liu et al., 2013), the 
results of FMEA and FMECA are typically intended to mitigate more specific effects and improve 
performance during design and production in a variety of processes (Liu et al., 2013; Chang & 
Cheng, 2011), which is not the intent here. Lack of specific and more robust data to develop 
conventional risk priority numbers (RPN) based on occurrence (O), severity (S) and detection (D) 
render FMEA a less than optimal approach for this effort, but perhaps a candidate for future efforts 
given increased data for specific (meso- and/or micro-scale) modes and processes. Our approach 
begins at the macro-scale, using existing data (both qualitative and quantitative), as well as 
modeled data using established techniques and authoritative sources.  This information is used to 
examine the overall state of flood protection infrastructure from the macro-scale, as well as trends 
in meso-scale contributing mechanisms (e.g., lack of maintenance, changes in hydrological 
patterns, changes in population, etc.) that effect the systems’ overall ability to perform intended 
functions, and to better understand possible implications for sustainable resilience over time.  
Multiple data sources for dams were concurrently investigated, which included the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) National Dam Inventory (USACE, 2018b) and the Stanford 
University National Performance of Dams Program (NPDP) database (NPDP, 2018) among other 
lesser contributing sources. The USACE database contains information identifying and 
characterizing over 50,000 dams, is searchable by state, and is updated every two-years; however, 
it does not include information regarding historical failures. The NPDP database includes 
information on over 1,300 historic dam failure events. Data sources for levees include the National 
Levee Database, administered by USACE, which contains almost 30,000 miles of levee without 
information on historical failures (USACE, 2018c) as well as other minor sources. As noted by the 
National Research Council (NRC), data on historic levee failure and impacts is largely limited to 
individual reports and is difficult to consolidate on a national level (NRC, 2012).  
 
Dam Failure 
Analysis of root causes for dam failure involved extracting and validating events from 
databases and publications, with the largest contribution of individual events collected from the 
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NPDP9 and the Association of State Dam Safety Officials (ASDSO). A total of 779 failure events, 
spanning the years 1852-2018, was collected. For the purpose of analysis, failure was defined as 
an uncontrolled release of water from the system (release of the dam reservoir over, through, or 
under a dam structure). Criteria for inclusion in the analysis included identification of i) year of 
incident, ii) location, iii) dam type, and iv) primary cause of failure. Where available, additional 
information included i) contributing cause(s) of failure, ii) number of fatalities, iii) damages and 
associated costs, and iv) description of impacts to social, economic, and environmental resources 
for communities. Limitations associated with this analysis involved the inability to accurately 
account for all historical and contemporary failures due to lack of available information and 
inaccuracies inherent through use and interpretation of best available information. In many cases, 
anecdotal information (e.g., media coverage) was used to better understand the extent of damages 
and impacts to communities. Information, including references, used in the analysis is located in a 
web-enabled appendix (Appendix F) with search and filter capability at: 
https://blindreview1.shinyapps.io/dams/.  
A summary of fatalities and costs (adjusted for inflation and brought forward to 2018) 
resulting from dam failure analysis is provided in Table 12, with distinction drawn between events 
that occurred before and after enactment of the National Dam Inspection Act (1972) and the Dam 
Safety Act (1979) (S.2735, 2006). 
 
 
Table 12. Summary of Fatalities & Costs Associated with Dam Failure Events (1852-2018) 
A summary of the types of dams represented in the analysis is provided in Figure 12 (percentages 
are relative to 779 U.S. dam failure events included in the analysis). Of the dams included in the 
                                                 
9 For events collected from the NPDP database, failure cause was derived from the individual incident “event” tab, 
rather than the main output page for queries. Where the two outputs did not match, deference was given to the 
incident description provided in the “event” tab. 
Dam Failures in U.S. 
(1852-2017)
Grand Total Total Since 1972 Total Since 1979
Total events 779 539 467
Cost (2018) $14,009,576,127 $11,805,556,845 $1,175,200,834
Events with fatalities 69 27 15
Total fatalities 3936 707 42
Events with > 10 
fatalities 
23 8 1
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analysis, 66% are classified as earthen structures (e.g., homogeneous-earth, earth-fill, earth-zoned, 
earth-gravity, etc.).  
 
Figure 12. Distribution of Failures According to Dam Types 
 
Primary, or root causes of failure (failure modes) were determined through examination of 
information (incident reports, explanations, narrative) documented for each dam, and where 
available, this information was validated against multiple sources. General descriptions for 
common dam failure modes identified in the analysis are provided in Table 13. 
 
 
Table 13. General Descriptions for Dam Failure Modes 
 
Failure Mode General Description
Breach Opening or break in structure (intentional or unintentional)
Cracking Structural cracking due to movement
Foundation Defects due to settlement of structure and/or slope instability
Overtopping Water flowing over top (crest) of structure 
Piping Sinkholes due to poor filtration of seepage and movement of soils at the foundation 
Poor Construction Inadequate design/construction 
Poor Maintenance Inadequate maintenance and repair
Seepage Wells or boreholes form due to poor drainage at foundation and abutments 
Spillway
Inadequacy or deficiency that prevents controlled release of water (reservoir 
drawdown) through spillway structure
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A summary of primary failure modes for dams is provided in Figure 13. The primary cause 
of dam failures is attributed to overtopping (42%). This finding is proportionally similar to ASDSO 
information regarding recent failures from 2010-2015 (ASDSO, 2018). Failure mode is unknown 
for 32% of events, while breach is cited in 12% of the records, with foundation, piping, and poor 
maintenance accounting for the remaining failures.  
 
Figure 13: Primary Modes (Root Causes) of Dam Failure in the U.S. 
 
Where available, secondary failure modes were also identified. Secondary modes are 
defined herein as significant contributing factors, without which failure may not have occurred or 
consequences may have been less severe. The majority (52%) of dam failures exhibited extreme 
weather as a secondary mode, primarily due to a hydrologic event (extreme/prolonged 
precipitation or storm with or without impacts associated with snowmelt). Thirty-eight percent of 
failures did not account for secondary modes, indicating that there was no secondary mode or none 
was recorded in the historical account. Figure 14 is an overall summary of secondary modes for 
dam failure based on events assessed. 
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Figure14. Secondary Modes (Contributing Factors) of Dam Failure in the U.S. 
 
The analysis results make clear that dam failure due to overtopping associated with a 
hydrologic event represents a significant risk scenario for downstream communities, with breach, 
foundation and piping failure also of concern. In particular, earthen dams (the majority of dam 
types associated with failure events in the analysis) appear highly susceptible to the effects of 
hydrologic events.  Table 14 provides a summary of risk scenarios derived from failure mode 
analysis and developed for this paper that present a challenge to the sustainable resilience of dam 
infrastructure and downstream communities based on these observations. 
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Table 14. Scenarios Presenting Risk to Dam Failure and Community Resilience 
 
Levee Failure 
Root cause analysis for levee failure relied heavily on individual reports, documenting 
events associated with large-scale disruption of levee systems in a specific region. The analysis 
includes 1,160 individual failure events, resulting from five flood episodes, Midwest (1993), 
California Central Valley (1997), New Orleans (2005), Midwest (2008 & 2011). While dams are 
considered to be individual structures, levees operate as systems of systems, rendering a different 
process for the analysis. Consequences are generally attributed to the collective impacts of a large-
scale event, as opposed to an individual failure within a levee system.  
Similarly to a dam failure event, levee failure event is defined as an uncontrolled release 
of water from the system (over, through, or under a levee structure). Criteria for inclusion in the 
analysis requires knowledge of i) year of incident, ii) location, and iii) primary cause of failure. 
All levees were earth embankment and a portion of levees also included flood walls atop the 
embankment structure. Where available, additional information includes i) contributing cause(s) 
of failure, ii) number of fatalities, iii) damages and associated costs, iv) description of impacts to 
social, economic, and environmental resources for impacted communities, and v) lessons learned. 
Failure 
Scenario
Scenario Description
Primary 
Failure Mode
Secondary 
Failure Modes 
(most significant)
% Primary 
Mode 
Failures
% All 
Failures
1
Heavy and/or persistent rainfall (with or without 
snowmelt impacts) results in exceedance of reservoir 
capacity, allowing water to flow over the crest; spillway 
deficiencies preventing safe drawdown contribute 
Overtopping 
Hydrologic 
event, spillway
94 42
2
Heavy and/or persistent rainfall (with or without 
snowmelt impacts) results in load exceedance, causing a 
break in the structure that allows water to flow 
through; spillway deficiencies and/or piping which 
erodes foundation material contribute 
Breach 
Hydrologic 
event, Spillway, 
Piping
92 12
3
Heavy and/or persistent rainfall (with or without 
snowmelt impacts) leads to settlement or slope 
instability , resulting in partial or total collapse and 
release of water; erosion and/or poor construction 
contribute 
Foundation 
Hydrologic 
event, Erosion, 
Poor 
construction
66 4
4
Poor filtration beneath the structure and/or at 
abutments results in loss of foundation material and 
release of water; hydrologic events and/or animal 
burrowing contribute 
Piping
Seepage, 
Hydrologic 
event, Animal 
61 4
Total 62
While all dam types display vulnerbaility to scenarios based on analysis, earthen dams comprise the majority of 
failure events.
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Analysis limitations were similar to those encountered in analyzing dam failures. Information used 
in the analysis, including references, is located in a web-enabled appendix (Appendix G) with 
search and filter capability at: https://blindreview1.shinyapps.io/levees/. A summary of fatalities 
and costs (in $2018) resulting from levee failure analysis is provided in Table 15. 
 
Table 15. Summary of Fatalities & Costs Associated with Levee Failure Events (1993-2011) 
 
The greatest number of fatalities and cost ($2018) occurred in 2005 following Hurricane 
Katrina in New Orleans (estimated to be at least 1,500 fatalities and over $138 billion in total cost), 
resulting from multiple levee failures, record storm surge, and complications in evacuation and 
emergency response (Reible et al., 2006; Wolshon et al., 2006; Mlakar, 2006; Van Heerden, 2007; 
Sills et al., 2008; USACE, 2009). While legislation related to levee safety was enacted in 2016, it 
has yet to be appropriated (S.612, 2016). General descriptions for common levee failure modes 
identified in the analysis are provided in Table 16.  
 
Table 16. General Descriptions for Levee Failure Modes 
 
Levee Failures in U.S. 
(1993-2011)
Total
Total failure events 1160
Cost (2018) $189,393,577,710
Fatalities 1576
Population displaced 153,000
Population evacuated 923,500
Failure Mode General Description
Breach Opening or break in structure (intentional or unintentional)
Cracking Structural cracking due to movement
Overtopping Water flowing over top (crown) of structure 
Piping
Sinkholes due to poor filtration of seepage and movement of soils at the foundation 
and abutments
Seepage Wells or boreholes form due to poor drainage at foundation and abutments 
Sliding
Sheer failure where saturated sections of levee slide down the face of the levee due 
to high water events
Sloughing Erosion of landside levee slope due to seepage or piping
Subsidence
Loss of levee elevation due to removal of subsurface support via piping, sinkholes, 
seismic activity, etc.
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The vast majority of levee failures in the analysis are attributed to overtopping (97%). 
While slightly over ninety percent of levee failures included are non-federal, this finding is 
proportionally similar to results from assessments performed by USACE on over 70% of its 
existing portfolio, where overtopping is the major driver for failure (USACE, 2018a). A summary 
of primary failure modes for levees is provided in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15. Primary Modes (Root Causes) of Levee Failure in the U.S. 
 
Every levee failure in the analysis is, by definition, related to extreme weather, represented 
as a hydrologic event characterized by extreme/prolonged precipitation (with or without impacts 
from snowmelt), and/or storm (including hurricanes, coastal and inland flooding, and storm surge). 
Secondary modes for levee failure are therefore considered as contributing factors other than 
hydrologic event. Figure 16 depicts the overall distribution of secondary modes for levee failure 
due to overtopping and hydrologic event. 
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Figure 16. Secondary Modes (Contributing Factors) of Levee Failure in the U.S. 
 
Breach contributed to 96% of levee failures due to overtopping and hydrologic event. Table 17 
provides a summary of high risk scenarios derived from failure mode analysis and developed for 
this paper that present a current challenge to the sustainable resilience of levee infrastructure and 
nearby communities. 
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Table 17. Scenarios Presenting Highest Risk to Levee Failure and Community Resilience 
  
Lessons learned from each of the five flood events assessed (Midwest (1993), California 
Central Valley (1997), New Orleans (2005), Midwest (2008 & 2011)) display a need for real-time 
monitoring of precipitation, river stage, streamflow/discharge, and soil moisture data, in addition 
to the ability to share this information across networks to aid in coordination and communication 
during events. Table 18 provides a summary of key issues identified for events. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Failure 
Scenario
Scenario Description
Levee 
Type*
Primary 
Failure Mode
Secondary 
Failure Modes 
(most significant)
% Primary 
Mode 
Failures
% All 
Failures
1
Storm surge and/or heavy and/or persistent rainfall 
(with or without snowmelt impacts, and excessive soil 
satutation) exceeds levee capacity, allowing water to 
flow over the crown; load exceedance and breaching 
contribute 
all Overtopping 
Hydrologic 
event, (with or 
without 
breach)
98 97
2
Storm surge and/or heavy and/or persistent rainfall 
(with or without snowmelt impacts, and excessive soil 
saturation) results in landside slope instability and loss 
of embankment material, allowing release of water; 
seepage or piping may also contribute
all Sloughing
Hydrologic 
event
1 1
3
Storm surge and/or heavy and/or persistent rainfall 
(with or without snowmelt impacts, and excessive soil 
saturation) results in load exceedance, causing a break 
in the embankment, allowing release of water; erosion 
may also contribute
all Breach
Hydrologic 
event
1 1
Total 99* Earthen embankments (with and without floodwall) comprise all failure events.
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Table 18. Lessons Learned from Past Levee Failures 
 
Many of the items in Table 18 can be applied to dam failures where similar failure modes 
exist. Early warning systems and enhancements in evacuation and emergency response processes 
are critical to reducing human injury, and require continuous improvement. The need for improved 
models and greater understanding of how changes in land use and climate may impact riverine, 
flash, and coastal flooding scenarios persists in the wake of events like Hurricane Sandy (Grinsted 
et al., 2013; Garner et al., 2017; Dietrich, 2018); Hurricane Harvey (Shah et al., 2017; Trenberth 
et al., 2018;  GAO, 2018), flooding in Louisiana (Wiel et al., 2017), Hurricanes Irma and Maria 
(GAO, 2018), and most recently, Hurricanes Florence and Michael. 
 
 
 
 
Event Levee Failure -  Lessons Learned/Needs Identified References*
Midwest, 
1993
- Need reliable real-time data on stream flow, stage, and soil moisture conditions 
(improved monitoring networks)
- Need improved models for future flooding and levee failure 
- Need comprehensive floodplain management & improved understanding of how 
changes in land use effect flooding within/across river basins
Galloway, 1994;  
Interagency
Floodplain 
Management Task
Force, 1994
CA Central 
Valley, 1997
- Need improved coordination of flood releases across delta
- Need a comprehensive approach to managing runoff
- Need increase in telemetered gaging stations for streamflow and precipitation
- Lack of maintenance contributed to failure (obstructed culverts, vegetation, etc.)
- Need improved monitoring of seismic effects
- Need improved coordination/communication for evacuation processes
FEAT, 1997; Burton 
& Cutter, 2008
New 
Orleans, 
2005
- Need improved/increased risk assessment for levees susceptible to storm surge 
(foundation and floodwall inadequacy contributed to breaching)
- Overtopping alone would have resulted in far less flooding 
- Need to understand how climate impacts storm intensity
- Need improved warning, coordination, communication & evacuation processes
Sills et al., 2008; 
Wolshon, 2006; 
ASCE, 2007; USACE, 
2007; Cutter & Gall, 
2007; USACE, 2009
Midwest, 
2008
- Limited river gaging information constrained the National Weather Service and others 
in developing timely and accurate river stage forecasts
- Need to review accuracy of the stage-discharge, discharge-frequency, and stage-
frequency relationships essential to flood control planning (determine how changes in 
land use patterns and climate alter relationships)
- Need greater enforcement of building restrictions, land use planning in floodplains
Bernhardt et al., 
2011;  Holmes et 
al., 2010; Gleason, 
2008; Carter, 2009
Midwest, 
2011
- Smart phone application/real-time GPS location of conditions in the field provided 
flood fighters ability to upload images, describe damage, and share critical data 
USACE, 2012
* Greater detail and a complete set of references can be found at Appendix B (https://blindreview1.shinyapps.io/levees/).
 95 
Implications for Future Sustainable Resilience of Flood Protection Infrastructure 
Factors Affecting Sustainable Resilience of Flood Protection Infrastructure 
 
Past and current events illustrate that changes in land use and development can impact local 
and regional hydrology affecting flood patterns and intensity (Interagency Floodplain 
Management Task Force, 1994; Villarini et al., 2011). Likewise, changes in coastal conditions 
brought about by subsidence and rising sea level can alter storm surge intensity and magnitude of 
flooding (Burkett et al., 2001; Van Heerden, 2007; Sills et al., 2008; Garner et al., 2017; Trenberth 
et al., 2018). Continued exposure of aging/failing infrastructure to extreme events and dynamic 
processes can create new and potentially unforeseen challenges for communities and the 
infrastructure they depend upon (Hallegatte, 2009; Neumann et al., 2015; Melvin et al., 2016; 
GAO, 2016 and 2018). Conditions such as those produced by long-term drought, followed by 
heavy precipitation can push infrastructure beyond design standards and initiate or accelerate 
failure as evidenced by Oroville Dam (Vahedifard, 2017). These conditions, coupled with 
increasing concentrations of people and property downstream of dams and behind levee walls 
create greater risk of injury and damage (NRCS, 2003; NRC, 2012; ASCE, 2017; USACE, 2018a; 
USACE, 2018f), potentially jeopardizing future sustainable resilience.  
NOAA recently updated its analysis of extreme climate disasters exceeding a billion dollars 
in cost.10 Since Hurricane Katrina in 200511, NOAA has recorded 128 events exceeding the billion 
dollar threshold in cost (NOAA, 2018b).12 Notably, extreme precipitation and storm accounts for 
83% of billion dollar events documented by NOAA (106 of 128), representing 86% of total cost 
and 90% of total deaths (NOAA, 2018b).13,14  
The aforementioned scenarios presenting highest risk to flood protection infrastructure 
failure and community sustainable resilience are also primarily attributed to occurrence of extreme 
hydrologic events. Figure 17 provides a summary of extreme hydrologic events (similar to those 
documented in dam and levee failures) present in the 106 precipitation/storm-related NOAA 
                                                 
10 Reflecting cost after 2018 Consumer Price Index adjustment. 
11 Largely considered a watershed event in terms of media coverage and magnitude of consequences. 
12 Totaling just under one trillion at $995.1 billion, and 4,472 lives lost (NOAA, 2018b). If new estimates for loss of 
life associated with Hurricane Maria are included, the total increases to 7,447 (Santos-Burgoa et al., 2018). 
13 Does not include Hurricane Florence (estimated at $1.2 billion and 42 deaths as of Sep 24, 2018 by CBS, 2018). 
14 Estimated at $853.3 billion in cost and 4,015 deaths. Estimates associated with Hurricane Maria increase total 
deaths to 6,990, while the proportion remains unchanged at 90% (Santos-Burgoa et al., 2018). 
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events since 2005. Events in italics are associated with documented dam and levee failures (Katrina 
2005, Midwest 2008, Midwest 2011, South Carolina 2015; Midwest 2017).  The hurricane 
category (CAT) represents magnitude at landfall (levels 1-4+). Precipitation is the total recorded 
for the event.  Storm categories and precipitation totals are derived from the following: NOAA,  
2018b; Holmes et al., 2010; USACE, 2012; NASA, 2017; Belles, 2018; NOAA, 2018e. Figure 17 
also depicts increasing linear trends in catastrophic events associated with flooding where both 
extreme precipitation and hurricane-related events appear to be increasing.  
 
Figure 17. Extreme Hydrologic Events Linked to Catastrophic Flooding (2005-2018) (NOAA, 
2018b; Holmes et al., 2010; USACE, 2012; NASA, 2017; Belles, 2018; NOAA, 2018e) 
 
Precipitation associated with events in Figure 17 is considered the total rainfall within a specified 
duration (hours or days), and can be compared to local recurrence intervals or intensity-duration-
frequency (IDF) tables to gage relative magnitude (NOAA, 2018d).15  
Extreme hydrologic events are often characterized in terms of a 100-year, 500-year, 1,000-
                                                 
15 Intensity-duration-frequency (IDF) tables provide a measure of rainfall intensity over specified durations 
necessary to produce a storm event (1, 4, 10, 25, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000-year storm). The NOAA Atlas 14 Point 
Precipitation Frequency Estimates are provided by state and NOAA gage here: 
https://hdsc.nws.noaa.gov/hdsc/pfds/pfds_map_cont.html (NOAA, 2018d). 
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year (and so on), which refers to the likelihood of observing an event of specified magnitude in 
any given year, based on calculation of a return, or recurrence interval from observed data for a 
specific location (USGS, 2018). A 100-year event has a 1 in 100 (1%) probability of occurring in 
a given year, and risk associated with such an event is determined based on its probability and 
expected damage. Events in excess of the 100-year standard have been recorded multiple times 
since 2005. Hurricane Harvey produced record floods in excess of 500 and 1,000-year events 
(Harris County, 2018), and Hurricanes Irma, Maria, and Florence have set records in terms of 
flooding and destruction in 2017 (GAO, 2018; Santos-Burgoa et al., 2018; Belles, 2018). Damages 
from Hurricane Michael were also catastrophic where the category 4 storm and heavy surge made 
landfall on the Gulf Coast in Florida (NOAA, 2018e). 
Recurrence intervals and associated risks are often used in planning and design of 
infrastructure. For example, the 100-year standard for storm surge is the basis for current structural 
specifications associated with the Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk Reduction System in the 
greater New Orleans area (USACE, 2018e). Risk and resilience are impacted by the correct 
determination and application of recurrence intervals, which are used to define both the public 
perception of, and the physical consequences potentially associated with, a hazard event (e.g., a 
community may assume a levee built to a 100-year standard should protect them from a 100-year 
storm, and may not question whether or not the standard is correct). Since recurrence intervals are 
largely based on historical data (what has been observed in the past), they are subject to uncertainty 
in future projections and, hence, need to be updated over time (NOAA, 2018d). Examination of 
observed precipitation data for the U.S. Gulf Coastal region from 1900 to 2016 displays an 
increasing recurrence, and associated likelihood, of extreme flooding events, like those 
experienced in 2017 (Weil et al., 2017). Future sustainable resilience requires consideration of 
how recurrence intervals and associated risks may change based on possible changes in the 
frequency and magnitude of extreme hydrologic events over the next several decades (within the 
life of both new and existing flood protection infrastructure). 
 
Use of General Circulation Models (GCMs) and Future Scenario Development 
Current literature displays convergence regarding both observed and predicted impacts of 
warming temperatures on increasing frequency and magnitude of extreme precipitation events 
(Allan & Soden, 2008; O’Gorman & Schneider, 2009; Kharin et al., 2013; Kendon et al., 2014; 
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Ban et al., 2015; Fischer & Kutti, 2016). Regional variation has been found to depend on relative 
changes in convective moisture, where increasing temperature generally produces greater 
precipitation in humid climates than dry climates due to the Clausius–Clapeyron equation (Prein 
et al., 2017a; Bao et al., 2017)16. Analysis of observed and modeled data indicates that the most 
significant increases in frequency and magnitude of precipitation appear to occur in the highest 
percentile events (rarest, or most extreme events), often at the expense of lower magnitude 
(more moderate) precipitation events, leading to longer dry periods that are followed by heavy 
rain and excessive runoff (Allan & Soden, 2008; Karl et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2017; Gao et 
al., 2017; Arritt et al., 2018). Uncertainty remains regarding the rate, or scale associated with 
increased frequency and magnitude over time (Bao et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017). Some 
studies suggest that scaling associated with Clausius–Clapeyron is likely to be more severe than 
models predict, where observed scaling exceeds modeled results (Allan & Soden, 2008). Such 
patterns can impact both drought and flood risk, and the need to review and possibly update 
recurrence intervals, risk assessments, and associated infrastructure standards (Wang et al., 
2017; Kharin et al., 2018).  
Similar convergence in literature is displayed for increasing magnitude of tropical cyclone 
impact in the North Atlantic, where the most extreme events appear most sensitive to warming 
temperatures (Grinsted, 2013). The 2017 U.S. hurricane season, which produced hurricanes 
Harvey, Irma, and Maria, was fueled by high sea surface temperatures and oceanic heat content 
(Lim et al., 2018). Midwest flooding may also be correlated with warming episodes in the North 
Atlantic water cycle via ocean-to-land-moisture-transport as determined by significance of salinity 
signatures identified during Spring precipitation prior to the 1993, 2008, and 2015 floods (Li et 
al., 2018).  
In the case of both precipitation and tropical cyclones, increases in predicted magnitude of 
extreme events (as well as magnitude of resulting damage) appear more pronounced as temperature 
rises. General circulation models (GCMs) operate under the assumption of four possible future 
scenarios termed ‘representative concentration pathways’ (RCPs) that range from limiting average 
global temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius (RCP 2.6), to a worst-case scenario (RCP 8.5), 
                                                 
16 This relationship is generally explained by the Clausius–Clapeyron equation (saturation vapor pressure of water 
increases with increasing in temperature, leading to increases in precipitation). 
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which results in greater temperature increase in the absence of mitigation strategies, and resulting 
radiative forcing (van Vuuren et al., 2011). Current studies indicate that RCP 2.6 may now be out 
of reach, and likely scenarios more realistically include those resulting in global temperature 
increase in excess of 2 degrees Celsius (Raftery et al., 2017; Mauritsen & Pincus, 2017; Peters et 
al., 2017; McGushin et al., 2018).   
For every degree Celsius increase in temperature, models predict a two- to seven-fold 
increase in events similar to the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina (Grinsted, 2013). The global 
trajectory is now approaching a 1.5 degree Celsius increase as early as 2030 (McGushin et al., 
2018). At an increase of 2 degrees Celsius, sea level rise may contribute to storm surge magnitudes 
that cost an additional $1.4 trillion in global annual losses (Jevrejeva et al., 2018). A worst-case 
future (RCP 8.5) may result in a 15% to 40% increase in maximum precipitation rates produced 
by convective storms (Prein et al., 2017b); sea level rise contributing to storm surge magnitudes 
that cost an additional $14 to $27 trillion in global annual losses (Jevrejeva et al., 2018). Modeled 
projections for almost all scenarios currently result in increasing risk due to flood and storm, with 
greatest risks represented by RCP 8.5 (Grinsted et al., 2013; Kharin et al., 2018; Jevrejeva et al., 
2018; Pant & Cha, 2018). This has prompted a general call to review risk assessments and 
standards for flood protection infrastructure (Prein et al., 2017b; Kharin et al., 2018) to ensure that 
future hazard scenarios are identified and sufficiently accounted for in design and planning efforts.    
 
Case Study: Nashville’s Flood Protection Infrastructure 
A case study is presented in which a single highest risk scenario for flood protection 
infrastructure is applied as represented in Tables 14 and 17. The scenario is that of heavy and 
persistent rainfall which exceeds the design capacity of a levee, resulting in an uncontrolled release 
of water that causes harm to social, economic, and environmental (built and natural) resources, 
thereby disrupting nearby communities. History provides a recent example of this scenario in 
Nashville, TN in 2010. This flood event exceeded all known events in the local, recorded account, 
spanning over seventy years. To better understand development and application of possible future 
scenarios for extreme events of similar magnitude, application of GCM and local data analysis 
provides insight into potential future risk and resulting implications for local sustainable resilience.  
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Nashville 2010 Flood 
Nashville, Tennessee experienced extreme precipitation in May 2010, resulting in 
catastrophic riverine and flash flooding which caused eleven deaths, over $2 billion in damages, 
and an estimated $3.6 billion in economic losses (Nashville-Davidson County, 2011; Nashville-
Davidson County, 2015a; Nashville-Davidson County, 2015b). During this period, precipitation 
in the area exceeded known historic records for 24-hour (184 millimeters), 2-day (345 
millimeters), and 3-day (over 431 millimeters) events, corresponding to 7.24, 13.58, and 17 inches, 
respectively (Nashville-Davidson County, 2015a; Keim et al., 2018). The 24-hour record 
corresponds to a 792-year event, while the 2-day and 3-day records exceed 1,000-year events, with 
the 2-day cumulative precipitation amount corresponding to a 13,833-year event (Keim et al., 
2018). The Cumberland River crested near levees protecting the downtown area at over 15.43 
meters, or 50.62 feet (just below the 500-year level) (USACE, 2018d; Davidson County, 2015c). 
While local dams did not fail, one of two levees protecting the downtown area failed due 
to overtopping, resulting in economic losses (Davidson County, 2015c). Investment in flood 
protection occurred following 2010 to ensure protection up to a 500-year event for at least one of 
two levees protecting the downtown Nashville area along the Cumberland River (Nashville-
Davidson County, 2015c). Studies conducted in the aftermath of the 2010 event indicate that heavy 
precipitation has increased within the area over the last 30 years, and that precipitation totals in 
excess of the 2010 event are possible (Higgins et al., 2011; Moore et al., 2012; Keim et al., 2018). 
Given current flood protection standards for local levees, it is possible that extreme precipitation 
in excess of the 2010 event could exceed design standards, resulting in levee failure and impacts 
to sustainable resilience for both infrastructure and the community. 
 
Development of Worst-Case Scenario for Local Flood Protection Infrastructure 
To better understand potential impacts to heavy precipitation (95th percentile and above) 
resulting from climate-based changes for the Nashville area, and how those changes may be related 
to sustainable resilience, analysis using both local data and downscaled CMIP5 climate projections 
is employed. In recognition of the limitations associated with the use of GCMs for local projection, 
the analysis is undertaken to provide better understanding of model processes, and how they may 
be related to future scenario development to aid in sustainable resilience planning.  
First, the significance of precipitation on the Cumberland River is determined in order to 
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validate risk posed to local flood protection infrastructure resulting from the scenario selected 
above. Daily stage (height)17 and precipitation observations18 from 2004 to 2018 are determined 
to be positively correlated where stage height is a lagging variable (cross-correlation is used to 
identify the optimal lag period of two days between variables) as shown at Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18. A. Plot of Time-Series De-Lagged Variables (River Stage Height and Precipitation) 
above Flood Stage for Cumberland River (>= 30 ft), B. Plot of De-Lagged Variables (River 
Stage Height and Precipitation) above Flood Action Stage for Cumberland River (>= 30 ft) with 
Linear and Local Regression Lines & Correlation Coefficient 
 
                                                 
17 Stage height data obtained from USACE river gage located at Davidson County, Shelby Street Bridge, Nashville 
TN (USACE, 2018d). 
18 Daily precipitation data obtained from the NOAA online data center for Nashville, TN (NOAA, 2018c). 
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A lagged regression model using the optimal lag period produces an Adjusted R-squared 
value of 0.88. A correlation coefficient of 0.49 is obtained using de-lagged data at river action 
stage and above with associated daily precipitation values.19 This suggests that precipitation is 
significant to riverine flooding, and that extreme precipitation events pose a threat to local levees. 
As the Cumberland River is the receiving stream for the metropolitan area, this finding is consistent 
with current, local flood risk assessment (Nashville-Davidson County, 2015c). To assess the 
potential for experiencing extreme precipitation events in the future, analysis using local 
precipitation gage data (NOAA, 2018c) with downscaled Coupled Model Intercomparison Project 
(CMIP5) climate model outputs for a worst-case scenario (RCP 8.5) is employed (NOAA, 2018c; 
Maurer et al., 2007; Meehl et al., 2007; Hibbard et al., 2007; Meehl et al., 2009; Taylor et al., 2012; 
Reclamation, 2013; Reclamation, 2014).  
Analysis of standardized precipitation anomalies using CMIP5 modeled outputs from 
twenty models for Nashville (covering four, 12 by 12 km grids) is conducted in a manner consistent 
with current climate literature (Hansen et al., 2012; Gao et al., 2017; Ryu & Hahoe, 2017). A list 
of CMIP5 models used is provided in Appendix H. Linear interpolation between locally observed 
daily precipitation (NOAA, 2018c) and anomalies calculated for CMIP5 observed daily 
precipitation (Maurer et al., 2002; Maurer et al., 2007) over the same period (1950-1999) is 
employed to determine thresholds (in the form of anomaly-equivalents) for the magnitude of both 
24-hour and 3-day heavy events based on local intensity-duration-frequency (IDF) tables (NOAA, 
2018d).  Observed data derived from CMIP5 are scaled to account for multiple variables including 
variation in land cover and changes in terrain across North America (Maurer et al., 2002; Maurer 
et al., 2007). Due to scaling scling, a comparison of CMIP5 observed data and locally observed 
data from NOAA gage stations reveals a similarity in pattern of precipitation highs and lows for 
both 1-day and 3-day annual maxima, but a consistent difference in magnitude of maximum events 
likely corresponding to factors noted by Maurer et al. (2002). 
We deem it necessary to compare local NOAA gage station data to CMIP5 observed data 
to relate CMIP5-derived anomalies to actual observed magnitudes if specific IDF-derived 
thresholds are desired for worst-case precipitation event analysis. Otherwise, percentile-based 
                                                 
19 Flood stage for the Cumberland River at the gage nearest local levees is 12.19 meters (40 feet). Action stage is at 
9.14 meters (30 feet), a level determined by USACE as requiring close monitoring and preparation for action in the 
event of flood (USACE, 2018d). 
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thresholds can be established (z-score analysis) to determine exceedances consistent with (Hansen 
et al., 2012; Gao et al., 2017). Establishment of a linear relationship between locally observed 
precipitation gage data (NOAA, 2018c) and anomalies for CMIP5 observed data (Maurer et al., 
2007) for 24-hour and 3-day events allows for calibration of historic threshold exceedance (as 
anomaly-equivalents) based on known events from local record, and the ability to estimate 
projected event magnitudes from modeled anomalies used in Nelson et al. (2019).  A summary of 
the method used is at Appendix I. 
The maximum 24-hour and 3-day event thresholds were selected (highest observed 
historical rainfall for the area) based on the Nashville 2010 flood, where precipitation amounts 
exceeded NOAA IDF thresholds for the 1000-year storm for both 2- and 3-day events (NOAA, 
2018d). The maximum historic thresholds were used in addition to the IDF-based thresholds for 
the analysis. Anomaly-equivalents for IDF values were determined to establish thresholds for 
analysis, categorized as i) 10-25 year event, ii) 25-100 year event, iii) 100-200 year event, iv) 200-
500 year event, and v) 500+ year event. These thresholds were used in analysis of projected (future) 
extreme precipitation scenarios by comparing the frequency (count) and intensity (count multiplied 
by magnitude) of threshold exceedances between the baseline period (1951-1980) and future 
periods though the remainder of the twenty-first century, determined by modeled outputs in a 
manner consistent with prior studies (Hansen et al., 2012; Gao et al., 2017; Ryu & Hahoe, 2017). 
The period (1951-1980) is selected as the baseline period for analysis of frequency and magnitude 
of threshold exceedance due to minimal signature associated with effects of climate change 
(Hansen et al., 2012).  
Analysis results suggest that precipitation events of similar or greater magnitude to those 
experienced in 2010 may be plausible given ensemble modeled outputs (average of results for all 
20 models) as demonstrated in Nelson et al., 2019. Local observed data over the baseline period 
does not contain occurrences of ‘extremely heavy 100-200 year events’ and above for 24-hour and 
3-day totals, including the second largest event on record for the area, set in 1979 at 167.74 mm 
(6.6 inches) (NOAA, 2018c). Projected, or future, periods (based on modeled outputs) contain 
occurrences of exceedances in thresholds at the 100-200, 200-500, and greater than 500-year event. 
The frequency of lower magnitude events at the 10-25 year threshold appears to decrease in future 
periods, a result consistent with similar analyses (Gao et al., 2017; Bao et al., 2017; Prein et al., 
2017b). Changes in frequency (count) of threshold exceedance for observed and projected periods 
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are displayed in Figure 19.  
 
 
Figure 19. Change in Frequency (Count) of Threshold Exceedance for Heavy Precipitation 
 
When both frequency of exceedance and magnitude of maximum anomalies are considered 
and compared to the 2010 event, the potential for more frequent and larger magnitude is plausible 
within projected periods (as shown in Table 19).  This suggests that Nashville should consider 
levee failure beyond its present protective design due to plausible future hydrologic events. 
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Table 19. Summary of Observed and Projected Frequency & Magnitude of Heavy Precipitation 
 
Both exceedances in frequency and magnitude of maximum modeled anomalies are 
highlighted in Table 19. The frequency of both 24-hour and 3-day events exceeding the 200-year 
threshold increases in projected periods (with a slightly greater increase in frequency after mid-
century for 200-500+ year storms, where greater significance is evident in 3-day precipitation 
events). The magnitude of the maximum modeled precipitation occurrence for a 24-hour event 
increases by over twenty-one percent above the magnitude observed in 2010, approximating a 
precipitation event somewhat above the 500-year threshold. The maximum modeled 3-day event 
increases by over seven percent above the magnitude observed in 2010. While the resulting 
increase in the 3-day event is smaller than that for a 24-event, it is well above the 1,000-year 
threshold and exceeds the record-setting rainfall observed in 2010 for a 3-day period (also 
exceeding the 1,000-year threshold). The decadal trajectory for projected precipitation intensity 
(threshold exceedance count multiplied by maximum anomaly magnitude) for 3-day events, which 
may be seen to produce the most severe conditions based on potential for levee impact due to 
increased river stage following at least 2 days of heavy rain, can be seen in Figure 20.  
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Figure 20. Decadal Trajectory for Ensemble Projected Heavy Precipitation for 3-Day Events 
 
Due to relatively significant uncertainty in GCM prediction, especially when used at local 
scales, Figures 19 and 20 are not intended to represent a precise estimation for future extreme 
precipitation change, but rather to illustrate that extreme event occurrence may be plausible in any 
decade based on modeled outputs and is not necessarily more prevalent post mid-century.  The 
methods employed here to develop a worst-case scenario for evaluating future sustainable 
resilience are not meant to predict or to represent the probability of extreme events, but to 
demonstrate the plausibility of such events in future planning horizons. 
An increase in extreme precipitation events over the remainder of the century is largely 
consistent with results obtained in other recent studies including EPA (2016), stating likelihood of 
trends since mid-20th century, resulting in a 27% increase in heavy rainfall; and research conducted 
on counties in the state of Tennessee by Camp et al.  (2016), which found an increase in both 
frequency and magnitude of extremely heavy precipitation with an average of over seven percent 
increase in magnitude for 3-day precipitation events above the 95th percentile. Differences in 
estimated heavy precipitation increase across studies highlight the need for additional research and 
improved ability to identify heavy rainfall trajectories more specifically by percentile (threshold) 
to better understand nuances in frequency and magnitude change both above and below the 95th 
percentile.  
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Conclusions 
Based on a review of recorded dam and levee failures, it is apparent that overtopping and 
breach of earthen dams/levees due to hydrologic events is of foremost concern.  This poses a 
significant threat to sustainable resilience for infrastructure and communities protected by these 
barriers. Given that extreme hydrologic events (in the form of precipitation at or greater than the 
95th percentile) are projected to increase in both frequency and magnitude over the remainder of 
the century when compared to observed baselines and historic events, this concern is 
exacerbated.  
Using the Nashville, TN area as an illustrative example, where a significant flood in 2010 
caused an earthen levee to fail, it was shown that, despite post-event improvements made to the 
levee, overtopping and breach due to a future extreme hydrologic event poses a potentially 
significant threat. These results suggest that additional flood adaptation strategies (updating 
recurrence intervals, risk assessments, public education, and other actions to reduce risk) are 
likely needed to sustain desired performance of flood protection infrastructure and prevention of 
uncontrolled release of water leading to harmful social, economic, and environmental resources. 
While this analysis focuses on flood protection infrastructure, the methods used here can be 
generalized to other types of infrastructure susceptible to flood risk, and to other locations based 
on selection of local data and identification of geographic area via CMIP5.  
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CHAPTER VI 
Conclusion 
 
The body of work represented by this dissertation began with a need to understand how the 
concepts of risk, vulnerability, resilience, sustainability, and adaptive capacity are linked, and a 
desire to demonstrate how aligning these concepts to better fit within the spatial and temporal 
needs of complex systems may improve the understanding of how to assess complex adaptive 
system performance. The process produced a multi-step approach, resulting in four peer-reviewed 
papers, which provide the following accomplishments.  
Chapter 2 provided a gap analysis of the concepts of vulnerability, resilience, and 
sustainability to identify strengths and weaknesses in their application to complex system 
assessment. Our investigation revealed that differences in perspective and scale across individual 
concepts produce strengths and weaknesses (gaps) when assessing a complex system.  When used 
independently to assess complex system performance over time, a single concept can overlook 
varying aspects of system quality leading to deficient or incomplete assessment and maladaptive 
consequences. Further analysis of each concept in terms of focal lens, goals, spatial and temporal 
scale, defining terminology, and key measures and practice, revealed specific areas where gaps 
can be filled and value can be added through focused integration. This resulted in a new concept, 
termed sustainable resilience, that accounts for changes in sustainability capital and sub-system 
vulnerability and their ability to increase or decrease system-wide resilience over time through 
moderation of adaptive capacity.   
Chapter 3 built upon work described in Chapter 2 to develop a unifying framework for 
sustainable resilience that can properly characterize complex adaptive social-environmental 
systems and assess their behavior in response to short-term disruptions and long-term challenges 
in the context of decision-making. The framework uses a serial process that enables 
operationalization at varying scales (depending on the needs of the user and system), allowing both 
researchers and practitioners the flexibility to utilize familiar assessment methodologies as well as 
the ability to employ more sophisticated and nascent approaches, while providing a path diagram 
to assist  users in exploring relationships between concepts. Use of cyclical iterations and 
development of multiple scenarios (representing dynamic processes) ensures that decision makers 
understand how each concept may influence the other. This provides the ability to integrate and 
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balance of priorities from different perspectives and achieve more effective allocation of resources 
for adaptation and/or transformation strategies. A detailed walk-through of the assessment 
framework for sustainable resilience is provided with illustration of use of methods and 
applications for each phase in the assessment process.  
In the process of illustrating methods and applications for use of the framework developed 
in chapter 3, a need arose to collect and consolidate the vast array of indicators and associated 
metrics for use in community resilience assessment, which led to the development of Chapter 4. 
In addition to a rapidly growing number of indicators across literature, it was found that 
redundancy and inconsistency in their application generates confusion regarding what should be 
included in a community resilience assessment and how to balance the use of indicators to achieve 
meaningful results.  This work resulted in the identification and consolidation of over 1,000 
individual indicators across social, economic, and environmental indices. Through a process of 
iterative review and consolidation applied through a classification system developed for assessing 
sustainable resilience of communities, a final set of non-duplicative indicators and associated 
metrics is provided to assist in operationalizing the practice of community resilience assessment. 
The set of indicators is classified based on identification of: primary and secondary capital 
systems; sustainable resilience domains; and phases of the sustainable resilience assessment 
framework. While the primary intent was focused on how the indicator set may be used within the 
framework for sustainable resilience, it is ultimately intended to assist users with indicator 
selection for any form of community resilience assessment.  
Chapter 5 built upon Chapters 3 and 4 to further illustrate how the assessment framework 
for sustainable resilience can be used to understand dynamic systems and their possible impacts 
upon communities.  Failure mode analysis was conducted for over 700 dams and 1,100 levees in 
the U.S., with the results indicating that overtopping and breach due to hydrological events 
(extreme or prolonged precipitation and/or storm) are the leading causes of both dam and levee 
failure. The failure mode analysis results were used to develop high-risk scenarios for flood 
protection infrastructure, which were then applied to Nashville, TN using local and modeled data 
to assess possible impacts to the community resulting from extreme precipitation events in the 
future. Anomaly analysis of GCM data via CMIP5 and determination of precipitation thresholds 
using local, historically derived data in conjunction with worst-case data from the 2010 Nashville 
flood suggest that extreme precipitation is likely to increase above the 95th percentile for both 1 
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and 3-day rain events. Despite post-event improvements made to a levee that failed in 2010, results 
also suggest that overtopping and breach due to a future extreme hydrologic event poses a 
potentially significant threat. Additional flood adaptation strategies (updating recurrence intervals, 
risk assessments, public education, and other actions to reduce risk) are likely needed to sustain 
desired performance of flood protection infrastructure. Methods used in this analysis can be 
generalized to other types of infrastructure susceptible to flood risk, and to other locations based 
on selection of local data and identification of geographic area via CMIP5. 
In summary, the body of work represented in this document provides the following 
advances in the study and application of resilience assessment: 
1. Development and definition of a new approach to dynamic resilience assessment for 
complex adaptive systems (e.g., sustainable resilience); 
2. Development and illustration of a dynamic assessment framework for sustainable 
resilience; 
3. Consolidation of over 1,000 indicators and associated metrics from across multiple 
fields, using a novel classification scheme designed to aid in selection and application 
of indicators to the assessment framework for sustainable resilience; 
4. A detailed demonstration of assessing impacts to community sustainable resilience 
through examination of high-risk scenarios for flood protection infrastructure in 
conjunction with analysis of projected extreme precipitation using local and modeled 
data from CMIP5, and synthesis of results to assess possible impacts to Nashville, TN 
based on worst historical events and the potential for exceeding events and established 
performance thresholds; and 
5. An alternative approach to traditional FMEA, using existing data (both qualitative and 
quantitative) as well as modeled data from multiple, authoritative sources.  This 
information is used to examine not only the state of flood protection infrastructure, but 
trends in large-scale mechanisms (lack of maintenance, changes in hydrological 
patterns, changes in population, etc.) that effect the systems’ overall ability to perform 
intended functions, and to better understand possible implications for sustainable 
resilience. 
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While the items above are designed with the concept of sustainable resilience in mind, in 
each case, the results and tools provided can be generalized to apply to any resilience assessment 
framework, any type of infrastructure, and any community based on availability of data. The 
results of this research should help push the boundaries of operational resilience assessment and 
use of results to increase community goals toward survival, well-being, and long-term 
preparedness. These efforts offer a new interpretation that can potentially help communities in 
building adaptive capacity and applying resources in a more efficient manner that leads to greater 
effectiveness in achieving resilience goals.  
The methods employed to develop worst-case scenarios for evaluating future sustainable 
resilience are not meant to predict or to represent the probability of extreme events, but to 
demonstrate the plausibility of such events in future planning horizons. While this research focused 
on a single community and a specific hazard (, the methods developed can be generalized and 
applied to any type of system, hazard, or risk-based environment to better understand performance 
over time (e.g., sudden or incremental shifts in economy, governance, or the possibility of 
intentional threat). In addition, the framework allows for consideration and scenario development 
to address emerging risk, hazards that we may not have encountered in the past, but may become 
more pressing in the future due to cumulative effects or exceedance of unprecedented threshlds. 
While there is no feasible way to address the unkown, the sustainable resilience framework 
suggests that adaptive capacity is critical to anticipation, preparation, response, recovery, and 
overall long-term viability for any system under risk, whether certain or uncertain. Investments 
made and strategies implemented to build adaptive capacity today will likely define the ability to 
act effectively in the future.   
The tools and methods provided herein are a starting point intended to increase 
understanding and access to needed definitions, an assessment framework, a set of indicators and 
metrics, a new way of looking at data to elicit plausible risk scenarios, and illustration of how each 
of these items may be employed. The intended audience for tools and methods provided is one that 
has sufficient information and understanding regarding how to employ and constructively use 
information and processes, or an audience that can be educated sufficiently to employ them. 
Ideally, it is hoped that any audience desiring to understand the concepts provided can have access 
to both the tools and the training needed to operationalize resilience assessment. 
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Although there are many limitations associated with the work as described (scaled 
application, sub-setting of indicators, testing on a single community, etc.), this research sets the 
stage for development of new applications and improved methods (e.g., new policy concepts, new 
measurement techniques, new models, etc.). It is understood that this work cannot provide a 
universal solution to a very complex problem – making communities more resilient - but it is hoped 
that this contribution will improve understanding and common practice through demonstration. 
Additional research is needed to further test and validate the established Sustainable 
Resilience Assessment Framework, including assessment of various types of complex adaptive 
systems. In addition, testing, validation, and benchmarking of the set of indicators and metrics for 
assessing the sustainable resilience of communities is needed to help in understanding how to 
prioritize indicators and which may matter most in assessment processes. Lastly, additional effort 
is needed to compare multiple applications and outcomes associated with the method developed 
to relate CMIP5 anomalies to locally derived precipitation data to better translate modeled data 
into meaningful information that can help communities understand plausible implications for 
worst-case climate based scenarios through use of familiar and non-familiar methods and sources. 
Again, the methods employed to develop worst-case scenarios for evaluating future sustainable 
resilience are not meant to predict or to represent the probability of extreme events, but to 
demonstrate the plausibility of such events in future planning horizons. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A: Dictionary of Terms and Concepts (1) 
Term Definition  
Ability to Resist Systemic Disruption 
Degree to which hazard-induced impacts to the system 
do not result in disruptions in system service (a static 
state); the ratio of impacts to performance measure 
thresholds. 
Adaptation 
An incremental change undertaken either in anticipation 
of stress, or in response to stress, intended to improve 
survivability or quality. 
Adaptation/Transformation Strategies 
Actions (collective or independent) developed by 
decision makers as part of an assessment/planning 
process that are intended to reduce anticipated injury 
and loss to a system; transformation strategies can result 
in a new system definition. 
Adaptive Capacity 
Also called adaptability, the ability to cope with, 
recover from, and adapt/transform through effective use 
of available sustainability capital in response to a 
hazardous event at a point in time.  
Anticipatory Coping Capacity 
A subset of adaptive capacity that specifically refers to 
conditions existing prior to a hazardous event; the 
ability to reduce the impact of a hazardous event via 
preparation/readiness. Includes planned individual 
actions, community support systems, or system-wide 
policies and programs in-place at the time of a 
hazardous event that improve the effectiveness and 
range of actions available in response to the event. 
Complex Adaptive Systems 
Systems characterized by multi-scalar and cross-scalar 
dynamics, feedback loops, interactions, that exhibit 
changes in system function and/or objectives over time. 
Coupled Systems 
Systems that are linked such that a system(s) may 
depend on one or more systems whereby the quality or 
fate of any individual system is shared or impacted by 
others. 
Contextual Vulnerability  
Extent to which a system is likely to experience losses 
from some hazard based on conditions at a specific 
point in time immediately prior to the onset of the 
hazard (a static, pre-existing or current state); a function 
of exposure, sensitivity, and anticipatory coping 
capacity.  
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Coping Capacity 
Also called capacity of response, adaptive capacity, and 
coping ability. Refers to the ability to absorb shock and 
respond to immediate threats. 
Economic Capital 
Money, property, credit, markets, other forms of 
financial capital that provide currency for economic 
activity and allow for transactions needed to ensure 
system viability and insure against risk. 
Environmental Capital 
Includes both built and natural resources (sometimes 
called natural capital), refers to renewable and non-
renewable natural resources (air, water, land, vegetation, 
wildlife, energy) essential for human survival and 
economic activity.  Most are non-substitutable (e.g., the 
atmosphere cannot be replaced).  Non-renewables 
includes fossil fuels, mineral deposits, extinction of 
species, etc.  Also includes engineered/built structures 
and supporting infrastructure systems. 
Exposure 
The magnitude (severity) and extent (in terms of spatial 
extent and temporal duration) of a hazard. 
Hazard 
A threat to a system, either a perturbation, disturbance, 
or stressor. 
Preparedness 
A state of readiness that requires anticipation, planning, 
and actions needed to support response and recovery 
from disturbance. 
Rapidity 
Speed of recovery from a state of disturbance to an 
acceptable level of performance that can be similar to 
the pre-disturbance or a new state. 
Recovery 
A time in which a system attempts to restore system 
function immediately following a hazard. 
Redundancy 
Existence and availability of duplicate or alternate 
components within a system, such that if one component 
fails, an alternate can perform its function to prevent 
systemic disruption or failure. 
Reliability 
Ability to operate without failure under specified 
conditions. 
Resilience 
Ability of a system to resist systemic disruption, 
recover, adapt, and transform given a hazardous event in 
order to maintain desired performance. 
Resilience Assessment 
Evaluates/measures system performance with respect to 
failure scenarios, resulting impacts, time to achieve 
recovery, and associated costs using quantitative and 
semi-quantitative methods; it can be applied at multiple 
scales.  
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Resilient systems 
Systems that possess physical, social, and organizational 
characteristics (both natural and designed/built) that 
allow the system to minimize systemic performance 
disruption given a hazard scenario, recover rapidly and 
effectively following a hazard scenario, or transform in 
response to a hazard in order to provide an acceptable 
level of service to society over the life of the system. 
Risk 
Occurrence of an event with an associated probability 
that results in a set of consequences. 
Risk Appetite/Risk Tolerance 
The amount of risk of adverse impacts that a system is 
willing to accept, usually as part of a trade-off with 
some other expected gain (e.g. financial). 
Robustness 
Ability to operate without failure under changing or 
adverse conditions (tests bounds of reliability). 
Sensitivity 
Innate physical characteristics and/or social structures 
that influence the degree to which impacts will be 
suffered given a certain level of hazard exposure. 
Social Capital 
Also called human capital, refers to the networks and 
relationships among people that enable society to 
function (e.g., community groups, associations, 
education, welfare, communication, law, government, 
policy, among others).  
Social-Environmental System 
Complex adaptive systems that are subject to multi-
scalar relationships between the system, sub-systems, 
and external systems and where interactions between 
physical and non-physical factors are common. Related 
terms include: Coupled Human-Environmental System, 
Social-Ecological System, and Coupled Human-Natural 
System. 
Strategic 
Designed or planned to serve a purpose or intent 
through identification and alignment of long-term goals 
and objectives, and the means of achieving them. 
Sustainability 
Ability to operate without failure by achieving balance 
across availability and performance of critical resources 
(social, environmental, and economic) such that 
negative impacts to the environment are reduced while 
positive impacts to society and economy are maintained 
at an acceptable level both now and into the future.   
Sustainability Assessment 
Evaluates/measures current and projected health 
(availability and performance) of critical social, 
environmental, and economic resources needed in order 
for a system to function and survive using quantitative 
and semi-quantitative methods; it can be applied at 
multiple scales.   
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Sustainability Capital  
The set of social, economic, and environmental capital 
that supports the existence of a community. 
Sustainable Development 
Development that maintains a desired level of system 
performance without compromising trans-generational 
equity in the availability of three key resources: social, 
environmental, and economic capital. 
Sustainable Resilience  
Ability of a system to maintain desired system 
performance by changing in response to expected and 
unexpected challenges over time, while simultaneously 
considering intra-system and inter-generational 
distribution of impacts and sustainability capital.  
System Objective 
A primary goal of the system as defined by the purpose 
of the system. 
Systemic Disruption 
Situation in which a system performance measure no 
longer provides an acceptable level of service. 
Systemic Failure 
Situation in which multiple system objectives are 
severely disrupted or irreversibly compromised. 
Threshold 
Value delineating between acceptable and unacceptable 
performance of a system objective. 
Transformation 
Change from an existing state to a new state through 
gradual transition (incremental adaptation) or abrupt 
transition such that the original system objectives are 
significantly altered. 
Uncertainty 
The range of possible values (multiple possible 
outcomes) within which the true value of a 
measurement lies. Various methods can be used to 
incorporate uncertainty into decision making process.  
Vulnerability  
Extent to which a system is likely to experience losses 
due to a hazard; a function of exposure, sensitivity, and 
adaptive capacity. 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Evaluates/measures levels of exposure, sensitivity, and 
adaptive capacity of critical system parts, components, 
or sub-components to determine the potential for loss 
related to a hazardous event using quantitative or semi-
quantitative methods.   
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Appendix B: Dictionary of Terms and Concepts (2) 
 
Term Definition  
Ability to Resist Systemic Disruption 
Degree to which hazard-induced impacts to the system 
do not result in disruptions in system service (a static 
state); the ratio of impacts to performance measure 
thresholds. 
Adaptation 
An incremental change undertaken either in anticipation 
of stress, or in response to stress, intended to improve 
survivability or quality. 
Adaptation/Transformation Strategies 
Actions (collective or independent) developed by 
decision makers as part of an assessment/planning 
process that are intended to reduce anticipated injury 
and loss to a system; transformation strategies can result 
in a new system definition. 
Adaptive Capacity 
Also called adaptability, the ability to cope with, 
recover from, and adapt/transform through effective use 
of available sustainability capital in response to a 
hazardous event at a point in time.  
Anticipatory Coping Capacity 
A subset of adaptive capacity that specifically refers to 
conditions existing prior to a hazardous event; the 
ability to reduce the impact of a hazardous event via 
preparation/readiness. Includes planned individual 
actions, community support systems, or system-wide 
policies and programs in-place at the time of a 
hazardous event that improve the effectiveness and 
range of actions available in response to the event. 
Complex Adaptive Systems 
Systems characterized by multi-scalar and cross-scalar 
dynamics, feedback loops, interactions, that exhibit 
changes in system function and/or objectives over time. 
Contextual Vulnerability  
Extent to which a system is likely to experience losses 
from some hazard based on conditions at a specific 
point in time immediately prior to the onset of the 
hazard (a static, pre-existing or current state); a function 
of exposure, sensitivity, and anticipatory coping 
capacity.  
Coping Capacity 
Also called capacity of response, adaptive capacity, and 
coping ability. Refers to the ability to absorb shock and 
respond to immediate threats. 
Economic Capital 
Money, property, credit, markets, other forms of 
financial capital that provide currency for economic 
activity and allow for transactions needed to ensure 
system viability and insure against risk. 
Environmental Capital 
Includes both built and natural resources (sometimes 
called natural capital), refers to renewable and non-
renewable natural resources (air, water, land, vegetation, 
wildlife, energy) essential for human survival and 
economic activity.  Most are non-substitutable (e.g., the 
 118 
atmosphere cannot be replaced).  Non-renewables 
includes fossil fuels, mineral deposits, extinction of 
species, etc.  Also includes engineered/built structures 
and supporting infrastructure systems. 
Exposure 
The magnitude (severity) and extent (in terms of spatial 
extent and temporal duration) of a hazard. 
Hazard 
A threat to a system, either a perturbation, disturbance, 
or stressor. 
Recovery A time in which a system attempts to restore system 
function immediately following a hazard. 
Resilience 
Ability of a system to resist systemic disruption, 
recover, adapt, and transform given a hazardous event in 
order to maintain desired performance. 
Risk Appetite/Risk Tolerance 
The amount of risk of adverse impacts that a system is 
willing to accept, usually as part of a trade-off with 
some other expected gain (e.g. financial). 
Social Capital 
Also called human capital, refers to the networks and 
relationships among people that enable society to 
function (e.g., community groups, associations, 
education, welfare, communication, law, government, 
policy, among others).  
Social-Environmental System 
Complex adaptive systems that are subject to multi-
scalar relationships between the system, sub-systems, 
and external systems and where interactions between 
physical and non-physical factors are common. Related 
terms include: Coupled Human-Environmental System, 
Social-Ecological System, and Coupled Human-Natural 
System. 
Strategic 
Designed or planned to serve a purpose or intent 
through identification and alignment of long-term goals 
and objectives, and the means of achieving them. 
Sustainability 
Ability to operate without failure by achieving balance 
across availability and performance of critical resources 
(social, environmental, and economic) such that 
negative impacts to the environment are reduced while 
positive impacts to society and economy are maintained 
at an acceptable level both now and into the future.   
Sustainability Assessment 
Evaluates/measures current and projected health 
(availability and performance) of critical social, 
environmental, and economic resources needed in order 
for a system to function and survive using quantitative 
and semi-quantitative methods; it can be applied at 
multiple scales.   
Sustainability Capital  
The set of social, economic, and environmental capital 
that supports the existence of a community. 
Sustainable Development 
Development that maintains a desired level of system 
performance without compromising trans-generational 
equity in the availability of three key resources: social, 
environmental, and economic capital. 
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Sustainable Resilience  
Ability of a system to maintain desired system 
performance by changing in response to expected and 
unexpected challenges over time, while simultaneously 
considering intra-system and inter-generational 
distribution of impacts and sustainability capital.  
System Objective 
A primary goal of the system as defined by the purpose 
of the system. 
Systemic Disruption 
Situation in which a system performance measure no 
longer provides an acceptable level of service. 
Systemic Failure Situation in which multiple system objectives are 
severely disrupted or irreversibly compromised. 
Threshold Value delineating between acceptable and unacceptable 
performance of a system objective. 
Transformation 
Change from an existing state to a new state through 
gradual transition (incremental adaptation) or abrupt 
transition such that the original system objectives are 
significantly altered. 
Uncertainty 
The range of possible values (multiple possible 
outcomes) within which the true value of a 
measurement lies. Various methods can be used to 
incorporate uncertainty into decision making process.  
Vulnerability  
Extent to which a system is likely to experience losses 
due to a hazard; a function of exposure, sensitivity, and 
adaptive capacity. 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Evaluates/measures levels of exposure, sensitivity, and 
adaptive capacity of critical system parts, components, 
or sub-components to determine the potential for loss 
related to a hazardous event using quantitative or semi-
quantitative methods.   
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Appendix C: Indicators and Metrics for Assessing Community Sustainable Resilience 
(see following pages) 
 
Also available in filterable/searchable format at: https://blindreview1.shinyapps.io/indicators/  
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Indicator Title 
Primary      
Capital 
System 
Secondary 
Capital System 
Sustainable 
Resilience 
Domain 
Quantitative Metrics Qualitative Metrics 
Primary 
and 
(Secondary) 
References 
Resource 
(R) / 
Driver (D) 
Rationale for 
Resource (R) / 
Driver (D) 
Socially organized Social  Community 
Composition 
Survival # community-led groups that 
provide support to the community; 
# community advisory groups for 
business, industry, agriculture, etc.; 
# of trade unions or other formally 
recognized local chapters; # 
community gardens or other shared 
assets that contribute to the 
community; # of volunteer-based 
organizations (fire fighters, 
community watch, shelters, food 
pantries, Red Cross, Good Will, 
Kiwanis, Rotary, etc.); # 
community-wide events per year; 
% of population engaged in 
volunteering during the previous 
year 
Relative health of 
community-led 
organizations in terms 
of recruiting and 
sustaining members and 
attracting volunteers; 
existence of informal 
leadership within the 
community that can 
rally and organize 
community members in 
time of crisis (church 
leaders, business 
leaders, etc.); relative 
health of volunteer-
based social support 
organizations  
Cabell and 
Oelofse,  
2012'; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; NAS, 
2017; 
Sempier et 
al., 2010; 
Thoms, 
2016; Yoon 
et al., 2016; 
DHS, 2016; 
UNISDR, 
2017; 
(Levin, 
1999; 
Holling, 
2001; 
Milestad and 
Darnhofer, 
2003; Atwell 
et al., 2010; 
McKey et 
al., 2010) 
Resource 
and Driver 
Low levels of 
cohesion indicate 
greater  sensitivity 
and decreased coping 
ability (driver); high 
levels of cohesion 
increase social capital 
by improving 
collective action, 
which can increase 
adaptive capacity 
(resource) 
Community identity, 
cohesion end 
engagement 
Social  Community 
Composition 
Well-being % resident participation in 
community-wide events; % voting 
age population that participates in 
presidential elections; % 
participation in town hall meetings, 
public hearings, etc. 
Relative level of trust 
(resident trust in 
government and 
leadership, and trust 
amongst residents and 
resident groups); sense 
of close community 
(across small 
communities, and 
between neighborhoods 
within large 
communities); level of 
community engagement 
and interest in 
addressing and solving 
community issues 
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; NAS, 
2017; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 'Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
'Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
'Cutter et al., 
2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; 
'McManus et 
al., 2012'; 
Cabell and 
Oelofse,  
2012'; Shen 
et al., 2011; 
Resource High levels of trust 
and engagement 
build social capital, 
which can increase 
adaptive capacity 
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Hughes & 
Bushell, 
2013; 
UNISDR, 
2017; 
(Berkes et 
al., 2003; 
Darnhofer et 
al., 2010; 
Milestad et 
al., 2010; 
Shava et al., 
2010; 
Peacock et 
al., 2010; 
Sherrieb et 
al., 2010) 
Family/household 
composition 
Social  Community 
Composition 
Survival % single parent families; % 
families with children 13-17, 6-12; 
3-5, 2 and under; % single person 
households; % multi-family 
households; # of children per 
household; # of households caring 
for an elderly parent/grandparent; 
% population in group housing; % 
seniors in group housing ; % 
children in group housing; % 
households with home care/need 
for assistance (medical, core 
activities, etc.) 
Identification of areas 
with  predominant 
demographic 
characteristics (clusters) 
Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 
Thoms, 
2016; 
Kontakosta 
& Malik, 
2018 
Driver Higher levels of 
individual/household
s with strong physical 
and mental capacity 
indicates lower 
sensitivity, and can 
increase coping 
ability 
Population age Social  Community 
Composition 
Survival Median age; % age makeup (adults 
over 65, adults between 50-64, 
adults 35-49, adults 25-34, adults 
18-24, children 13-17, children 6-
12, children 3-5, children 2 and 
under) 
Identification of areas 
with  predominant 
demographic 
characteristics (clusters) 
Cutter et al., 
2014; Cutter, 
2016c; 
Sharifi, 
2016; NAS, 
2017; 
Thoms, 
2016; Yoon 
et al., 2016; 
Kontakosta 
& Malik, 
2018 
Resource 
and Driver 
Higher levels of 
individual/household
s with strong physical 
and mental capacity 
indicates lower 
sensitivity and 
greater coping ability 
(driver); balanced age 
structure also builds 
social capital by 
providing a stable 
workforce, which can 
increase adaptive 
capacity (resource) 
Diversity Social  Community 
Composition 
Survival % racial/ethnic makeup;  ratio of 
male to female; % religious 
affiliation;  % population with 
disability or special needs; % 
migrant population; % population 
 Identification of areas 
with  predominant 
demographic 
characteristics (clusters) 
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; ' 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
Driver Populations that may 
be marginalized or 
isolated in terms of 
identify and special 
needs have higher 
sensitivity and may 
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without proficient English speaking 
skills 
2015'; 
Thoms, 
2016; Yoon 
et al., 2016; 
Kontakosta 
& Malik, 
2018   
have less coping 
ability 
Equality, acceptance, 
and inclusion 
Social  Community 
Composition 
Well-being % median income by gender, race, 
religion, etc.; # hate related crimes 
per year; # demonstrations actively 
protesting a specific culture, 
religion, etc. % absolute difference 
in male and female income; % 
absolute incomes difference by 
race/ethnicity; inverted Gini 
coefficient 
General respect for 
different cultures and  
races; inclusion of 
residents of all 
backgrounds, abilities, 
genders, roles in 
community events; 
positive/healthy 
behavioral norms; open 
hostility, ostracism, or 
exclusion of people 
based on race, culture, 
religion, sexual 
orientation, etc. There is 
equality in income 
across gender, 
race/ethnicity. Fair and 
transparent policies for 
immigrants and children 
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
''Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cutter 
et al., 2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; 
Thoms, 
2015; U.N., 
2015; 
UNISDR, 
2017;  
(Norris et al., 
2008; 
Sherrieb et 
al., 2010; 
Enarson, 
2012) 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of economic 
power and social 
acceptance of these 
populations can 
increase sensitivity 
and reduce coping 
ability (driver); 
openly prejudicial 
attitudes and 
segregation leads to 
lack of community 
cohesion and trust, 
reducing social 
capital and adaptive 
capacity (resource) 
Education and skill 
level 
Social  Community 
Composition 
Well-being % population with graduate degree 
or higher, % population with 4-year 
college degree, % population with 
2-year degree, % population with 
technical degree or certification; % 
population with only high school 
degree or GED, % population with 
some high school, but no degree; 
ratio of population with high school 
education to post-high school 
education 
Trends in education 
level especially high 
school degree 
completion and above 
Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
'Cutter et al., 
2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; NAS, 
2017; 
Thoms, 
2016; 
(Morrow, 
2008; 
Sherrieb et 
al., 2010) 
Resource 
and Driver 
Low skill level and 
lack of situational 
awareness may 
increase sensitivity 
and coping ability 
(driver); high 
education and skill 
levels build social 
capital, workforce 
diversity, and can 
increase adaptive 
capacity (resource). 
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Availability and 
access to community 
organizations and 
activities 
Social  Community 
Composition 
Well-being # of churches/places of worship per 
1,000 residents (or appropriate 
alternative); # recreation centers or 
community activity centers per 
1,000 residents (or appropriate 
alternative); # public libraries per 
1,000 residents (or appropriate 
alternative); # public 
parks/playgrounds per 1,000 
residents (or appropriate 
alternative) 
Are the number of 
churches/places of 
worship proportional to 
religious makeup of 
residents; are places or 
worship, libraries, 
parks, playgrounds, etc., 
distributed equitably 
throughout the 
community 
Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 'Cutter 
et al., 2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; NAS, 
2017; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 
Thoms, 
2016; 
(Sherrieb et 
al., 2010; 
Walsh, 2007) 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of access to 
opportunities for 
social engagement 
and recreation may 
decrease mental and 
physical health, 
reducing ability to 
cope (driver); social 
and recreational 
opportunities can 
build social capital 
by increasing health, 
engendering trust, 
cooperation, and 
cohesion in the 
community, which 
can increase adaptive 
capacity (resource) 
Availability and 
access to essential 
services 
Social  Community 
Composition 
Survival # of schools within an area or 
distance to schools; # of day care 
centers within an area or distance 
to them; # of healthcare providers 
within an area, # of grocery stores 
within an area ; # of K-12 schools 
per 1,000 children (or other 
appropriate measure); average 
distance from schools to 
households with children; % and 
amount ($) of public resources 
spent on education, health, and 
social protection 
General proximity and 
availability of key 
resources and services 
based on demographics 
(schools, day care, 
healthcare, groceries, 
etc..); School buses are 
available and accessible 
to all K-12 students; 
maximum distance from 
home to school does not 
exceed 10 miles for 
public education 
Cutter et al., 
2014; Cutter, 
2016c; 
Sharifi, 
2016; NAS, 
2017; Lynch 
et al., 2011; 
U.N., 2015 
Resource 
and Driver 
Those without access 
to essential services 
are more likely to 
have higher 
sensitivity and low 
coping ability as they 
are less likely to have 
the physical, 
monetary, and time 
resources necessary 
to respond to hazards 
(driver); improved 
access to schools, 
daycares, healthcare 
providers, and 
grocery stores builds 
social capital by 
providing for basic 
needs, allowing 
greater flexibility in 
resources, and 
increasing 
desirability, which 
can increase adaptive 
capacity (resource)  
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Car ownership, 
mobility 
Social Community 
Composition 
Well-being % households without access to a 
vehicle; # of cars per household 
Most of the community 
has access to a vehicle  
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cutter 
et al., 2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; NAS, 
2017 
Driver Lack of personal or 
household mobility 
may increase 
exposure and 
sensitivity, and 
decrease coping 
ability unless 
alternative means of 
transport and 
evacuation are 
maintained and ready 
Sufficient affordable 
food supply 
Social Community 
Composition 
Survival % population without access to 
fresh produce on a regular basis; % 
households with children without 
access to fresh produce on a regular 
basis; % population requiring 
assistance with food; # foodbanks 
or other services to supply food 
when needed; # local food 
suppliers and farms; # of 
community supported agriculture 
(CSA); % population participating 
in SNAP or WIC; % of children 
and expecting mothers without 
adequate nutrition; % children 
eligible for free and reduced lunch 
programs; # cases malnutrition 
reported annually for children and 
adults (wasting and overweight); % 
population on food subsidy 
programs by age, gender, race             
All residents have 
access to adequate food, 
including fresh produce 
on a regular basis; 
minimal population 
needs assistance with 
buying/obtaining an 
adequate supply of 
food; food assistance is 
available and accessible 
to those in need  
Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
'Cutter et al., 
2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; Shen 
et al., 2011; 
Lynch et al., 
2011; 
Venton 
2014; U.N., 
2015; 
UNISDR, 
2017; 
(Berardi et 
al., 2011; 
Pingali et al., 
2005; Tobin 
and 
Whiteford, 
2013) 
Driver Lack of nutrition and 
access to healthy 
food weakens mental 
and physical 
capacity, especially 
in children, 
increasing sensitivity 
and decreasing 
coping ability 
Population stability Social  Community 
Composition 
Survival % residents who remain in the 
community for 5 years or less 
(excluding college or community 
college students); % annual births 
and deaths occurring within 
community; number of new 
residents moving into community 
annually; % change in working age 
population (under 25, 25-50, 50 
and over); % population over 65 
Relative stability in total 
population, relative 
stability in working age 
population, increase in 
aging population, 
decrease in population 
between 18-35; increase 
in young families; 
overall sense of 
predictability in 
population  
Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
'Cutter et al., 
2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; 
'McManus et 
al., 2012'; 
'Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; NAS, 
2017; 
(Norris et al., 
2008; 
Sherrieb et 
Resource A stable and robust 
population builds 
social and economic 
capital and increases 
adaptive capacity 
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al., 2010; 
NAS, 2012) 
Community 
emergency/disaster 
awareness  
Social  Governance Well-being # warning sirens per 1,000 people 
(or other appropriate measure); % 
operational warning sirens; # and 
type of public warning signals; 
frequency of warning siren tests or 
other warning signal tests; # and 
type of public access to information 
on hazard, risk, preparation, 
response, emergency services, 
emergency contact information, 
evacuation procedures and routes 
(including websites, fliers, news 
letters, radio, TV, public meetings, 
etc.); # and location of designated 
emergency shelters; % population 
aware of most likely and most 
severe disaster scenarios and how 
to respond 
Information is available 
to both permanent and 
seasonal residents, and 
is provided in a 
language other than 
English if necessary; 
emergency preparedness 
checklists and supply 
lists are made available 
to the public; evacuation 
routes are clearly 
marked and procedures 
are made publicly 
available through a 
variety of sources; signs 
are clearly posted on 
designated emergency 
shelters; information on 
location of designated 
emergency shelters is 
publicly available; all 
residents know how to 
contact emergency 
services and first 
responders; all residents 
are aware of most likely 
and most severe disaster 
scenarios and know how 
to respond 
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 'Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
'Cabell and 
Oelofse,  
2012'; 
'Matthews et 
al., 2014'; 
Thoms, 
2016; DHS, 
2016; U.N., 
2015 
Driver Awareness of 
resources and 
available guidance 
can decrease 
sensitivity and 
exposure and  
improve coping  
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 Regional 
Connectivity 
Social  Governance Survival # of adjacent independent 
communities, counties, cities; # of 
special districts (military 
installations/facilities, federal 
lands/facilities, other significant 
non-community owned or operated 
lands/facilities) within 100 miles; # 
of tribal entities within 100 miles;# 
of inter-community/regional 
partnerships/organizations/planning 
committees 
Relative isolation or 
connectivity of 
community with outside 
communities and 
entities 
Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cutter 
et al., 2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; NAS, 
2017; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; DHS, 
2016; 
UNISDR, 
2017; 
(Murphy, 
2007; Ansell 
et al., 2010) 
Resource 
and Driver 
Physical isolation can 
increase exposure 
and sensitivity to 
hazards, reducing 
coping ability 
(driver); strong 
connection and 
coordination with 
regional governance 
and trade activities 
increases social and 
economic capital and 
adaptive capacity 
through extension 
and leveraging of 
resources (resource) 
Effective external 
coordination (local 
and regional 
governments) 
Social  Governance Well-being  # of participants in regional 
planning groups; % 
participation/attendance in regional 
planning and coordination 
activities; frequency of regional 
planning group meetings/calls: # 
and type (purpose) of MOUs and 
agreements in place to provide 
assistance during disasters (shelter, 
food, equipment, hospitals, first 
responders, medical aid, etc.) 
Active participation in 
planning, decision-
making, and issues that 
impact governance 
across community 
boundaries;  active 
coordination with 
special districts; active 
consultation/coordinatio
n with tribes; 
identification of 
significant intra-
community 
partnerships; 
identification of 
significant shared 
community/regional/stat
e plans and agreements  
'Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 'Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
'Cabell and 
Oelofse,  
2012'; 
'Matthews et 
al., 2014'; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Resource Coordination and 
partition with other 
governments can 
increase social and 
economic capital by 
improving capacity 
for response, growth, 
and extending 
resource availability 
and access, thus 
increasing adaptive 
capacity  
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Integration of risk 
reduction, resilience, 
sustainability, and 
adaptation across 
institutions and 
decisions 
Social  Governance Preparednes
s 
# of integrated policies that address 
risk reduction, resilience, 
sustainability, and adaptation; # of 
cross-departmental working groups 
that actively participate in policy 
and planning for risk reduction, 
resilience, sustainability, and 
adaptation; # adaptation actions 
planned; $ allocated for adaptation; 
cost-benefit analysis for adaptation 
actions; 
Risk identification, 
assessment, mitigation, 
adaptation, 
communication, and 
response are 
appropriately integrated 
into strategic plans, 
master plans, 
transportation plans, 
budgets, land use plans, 
economic plans, 
infrastructure plans, 
climate adaptation 
plans, sustainability 
plans, etc. to ensure 
consistency and 
coordination across 
government sectors and 
responsibilities; laws, 
directives, and policies 
reflect sustainable and 
resilient practices that 
protect critical 
resources, functions, 
and services  
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 
Hughes & 
Bushell, 
2013; 
Thoms, 
2016; DHS, 
2016; U.N. 
2015; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Resource Integrated planning 
can improve 
government 
efficiency, 
effectiveness, and 
capacity for response, 
which builds social 
capital, coordination 
within and across 
government functions 
can help to align 
resources for greater 
efficiency and 
effective use, 
increasing economic 
capital, which can 
increase adaptive 
capacity 
 129 
Appropriate 
government 
processes and 
decision-making 
communication 
Social  Governance Well-being # of public access areas (website, 
newsletter, etc.) where results of 
community decisions, 
announcements for upcoming 
events and public 
meetings/hearings, etc., are made 
available; # of public meetings and 
hearings held 
Community/city website 
that clearly displays 
organizational hierarchy 
(organization chart) 
with key areas of 
responsibility, staff 
members, and contact 
information; site 
provides residents with 
access to plans, policies, 
partnerships, and other 
information necessary to 
maintain contact, 
coordination, and 
effective governance; 
site provides 
information regarding 
relationships with 
associated counties, 
cities, regions, state, 
etc.; site provides access 
to meeting minutes, 
records of public 
hearings, information 
regarding public 
decisions, actions, and 
upcoming events and 
activities for public 
participation; alternative 
notification is provided 
in the form of 
newsletters, public 
postings, newspaper 
articles, and availability 
of civic plans and 
documents in public 
facilities (courthouse, 
library, administrative 
building, etc.) 
Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; DHS, 
2016; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Resource Increased 
transparency and 
opportunity for 
awareness and 
engagement can 
improve government 
effectiveness, trust, 
and capacity for 
response, which 
builds social capital 
and increases 
adaptive capacity 
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Institutional 
character 
Social  Governance Well-being # cases of corruption, fraud, waste, 
abuse on an annual basis; # elected 
officials suspended or removed 
from office; # of unresolved or 
unheard legal cases made against 
the local government by residents; 
# of official complaints lodged by 
residents against the local 
government or elected officials 
Persons in elected 
positions fulfill full 
terms; decisions and 
actions are transparent 
and communicated 
through various means 
to residents; leaders and 
elected officials engage 
in community activities 
to support learning and 
innovation; there are 
official mechanisms for 
reporting and 
investigating fraud, 
abuse, and transgression 
of legal or ethical 
standards; hotlines and 
contact information for 
reporting such items to 
appropriate government 
staff are publicly posted 
and easily accessible; 
there are whistle-blower 
protections and anti-
retributive protections in 
place for workers and 
members of the 
community; there are 
accessible and reliable 
means of conflict 
resolution between 
residents and 
government entities; 
local leadership and 
elected officials seek 
input from the 
community and 
opportunities for public 
comment, public 
hearings, etc. are 
advertised and 
publicized in a timely 
and effective manner 
Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 'Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; Shen 
et al., 2011; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Resource Accountability, 
transparency, and 
trust build social 
capital and economic 
capital through 
greater efficiency and 
effectiveness of 
resources, which 
increases adaptive 
capacity 
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Efficient and 
effective 
management of 
resources  
Social  Governance Well-being % annual change in community 
budget by major service/allocation 
(police, fire, education, health, 
public works, transportation, 
disaster response, etc.);# of 
externally awarded grants used for 
civic purposes on annual basis; # of 
internally or externally originated 
audits per year 
Are responsibilities and 
resources decentralized 
and delegated, or 
centrally controlled; 
does the government 
actively pursue 
opportunities for grants 
or external funding to 
supplement existing 
funds; are results of 
audits and public 
investigations made 
accessible to the 
community; are fiscal 
plans and results made 
available to the 
community 
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 
'Cabell and 
Oelofse, 
2012'; 
McManus et 
al., 2012, 
(Buchmann, 
2009; Shava 
et al., 2010) 
Resource Improved 
government 
efficiency and 
effectiveness can 
increase capacity for 
response and build 
social and economic 
capital, leading to 
increased adaptive 
capacity 
Critical 
services/managemen
t staffing 
Social  Governance Survival # and type of critical government 
positions vacant 
Are critical government 
and service positions 
filled 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 
'Cabell and 
Oelofse,  
2012'; 
Driver Lack of appropriate 
staffing may increase 
sensitivity and  
decrease ability to 
cope by diminishing 
capacity for response 
Accessible criminal 
and civil justice 
Social  Governance Well-being # lawyers per 1,000 residents (or 
other appropriate measure); # of 
public defenders per 1,000 
residents (or other appropriate 
measure); # courthouses per 1,000 
residents (or other appropriate 
measure); # unheard/backlogged 
cases per year 
Are legal services 
sufficient to meet the 
needs of the community 
(skill level, 
affordability, 
accessibility, language 
considerations, 
impartiality, etc.); are 
legal actions (hearings, 
decisions, etc.) carried 
out in a timely, 
consistent, and impartial  
manner 
Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014' 
Resource Access to fair and 
impartial justice 
services can increase 
trust and 
engagement, which 
builds social capital 
and can increase 
adaptive capacity 
 132 
Emergency/disaster 
funding 
Social  Governance Well-being $ allocated for emergency/disaster 
response and recovery 
There are sufficient 
fiscal and other critical 
resources immediately 
available to respond to 
disruption and/or 
disaster; additional 
resources are available 
within 24-48 hours 
(through partnerships 
with other communities, 
or external aid) to 
continue and complete 
response and recovery 
efforts to restore 
essential services and 
safety; emergency 
personnel are identified 
by skill and location in 
the event of notification; 
existence of an 
emergency response 
center  
Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
Orencio & 
Fujii, 2013; 
Yoon et al., 
2016; 
UNISDR, 
2017  
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of allocation of 
resources to disaster 
relief efforts can 
increase sensitivity 
and reduce coping 
during hazards 
(driver); ready access 
to disaster relief 
resources and 
coordination of 
response efforts 
increases trust, 
capacity for response, 
and can increase 
efficient use of 
immediate resources 
and may reduce the 
need for outside help, 
increasing adaptive 
capacity (resource)  
Emergency/disaster 
response & recovery  
time 
Social  Governance Survival Amount of time required to 
respond to and recover essential 
services and/or total recovery time 
following disruption (power 
outage, water main break, road 
accessibility, etc.) or disaster 
(flood, tornado, etc.) per event per 
year; # deaths, injuries, missing due 
to immediate impact of emergency/ 
disaster per year; # deaths, injuries, 
missing related to aftermath and 
recovery following 
emergency/disaster per year; 
amount ($) direct and indirect 
economic loss due to 
emergency/disaster per year by 
sector; % population without 
essential services and duration of 
time without services (power, 
drinking water, sanitation, 
transportation, medical care, etc.) 
Are recovery times 
following service 
disruption or disaster 
reasonable (prevent 
unnecessary or 
collateral loss, damage, 
injury)? 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 
'Cabell and 
Oelofse,  
2012'; U.N., 
2015; 
Mitchell et 
al., 2013; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Driver Extended disaster 
response times can 
increase exposure 
and sensitivity of the 
community to 
hazards, by failing to 
mitigate damages 
before complete or 
unnecessary injury, 
loss, and or failure 
occurs 
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Adequate and 
effective community 
disaster mitigation & 
adaptation planning 
Social  Policy & 
Planning 
Preparednes
s 
Age of current disaster mitigation 
plan (preferably within 5 years of 
current date); date of plan approval 
if required by FEMA/State; % 
community budget allocated to 
disaster mitigation planning; last 
review within 3 years and public is 
made aware of timelines and 
opportunities to engage; # priorities 
and actions for disaster mitigation 
and adaptation in most recent plans 
with timelines and targets for 
completion; % actions completed 
since last plan update; cost-benefit 
for adaptation and mitigation 
actions; $ allocated for planning 
and plan implementation (including 
actions and projects identified in 
plans); date of last post-disaster 
review of plans, actions, and 
lessons learned; date of last skills 
inventory to ensure all key skills 
and experience are available during 
disaster 
A community disaster 
mitigation plan exists; is 
the plan incorporated 
into a state required 
mitigation plan 
(Stafford Act and 44 
Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) Part 
201); is the plan 
developed with State, 
Tribal, or local planning 
guidance developed by 
the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency 
(FEMA); Does the plan 
address the following: 
Plan is current and 
routinely updated; 
broadly available to 
public; coordinated with 
regional neighbors; 
addresses adequate 
disaster staffing and 
staff rotation 
requirements for 
emergency operation 
center; addresses all 
local hazards and risks; 
includes current maps 
for key assets and 
infrastructure; identifies 
special skills, training 
and knowledge that 
might help in a disaster; 
identifies emergency 
supplies (e.g., food, 
medical supplies, fuel, 
generators); identifies 
external support and 
resources; includes 
community stakeholder 
engagement and public 
comment; identifies 
emergency 
communication 
methods, equipment and 
procedures (amateur 
radio (HAMS) and/or 
satellite phone 
operators) to assist with 
Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014;  
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 
'Matthews et 
al., 2014'; 
'Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
Sempier et 
al., 2010; 
DHS, 2016; 
Mitchell et 
al., 2013; 
UNISDR, 
2017; 
Parsons & 
Morley, 
2017 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of 
comprehensive and 
coordinated disaster 
mitigation planning 
can increase  
sensitive and 
exposure, and reduce 
coping ability 
(driver); 
comprehensive and 
coordinated planning 
efforts can align 
response and 
resource allocation, 
increasing efficiency, 
effectiveness, and 
capacity for response, 
thus increasing 
social, economic, and 
environmental  
capital, as well as 
adaptive capacity 
through greater 
ability to anticipate, 
prepare for, respond 
to, and recover from 
hazards (resource) 
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emergency 
communication; 
identifies evacuation 
plan; addresses 
communication and 
cooperation between 
fire-fighting, search and 
rescue, policing, and 
medical responders; 
includes measures for 
temporary human and 
animal shelter, food, 
water, power and fuel 
for permanent and 
seasonal residents; 
addresses accessibility 
(for those with 
disabilities, low income) 
and equity; includes 
coordination with 
schools, hospitals, 
support agencies, care 
facilities and businesses; 
maximizes regional 
cooperation for training,  
equipment, and 
services; includes 
establishing interagency 
and inter-governmental 
communication 
channels and 
cooperation agreements 
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Schools/daycares are 
prepared for 
emergency/disaster 
Social  Policy & 
Planning 
Preparednes
s 
# of schools and licensed daycare 
facilities that do not meet current 
building codes; # of schools and 
licensed daycare facilities that do 
not have adequate security 
measures; # schools without 
current (updated annually) 
emergency/disaster plans, 
evacuation procedures, and 
communication plans; # of schools 
and licensed daycare centers that 
have not conducted an emergency 
drill within the last 6 months; % 
schools that provide in-class 
training and education to parents on 
how to respond to 
emergency/disaster in school 
including post-event reunification; 
# days per year schools are closed 
due to disaster/emergency; # 
injuries and deaths (adults and 
children) occurring on school 
grounds due to emergency/disaster; 
# affected 5-12 year olds and # 
days without access to learning 
facilities and materials due to 
emergency/disaster annually 
School/daycare 
emergency/disaster 
plans include the 
following: clear 
instruction on response 
to emergency/disasters; 
identification of 
emergency supplies; 
communication with 
critical services (law 
enforcement, emergency 
healthcare; etc.); 
evacuation and how to 
move/transport children 
and injured; 
communication plan for 
parents and caregivers; 
faculty, staff, students, 
and families are aware 
of the plan and 
understand what to do; 
the plan is made 
available and easily 
accessible to families; 
rapid scale-up and 
assistance is available to 
return students and 
teachers to school as 
quickly as possible 
following disaster 
Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 
Mitchell et 
al., 2013; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of 
comprehensive and 
coordinated disaster 
mitigation planning 
can increase  
sensitive and 
exposure, and reduce 
coping ability 
(driver); 
comprehensive and 
coordinated planning 
efforts can align 
response and 
resource allocation, 
increasing efficiency, 
effectiveness, and 
capacity for response, 
thus increasing 
social, economic, and 
environmental  
resources, increasing 
adaptive capacity 
through greater 
ability to anticipate, 
prepare for, respond 
to, and recover from 
hazards (resource) 
Residents are 
prepared for 
emergency/disaster 
Social  Policy & 
Planning 
Preparednes
s 
# of public access areas (website, 
newsletter, etc.) where 
emergency/disaster preparation 
guidelines or checklists are made 
available; % population exposed to 
high to moderate risk from disaster 
by type (flood, hurricane, etc.); # 
and identification of media 
channels (tv, radio, online, mobile 
alert, text alert, etc.) to notify & 
inform public;   
Maps made available to 
community showing 
where high risk areas 
are located; Guidelines 
or checklists for 
household 
emergency/disaster are 
made available and 
accessible to the 
community;  households 
at high risk (or remote 
locations) are prepared 
to survive at least 2 
weeks without outside 
help (e.g., food stores, 
back up power and heat, 
alternate water supplies, 
access to fuel; 
communication; 
medication; etc.); most 
Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 
Thoms, 
2016; DHS, 
2016; 
Mitchell et 
al., 2013 
Driver Lack of access to 
timely and accurate 
information and 
resources increases 
sensitivity and 
exposure, decreasing 
coping ability  
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residents minimize 
disaster risks (e.g., 
trimming trees around 
the home, insulating 
pipes); Residents know 
where to go and what to 
do in event of disaster 
Local healthcare 
facilities (e.g., 
nursing stations, 
residential care) are 
prepared for 
emergency/disaster 
Social  Policy & 
Planning 
Preparednes
s 
# of healthcare facilities that do not 
meet current building codes; # of 
healthcare facilities that do not 
have adequate security measures; # 
facilities without current (updated 
annually) emergency/disaster plans, 
evacuation procedures, and 
communication plans 
Healthcare facility 
emergency/disaster 
plans include the 
following: identification 
of emergency supplies; 
hazardous material 
storage; 
communication; 
evacuation and how to 
move/transport people 
who are bedridden or 
otherwise disabled; 
plans to meet the 
increase in demands for 
health/mental health 
services in a disaster; 
coordinated with 
regional healthcare 
facilities  
Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015' 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of 
comprehensive and 
coordinated disaster 
mitigation planning 
can increase  
sensitive and 
exposure, and reduce 
coping ability 
(driver); 
comprehensive and 
coordinated planning 
efforts can align 
response and 
resource allocation, 
increasing efficiency, 
effectiveness, and 
capacity for response, 
thus increasing 
social, economic, and 
environmental  
capital, as well as 
adaptive capacity 
through greater 
ability to anticipate, 
prepare for, respond 
to, and recover from 
hazards (resource) 
 137 
Community 
evacuation plan 
Social  Policy & 
Planning 
Preparednes
s 
Age of evacuation plan; evacuation 
plan publicly accessible; # 
evacuation centers 
Evacuation plans and 
publicly accessible 
information includes: 
broad access to 
evacuation information; 
evacuation procedures 
and hazard-specific 
alternatives (e.g. in case 
of chemical spill, 
nuclear accident); plan 
includes up-to-date 
inventories (what, 
where) of equipment & 
vehicles that could be 
used in evacuation (e.g., 
snowmobiles, quads, 
buses, trucks) and 
response (e.g., front end 
loaders, tractors); 
address communication 
and cooperation 
between fire-fighting, 
search and rescue, 
policing, and medical 
responders; addresses 
permanent and non-
permanent residents, 
and animal (livestock 
and pets) 
Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 
'Matthews et 
al., 2014'; 
Kontakosta 
& Malik, 
2018 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of 
comprehensive and 
coordinated disaster 
mitigation planning 
can increase  
sensitive and 
exposure, and reduce 
coping ability 
(driver); 
comprehensive and 
coordinated planning 
efforts can align 
response and 
resource allocation, 
increasing efficiency, 
effectiveness, and 
capacity for response, 
thus increasing 
social, economic, and 
environmental  
capital, as well as 
adaptive capacity 
through greater 
ability to anticipate, 
prepare for, respond 
to, and recover from 
hazards (resource) 
Effective policy, 
legislation, planning 
Social  Policy & 
Planning 
Well-being # enforcement actions for failure to 
comply with applicable codes per 
year; number of key policies or 
plans older than 10 years; # of new 
policies or pieces of legislation 
passed; # policy impact and 
progress reports provided; # or 
extent of policy monitoring 
activities 
Policy, plans, and 
legislation are passed; 
enforcement and 
monitoring of policies 
occur  
Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
'Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 
'Matthews et 
al., 2014' 
Driver Inability ability to 
pass and enforce 
policies can increase 
sensitivity to hazards 
and reduce coping 
ability (driver) 
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Active 
hazard/disaster 
mitigation efforts 
Social  Policy & 
Planning 
Preparednes
s 
Annual amount ($) spent on hazard 
mitigation efforts (projects, 
education, etc.); # and amount of 
disaster mitigation grants or other 
external funding for disaster 
planning, mitigation, or education 
received over last 10 years; # and 
type of incentives offered to 
residents and businesses to mitigate 
hazard (rebates, lower rates, tax 
credits, etc.); # public-private 
partnerships benefitting hazard 
mitigation; % total public 
infrastructure disaster relief funds 
spent on Section 406 Mitigation for 
disasters in preceding 5 years; % of 
Small Business Administration 
(SBA) home disaster loan funds 
spent on mitigation assistance  
Active community 
engagement in hazard 
mitigation; local 
business engagement in 
hazard mitigation 
Cutter et al., 
2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; NAS, 
2017; DHS, 
2016; 
Mitchell et 
al., 2013; 
UNISDR, 
2017; (Rose, 
2007; 
Godschalk et 
al., 2009; 
Cutter et al., 
2008; 
Tierney and 
Bruneau, 
2007)  
Driver Lack of necessary 
mitigation funding 
and implementation 
of mitigation 
activities can increase 
sensitivity and 
exposure and reduce 
the coping ability of 
the community 
during hazards 
Comprehensive 
hazard monitoring 
and risk assessment 
Social  Policy & 
Planning 
Preparednes
s 
# dedicated data management staff; 
# of real-time, continuous 
monitoring stations (precipitation, 
temperature, wind, streamflow, 
stream height, air quality, noise, 
storm, sea level, water quality, 
seismic, drought, etc.); # and type 
of most probable and most severe 
hazards faced by the community; 
worst-case scenario estimates of 
damage and loss ($) with 
descriptions for each most probable 
and most severe hazard (% 
homes/businesses destroyed, % 
homes/businesses covered by 
insurance; # displaced; ($) wages 
lost; # work days lost; # casualties 
(injuries & deaths); etc.); % GDP 
lost in most probable and severe 
scenarios; % funding available to 
cope with most severe and most 
probably risk scenarios; % hazard 
areas mapped; Date of most recent 
maps depicting hazard areas 
Current and up to date 
methods for gathering, 
storing, managing, 
analyzing, and sharing 
data and information 
related  to hazard 
monitoring (databases, 
models, etc.); current 
vulnerability or risk 
assessments; 
documentation of 
historical hazards 
(Presidential and State 
declarations, impacts 
associated with 
historical events, etc.); 
means for identifying 
and assessing future 
hazard scenarios; 
partnerships with 
universities, research 
organizations, or other 
communities to share 
resources, information, 
and results; inclusion of 
climate change in 
vulnerability and risk 
analysis; publication of 
health and safety related 
data and changes in data 
Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 
'Matthews et 
al., 2014'; 
'Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
Hughes & 
Bushell, 
2013; 
Hiremath et 
al., 2013; 
DHS, 2016; 
UNISDR, 
2017; 
Parsons & 
Morely 2017 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of ability to 
both historical  and 
future risk can 
negatively impact the 
ability to anticipate, 
plan, and prepare for 
hazards, which can 
increase sensitivity 
and exposure and 
reduce the coping 
ability of the 
community (driver); 
monitoring and 
management of 
accurate and 
consistent data and 
information related to 
hazards and risk is 
essential for 
planning, 
preparation, and 
response activities; 
dedicated workforce 
and resources to 
ensure proper risk 
analysis and 
integrated activities 
can increase social 
and economic capital 
through increased 
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over time; 
understanding of 
climate change and how 
to incorporate risk into 
planning and decision 
making 
response capacity 
thus increasing 
adaptive capacity 
Research capabilities Social  Policy & 
Planning 
Preparednes
s 
# of partnerships with universities, 
consultants, or research agencies; $ 
funding for research activities; % 
workforce in research, science, 
technology 
Partnerships with 
universities, research 
organizations, or other 
communities to share 
resources, information, 
and results; inclusion of 
climate change in 
vulnerability and risk 
analysis 
'Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 
Thoms, 
2016; U.N., 
2015; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Resource Partnerships with 
research institutions 
can leverage 
available social and 
economic resources 
and provide access to 
extended resources 
that may increase risk 
awareness, improve 
planning and 
mitigation actions, 
and increase both 
capacity for response 
and adaptive capacity 
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Community recovery 
& planning 
Social  Policy & 
Planning 
Preparednes
s 
Age of current community disaster 
recovery plan (preferably within 5 
years of current date); amount ($) 
annually on disaster preparedness 
and recovery; # days to reopen 
schools following 
emergency/disaster annually; # 
residents and # days without 
power, water, sanitary services per 
year due to emergency/disaster; 
amount (tons) debris removed and 
# days to remove debris following 
emergency/disaster; # roads, 
bridges, access points closed and # 
days to reopen/regain access 
following disaster/emergency; # 
health facilities closed and # days 
closed following 
emergency/disaster; # trauma 
counselors/mental health 
professionals available to assist 
following emergency/disaster; 
gallons emergency fuel; tons 
emergency food stock; # 
emergency shelters; # emergency 
generators; # gallons drinking 
water; # and type emergency 
equipment; # and type emergency 
medical personnel  
A community disaster 
recovery plan exists; are  
the disaster mitigation 
and recovery plans 
integrated; plans are 
updated simultaneously; 
does the plan address: 
short- and long-term 
impacts and recovery 
needs (e.g., social, 
economic, emotional, 
and environmental); 
post-disaster debris 
management; sanitation; 
continued provision of 
shelter, food, medical, 
and other critical 
supplies throughout 
recovery; residential  
and business recovery 
of property; insurance 
claims; reunification of 
animals (pets and 
livestock); 
communication and 
media; inclusion of 
disaster resilience and 
lessons learned; 
economic response and 
recovery; occurrence of 
events post-disaster to 
raise funds, recognize 
impacts, grieve, 
remember, 
commemorate; trauma 
counseling available in 
aftermath of events; 
mechanisms to collect 
lessons learned for 
future planning and 
policy 
Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 
'Matthews et 
al., 2014'; 
'Sanders et 
al., 2015'; 
Thoms, 
2016; DHS, 
2016; 
Mitchell et 
al., 2013; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Driver Poor or outdated 
plans can increase 
sensitivity and 
exposure, and 
decrease community 
coping in the event of 
a hazard 
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Engagement and 
support of vulnerable 
groups 
Social  Policy & 
Planning 
Well-being # of advocacy groups representing 
the needs of vulnerable 
populations; # of law firms that 
represent vulnerable groups at 
no/low cost; amount ($) funding 
and assistance allocated to help 
vulnerable residents 
Are vulnerable groups 
included in community 
decisions and planning; 
Are vulnerable groups 
sufficiently engaged to 
be aware of disaster 
response measures;  
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 
'Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
'Cutter et al., 
2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; NAS, 
2017; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 'Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
Parsons & 
Morley, 
2017; 
(Messias et 
al., 2012;  
Blackstone 
and Kailes, 
2015) 
Driver Lack of engagement 
and participation 
from vulnerable 
groups may lead to 
incomplete or 
incorrect methods for 
decreasing 
vulnerability and 
increasing coping 
ability within the 
community 
Availability and 
access to support 
services 
Social Services Well-being [all units are per 1,000 capita of 
vulnerable residents, or other 
appropriate measure] # and type of 
support services (Red Cross, Good 
Will, AGAPE, YMCA, YWCA, 
women and children's shelters, 
child services, homeless shelters, 
employment assistance, youth 
organizations, etc.); # and type of 
assistance programs and social 
welfare (medical, unemployment, 
disability, food assistance, etc.); # 
of affordable daycare and childcare 
services to allow adults to work; 
average distance from vulnerable 
populations areas to services; # of 
non-profits and organizations that 
contribute to community wellbeing 
by providing (money, food, 
services, care, volunteers, etc.); # 
of affordable English courses 
available for non-native English 
speakers; amount ($) annual 
funding to provide services 
Are services reasonably 
accessible to areas with 
vulnerable populations 
(within walking 
distance, bus line, other 
affordable public 
transportation); are 
services consistent and 
reliable 
Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
'Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 'Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014';  
'Matthews et 
al., 2014'; 
DHS, 2016; 
U.N., 2015; 
Parsons & 
Morley, 
2017; (Paton 
et al., 2006)  
Resource 
and Driver 
Those without access 
to support services 
are more likely to 
have higher 
sensitivity and low 
coping ability as they 
are less likely to have 
the physical, 
monetary, and time 
resources necessary 
to respond to hazards 
(driver); adequate 
and equitable access 
to support services 
builds social and 
economic capital by 
providing for basic 
needs and allowing 
greater flexibility in 
resources which 
increases adaptive 
capacity (resource)  
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High quality 
education (pre-K 
through 12th grade)  
Social Services Well-being Average child-teacher ratio per 
school; amount ($) spent annually 
on K-12 education; average salary 
for K-12 teachers; school rankings 
or state test rankings; annual cost 
of tuition by school; graduation 
rate; special education offered; 
college acceptance rates: % 
children over age 3 not enrolled in 
school 
Families do not need to 
leave the community 
(relocate) to access high 
quality schools; all 
public schools are 
equipped with 
computers and internet 
access; all public 
schools have sufficient 
resources to provide 
adequate classroom 
space, materials, and 
services; all children 
have access to good 
nutrition in schools (no 
child goes without a 
healthy breakfast or 
lunch regardless of 
availability to pay) 
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; Cutter 
et al., 2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; 'Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
Mitchell et 
al., 2013; 
Parsons & 
Morley, 
2017; 
Kontakosta 
& Malik, 
2018; 
(Cavallo and 
Ireland, 
2014; Ronan 
and 
Johnston, 
2005) 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of availability 
and access to quality 
schools and 
educational 
opportunity can 
increase sensitivity 
and reduce coping 
ability (driver); 
adequate availability 
and access to quality 
schools and 
educational 
opportunity builds 
social and economic 
capital, workforce 
diversity, and 
increases desirability 
and adaptive capacity 
(resource) 
Opportunity for post-
high school 
education and 
training 
Social Services Well-being # of four-year colleges/universities 
within 30 miles; # of 2-year 
associate or technical degree 
programs within 30 miles; # and 
type of technical and training 
certification courses within 30 
miles; illiteracy rate; % population 
unable to read English 
Residents do not need to 
leave the community 
(relocate) to obtain 
access to educational 
and training 
opportunities; schools 
and training are 
affordable and 
accessible; GED, 
literacy, and basic skills 
courses are available 
and accessible 
Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 'Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
'Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
U.N., 2015 
Resource 
and Driver 
Varying skill level 
and situational 
awareness may 
impact sensitivity and 
coping ability 
(driver); high 
education and skill 
levels build social 
capital, workforce 
diversity, and 
increase adaptive 
capacity (resource) 
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Sufficient and 
effective emergency 
response services 
(police, fire, medical, 
etc.) 
Social Services Survival # of police, fire, emergency 
medical response personnel per 
1,000 residents (or other 
appropriate measure); # unfilled 
critical emergency response 
positions; amount ($) spent 
annually on emergency response; 
average salary of emergency 
responders by type; average 
response times for emergency calls; 
average distance to fire station, 
police station, emergency center  
Emergency response 
personnel are trained 
and certified based on 
current standards and 
requirements; 
equipment meets current 
standards and is 
maintained and 
operational; sufficient 
equipment, facilities, 
and supplies exist and 
are maintained at 
appropriate levels of 
quantity and quality; 
emergency services are 
available and accessible 
to all    
Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
'Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 
Orencio & 
Fujii, 2013; 
UNISDR, 
2017; 
Kontakosta 
& Malik, 
2018; 
Parsons & 
Morley, 
2017 
Resource 
and Driver 
Sufficient and 
effective emergency 
response series 
reduce exposure and 
sensitivity and 
increase coping 
(driver); investment 
in proper manpower 
and training increase 
build social capital 
by increasing trust, 
capacity for response, 
desirability, and 
creating a safe and 
stable environment, 
which can increase 
adaptive capacity 
(resource) 
Community is 
trained on how to 
respond to 
emergency/disaster  
Social Services Preparednes
s 
# of annual community events 
focused on safety and emergency 
response training and education; # 
of locations offering courses in 
safety and emergency response 
(CPR, first aid, etc.); # emergency 
drills conducted annually to 
prepare for disaster; # events 
annually that engage vulnerable 
groups or most likely to be harmed 
in a disaster to ensure training and 
education (poor, non-English 
speaking, assisted living, prisons, 
retirement homes, etc.) 
Emergency services 
participate in local 
drills; healthcare 
providers have 
emergency and disaster 
training; emergency 
training is offered in 
languages other than 
English as needed; 
vulnerable populations 
are engaged and 
educated on what to do 
in a disaster  
Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 'Cutter 
et al., 2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; NAS, 
2017; 
UNISDR, 
2017; 
(Godschalk, 
2003; 
Simmonovic
h and 
Sharabi, 
2013)  
Driver Lack of awareness of 
resources and access 
to training can 
increase sensitivity 
and exposure and 
reduce coping in the 
event of a hazard 
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Sufficient access to 
quality healthcare 
Social Services Well-being % population without access to 
health insurance; # of healthcare 
providers by type per 1,000 people 
(or other appropriate measure); # of 
emergency healthcare providers per 
1,000 people (or other appropriate 
measure); # of urgent care 
providers per 1,000 people (or 
other appropriate measure); # of 
pharmacies per 1,000 people (or 
other appropriate measure); # 
hospital beds per 1,000 people (or 
other appropriate measure); 
average distance to emergency 
medical facilities; average wait 
time for emergency room care; 
average number of care providers 
by type per 1,000 people 
(primary/family care, internal 
medicine, obstetrics and 
gynecology, optometry 
ophthalmology, dentist 
endodontist, specialty care, etc.); ; 
average distance to nearest health 
services center 
Emergency healthcare is 
available to all; essential 
healthcare services are 
available for all 
maternal, newborn, 
child, and infectious 
diseases regardless of 
ability to pay; residents 
do not need to leave the 
area to receive basic 
healthcare; healthcare 
professionals and 
facilities are adequately 
staffed and equipped 
(medical supplies, 
equipment, beds, 
ambulances; etc.); 
regional health services 
are accessible and 
available to provide 
specialized care and or 
additional support; 
healthcare services 
provide preventive 
health services 
(screening, testing, 
exams, immunization, 
contraception, etc.) and 
community outreach; 
there is an accessible 
area for medical 
evacuation (airstrip, 
helipad, other); hospice 
and homecare services 
are available; women's 
healthcare family 
planning (reproductive 
health) are available, 
accessible, and 
affordable 
Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 'Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
'Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
Cutter et al., 
2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; NAS, 
2017; 
'McManus et 
al., 2012'; 
Shen et al., 
2011; 
Hiremath et 
al., 2013; 
DHS, 2016; ; 
U.N., 2015; 
UNISDR, 
2017; 
Kontakosta 
& Malik, 
2018; 
(Chandra et 
al., 2011; 
Plough et al., 
2013; Norris 
et al., 2008; 
Birkmann et 
al., 2013; 
Cimellaro et 
al., 2010; 
Renschler et 
al., 2010) 
Resource 
and Driver 
Communities without 
equitable access to 
quality healthcare 
services are more 
likely to have higher 
sensitivity and low 
coping ability as they 
are less likely to have 
the physical, 
monetary, and time 
resources necessary 
to respond to 
disruption (driver); 
improved access to 
quality healthcare 
builds social and 
economic capital by 
providing for basic 
needs, allowing 
greater flexibility in 
resources, and 
increasing 
desirability, which 
increases adaptive 
capacity (resource)  
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 Health Social Services Survival % population diagnosed with 
chronic health issues 
(cardiovascular, diabetes, cancer, 
respiratory, etc.); average life 
expectancy; birth rate; under 5 
years-old mortality rate; maternal 
mortality rate; child and adult 
vaccination rate; % population not 
participating in leisure time 
physical activity; rate of drug and 
alcohol abuse; annual reported 
spousal abuse; annual reported 
child abuse; % obesity in adults 
and children; # STDs reported per 
year including HIV; % population 
that uses tobacco products 
Population is physically 
healthy and sound; 
disparity in health is 
monitored based on 
community location and 
vulnerable populations; 
immunization is 
mandatory for all 
school-aged children 
attending public or 
private schools 
Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
'Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; DHS, 
2016; U.N., 
2015; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Resource 
and Driver 
Higher levels of 
individual/household
s with poor physical 
capacity indicates 
high sensitivity and 
low coping ability 
(driver); higher levels 
of health and 
wellness build social 
capital by providing 
greater workforce 
stability, increasing 
community 
desirability, and 
increasing adaptive 
capacity (resource) 
Mental health 
support 
Social Services Survival # 
psychiatric/psychological/counselin
g practitioners per 1,000 people (or 
other appropriate measure); suicide 
rate; amount ($) spent annually on 
assistance for mental health, 
addiction, abuse 
Population is mentally 
healthy and sound; 
disparity in health is 
monitored based on 
community location and 
vulnerable populations; 
assistance in available 
to families in the 
aftermath of crisis and 
disaster 
Cutter et al., 
2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 
Orencio & 
Fujii, 2013; 
Hiremath et 
al., 2013; 
U.N., 2015; 
(Pietrzak et 
al., 2012; 
Springgate et 
al., 2011) 
Resource 
and Driver 
Higher levels of 
individual/household
s with poor 
emotional/mental 
capacity indicates 
high sensitivity and 
low coping ability 
(driver); higher levels 
of health and 
wellness build social 
capital by providing 
greater workforce 
stability, increasing 
community 
desirability, and 
increasing adaptive 
capacity (resource) 
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Adequate and 
available law 
enforcement and 
crime prevention 
Social Services Survival # violent crimes per year; # non-
violent crimes per year; # 
homicides per year; # juvenile 
crimes per year; amount ($) spent 
annually on law enforcement and 
crime prevention; # fire-related 
deaths per year; 911 response time 
per call from initial call; # traffic 
related deaths per year; # sexual 
assaults per year; # hate crimes 
reported per year 
Perceived safety is high; 
community has active 
neighborhood watch; 
public trusts police 
force and law 
enforcement  
Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 
'McManus et 
al., 2012'; 
'Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 'Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; Shen 
et al., 2011; 
U.N., 2015 
Resource 
and Driver 
High levels of crime 
and perception of 
danger increase 
exposure and 
sensitivity and reduce 
coping (driver); 
investment in proper 
manpower and 
training high levels 
of perceived safety 
increase social capital 
by increasing trust, 
desirability, and 
creating a safe and 
stable environment, 
which can increase 
adaptive capacity 
(resource) 
Remoteness Social Services Survival Distance from community center to 
the nearest urban 
center/metropolitan statistical area; 
distance from community center to 
the nearest major highway; 
distance from community center to 
the state capitol; average household 
distance to nearest hospital; 
average household distance from 
community center; average 
distance between households 
The nearest regional 
hub has the services 
(e.g., banking, health, 
dental, etc.) local 
residents need and is 
within 2 hours travel 
year-round  
Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
'Cutter et al., 
2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; NAS, 
2017; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 
(Bowman 
and Parson, 
2009) 
Driver  Community physical 
isolation can increase 
exposure and 
sensitivity to hazards, 
reducing coping 
ability 
Adequate services 
and amenities are 
available for 
permanent and 
seasonal residents 
and visiting 
occupants 
Economic Micro/Meso 
Economic 
efficiency 
Survival [all measures are per 1,000 people 
(or other appropriate measure] # 
grocery stores; # hotel/motels; # 
fueling stations; # banks/financial 
providers   
Adequate repair and 
maintenance services; 
adequate goods, 
supplies, and equipment 
vendors; adequate retail 
stores and restaurants to 
meet resident's needs; 
residents do not need to 
leave the community to 
meet service and 
amenity needs 
McManus et 
al., 2012; 
'Cutter et al., 
2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; NAS, 
2017; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014;  
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 
Orencio & 
Fujii, 2013; 
(Ozbay et al., 
2007; 
Tierney, 
2009; Rose 
Resource 
and Driver 
Those without access 
to services and 
amenities are more 
likely to have higher 
sensitivity and low 
coping ability as they 
are less likely to have 
the physical, 
monetary, and time 
resources necessary 
to respond to 
disruption (driver); 
improved access to 
services and 
amenities builds 
social and economic 
capital by providing 
for needs and 
allowing greater 
flexibility in 
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and 
Krausmann, 
2013; Wein 
and Rose, 
2011) 
resources, and greater 
desirability, which 
increases adaptive 
capacity (resource)  
Livable wage Economic Macroeconomi
c Stability 
Survival % population at or below the 
poverty line by age, gender, race; 
% of population working more than 
1 job; % of population income 
derived via external support 
(welfare, subsidy, etc.); % inactive 
businesses/farms; Gini 
coefficient/income distribution; # 
children living in poverty; % 
population receiving government 
financial assistance; # jobs lost due 
to natural disaster/disaster; median 
per capita income; amount ($) 
spent on ending poverty per year; # 
households entering poverty due to 
emergency/disaster 
Most of the population 
can earn a livable wage 
working a single job 
Cabell and 
Oelofse,  
2012'; 
Palmisano et 
al., 2016'; 
'Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
Shen et al., 
2011; Lynch 
et al., 2011; 
Ranger & 
Surminski, 
2013; 
Venton 
2014; DHS, 
2016; U.N., 
2015; 
Mitchell et 
al., 2013 
Resource 
and Driver 
Those without access 
to a livable wage are 
more likely to have 
higher sensitivity and 
low coping ability as 
they are less likely to 
have the physical, 
monetary, and time 
resources necessary 
to respond to 
disruption (driver); 
higher percent of 
livable wage builds 
social and economic 
capital by providing 
for needs and 
allowing greater 
flexibility in 
resources, and greater 
desirability, which 
increases adaptive 
capacity (resource)  
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Innovation and 
growth in businesses  
Economic Macroeconomi
c Stability 
Well-being % annual change in new, locally 
owned business; % privately 
owned businesses in operation for 
more than 5 years; % change GDP 
from new business; % growth in 
employment; # locally provided 
loans, risk-transfer or sharing 
programs to help new businesses 
Stability or growth in 
new business; privately 
owned businesses can 
be sustained; the 
community encourages 
niche, craft, and micro-
enterprises 
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 'Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
'Palmisano et 
al., 2016'; 
Rose & 
Krausmann, 
2013; U.N., 
2015; 
Mitchell et 
al, 2013; 
Parsons & 
Morley, 
2017 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of growth or 
lack of stability in 
local business 
(businesses 
frequently fail to 
survive) creates 
higher sensitivity and 
lower coping in the 
event of hazards 
(driver); stable, long-
term growth in new 
business increases 
social  and economic 
capital, desirability, 
and adaptive capacity 
(resource) 
Diverse economic 
structure, skills, and 
livelihood strategies 
Economic Micro/Meso 
Economic 
efficiency 
Well-being % and type of industry sectors 
present in the community 
(industrial, manufacturing, 
agricultural, etc.); % labor force 
engaged in the following 
(agriculture, farming, tourism, 
fishing, mining/extraction); % and 
type of skilled professionals 
(doctors, nurses, lawyers, dentists, 
veterinarians, scientists, etc.); ratio 
of highly skilled jobs to trade-level 
jobs; % farms receiving subsidies 
or paid not to produce 
Economic base is 
diverse and does not 
depend on a single or 
only a few industries; 
balance between small 
and large businesses; 
there is an adequate 
number of highly skilled 
professionals to meet 
community needs; 
professionals stay 
within the community; 
critical skills are 
typically filled and not 
vacant; flexible 
strategies are developed 
to avoid dependence on 
single sectors or goods 
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 
Palmisano et 
al., 2016'; 
'Cutter et al., 
2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; NAS, 
2017; 'Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 
'Matthews et 
al., 2014'; 
'Cabell and 
Oelofse,  
2012'; Rose 
& 
Krausmann, 
2013; 
Hughes & 
Bushell, 
2013; U.N., 
2015; 
Mitchell et 
al., 2013; 
Driver Lack of diversity 
(reliance on one or 
few skills and 
livelihood strategies) 
can increase 
sensitivity and reduce 
coping in the event of 
a hazard  
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UNISDR, 
2017; 
Kontakosta 
& Malik, 
2018; 
(Altieri, 
1999; Ewell, 
1999; Berkes 
et al., 2003; 
Luck et al., 
2003; Swift 
et al., 2004; 
Folke, 2006; 
Jackson et 
al., 2007; Di 
Falco and 
Chavas, 
2008; 
Chapin et al., 
2009; 
Darnhofer et 
al., 2010; 
Sherrieb, et 
al., 2010) 
Desirability Economic Macroeconomi
c Stability 
Well-being Relative comparison of: property 
tax, sales tax, state income tax to 
other nearby communities; relative 
comparison of well-being 
(education, crime rates, healthcare 
services, public spending on 
community infrastructure and  
upkeep, etc. to other nearby 
communities) 
Public finances are 
well-managed and 
reported to the 
community in a 
transparent way; public 
economic reports and 
audits are available to 
the public 
Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015' 
Resource 
and Driver 
Poor value 
performance (prices, 
taxes, etc.) can lead 
to greater sensitivity 
and lower coping 
(driver); increased 
value performance 
builds social and 
economic capital and 
desirability, leading 
to increased adaptive 
capacity (resource) 
Public-private 
partnership and 
investment 
Economic Macroeconomi
c Stability 
Well-being # and worth of significant public-
private partnerships 
There is shared 
investment in the 
community between 
public and private 
partners  
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016' 
Resource Public/private 
partnerships can 
leverage available 
resources and provide 
access to extended 
resources that can 
increase social  and 
economic capital, and 
increase both 
capacity for response 
and adaptive capacity 
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Property ownership Economic Micro/Meso 
Economic 
efficiency 
Well-being % of population owning homes 
(outright or mortgage); % or 
population owning land (outright or 
mortgage); # families displaced 
(homes lost without compensation) 
due to natural disaster/disaster 
annually 
The majority of 
residents own property 
as opposed to 
renting/leasing 
Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
'Cutter et al., 
2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 
Ranger & 
Surminski, 
2013; 
Thoms, 
2016; 
Venton, 
2014; U.N., 
2015; 
(Peacock et 
al., 2010; 
Tierney, 
2009; 
Haveman 
and Wolff, 
2005; 
Pendall et 
al., 2012) 
Driver Lack of property 
ownership (high 
levels of renting or 
leasing) can indicate 
lack of financial 
stability or lack of 
permanence in 
residents, which can 
lead to higher levels 
of sensitivity and 
lower coping in the 
event of a hazard 
Age structure of 
working population 
Economic Macroeconomi
c Stability 
Survival % workforce by age bracket; % 
change in workforce by age bracket 
The majority of the 
workforce is not close to 
retirement age; 
workforce is stable with 
a balanced mix of age 
groups 
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cutter 
et al., 2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; NAS, 
2017; 
(Morrow, 
2008) 
Resource Balanced and stable 
workforce age allows 
for greater potential 
diversity in work 
structure, skills, and 
livelihood, increasing 
social and economic 
capital and adaptive 
capacity 
Stability of prices, 
incomes, property 
values 
Economic Macroeconomi
c Stability 
Well-being [% change in last 5 years in] 
property values; property taxes; 
median income; average household 
utility cost (water, electricity, gas, 
renewable, etc.); average cost of 
living; inflation rate; % population 
spending more than 30% income 
on housing and transportation costs 
(emphasis on low income families) 
Property values, tax 
rates, cost of living are 
relatively stable 
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; Shen 
et al., 2011; 
Lynch et al., 
2011; DHS, 
2016 
Resource 
and Driver 
Poor value 
performance (prices, 
taxes, etc.) can lead 
to greater sensitivity 
and lower coping 
(driver); increased 
desirability can lead 
to greater social and 
economic capital and 
increased adaptive 
capacity (resource) 
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Balanced market 
supply and demand 
Economic Macroeconomi
c Stability 
Survival Ratio of imported to exported 
goods; # and value of mutual aid 
agreements for major supply 
chains, etc. (agreements between 
public/private entities to pool 
resources, shift or re-route supply 
chains/transport when needed, 
share storage, etc.); Amount of 
emergency stockpile/back-up, 
excess capacity for critical goods 
and supplies (raw materials, fuel, 
food, etc.); ratio of imported 
(energy, food, industrial supply) to 
GDP as a measure of dependence 
on strategic import of goods into 
community 
Supply and demand 
strategies are not sole-
sourced and are 
sufficiently 
redundant/diverse to 
accommodate 
disruption; healthy 
reliance on local 
markets and resources; 
existence of back-up or 
stockpile for critical 
resources in the event of 
disruption to keep 
businesses running; 
existence of redundant 
capabilities for critical 
supply and demand; 
existence of excess 
labor when needed 
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 
'Cabell and 
Oelofse,  
2012'; Rose 
& 
Krausmann, 
2013; 
Orencio & 
Fujii, 2013; 
Ranger & 
Surminski, 
2013; 
Briguglio et 
al., 2009; 
UNISDR, 
2017; 
(Holling, 
2001; 
Gunderson 
and Holling, 
2002; 
Milestad and 
Darnhofer, 
2003; Folke 
et al., 2010; 
van 
Apeldoorn et 
al., 2011) 
Resource 
and Driver 
Imbalanced market 
structure (significant 
reliance on export or 
import, reliance on a 
single supplier or 
buyer) can lead to 
increased 
vulnerability and 
lower coping in the 
event of a hazard 
(driver); balanced 
and diverse market 
structures allow for 
growth in social and 
economic capital and 
greater adaptive 
capacity (resource) 
Stable employment 
rate 
Economic Micro/Meso 
Economic 
efficiency 
Well-being % annual change in 
unemployment; % community jobs 
that are state or federal positions; 
% annual job growth; % jobless 
families with children under 15 
years of age; 3-year average 
unemployment rate; % population 
over age 16 unemployed 
Employment rates are 
stable; Employment is 
not significantly 
impacted by relocation 
of state and federal 
facilities 
Cutter et al., 
2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 
McManus et 
al., 2012; 
'Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
DHS, 2016; 
U.N., 2015; 
Kontakosta 
& Malik, 
2018; (Rose 
Driver  Unstable 
employment 
(significant 
variability in 
employment rates, 
significant increase in 
unemployment, or 
reliance on a single 
major employer) can 
lead to increased 
vulnerability and 
lower coping in the 
event of a hazard 
(driver); stable and 
diverse employment 
opportunity allows 
for growth in social 
and economic capital 
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and 
Krausmann, 
2013; 
Sherrieb et 
al., 2010) 
and greater adaptive 
capacity (resource) 
Strong integration 
between local and 
regional economies  
Economic Macroeconomi
c Stability 
Well-being % of businesses with international, 
national, regional, or state-wide 
presence/distribution   
Strong 
collaboration/integration 
of local and regional 
markets; contingency 
contracts with suppliers 
& transporters; capacity 
for credit/assistance 
from network 
distribution and 
local/regional markets 
Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 
'Cabell and 
Oelofse,  
2012'; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; Rose 
& 
Kruasmann, 
2013; 
Ranger & 
Surminski, 
2013 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of integration 
between local and 
regional  economies 
can increase 
isolation, leading to 
greater sensitivity to 
hazards and lower 
coping ability 
(driver); integration 
and coordination with 
other local and 
regional economies 
can leverage 
available resources 
and provide access to 
extended resources 
that builds social and 
economic capital and 
may increase risk 
awareness, improve 
planning and 
mitigation actions, 
and increase both 
capacity for response 
and adaptive capacity 
(resource) 
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Urban 
sprawl/farmland 
conversion 
Economic Macroeconomi
c Stability 
Well-being % annual change in land use 
conversion by type (from one land 
use to another) 
Impacts of urban sprawl 
and farmland 
conversion are 
monitored 
Skog and 
Steinnes, 
2016' 
Resource 
and Driver 
Significant increase 
in farmland 
conversion or other 
forms of land use 
change should be 
monitored to ensure 
that impacts do not 
increase sensitivity to 
hazard (driver); 
diversity in land use 
and strategic 
management of land 
use conversion can 
build social, 
economic, and 
environmental 
capital, leading to 
increase in adaptive 
capacity (resource) 
Contingency 
funds/savings 
(private and public) 
Economic Micro/Meso 
Economic 
efficiency 
Well-being % of residents with active savings; 
% of municipal funding set aside 
for contingency/emergency; $ 
amount of financial or in-kind 
agreements with public/private 
entities to provide 
support/assistance in 
emergency/natural disaster/disaster  
Existence of public and 
private financial reserve 
(internal and external 
funds) in case of 
contingency/emergency; 
estimates of worst-case 
scenarios for medium to 
high-risk natural 
disaster/disaster (storm, 
flood, earth quake, 
wildfire, etc.) and 
strategies to access 
needed resources based 
on estimates 
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 
Hughes & 
Bushell, 
2013; 
Ranger & 
Surminski, 
2013; 
Thoms, 2016   
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of allocation of 
individual and 
community resources 
to respond to hazards 
can increase 
sensitivity and reduce 
coping (driver); 
adequate 
establishment of 
private and public 
contingency funds 
increases economic 
capital through 
availability and 
access to immediate 
resources and may 
reduce the need for 
outside help, 
increasing both 
capacity for response 
and adaptive capacity 
(resource) 
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Insurance Economic Micro/Meso 
Economic 
efficiency 
Well-being % homes not insured; % 
businesses/farms uninsured; % 
properties located in flood plain not 
insured by National Flood 
Insurance Program(NFIP); % of 
NFIP-participating community 
enrolled in Community Rating 
System (CRS) with a rating of 5 or 
better; # Repetitive Loss 
Properties; # Severe Repetitive 
Loss Properties; # acquired 
Repetitive Loss Properties; % 
farms without crop insurance; % 
financial institutions not insured by 
FDIC; amount ($) paid insurance 
claims due to natural  
disaster/disaster annually; # and 
value ($) of homes, businesses, 
farms lost/damaged by natural 
disaster/disaster; % loss 
agricultural output due to disaster 
annually 
Properties and 
businesses are 
adequately insured; 
existence of property 
"buy-out" program to 
remove Repetitive Loss 
and Severe Repetitive 
Loss properties from 
flood hazard zones; 
Most recent Flood 
Insurance Rate Maps 
(FIRM) are publicly 
accessible  
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cutter 
et al., 2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 
Sempier et 
al., 2010; 
Ranger & 
Surminski, 
2013; DHS, 
2016; 
Mitchell et 
al., 2013; 
(Michel-
Kerjan et al., 
2012) 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of insured 
properties and 
businesses can 
increase sensitivity to 
hazards and reduce 
coping (driver); 
appropriate insurance 
coverage can increase 
economic and social 
capital by generating 
resources to aid in 
recovery and 
allowing other 
resources to be used 
more effectively in 
response, which 
increases adaptive 
capacity (resource) 
Comprehensive 
planning and support 
for local business 
continuity 
Economic Micro/Meso 
Economic 
efficiency 
Preparednes
s 
% businesses with 
continuity/recovery plans that 
include communication, 
evacuation, emergency supplies, 
shelter, leadership/staff succession, 
contingency, relocation, re-
financing, practice restarting, 
change procedures, supply re-
routing,  mutual aid agreements, 
and family assistance (including 
farms and agro-industry); # of local 
financial institutions that provide 
low-interest or no-interest 
financing mechanisms to 
businesses for mitigation and 
recovery; % businesses that have 
employee assistance programs 
during times of disruption 
Business continuity 
plans address 
mitigation, response, 
and recovery and/or 
redevelopment; low-
interest or no-interest 
financing mechanisms 
are available to 
businesses for 
mitigation and recovery; 
business leaders actively 
support small business 
continuity by providing 
assistance; 
understanding and 
estimation capability for 
worst-case damage/loss 
scenarios related to 
likely hazards (flood, 
storm, etc.); employee 
communication plans in 
place; current business 
plan and operations 
plan; understanding of 
worst-case damage/loss 
from likely hazards 
scenarios; 
agreements/contracts in 
Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014;  
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; Rose 
& 
Krausmann, 
2013; 
Orencio & 
Fujii, 2013; 
Sempier et 
al., 2010; 
Ranger & 
Surminski, 
2013; LaDon 
et al., 2015; 
Mitchell et 
al., 2013; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Driver  Businesses that do 
not have a plan for 
continued operation, 
access to needed 
resources, and 
recovery are 
generally more 
sensitive to hazards 
and have  lower 
coping ability 
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place with other 
businesses and suppliers 
in event of disaster; at 
least 3 months 
emergency operating 
funds; adequate 
insurance; backup 
generators/emergency 
supplies on hand 
Job density 
(proximity, 
commuting, etc.) 
Economic Micro/Meso 
Economic 
efficiency 
Survival % population that commutes more 
than 20 miles one way (high 
mileage commuters); % of high 
mileage commuters that are low 
income 
Most jobs are located 
within 20 miles of 
residences; low income 
workers can afford to 
live within reasonable 
distance from jobs  
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015' 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of reasonable 
proximity to jobs that 
provide a livable 
wage (excessive 
commuting or 
commuting outside 
the community to 
find work) can 
increase sensitivity to 
hazards and reduce 
coping ability 
(driver); access and 
proximity of jobs that 
provide livable wages 
within the 
community build 
social and economic 
capital, and can 
increase adaptive 
capacity (resources) 
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Collective ownership 
of community 
resources 
Economic Micro/Meso 
Economic 
efficiency 
Well-being # of co-ops, # of community 
gardens; # of farmers markets; # of 
shared community spaces; # of 
community supported agriculture 
(CSA) 
There is shared 
ownership/investment in 
community resources 
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cutter 
et al., 2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; 
Hughes & 
Bushell, 
2013  
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of shared 
investment in 
community resources 
can increase 
sensitivity and reduce 
coping (driver); 
shared investment 
and ownership in 
community resources 
increases social and 
economic capital 
through cohesion and 
leveraging of 
resources, which can 
increase adaptive 
capacity (resource) 
Tourism Economic Micro/Meso 
Economic 
efficiency 
Well-being Number of annual tourists, % 
community revenues generated by 
tourism; % jobs dependent on 
tourism   
Relative dependence on 
tourism 
Palmisano et 
al., 2016'; 
U.N., 2015 
Resource 
and Driver 
Communities that 
rely primarily on 
tourism may have 
increased sensitivity 
to hazards and lower 
coping ability 
(driver); tourism 
balanced with other 
livelihood sources 
(diversity) can 
increase social and 
economic capital and 
may result in greater 
adaptive capacity 
(resource) 
Asset operations and 
maintenance 
Economic Macroeconomi
c Stability 
Well-being Annual $ needed for operation and 
maintenance of WWTP, storm 
sewers, water and wastewater 
distribution networks, drinking 
water plants, roadways and bridges, 
buildings, electric distribution 
stations, gas/electric lines, 
information technology 
(broadband, cable, fiber)  
Amount of funding 
needed to maintain 
critical assets and 
systems (public and 
private) 
'Palmisano et 
al., 2016'; 
Thoms, 
2016; DHS, 
2016; U.N., 
2015; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Resource 
and Driver 
Inadequate funding to 
maintain critical 
systems and assets 
leads to higher 
sensitivity and lower 
coping ability 
(driver); well 
maintained and 
operated system and 
assets increase social, 
economic, and 
environmental 
capital, reducing 
injury, loss, and time 
to recovery, and 
increasing adaptive 
capacity (resource) 
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Local businesses are 
included in 
community 
processes and 
decisions 
Economic Micro/Meso 
Economic 
efficiency 
Well-being # of businesses in the chamber of 
commerce, size/membership in 
chamber of commerce, local better 
business bureau membership 
Chamber of Commerce 
or equivalent meets 
regularly; business 
leaders participate in 
community decisions 
and planning processes 
Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015' 
Driver  Failure to include 
businesses in 
community processes 
and decisions can 
lead to lack of 
awareness and 
incomplete or 
inaccurate decisions 
that increase 
sensitivity and may 
reduce coping  
Well-managed 
public finances 
Economic Macroeconomi
c Stability 
Well-being Ratio of community annual 
revenue to debt; community credit 
rating; amount ($) community 
investments; amount ($) 
community savings; fiscal deficit to 
GDP ratio; external debt to GDP 
ratio 
Public finances are 
well-managed and 
reported to the 
community in a 
transparent way 
Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; NAS, 
2017; 
Ranger & 
Surminski, 
2013; 
Briguglio et 
al., 2009; 
DHS, 2016; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Resource 
and Driver 
Poorly managed 
public finances can 
lead to increased 
sensitivity to hazards 
and lower coping 
ability (driver); well 
managed public 
finances increase 
social and economic 
capital by building 
trust, efficient use of 
resources, and 
extending access to 
external resources 
when needed (credit, 
loan, etc.), increasing 
adaptive capacity 
(resources) 
Economic 
development 
planning 
Economic Macroeconomi
c Stability 
Preparednes
s 
Age of current community 
economic development plan 
(preferably within 5 years of 
current date) 
Community economic 
development plan 
exists; plan looks 
forward to consider 
changes that might 
affect the tax base or the 
demand for specific 
services; coordinated 
with other local/regional 
governments   
Matthews et 
al., 2014'; 
'Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of 
comprehensive and 
coordinated 
economic 
development 
planning can increase 
sensitive and 
exposure, and reduce 
coping ability 
(driver); 
comprehensive and 
coordinated 
economic 
development 
planning can increase 
opportunity to build 
diversity and 
desirability, 
increasing social, 
economic, and 
environmental  
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capital, leading to 
greater adaptive 
capacity (resource) 
 Adequate & 
affordable housing 
Environmen
t 
Built  Survival % deficit or excess in housing by 
type and average price; % available 
housing based on price and 
community income brackets; % 
homes vacant; % homes for rent; % 
vulnerable home types (trailers, 
etc.); % housing units built prior to 
1970 or after 2000; # and % change 
in annual foreclosures; 
gentrification or displacement rate 
for lower income residents; 
housing affordability gap; % 
households with monthly housing 
costs that exceed 30% of monthly 
income; % of total households with 
at least 1 of 4 severe housing 
problems (housing unit lacks 
complete kitchen facilities; housing 
unit lacks complete plumbing 
facilities; household is severely 
overcrowded; and household is 
severely cost burdened); % homes 
subsidized by State or Federal 
government 
Is there enough 
affordable housing to 
meet population needs; 
Is available housing of 
good quality; Is there an 
excess of housing 
McManus et 
al., 2012; 
Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
Cutter et al., 
2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; NAS, 
2017; 'Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; Shen 
et al., 2011; 
Lynch et al., 
2011; DHS, 
2016; U.N., 
2015; (Kern, 
2010; 
Tierney, 
2009; Mileti, 
1999; 
Theckethil, 
2006) 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of affordable, 
quality housing 
increases sensitivity 
to hazards and lowers 
coping ability 
(driver); balanced 
availability and 
access to safe and 
affordable housing 
(avoiding major 
deficit or excess) 
builds social, 
economic, and 
environmental capital 
and may increase 
adaptive capacity 
(resources) 
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Building codes and 
enforcement 
(residential and 
commercial) 
Environmen
t 
Built  Survival % inspected buildings that meet 
current international building 
codes; % schools/childcare 
facilities that meet current building 
codes; # of enhanced building 
codes adopted to promote disaster 
resilience if community if subject 
to seismic, hurricane, or flood 
hazard; # schools and daycares 
with enhanced building codes to 
promote disaster resilience; % 
homes and businesses with 
enhanced building codes; # and 
type of incentives offered to 
encourage enhanced codes for 
hazard-prone areas 
Do most buildings meet 
current codes; do codes 
reflect higher standards 
if in high risk areas for 
storms/ hurricanes/ 
earthquakes (protect 
against most severe 
scenarios), etc.; are 
codes routinely 
enforced; adherence to 
building codes that 
promote disaster 
resilience; existence of 
incentive-based 
mitigation measures 
(flood proofing; 
elevation; relocation; 
etc.); adequate # of 
certified building 
inspectors and staff to 
inspect and enforce 
codes 
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
Sharifi, 
2016'; Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 
Orencio & 
Fujii, 2013; 
Sempier et 
al., 2010; 
DHS, 2016; 
Mitchell et 
al., 2013; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Driver Lack of safe housing 
and faculties due to 
inconsistent code 
compliance and 
enforcement 
increases sensitivity 
to hazards and can 
impact coping ability  
Availability and 
access to secure and 
reliable information 
and communication 
technology systems 
(ICT) and networks 
Environmen
t 
Built  Survival % population without access to 
phone/cellular/mobile service; % 
population without access to 
internet; % population without 
access to cable or satellite (TV) 
Use of secure networks 
for commerce, finance, 
medical, etc.; frequency 
and duration of 
disruption in services 
(cable, cellular, internet, 
phone, etc.); reverse 911 
is available 
Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
Cutter et al., 
2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; NAS, 
2017; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
Sharifi, 
2016'; Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 
'Parsons et 
al., 2016'; 
(Burger et 
al., 2013; 
Strawderman 
et al., 2012; 
UNDESA, 
2007); 
Thoms, 
2016; DHS, 
2016; U.N., 
2015 
Driver Lack of secure and 
reliable ICT and 
networks can 
increase sensitivity to 
hazards and reduce 
coping ability  
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Emergency 
communication 
systems (before, 
during, after event) 
Environmen
t 
Built  Survival # of warning sirens per 1,000 
people (or other appropriate 
measure); % capability to alert 
population via mobile devices 
(texts, social media, etc.) before, 
during, and after an event; % 
capability to enable inbound flow 
of information from mobile devices 
to support crowd sourcing of data; 
% population that reports receiving 
warnings during drills 
Sufficient warning 
sirens, alert systems to 
notify residents; alert 
methods are sufficiently 
redundant to reach 
residents (sirens, radio, 
TV, phone, etc.); the 
community has access 
to contingency 
communication systems 
and devices (HAM, 
hand-held radios, etc.) 
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
'Sharifi, 
2016'; 
Thoms, 
2016; 
Mitchell et 
al, 2013; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Driver Lack of awareness 
and reliable alert 
mechanisms 
increases exposure to 
hazards and may 
decrease coping 
ability 
Critical 
infrastructure 
identification 
Environmen
t 
Built  Survival % critical infrastructure not 
currently identified on community 
maps (digital mapping such as GIS 
is preferred) [critical infrastructure 
are facilities and networks that are 
considered one of 16 recognized 
categories by the Department of 
Homeland Security - chemical, 
commercial, communication, 
information technology, 
manufacturing, dams, levees, 
defense, agricultural, energy, 
finance, government, healthcare, 
nuclear, transportation, water]; # 
and type of protective 
infrastructure  systems (levees, 
dams, seawalls, etc.) 
Can community 
officials and first 
responders immediately 
identify and convey the 
location of all critical 
infrastructure facilities 
and networks, as well as 
protective structures; 
100% critical  
infrastructure and 
protective infrastructure 
systems are mapped, up 
to date, and available to 
first responders and 
public as appropriate; 
identification of 
airports, rail stations, 
helipads, etc. for 
emergency transport  
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
Sharifi, 
2016'; DHS, 
2016; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Driver Inaccurate or 
incomplete 
identification and 
mapping of critical 
infrastructure can 
increase sensitivity to 
hazards and reduce 
coping ability  
Critical 
infrastructure 
protection and 
maintenance 
Environmen
t 
Built  Well-being % critical infrastructure/systems 
and protective structures  that 
require significant or moderate 
maintenance, repair, replacement; 
current amount ($) of critical 
deferred maintenance backlog; % 
critical systems, services, or 
resources without adequate 
alternative (backup) or spare 
capacity; % critical infrastructure 
without an emergency continuity 
plan; % protective infrastructure 
with current inspection and 
Emergency Action Plan (EAP); % 
protective infrastructure fully 
operational and prepared to handle 
most severe disaster scenario 
Critical infrastructure 
and protective structures 
are regularly maintained 
and operational; critical 
infrastructure is 
regularly monitored; 
critical infrastructure, 
systems, and resources 
are protected from 
identified hazards; 
emergency plans and 
inspections are up to 
date 
Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
Sharifi, 
2016'; Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 
'Cabell and 
Oelofse,  
2012'; DHS, 
2016; 
UNISDR, 
2017; 
(Sundkvist et 
al., 2005; 
Darnhofer et 
Resource 
and Driver 
Inadequate protection 
and maintenance of 
critical infrastructure 
leads to higher 
exposure and 
sensitivity to hazards 
and can lower coping 
ability (driver); well 
maintained and 
protected critical 
infrastructure 
increase social, 
economic, and 
environmental 
capital, reducing 
injury, loss, and time 
to recovery, and 
increasing adaptive 
capacity (resource) 
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al., 2010; 
Folke et al., 
2010) 
Energy & Water 
efficiency and 
renewable energy  
Environmen
t 
Built  Well-being % public buildings meeting current 
energy and/or water efficiency 
standards/codes; % residential 
buildings meeting current energy 
and/or water efficiency 
standards/codes; % renewable 
energy based on total community 
energy supply; average megawatt 
hours per energy consumer; per 
capita energy and water 
consumption; energy and water 
intensity by economic/industrial 
sector 
Relative levels of 
energy and water 
efficiency across 
commercial and 
residential areas, public 
and private sectors; 
availability and use of 
renewable energy  
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
Sharifi, 
2016'; Cutter 
et al., 2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; NAS, 
2017; 
Palmisano et 
al., 2016;; 
Shen et al., 
2011; DHS, 
2016; U.N., 
2015; 
UNISDR, 
2017; 
(UNDESA, 
2007) 
Resource Greater availability 
and access to 
efficient and 
renewable energy 
sources increases 
social, economic, and 
environmental capital 
and can increase 
adaptive capacity  
Accessible, 
affordable, safe, and 
reliable power 
Environmen
t 
Built  Well-being % residents without access to 
power; % residents without access 
to municipal/utility-provided 
power; % residents without 
heating/cooling (HVAC); % 
population at risk from exposure to 
pollution from power 
generation/energy extraction   
All residents have 
access to power; most 
residents have 
heating/cooling 
(HVAC); elderly have 
access to heating and 
cooling in areas at risk 
for extreme temperature 
Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 'Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
DHS, 2016; 
U.N., 2015 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of access to safe 
and reliable power 
increases sensitivity 
to hazards and 
reduces coping 
ability (driver); 
equitable access to 
safe, affordable, and 
reliable power builds 
social, economic, and 
environmental capital 
and increases 
adaptive capacity 
(resource) 
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Assets located 
outside of hazard 
zones (floodplains, 
exposed coastal 
zones, landside 
areas, etc.) 
Environmen
t 
Built  Survival # residential structures located in 
high-hazard zones (floodplain, 
landslide, subsidence, storm surge, 
etc.); # residential structures 
located in high-hazard zones 
(floodplain, landslide, subsidence, 
storm surge, etc.); # schools and 
childcare facilities located in high-
hazard zones; # medical facilities 
located in high-hazard zones; # of 
critical facilities/services (sub-
stations, radio towers, emergency 
equipment storage, water treatment 
plants, etc.); % population within 
10 miles of nuclear power plant, 
major dam, major levee, or other 
high impact structure; % 
population by age, gender, race 
residing in known areas that are 
prone to hazard 
Critical infrastructure is 
not located in high-
hazard areas; residential 
buildings are not located 
in high-hazard areas; 
commercial buildings 
are not located in high-
hazard areas; active 
programs to remove or 
relocate properties in 
hazard zones; routine 
enforcement of zoning; 
community has a 
floodplain manager; 
community uses early 
warning systems for 
flood; zoning 
restrictions are enforced  
Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
Sempier et 
al., 2010; 
Shaw et al., 
2009; 
Mitchell et 
al., 2013; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Driver Improper zoning and 
location of homes, 
businesses, or other 
structures within high 
hazard areas 
increases exposure 
and sensitivity to 
hazards, and reduces 
ability to cope  
Retrofit, renewal, 
and refurbishment of 
the built 
environment 
Environmen
t 
Built  Well-being % community that is compromised 
by blight (vacant/abandoned 
property) - less than 4% of property 
base is desired 
Community blight is 
low (vacant/abandoned 
property); there is an 
active program to 
identify and reduce 
blight 
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
Sharifi, 
2016'; Cutter 
et al., 2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; NAS, 
2017 
Resource 
and Driver 
Persistent blight 
increases sensitivity 
and exposure to 
hazards and may 
reduce coping ability 
(driver); reduction in 
blight and 
revitalization of 
vacant/abandoned 
properties increases 
social, economic, and 
environmental 
capital, and can 
increase adaptive 
capacity (resource) 
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Land use planning Environmen
t 
Built  Well-being Age of current land use planning 
documents and maps (preferably 
within 5 years); % farmland 
converted to other use; % critical 
ecosystem services identified; # 
green & blue infrastructure projects 
(greening roofs, urban gardens, 
green corridors for natural storm 
water attenuation, replace 
impervious surfaces with pervious; 
restoration of embankments, 
restoration of waterways, river and 
stream banks, etc.); # miles 
continuous bike trails; % areas 
considered "walkable" - able  to 
work and live in proximity to 
essential services and amenities 
Community land use 
planning uses 
appropriate zoning 
ordinances and codes to 
protect resources 
(property, people, 
services, etc.); 
ordinances and codes 
are routinely enforced; 
land use planning 
adequately addresses 
issues of blight, 
gentrification; low-
income housing; 
accessibility to essential 
services, identification 
and avoidance of high 
risk areas; protection of 
ecosystem services 
Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 'Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
'Skog and 
Steinnes, 
2016'; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Resource Land use planning 
and enforcement of 
zoning that is 
integrated with other 
community plans 
(economic 
development, disaster 
mitigation, etc.) can 
increase social, 
economic, and 
environmental capital 
and can increase 
adaptive capacity 
(resource) 
Temporary shelter 
and relief availability 
Environmen
t 
Built  Well-being # of beds that can be provided to 
those in need of shelter (homeless, 
women & children, disaster); # of 
services that provide relief 
(homeless, women & children, 
disaster); # homeless adults and 
children 
There is adequate 
shelter for those in need 
(homeless, women & 
children, disaster); there 
is adequate relief 
support for those in 
need (immediately 
available or otherwise 
accessible within 24 
hours) 
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
Sharifi, 
2016'; Cutter 
et al., 2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; 
Lynch et al., 
2011; Shen 
et al., 2011; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of temporary 
shelter and resources 
dedicated  to relief 
can increase exposure 
and sensitivity to 
hazards, lowering 
coping ability 
(driver); integrated 
efforts to identify and 
maintain resources 
for temporary shelter 
and relief increase 
social and economic 
capital, and can 
increase adaptive 
capacity during 
response and 
recovery (resource) 
Most livestock 
owners understand 
local hazard risks 
and how to keep 
animals safe through 
alternate shelter, 
food supplies, or 
evacuation 
Environmen
t 
Built  Preparednes
s 
# farms/livestock owners that are 
not prepared for disaster 
Livestock/farm owners 
have identified and 
invested in emergency 
response resources, 
equipment, and 
contingency power; 
backup supplies (food, 
water, medicine) and 
shelter are available; 
livestock vaccinations 
up to date 
Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 
Hughes & 
Bushell, 
2013 
Driver Lack of emergency 
planning and 
preparation for 
livestock 
maintenance can 
increase exposure 
and sensitivity to 
hazards, and may 
reduce coping ability 
especially within the 
agricultural sector 
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Recreational 
opportunities 
encourage young 
adults and families 
to stay 
Environmen
t 
Built  Well-being # community recreational 
facilities/areas per 1,000 people (or 
other appropriate measure) 
[includes sport/health clubs, 
recreation centers, parks, 
playgrounds, skate ramps, green 
space, etc.]; square feet (acres, etc.) 
of public recreation facility space 
per capita (facilities and green 
space/parks); $ spent annually on 
public recreation; # libraries 
Adequate number of 
recreational facilities 
and areas available for 
community use; 
facilities and areas are 
accessible to all; 
facilities and areas are 
well-maintained and 
safe; residents do not 
need to leave the 
community to access 
recreational 
opportunities 
Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
Sharifi, 
2016'; 
McManus et 
al., 2012; 
Shen et al., 
2011; U.N., 
2015; 
Kontakosta 
& Malik, 
2018 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of recreational 
opportunity increases 
sensitivity and may 
impact coping due to 
lack of cohesion and 
community 
engagement (driver); 
opportunity for 
recreation through 
facilities or natural 
spaces increases 
social capital and 
economic capital by 
increasing 
desirability, creating 
new 
revenue/business, and 
fostering social 
cohesion and trust, 
increases 
environmental capital 
and adaptive capacity 
as resources can also 
be used for 
temporary shelter and 
relief (resource) 
Access and 
evacuation routes 
Environmen
t 
Built  Well-being # major road egress point per 1,000 
persons (or other relevant 
measure); Amount funding 
allocated to emergency evacuation 
procedures (crews, transportation, 
etc.); # airports; # rail lines; # 
helipads 
Adequate road egress 
points to enter and leave 
the community based on 
population; adequate 
signage to identify 
routes; routes and 
information available to 
public via multiple 
communication systems 
(internet, maps, plans, 
etc.); emergency 
signage is posted and 
easily understandable 
(flood, avalanche, 
tsunami, etc.); multiple 
access routes into and 
out of the community; 
alternate access routes 
are available and 
maintained; plan in 
place to monitor 
evacuation, clear debris, 
assist with traffic 
control; remove 
Cutter et al., 
2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 
Sempier et 
al., 2010 
Driver Lack of adequate 
access and 
evacuation routes 
(and identification 
and awareness of 
routes) can increase 
exposure and 
sensitivity to hazards 
and reduce coping 
ability, especially 
during evacuation, 
response, and 
recovery 
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vehicles, provide public 
transportation, and 
complete emergency 
repair of roads and 
transportation systems; 
mutual aid agreements 
with other communities 
Industrial re-supply 
potential  
Environmen
t 
Built  Well-being # of rail miles per square mile; # of 
ports in area; # of multimodal 
transport hubs in area 
Commercial rail is 
available to the 
community, other 
commercial transport 
and shipping modes 
available 
Cutter et al., 
2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; NAS, 
2017; (Cutter 
et al., 2008) 
Resource Availability of means 
for industrial 
resupply increases 
social and economic 
capital, especially 
during response and 
recovery, and 
increases adaptive 
capacity 
Adequate, 
accessible, reliable, 
safe, and affordable 
transport networks 
Environmen
t 
Built  Well-being # and type of 
transportation/mobility networks 
(bus, rail, etc.); % households 
within 1/4 mile of a transit stop; 
miles of bike lane; % population 
using transit (ridership); # primary 
ingress/egress routes (alternate 
means of access or evacuation); % 
of public transportation passenger 
terminals with intermodal 
connectivity and in compliance 
with ADA requirements 
Transportation modes 
are affordable and 
reliable; networks are 
adequately connected; 
networks are accessible 
and consistently 
available; transportation 
infrastructure, 
equipment, and services 
are adequately 
maintained (roads, 
signage, bridges, rail 
line, buses, trains, 
stations, shelters, etc.) to 
ensure safety and 
operability; disruption 
to service is minimal 
(length and duration of 
disruption); existence of 
Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
Sharifi, 
2016'; 'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; Lynch 
et al., 2011; 
Sempier et 
al., 2010; 
DHS, 2016 
Resource 
and Driver 
Inadequate 
transport/mobility 
networks increases 
exposure and 
sensitivity to hazards, 
and decreases coping 
ability, especially 
during evacuation, 
response, and 
recovery (driver); 
equitable access to 
safe, reliable, and 
affordable means of 
transport increase 
social and economic 
capital, as 
community 
desirability and 
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alternate routes for 
access/evacuation 
adaptive capacity 
(resource) 
Cultural and 
historical 
preservation, 
indigenous 
knowledge and 
traditions 
Environmen
t  
General Well-being # cultural/archeological sites; # 
museums; public/private 
investment ($ annually) in 
cultural/heritage sites 
Community legislation 
and policy protect 
cultural/historical 
resources; history and 
tradition is respected 
(existence of 
cultural/historical 
groups focused on 
protection, preservation, 
and education); 
maintenance of 
heirloom seeds and 
native species; 
engagement of elders; 
incorporation of 
traditional techniques 
with modern knowledge 
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
Sharifi, 
2016'; 
'Palmisano et 
al., 2016'; 
'Cabell and 
Oelofse,  
2012'; Shen 
et al., 2011; 
UNISDR, 
2017; 
(Gunderson 
and Holling, 
2002; 
Cumming et 
al., 2005; 
Shava et al., 
2010; van 
Apeldoorn et 
al., 2011) 
Resource Maintenance of land, 
facilities, and assets 
associated with local 
history and heritage 
increases social and 
environmental capital 
through learning, 
memory. cohesion, 
increased desirability, 
recreation, and 
shared space, which 
can increase adaptive 
capacity 
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Climate is 
considered in risk 
identification, 
assessment, and 
planning, and policy  
Environmen
t  
General Preparednes
s 
% change in maximum, average, 
and minimum daily temperatures 
over 10 year period; % change in 
maximum, average, and minimum 
precipitation over 10 year period; 
% change in frequency and 
intensity of severe storms, floods, 
drought, wildfire, etc. over last 10 
years; % change in reported 
damages ($) resulting from severe 
storms, floods, drought, wildfire, 
earthquake, etc. over last 10 years; 
% change sea level over last 10 
years (for coastal communities); # 
of sites designated as StormReady 
and/or TsunamiReady  
Climate risk and 
impacts are considered 
for built and natural 
infrastructure, economy, 
safety, and wellbeing; 
community resources 
are allocated for 
assessment of climate 
impacts; monitoring of 
changes in frequency 
and intensity/severity of 
storms, flood, wildfire, 
drought, erosion, 
subsidence, infestation, 
and related damage and 
loss, etc.; coastal 
communities consider 
impacts of sea level rise 
and salinity intrusion 
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
Sharifi, 
2016'; 
'Matthews et 
al., 2014'; 
Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 
Hughes & 
Bushell, 
2013; Shaw 
et al., 2009; 
Yoon et al., 
2016; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Driver Failure to adequately 
monitor, assess, and 
integrate climate data 
(past, current, and 
future projections) 
into risk assessment 
and planning can 
result in 
underestimation of 
frequency and 
severity of hazards 
and lack of 
identification of 
social, economic, and 
environmental 
impacts -  this 
increases exposure 
and sensitivity to 
hazards and lowers 
coping ability  
Mapping capability Environmen
t  
General Preparednes
s 
% critical assets currently mapped 
(infrastructure, critical services, 
evacuation routes, populations, 
high risk areas, etc.)  
Accurate and up-to-date 
mapping of critical 
assets, infrastructure, 
services, evacuation 
routes, populations, 
hazard scenarios (flood, 
tidal surge, wind, etc.) 
exists and is available to 
the public; maps are 
updated regularly; GIS 
is used 
Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
Venton, 
2014; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Resource The ability to apply 
integrated tools such 
as mapping capability 
(GIS, etc.) to risk 
assessment, planning, 
and policy increases 
social capital through 
trust, efficiency, and 
capacity for response, 
and can also increase 
economic and 
environmental capital 
through more 
efficient and effective 
use of resources and 
linked impacts during 
hazard/mitigation 
planning and 
strategies for 
adaptation or 
transformation, 
which can increase 
adaptive capacity 
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Waste management Environmen
t  
General Survival % population without access to 
municipal waste management; % 
population without adequate 
sewage treatment (including septic 
fields); number of hazardous waste 
collection/treatment sites; % 
population burning trash; # of 
"non-permitted" landfills/waste 
repository sites; # hazardous spills 
reported in last year; # transpiration 
related spills/releases of hazardous 
materials in last year; # recycling 
services; # wastewater treatment 
facilities; # of wastewater treatment 
systems that did not meet permit 
requirements in the last year; # 
untreated discharges from 
wastewater treatment plants in last 
year; # beach closures in last year; 
# fishing/swimming advisories 
issued in last year; # of impaired 
water sources (rivers, aquifers, 
etc.); # of septic tanks and septic 
fields; % combined sewer/storm 
water systems; % facilities failing 
to meet air quality standards in last 
year; # air quality 
warnings/advisories to public in 
last year; % population exposed to 
excessive noise levels; # of 
reported medical respiratory 
incidents related to air quality in 
adults and children; carbon dioxide 
emissions intensity by economic 
sector/industry (tons/year) 
The community has 
access to safe and 
sanitary waste disposal 
and management 
services; municipal 
waste is disposed of at a 
permitted facility; 
appropriate measures 
are in place for spill 
response and recovery; 
where trash burning is 
allowed, the community 
provides safety 
guidelines; recycling is 
available; municipal 
waste water treatment 
systems meet permit 
requirements; waste 
sites/repositories are 
adequately maintained 
and protected; 
wastewater treatment 
plants are in compliance 
with permits; water 
quality standards in 
lakes, rivers, and 
streams are adequately 
maintained; residents 
understand how to 
properly maintain septic 
tanks; storm water is 
adequately managed; air 
quality standards are 
maintained; air quality 
is consistently good; 
noise levels are 
acceptable 
Palmisano et 
al., 2016; 
Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 'Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; Shen 
et al., 2011; 
Lynch et al., 
2011; 
Hiremath et 
al., 2013; 
U.N., 2015; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of safe and 
reliable waste 
disposal and sanitary 
services increases 
exposure and 
sensitivity to hazards 
and can decrease 
coping ability 
(driver); equitable 
access to safe and 
reliable waste 
management and 
sanitation services 
increases social 
capital through 
health, trust, and 
desirability, 
economic and 
environmental capital 
are also increased 
through prevision of 
jobs, and prevention 
of natural 
degradation, when 
services are present 
and reliably 
maintained, adaptive 
capacity is higher 
(resource) 
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Water supply and 
quality 
Environmen
t  
General Survival  % population without access to 
municipal drinking water 
(municipal, private wells, etc.); # 
municipal multiple water supply 
sources; % public drinking water 
systems that did not meet permit 
requirements in the last year; % 
population with only access to 
groundwater; % irrigation from 
groundwater; water supply stress 
index; # of waterborne illnesses 
reported in last year; # of annual 
disruptions to water supply; # of 
droughts and length and severity of 
drought conditions; # bottled water 
notices; # boil water notices; # 
swimming water notices; % water 
lost in conveyance 
All residents have 
access to adequate 
supplies of safe drinking 
water; multiple water 
supply sources; water 
meets current and future 
(over next 20 years) 
needs (municipal, 
industrial, agricultural, 
etc.); water distribution 
and treatment facilities 
are well maintained; the 
community adequately 
protects source water 
areas, watersheds, 
reservoirs, springs, well 
heads; ; does the state 
have a Mutual Aid and 
Assistance Agreement 
in place through the 
Water/Wastewater 
Agency Response 
Network (WARN) 
Cutter et al., 
2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; NAS, 
2017; 
Palmisano et 
al., 2016; 
Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; 'Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
Lynch et al., 
2011; 
Hughes & 
Bushell, 
2013; DHS, 
2016; 
Hiremath et 
al., 2013; 
U.N., 2015; 
UNISDR, 
2017; 
(UNDESA, 
2007) 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of long-term 
availability and 
access to safe 
drinking water 
increases exposure 
and sensitivity to 
hazards and lowers 
coping ability 
(driver); long-term 
availability and 
equitable access to 
safe drinking water 
through integrated 
demand-management 
and watershed 
planning increases 
social, economic, and 
environmental 
capital, and increases 
adaptive capacity 
(resource) 
Redundancy and 
diversity in natural 
resources 
Environmen
t  
Natural Well-being # and type of crops planted 
annually; # and type of water 
sources available for community 
use; # and type of energy sources 
available to the community (coal, 
natural gas, heating oil, nuclear, 
wind, solar, etc.); % annual change 
in land cover from natural to other 
use; % of total surface and 
groundwater sources used; water 
demand projections for 
agricultural, industrial, municipal 
sectors for next 10-20 years; 
Adequate diversity and 
redundancy in natural 
resources (water, 
energy, land); 
consideration of impact 
associated with water 
rights; adoption of 
hazard resistant 
agriculture 
Srinivasan et 
al., 2012; 
Cabell and 
Oelofse,  
2012';'Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; Shen 
et al., 2011; 
Lynch et al., 
2011; 
Orencio & 
Fujii, 2013; 
Hughes & 
Bushell, 
2013; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of redundancy 
and diversity in 
resource availability 
and use increases 
sensitivity to hazard 
and can lower coping 
ability (driver); 
adequate redundancy 
and diversity in 
resource availability 
and use ensures 
access to resources 
under changing 
conditions and allows 
for greater flexibility 
over time which can 
increase social, 
economic, and 
environmental capital 
and adaptive capacity 
(resource) 
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Diversity in 
landscape elements 
Environmen
t  
Natural Well-being % land use by type; % pervious 
surface in urban areas; % 
woodland, prairie, and natural 
space; % change in natural areas 
annually (loss of green space, 
including farm conversion) 
Balanced community 
design (mixed use, 
compact, dispersed, 
green space, etc.); 
patchiness in 
agricultural areas; 
mosaic pattern of 
managed and 
unmanaged land; 
diverse forestry and 
cultivation practices; 
crop rotation; 
heterogeneity of 
features within the 
landscape; master plan 
and economic 
development are 
integrated to preserve 
landscape and natural 
assets 
Palmisano et 
al., 2016; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
Sharifi, 
2016'; Cabell 
and Oelofse,  
2012'; Cutter 
et al., 2014'; 
Cutter, 
2016c; NAS, 
2017; 
UNISDR, 
2017; 
(Altieri, 
1999; Ewell, 
1999; Berkes 
et al., 2003; 
Luck et al., 
2003; Swift 
et al., 2004; 
Folke, 2006; 
Jackson et 
al., 2007; Di 
Falco and 
Chavas, 
2008; 
Chapin et al., 
2009; 
Darnhofer et 
al., 2010; 
Devictor et 
al., 2008) 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of diversity in 
land use and 
landscape elements 
can increase 
sensitivity to hazards 
and reduce coping 
ability (driver); 
adequate presence of 
green (natural) and 
gray (built) features 
allows for natural 
attenuation and 
natural buffers (water 
quality, flood, etc.), 
which increases 
social capital through 
presence of green 
spaces, economic 
capital through 
greater efficiency, 
and environmental 
capital through 
infrastructure 
protection and 
ecosystem services, 
which increases 
adaptive capacity 
(resource) 
Managed exposure 
to disturbance  
Environmen
t  
Natural Well-being # controlled burn events in last 
year; # controlled inundation 
events in last year; # forest fuel 
clearing events; # acres harvested 
through sustainable forest practices 
Pest management that 
allows a certain 
controlled amount of 
invasion followed by 
selection of plants that 
fared well and exhibit 
signs of resistance; 
controlled burn to 
manage land cover; 
controlled flooding for 
nutrients and 
maintenance; 
environmental practices 
that reduce hazard risk 
Cabell and 
Oelofse,  
2012'; 
Orencio & 
Fujii, 2013; 
(Gunderson 
and Holling, 
2002; Berkes 
et al, 2003; 
Folke, 2006) 
Resource 
and Driver 
Managed exposure 
increases health and 
availability of natural 
assets and buffers 
(resource); lack of 
managed exposure 
decreases natural 
coping and increases 
unwanted risk of 
disaster and potential 
for harm (wildfire, 
infestation, etc.) 
(driver) 
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Effectively managed 
ecosystems 
Environmen
t  
Natural Well-being # and type of critical ecosystem 
services identified (forests, 
fisheries, mangroves, riparian 
zones, wetlands, reefs, lakes, rivers, 
beaches, aquifers, dunes, protective 
buffers, etc.); ($) allocated for 
protection of ecosystem services 
annually, % loss of natural systems 
and buffers in last year by type; % 
partnerships to maintain and 
protect critical natural assets and 
ecosystem services 
Adequate monitoring 
and maintenance of 
biodiversity, critical 
habitat, and ecosystem 
services (rivers, lakes, 
forests, prairies, 
watersheds, beaches, 
riparian zones, natural 
flood protection 
systems, etc.); master 
plans, zoning, and 
economic development 
plans are coordinated to 
preserve natural buffers 
and assets; laws are in 
place and enforced  to 
protect critical natural 
areas and ecosystem 
services 
Arup 
(Rockefeller)
, 2014'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
Sharifi, 
2016'; Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 
Srinivasan et 
al., 2012; 
Cabell and 
Oelofse,  
2012'; NAS, 
2017; DHS, 
2016; 
UNISDR, 
2017; 
(Ewell, 
1999; 
Milestad and 
Darnhofer, 
2003; 
Naylor, 
2009; 
Darnhofer et 
al., 2010; 
van 
Apeldoon et 
al., 2011) 
Resource 
and Driver 
Failure to adequately 
monitor and maintain 
local ecosystems and 
services (natural 
buffers, water 
quality, parks, 
forests, etc.) can lead 
to resource 
degradation and 
increased exposure 
and sensitivity to 
hazards as well as 
reduced coping 
ability (driver); 
integrated and 
coordinated planning 
to protect and 
maintain ecosystems 
and services 
increases social 
capital through 
cohesion, health, and 
desirability and 
environmental capital 
by providing natural 
protection of 
facilities and assets, 
and increases 
adaptive capacity 
(resource)  
Sustainable 
management of 
resources 
Environmen
t  
Natural Well-being % population participating in 
resource conservation and 
recycling; % farms using natural 
herbicides and pesticides; % 
organic farms; # of landfills; tons 
of trash; mulch and compost 
service available; # recycling 
centers; % farms using sustainable 
and organic agriculture practices 
Builds (does not 
deplete) soil and organic 
matter; recharges water; 
reduces need to import 
nutrients;  reduces need 
to export waste; 
resources function 
adequately without need 
for excessive 
augmentation; 
agriculture and forestry 
maintain plant cover 
and incorporate more 
perennials; provide 
habitat for predators and 
parasitoids; and align 
production, harvesting, 
and extraction with 
Cabell and 
Oelofse,  
2012'; 
'Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
Sharifi, 
2016';Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; DHS, 
2016; U.N., 
2015; 
(Sundkvist et 
al., 2005; 
Ewell, 1999; 
Jackson, 
2002; Swift 
et al., 2004; 
McKey et 
Resource Sustainable 
management of 
resources that allows 
for minimization of 
degradation to soils, 
water, air, etc., and 
more efficient use of 
resources and 
services 
(minimization of 
solid waste to prevent 
the need for 
additional landfills, 
costs, etc.) increases 
social, economic, and 
environmental capital 
and increases 
adaptive capacity 
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local ecological 
parameters 
al., 2010; 
Holling, 
2001; 
Gunderson 
and Holling, 
2002) 
Public, commercial, 
and residential 
properties and 
services located 
outside of critical 
natural areas (natural 
buffers, wetlands, 
riparian zones, 
critical habitat, etc. 
Environmen
t  
Natural Well-being # endangered and threatened 
species (plants and animals); # of 
designated critical habitat areas; % 
loss in critical species and habitat 
(plants and animals) 
Threatened and 
endangered species are 
adequately monitored 
and protected; critical  
habitat is adequately 
monitored and 
protected;  
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
Sharifi, 
2016'; Cutter 
et al., 2014; 
Cutter, 
2016c; NAS, 
2017; Lynch 
et al., 2011; 
(Beatley and 
Newman, 
2013) 
Resource Adequate monitoring 
and management of 
critical species and 
habitat helps to 
preserve community 
health, heritage, and 
diversity and can 
build social, 
economic, and 
environmental 
capital, increasing 
adaptive capacity 
(die-offs and loss of 
habitat due to 
degradation are 
typically precursors 
to systemic 
community 
degradation of 
capital) 
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Management of 
environmental 
impacts 
Environmen
t  
Natural Well-being Amount ($) spent on restoration of 
natural, cultural, and historical 
resources by type in last year  
Measures are in place to 
manage and prevent 
negative impacts to 
natural, cultural, and 
historical resources; 
funding is allocated for 
prevention and 
restoration  
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
Sharifi, 
2016'; 
Srinivasan et 
al., 2012; 
DHS, 2016 
Resource 
and Driver 
Lack of adequate 
management and 
restoration of natural, 
cultural, and historic 
resources can lead to 
increased exposure 
and sensitivity to 
hazards and lower 
coping ability 
(driver); maintenance 
and restoration of 
natural, cultural, and 
historical assets 
increases social, 
economic, and 
environmental 
capital, and can 
increase adaptive 
capacity (loss of 
natural, cultural, and 
historical assets 
through degradation 
and neglect are 
typically precursors 
to systemic 
community 
degradation of 
capital) 
Availability and 
accessibility of high 
quality resources 
(air, energy, water, 
food, land, habitat; 
etc.) 
Environmen
t  
Natural Survival % population at risk for loss of 
access to critical resources 
(depletion, degradation, loss, etc.); 
Amount of food and water 
available for emergency; Per capita 
water demand estimates and plans 
for acquisition/storage/treatment 
for next 20 years 
The community is not at 
risk for loss of future 
resources due to 
degradation, depletion, 
or other factors); there 
no significant 
detrimental changes in 
the quality or quantity 
of natural resources 
(water, soil, land cover, 
air, habitat, landscape, 
view shed, aesthetics, 
noise, etc.) 
Sharifi and 
Yamagata, 
2014; 
Sharifi, 
2016'; Cox 
and Hamlen, 
2015'; 
'McManus et 
al., 2012; 
Srinivasan et 
al., 2012; 
Shen et al., 
2011; 
Orencio & 
Fujii, 2013; 
U.N., 2015; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Resource Long-term, equitable 
access to life-
sustaining natural 
resources increases 
all forms of capital 
and is essential for 
supporting adaptive 
capacity (lack of 
availability and 
equitable access to 
these resources are 
typically precursors 
to systemic 
community 
degradation of 
capital) 
 174 
Leaders/local 
government identify 
and protect 
environmentally 
sensitive areas and 
natural resources 
Environmen
t  
Natural Well-being # of environmental enforcement 
actions in last year by type/statute; 
amount ($) in fines in last year; 
amount ($) spent on management 
on environmental management in 
last year 
Adequate legislation, 
policy, and planning for 
environmental 
management and 
pollution control; 
adequate funding to 
manage environmental 
(natural, cultural, and 
historical) resources; 
enforcement of 
environmental laws and 
policies; management 
plans are current for 
environmental programs 
and permitting (noise, 
air quality, water 
quality, pollution 
control, waste 
management, sanitation, 
land use, etc.) 
Cox and 
Hamlen, 
2015'; Shen 
et al., 2011; 
DHS, 2016; 
UNISDR, 
2017 
Resource Adequate 
government measures 
to maintain and 
enforce protecting of 
natural, cultural, and 
historic resources is 
essential to all forms 
of capital and 
adaptive capacity 
(failure to provide 
and enforce 
mechanisms for 
protection indicate a 
weak and ineffective 
government and can 
be seen as precursor 
to systemic 
community 
degradation of 
capital) 
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Appendix D: Journal Titles Produced in Literature Review 
 
Journal Title/Source 
No. Initial 
Search 
Global environmental change 2 
J. Infrastruct. Syst. 1 
Land Use Policy 1 
PLoS One 2 
Sustainable Cities and Society 1 
Accounting, Auditing, and Accountability Journal 1 
Agriculture, ecosystems & environment 2 
Ambio 2 
American Behavioral Scientist 1 
American journal of community psychology 1 
American journal of public health 2 
Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 1 
Annual Review of Environment and Resources 2 
Anthropocene 1 
Applied Geography 3 
Applied Research in Quality of Life 1 
Asian Journal of environment and disaster Management 1 
Australian Journal of Emergency Management 1 
Australian Journal of Emergency Management 1 
Benchmarking 1 
Benchmarking: An International Journal 1 
Biological Sciences 1 
BioScience 1 
Building Research and Information 1 
Child development 1 
Cities 3 
Climate Change 2 
 176 
Conservation Ecology 2 
Disaster Prevention and Management 1 
Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal 1 
Disaster resilience: An integrated approach 1 
Disasters 3 
Earthquake Spectra 2 
Ecological complexity 1 
Ecological economics 1 
Ecological Indicators 3 
Ecology and Society 4 
Economic Systems Research 1 
Economic systems research: journal of the international Input-Output Association 1 
Ecosystems 3 
Energy for sustainable development 1 
Energy Policy 1 
Energy Procedia 1 
Engineering Structures 1 
Environment and Society 2 
Environment international 1 
Environment Monitoring and Assessment 1 
Environment Systems & Decisions 3 
Environmental Earth Sciences 1 
Environmental Education Research 1 
Environmental Hazards 2 
Environmental Impact Assessment Review 2 
Environmental Law 2 
Environmental Management 5 
Environmental Reviews 2 
Environmental science & policy 1 
Family process 1 
 177 
Fisheries 3 
Food Policy 1 
Food Security 1 
Forest Ecology and Management 1 
Futures 1 
Geoheritage 1 
GeoJournal 1 
Global environmental change 4 
Habitat International 3 
Human Ecology 1 
Human Ecology Review 3 
Intenational Journal of River Basin Management 1 
International Journal  of Disaster Reduction 3 
International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management 1 
International journal of agricultural sustainability 2 
International journal of disaster risk reduction 3 
Journal  of Coastal Research 1 
Journal  of Urban Health 1 
Journal of Business Economics and Management 1 
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 2 
Journal of Current Issues in Globalization 2 
Journal of environmental management 1 
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 4 
Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences 1 
Journal of Management & Governance 1 
Journal of Risk Research 2 
Journal of sustainable agriculture 2 
Journal of Sustainable Development 2 
Journal of Toxicology and Environmental Health 1 
Lancet 2 
 178 
Land Economics 2 
Land Use Policy 3 
Landscape and urban planning 1 
Landscape Ecology 1 
logistics and transportation review 1 
Measuring Business Excellence 1 
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 3 
Natural hazards 7 
Natural hazards review 3 
Nature climate change 1 
OECD Environment Working Papers 1 
OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers 1 
OECD Regional Development Working Papers 1 
OECD Working Papers on Public Governance 1 
Patient-Provider Communication: Roles for Speech-Language Pathologists and Other Health 
Care Professionals 
1 
Philadelphia: Penn Institute for Urban Research. 1 
Progress in Human Geography 1 
Progress in Planning 1 
Quality in Higher Education 1 
Rand health quarterly 1 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety 1 
Remote Sensing of Environment 1 
Risk Analysis 1 
Social indicators research 3 
Social psychology quarterly 1 
Social Science Quarterly 1 
Society & Natural Resources 2 
Springer books 3 
Sust. Dev 1 
Sustainability 2 
 179 
Sustainability Science 1 
Sustainability: Science, Practice, & Policy 2 
Technological Forecasting and Social  Change 2 
Trends in Ecology & Evolution 1 
Urban Climate 1 
Water Resources Management 1 
Water Resources Research 1 
WHOQoL Group 2 
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews. Climate Change 1 
World Development 1 
Total 205 
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Appendix E: Literature Review Results 
Also available in filterable/searchable format at: https://blindreview1.shinyapps.io/Search/  
 
Journal/Source 
From 
Google 
Scholar 
Full-
Text 
Review 
Used in 
Appendix 
B 
Reference 
 Annual review of ecology 
and systematics 
1 1   
Holling, C. S. (1973). Resilience and stability of ecological systems. Annual 
review of ecology and systematics, 4(1), 1-23. 
 Current opinion in 
environmental sustainability 
1 1   
Leichenko, R. (2011). Climate change and urban resilience. Current opinion 
in environmental sustainability, 3(3), 164-168.  
 Family process 1 1 1 
Walsh, F. (2007). Traumatic loss and major disasters: Strengthening family 
and community resilience. Family process, 46(2), 207-227.  
 Global Environmental 
Change 
  1   
Hinkel, J. (2011). “Indicators of vulnerability and adaptive capacity:” 
Towards a clarification of the science–policy interface. Global 
Environmental Change, 21(1), 198-208. 
 J. Infrastruct. Syst.   1   
Johansen, C., Horney, J., Tien, I. (2016). Metrics for Evaluating and 
Improving Community Resilience. J. Infrastruct. Syst., 23(2), 04016032. 
 Trends in Ecology & 
Evolution 
1 1 1 
Luck, G. W., Daily, G. C., Ehrlich, P. R. (2003). Population diversity and 
ecosystem services. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 18(7), 331-336.  
(Doctoral dissertation). 
Retrieved from 
https://scholarcommons.sc.e
du/etd/1275 
1 1   
Burton, C. G. (2012). The development of metrics for community resilience 
to natural disasters. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from 
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/1275 
Agriculture, ecosystems & 
environment 
  1 1 
Altieri, M. A. (1999). The ecological role of biodiversity in agroecosystems. 
Agriculture, ecosystems & environment, 74(1), 19-31.  
Agriculture, ecosystems & 
environment 
  1 1 
Jackson, L. E., Pascual, U., Hodgkin, T. (2007). Utilizing and conserving 
agrobiodiversity in agricultural landscapes. Agriculture, ecosystems & 
environment, 121(3), 196-210.  
 181 
Agriculture, Ecosystems & 
Environment 
  1 1 
Swift, M. J., Izac, A. M., van Noordwijk, M. (2004). Biodiversity and 
ecosystem services in agricultural landscapes—are we asking the right 
questions? Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment, 104(1), 113-134.  
AMBIO: A Journal of the 
Human Environment 
  1   
Ernstson, H., Leeuw, S. E. V. D., Redman, C. L., Meffert, D. J., Davis, G., 
Alfsen, C., Elmqvist, T. (2010). Urban transitions: on urban resilience and 
human-dominated ecosystems. AMBIO: A Journal of the Human 
Environment, 39(8), 531-545. 
AMBIO: A journal of the 
human environment 
  1   
Folke, C., Carpenter, S., Elmqvist, T., Gunderson, L., Holling, C.S. and Walker, 
B., (2002). Resilience and sustainable development: building adaptive 
capacity in a world of transformations. AMBIO: A journal of the human 
environment, 31(5), pp.437-440. 
American Behavioral Scientist 1 1 1 
Cox, R. S., & Hamlen, M. (2015). Community disaster resilience and the rural 
resilience index. American Behavioral Scientist, 59(2), 220-237. 
American journal of 
community psychology 
1 1 1 
Norris, F. H., Stevens, S. P., Pfefferbaum, B., Wyche, K. F., Pfefferbaum, R. L. 
(2008). Community resilience as a metaphor, theory, set of capacities, and 
strategy for disaster readiness. American journal of community psychology, 
41(1-2), 127-150.  
American journal of public 
health 
  1 1 
Plough, A., Fielding, J.E., Chandra, A., Williams, M., Eisenman, D., Wells, 
K.B., Law, G.Y., Fogleman, S. and Magaña, A. (2013). Building community 
disaster resilience: perspectives from a large urban county department of 
public health. American journal of public health, 103(7), 1190-1197.  
Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour.   1   
Eakin, H., & Luers, A. L. (2006). Assessing the Vulnerability of Social-
Environmental Systems. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 31, 365–94. 
Annual Review of 
environment and resources 
  1   
Parris, T. M., & Kates, R. W. (2003). Characterizing and measuring 
sustainable development. Annual Review of environment and 
resources, 28(1), 559-586. 
Applied Geography   1   
Frazier, T.G., Thompson, C.M., and Dezzani, R. J. (2014). A framework for 
the development of the SERV model: A Spatially Explicit Resilience-
Vulnerability model. Applied Geography, 51, 158-172. 
 182 
Arup International 
Development and The 
Rockefeller Foundation 
1 1 1 
Arup International Development and The Rockefeller Foundation. (2014). 
City Resilience Index: City Resilience Framework. London. 
Asian Journal of Environment 
and Disaster Management 
1 1 1 
Shaw, R., & Team, I. E. D. M. (2009). Climate disaster resilience: focus on 
coastal urban cities in Asia. Asian Journal of Environment and Disaster 
Management, 1, 101-116. 
Australian Journal of 
Emergency Management 
  1 1 
Parsons, M., & Morley, P. (2017). The Australian natural disaster resilience 
index. Australian Journal of Emergency Management, The, 32(2), 20. 
Biological Sciences   1 1 
Devictor, V., Julliard, R., Couvet, D., Jiguet, F. (2008). Birds are tracking 
climate warming, but not fast enough. Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
London B: Biological Sciences, 275(1652), 2743-2748.  
BioScience   1   
Alberti, M., Marzluff, J. M., Shulenberger, E., Bradley, G., Ryan, C., 
Zumbrunnen, C. (2003). Integrating humans into ecology: opportunities and 
challenges for studying urban ecosystems. BioScience, 53(12), 1169-1179. 
Cambridge University Press 1 1   
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Name Year State Type 
Primary 
Cause 
Secondary 
Cause 
Cost 
Description of 
Damages 
Fatalities 
Explanation and 
Commentary 
References 
Lake Paran 1852 VT earth piping unknown  
Heavy destruction 
along Paran Creek. All 
dams, bridges, and 
structures reported 
destroyed downstream. 
1 
4 to 5 hour warning time 
prevented further loss of life 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Kohanza 
Dam, Flint's 
Dam 
1869 CT unknown foundation ice  
Destroyed homes, 
businesses, 3 bridges. 
11 
Dams broke at night with no 
warning 
NRC, 2012; Association 
of State Dam Safety 
Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
https://connecticuthistor
y.org/frozen-reservoir-
destroys-danbury-today-
in-history/ 
Williamsburg 
Dam 
1874 MA 
earth 
masonry 
piping 
seepage, 
poor 
construction 
1,000,00
0 
Destroyed factories, 
740 homes in 
Williamsburg, Leeds, 
Skinnerville, and 
Haydenville, deaths 
included 43 children 
under age 10) (NPDP 
estimates 143 deaths). 
139 
Occurred in early morning.  
Most heard no warning.  The 
losses were so great that the 
mill towns eventually 
petitioned for assistance from 
the legislature in Boston. There 
was no precedent for the state 
government to provide direct 
relief to a city or town; 
residents in troubled towns 
usually received only a 
temporary abatement of taxes. 
The legislators were hesitant to 
break with tradition, but they 
eventually granted $120,000 to 
rebuild bridges and roads. 
Resulted in first state 
requirements for dam safety 
and design and construction 
standards. The dam failed due 
to seepage resulting in 
embankment and foundation 
failure, and collapse of the 
masonry core wall. 
Sharpe, 2004; 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://www.massmomen
ts.org/moment.cfm?mid
=145; Wahl, 1998 
Lynde Brook 
Reservoir 
Dam 
1876 MA 
earth 
gravity 
breach piping 
1,000,00
0 
unknown 0 
Failure due to seepage along 
outlet conduit, creating a 
breach 200 feet long. 
$1,000,000 in property 
damage. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
STAFFORDV
ILLE 
RESERVOIR 
1877 CT earth seepage unknown  unknown 0 
The dam failed due to seepage 
along the outlet conduit. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BIBBINS 
POND 
1884 CT unknown unknown unknown 250,000 unknown 0 none 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Mud Pond 1886 MA unknown foundation 
poor 
construction 
250,000 
Heavily damaged or 
destroyed a dozen 
shops and industries 
along Greenwater 
Brook. 
7 
Rebuilt, new dam failed in 
1968 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
South Fork 
Dam 
1889 PA 
earth 
zoned 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, poor 
maintenance 
17,000,0
00 
Almost the entire city 
was destroyed (1600 
homes, 280 businesses 
demolished);( more 
than 1 in every 5 
residents of Johnstown 
died).  Of 
victims: 99 entire 
families, 396 children 
under the age of 10, 
and 755 unidentified 
victims.  45% of the 
victims whose ages 
were known were 
under 20.  (NPDP 
estimates $6,000,000 
in damages). 
2209 
Weakened structurally through 
modification and lack of 
maintenance.  The dam had a 
deficient outlet and spillway, 
had been improperly 
maintained, and was 
overtopped and washed out 
during heavy rains.  In 
previous years, many “alarms” 
had been sounded regarding 
the imminent failure of the 
dam.  Under the misguided 
belief that this final alarm was 
just another “false alarm”, 
many people in Johnstown did 
not seek higher ground.  By the 
time the floodwater reached 
Johnstown, it was no longer 
water, but rather included 
much of the debris from the 
14-mile long Valley between 
the South Fork Dam and 
Jonestown.  The debris flow 
was reportedly up to 1/2-mile 
wide and may have been as tall 
as 40 feet above ground in 
places.  There was no safe 
refuge in town. 
NRC, 2012; 
McCullough, 1987; 
JAHA, 2012; 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://madridengineerin
g.com/johnstown-flood-
engineering-failure/; 
Wahl, 1998 
SPRING 
LAKE 
1889 RI earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
A portion of the dam just 
above the waste pipe was 
washed away. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Walnut Grove 
Dam 
1890 AZ rockfill 
poor 
constructio
n 
spillway 800,000 
Destroyed town of 
Seymour (pop: <10); 
huge economic losses 
in Wickenburg; 
washed out new 25’-
high diversion dam 12 
miles downstream.  
(NPDP estimates 85 
deaths). 
70 
The dam was 110 feet high, 
400 feet long at the top, 140 
feet base width (note height-to-
width ratio), top width of 10 
feet. It was rockfill and poorly 
sealed so that it leaked badly. 
The total operable outlets 
consisted of two 20-inch pipes. 
A 5 ft by 5 ft (or 3 ft by 5 ft 
depending on which 
engineering article you believe) 
flume in the bottom of the dam 
was inoperable, but would have 
not saved the dam if it had 
been opened.  (Source: Jim 
Liggett, Cornell University); 
inadequate spillway that was 
able to pass only about 4% of 
the flood flow at the time of 
failure; spillway terminated at 
the toe of dam and probably 
led to undermining. Poor 
design & construction 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BROAD 
BROOK 
RESERVOIR 
1890 CT concrete unknown unknown 50,000 
5 dams failed; 2 
railroad trestles and 6 
highway bridges 
damaged; Total 
damage $50,000. 
0 
5 dams failed; 2 RR trestles 
and 6 highway bridges 
damaged; Total damage 
$50,000 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Mud Pond 1890 VT earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
There was no engineer, and the 
dam failed eight days after 
completion. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
CHAMBERS 1891 CO earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lynx Creek 1891 AZ 
concrete 
arch 
breach 
poor 
construction 
 unknown 0 
Height of dam was 28 feet at 
time of failure (designed to 
reach 50 feet). Failed during 
first flood (during 
construction). No fatalities. 
Breach was 35 feet long and 
down to bed rock. Poor 
construction - mortar too lean. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MAHANOY 
TOWNSHIP 
DAM NO 2 
1892 PA earth unknown unknown  
Dam was under repair 
when the failure 
occurred. The cause of 
the failure is not 
known. One fatality 
and considerable 
damage occurred as a 
result. 
1 
Dam was under repair when 
the failure occurred. The cause 
of the failure is not known. 
One fatality and considerable 
damage occurred as a result. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
 203 
Long Valley 1892 CA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Dam was carried away by 
flood caused by heavy rains. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Mountjoy Hill 
Reservoir 
1893 ME earth unknown unknown  Severe damage 4 
Action of frost, or the light 
embankment, or water 
following the pipes (seepage 
along the drain pipe). Much 
damage was done, and four 
lives were lost. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Goodrich 
Reservoir 
1896 OR earth unknown unknown  
Family of 7 drowned, 
farmhouse washed 
away. 
7 
family of 7 drowned, 
farmhouse washed away 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Staunton Dam 1896 VA gravity overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 
5 fatalities and 
significant property 
damage as a result of 
the flood. 
0 
5 fatalities and much property 
damage as a result of the flood. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Alcyon Lake 
Dam 
1896 NJ 
earth 
gravity 
unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LOWER 
MELZINGA
H DAM 
1897 NY 
earth 
masonry 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
30,000 
Failure due to freshet 
flowing over crest of 
both dams. Seven 
fatalities and $30,000 
property damage. 
7 
2 dams failed. Failure due to 
freshet flowing over crest of 
both dams. Seven fatalities and 
$30,000 property damage. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
BOYDSTOW
N 
1897 PA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
After a heavy rain, 
approximately 100 feet of the 
embankment washed out. 
According to Ref.1259, 
embankment washed out either 
from overtopping or 
percolation along iron pipe 
line. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
ST 
ANTHONY 
FALLS 
UPPER 
LOCK & 
DAM 
1899 MN 
concrete 
gravity 
foundation ice  unknown 0 
Ice pressure contributed to 
sliding or overturning. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Austin Dam 1900 TX rockfill overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
foundation 
1,400,00
0 
100 houses, 
powerhouse destroyed. 
(NPDP estimates 8 
deaths and $500,000 in 
damages). 
18 
No warning despite 7 hours of 
overtopping.  Engineers were 
surprised by amount of 
siltation and effects of 
hydraulic uplift and erosion 
which undercut the toe. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
https://www.researchgat
e.net/publication/29116
4788_Powerpoint_Lect
ure-
Texas_Austin_Dam_Fai
lure-1900; 
http://damfailures.org/le
ssons-learned/; 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Grand Rapids 
Detached 
Dike No 2 
1900 MI 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
1,000,00
0 
Not sure of the cause 
of the overtopping. 
Not sure of height. 
Water was 25 ft deep. 
Caused $100,000 
damage. According to 
Ref.1259, 1 fatality 
and $1,000,000 
damage. 
1 
Not sure of the cause of the 
overtopping. Not sure of 
height. Water was 25 ft deep. 
Caused $100,000 damage. 
According to Ref.1259, 1 
fatality and $1,000,000 
damage. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
ASHLAND 
RESERVOIR 
1901 PA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
upstream 
dam failure 
 
Caused by failure of 
two upstream dams. 
See Haupt Estate 
Dams 1 and 2. A 
fourth dam belonging 
to the town of Ashland 
may also have been 
damaged. 
0 
Caused by failure of two 
upstream dams. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
BISON PARK 1901 CO earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Reservoir on Pikes Peak for 
supplying water to Victor 
washed away due to inadequate 
spillway. All 70 million gallons 
of water in the reservoir 
escaped. No details as to nature 
or cause of failure. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Randall's 
Pond 
1901 RI unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
Lake 
Housatonic 
1902 CT 
concrete 
gravity 
unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Muskrats were burrowing 
under the foundation. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
ASHLAND 
RESERVOIR 
1902 RI unknown overtopping unknown  
partial failure due to 
high water break 
0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
unknown 1902 TN unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
Utica 
Reservoir 
1902 NY unknown unknown unknown  unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
Oakford Park 1903 PA 
earth 
masonry 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 23  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BOYDSTOW
N 
1903 PA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Rebuilt after the failure in 
1897. According to Ref. 1259, 
failed by overtopping. 
Inadequate spillway. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Fort Pitt 1903 PA unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Haledon 
Reservoir 
Dam 
1903 NJ 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 
Number of mills 
flooded and forced to 
shut down. 
0 
Number of mills flooded and 
forced to shut down. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
PANGUITCH 
LAKE 
1903 UT other overtopping wave action  unknown 0 
Failed while still under 
construction. Wave action from 
heavy wind caused dam to fail. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Winston Lake 
Dam 
1904 NC 
other 
brick 
unknown unknown  unknown 9 
Brick dam. Failed one year 
after storage increase. Wall 
overturned, unable to withstand 
increased water pressure; poor 
design. 9 people killed. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
AVALON 1904 NM 
earth 
rockfill 
breach 
hydrologic 
event, piping 
 unknown 0 
Rebuilt, failed again during 
flood of unprecedented 
magnitude, by water forcing a 
passage through the dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lake Vera 1905 CA 
other 
buttress 
unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Short spillway with insufficient 
capacity caused overtopping 
washing out 14' in height from 
top of dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
REEDER 1905 CO earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, breach 
 unknown 0 Overtop - breach in middle 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
TUPELO 
BAYOU SITE 
1 
1905 AK earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
CHAMBERS 1907 CO earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Hauser 1908 MT other steel unknown unknown  
Failure caused owner's 
power company to fail 
and sell out 
0 
In operation for one year prior 
to failure.  Replaced with 
concrete dam. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
Fergus Falls 
Hydro Dam 
1909 MN unknown unknown unknown 15,000 
Washed out 4 
downstream dams; 
damaged 2 mills 
0 
Failure of 1-year old dam 
washed out Red River Mill 
Dam ($10,000 loss) & 
destroyed Woolen Mill Dam 
($5,000 loss). Advanced 
warning saved Dayton Hollow 
Dam, 5 miles south, as owner 
& president of Otter Tail 
Power Company had time to 
open the flood gates. Of the 
demolished dams, only Central 
Dam near South Cascade was 
rebuilt. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
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Ashley Dam 1909 MA unknown unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Piping failed during first 
filling. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
Ashley Dam 1909 MA unknown unknown unknown  unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Black Rock 1909 NM 
earth 
rockfill 
unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Failure by piping through 
abutment; undermined by 
passage of water under cap of 
lava rock which flanked dam 
and extended beneath spillway. 
Portion of spillway dropped 7 
feet; some fill at south end 
washed out. Main part of dam 
uninjured. Repaired now 
known as Black Rock. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
DANSVILLE 
RESERVOIR 
DAM 
1909 NY earth breach undermining  unknown 0 
Undermining when water stood 
about 14 against flashboards. 
Breach: deck slap snapped. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Humphrey's 
Lake Dam 
1909 MD unknown unknown unknown  unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
LAKE 
GEORGE 
1909 CO earth overtopping unknown  unknown 0 
First of two overtopping 
incidents. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
JUMBO 1910 CO earth piping seepage  unknown 0 
Serious seepage began in 1907. 
This dam is also listed as 
having NPDP ID No. 2439. 
According to NPDP Ref 
No.1040, section of west 
embankment washed out 
completely in 1911. Strong 
possibility that failure was 
result of foundation piping. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
RIVERSIDE 1910 CO earth cracking 
hydrologic 
event, wave 
action 
 unknown 0 
Partial failure due to the 
cracking of the concrete paving 
and the sloughing of the 
embankment. According to 
NPDP Ref no 4918, concrete 
facing broke up due to wave 
action with subsequent erosion 
of earth beneath the concrete. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
White River 1910 WI 
earth 
gravity 
foundation 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Failure of earthfill section and 
powerhouse during flood. 
Rebuilt. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Bayless Pump 
& Paper Mill 
1911 PA 
concrete 
gravity 
foundation 
hydrologic 
event, poor 
maintenance 
3,000,00
0 
Water picked up debris 
and stacks of pulp 
wood, estimated to be 
as much as 700,000 
cords, from the 
Bayless lumber yard. 
These logs became 
deadly weapons as the 
water hit the town of 
Austin. After the 
waters raged through 
Austin, they hit the 
nearby town of 
Costello. Between 
1910 and 1920, the 
town lost half of its 
population.  (NPDP 
estimates 80 deaths). 
88 
Bayless Pulp and Paper 
Company made cost-cutting 
modifications to the dam that 
contributed to a minor 
structural failure in January 
1910. Company allowed the 
rains to fill the dam to its 
maximum capacity. On 
September 30, 1911, the 
Bayless Pulp and Paper 
Company Dam gave way under 
the pressure. Coursing down 
Freeman Run, the water picked 
up debris and stacks of pulp 
wood, estimated to be as much 
as 700,000 cords, from the 
Bayless lumber yard. These 
logs became deadly weapons 
as the water hit the town of 
Austin. After the waters raged 
through Austin, they hit the 
nearby town of Costello. 
Between 1910 and 1920, the 
town lost half of its population. 
dam was loaded before the 
concrete had completely set, 
allowing for the opening of 
cracks and excessive pressures 
under the dam. As a result, in 
January 1910, the dam dropped 
down about 6 inches and slid 
about 18 inches at the spillway. 
The dam was left in this 
condition until it failed 
suddenly by sliding 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://explorepahistory.c
om/hmarker.php?marke
rId=1-A-3D; 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
White River 1926 WI 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping gate  unknown 0 
Due to debris at gates, pipeline 
was dynamited to allow added 
flow. Later sandstone 
foundation found to be eroded. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Hatfield 1911 WI 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
upstream 
dam failure 
23,000,0
00 
Business section of 
Black River Falls 
destroyed. 
0 
Failure of this dam 
preceded/caused by failure of 
Dells (Wisconsin Dells) dam. 
Insufficient spillway. Business 
section of Black River Falls 
destroyed. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Institute Pond 1911 VT earth unknown unknown  homes damaged 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MILITARY 
PARK 
1911 CO earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
 208 
VALENTINE 
FISH 
HATCHERY 
DAM 
1911 NE earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Dam failed on first filling as a 
result of settlement of fill under 
concrete spillway. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Ansonia Brass 
& Copper Co. 
Dam 
1912 CT unknown foundation undermining 150,000 unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
Brokow 1912 WI 
timber 
crib 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
80,000 unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Wausau 
Detached 
1912 WI gravity overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
75,000 damage to power plant 0 
One of eight dams washed out 
by this flood (Brokaw 
[original], Callon, Kelly, 
Lindauer's, Merrill, Rothchild, 
Schofield). Height unknown. 
Flood washed out 125 feet of 
dam. $75,000 damage to dam 
and power plant. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Brokaw 1912 WI unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
CARLISLE 
RAW 
WATER 
INTAKE 
1912 PA 
stone 
masonry 
foundation ice  unknown 0 Overturned due to ice pressure 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
City Reservoir 1912 TN unknown unknown unknown  
25 million gallons of 
water released 
0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
Merrill 1912 WI gravity unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
OWASCO 
LAKE 
OUTLET 
DAM 
1912 NY masonry unknown unknown  little damage 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
ROCKPORT 
POND DAM 
1912 NY 
stone 
masonry 
unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Davis 1914 CA 
earth 
rockfill 
seepage 
poor 
construction 
 unknown 0 
Seepage through backfill noted 
soon after first water in 
reservoir, repairs attempted but 
unsuccessful. On June 27 dam 
1 ft from full, failure on June 
28. Water users complained 
backfill not adequately puddled 
exposed cut confirmed poor 
backfill. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
 209 
LAKE 
GEORGE 
1914 CO earth overtopping unknown  unknown 0 
Second of two overtopping 
incidents. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
OWENS 
DAM 
1914 CA earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 leakage around outlet structure 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Stony River 
Dam 
1914 WV gravity foundation 
hydrologic 
event, 
undermining 
 unknown 0 
Foundation failure shortly after 
completion. Undermined, 
cutoffs not carried sufficiently 
deep. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lyman 1915 AZ 
earth 
zoned 
unknown unknown 500,000 unknown 8  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
Wahl 1998; 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
POINT OF 
ROCK 
1915 CO earth overtopping wave action  unknown 0 
Concrete slope paving failed 
due to five foot wave action. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SAND 
CREEK 
1915 CO earth piping seepage  unknown 0 
Piping, foundation seepage. 
Break in the dam on the east 
side of the outlet of Sand Creek 
Reservoir, with a loss of about 
1,500 acre feet of water. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
unknown 1916 WV unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 60  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
unnamed 1916 WV unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
600,000 
Extensive damage; 
esp. to rail, telephone, 
and coal company 
44  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Lower Otay 1916 CA 
concrete 
rockfill 
overtopping unknown 
1,500,00
0 
NPDP estimates 
$250,000 in damages 
30 
Failed on first filling.  Dam 
operator opened outlet gate 
which failed to slow rising 
levels.  He decided to send 
notification of dam failure by 
courier and telephone.  Most 
residents took advantage of the 
warning. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
https://pubs.usgs.gov/ws
p/0426/report.pdf; 
Wahl, 1998 
John 
Thompson's 
Mill Dam 
1916 TN rockfill breach 
hydrologic 
event 
50,000 
Many buildings, crops, 
and livestock 
destroyed, railroad 
damage 
24 
The dam broke following nine 
inches of rainfall in five hours, 
sending a wall of water 25 feet 
high crashing down the river. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lake 
Toxaway 
1916 NC earth unknown unknown 50,000 unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
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LAKE 
SHERBURN
E 
1916 MT earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Floating logs displaced hand 
placed riprap (apparently 
during construction). 
Excavation for spillway 
initiated slow slide of 
considerable extent on left 
abutment above spillway. Over 
the years, hillside moved 
slowly downward toward dam, 
deforming and lifting spillway 
structure. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lookout 
Shoals 
1916 NC 
earth 
masonry 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
West embankment washed out 
after a flood. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Sweetwater 
Main 
1916 CA gravity overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, breach 
 unknown 0 
Earthfill dyke at north end of 
structure was overtopped and 
breached which broke the 
concrete core wall. Break was 
75 feet wide and 30 feet deep. 
A puddled core saddle dyke 
some distance from dam was 
overtopped and swept away. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
unknown 1916 NC unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
unknown 1916 NC unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
unknown 1916 CA unknown unknown unknown  
released 13 billion 
gallons 
0 
The dam at Sweetwater 
Reservoir fails releasing 13 
billion gallons of water.  Dam 
constructed in 1888. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Wateree 1916 SC 
concrete 
earth 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
West embankment washed out 
after a flood. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
West Brook 
Reservoir # 3 
1916 NY unknown unknown unknown  unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Mammoth 
Dam 
1917 UT earth unknown unknown  
Extensive damage to 
Rio Grande railroad, 
several coal mines and 
settlements. 
1 
Dam poorly constructed; 
carelessly repaired, modified, 
and operated. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
COON 
RAPIDS 
1917 MN 
earth 
gravity 
unknown unknown  unknown 0 
hole eroded under dam - no 
collapse 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Masonry Dam 
(Boxely) 
1918 WA masonry unknown unknown  
Destroyed RR line & 
village of Eastwick 
0 
Excessive seepage through 
glacial moraine abutment 
caused mud flow about 1 mi. 
from reservoir. Destroyed RR 
line & village of Eastwick. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MINATARE 1920 NE earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Partial failure. Wave action 
broke and entered concrete 
slabs, thus washing out gravel 
and earth. This caused the slabs 
to settle. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BARTON 1922 ID earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Considerable moisture was 
noted on downstream slope in 
May 1922, and in June, a 
localized slide occurred. 
Following slide, downstream 
slope continued to be saturated 
whenever reservoir was kept 
full for any length of time. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
OVERHOLS
ER 
1923 OK earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Insufficient spillway capacity. 
Flood overtopped dam and 
washed out 300 ft of west end 
embankment, to the depth of 
the base of the dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Saltville Muck 
Dam 
(Mathieson 
Alkali Works 
Plant Waste) 
Dam 
1924 WV unknown unknown unknown  
plant waste dam failed 
sending tons of waste 
into Palmertown and 
blocking portions of 
the Holston River; 
many homes destroyed 
19 
"Palmertown tragedy" A plant 
waste dam failed sending tons 
of waste into Palmertown and 
blocking portions of the 
Holston River. “…tons of 
waste raced through the tiny 
community of Palmertown. 
Pieces of the dam and boulders 
of muck blocked the North 
Fork of the Holston River, 
sending the flood upstream into 
the even smaller community of 
Chinch Row.” Source: “The 
1924 Saltville muck dam 
disaster” Roaknoke Times, 
12/24/2004; Muck dam in 
Saltville burst on Christmas 
Eve, covering the village of 
Palmertown with a thick, white 
caustic liquid that killed 19 
people and demolished many 
homes. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
MANITOU 1924 CO rockfill unknown unknown  unknown 0 
 
Partial failure, was 
disintegrating and converted 
into gravel fill. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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BULLY 
CREEK 
1925 OR earth spillway ice  unknown 0 
Ice blocked outlet gate, 
Condemned in 1916. Dam was 
abandoned uncompleted at the 
time of failure. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
French 
Landing 
1925 MI 
earth 
gravity 
unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Failed before reservoir was 
filled. According to NPDP Ref 
No 4112, erosion of gravely 
soil in the foundation caused a 
break in the embankment. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MISSION 
LAKE 
1925 KS earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Settlement and overtopping. 
Dam had an insufficient 
spillway. According to NPDP 
Ref No 4288, exceptionally 
heavy rains caused flooding the 
overtopping of dam. A break 
developed adjacent to the 
spillway. Effective flood fight 
controlled the breach so 500 
million gallons were still stored 
in the reservoir. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Moyie 1925 ID 
concrete 
gravity 
spillway 
hydrologic 
event, 
undermining 
 unknown 0 
Spillway undermined, flood cut 
by-pass around and washed out 
abutment. Reference indicates 
that except for abutment, dam 
remained intact. However, 
headline of ENR article noted 
by reference states that these 
two dams failed due to 
undermining of abutments. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Sheffield Dam 1925 CA earth foundation 
settlement, 
earthquake 
 unknown 0 
6.5 earthquake; led to 
increasing interest in using 
instruments to study the 
performance of dams 
NRC, 2012; Seed et al., 
1970 
Great Falls 1926 TN 
concrete 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 
destruction of and 
extensive damage to 
homes 
0 
Failed following heavy rains, 
likely due to overtopping. 
Numerous homes swept away 
by floodwaters. No deaths 
known to be reported, but 
extensive and costly damages. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SCNONAME 
23001 
1926 SC gravity foundation undermining  unknown 0 
Failure due to undermining of 
abutment. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lake Hemet 1927 CA gravity overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, breach 
 extensive property loss 1 
Auxiliary earth dyke was 
overtopped and breached. 
Escaping water cleaned off 
good quality rock foundation. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
George Lake 
Dam 
1927 NJ 
earth 
gravity 
unknown unknown  unknown 0 
timber-crib rock fill structure 
with a concrete core wall, 
failed 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Mackville 
Pond 
1927 VT 
stone 
masonry 
breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 major damage 0 
The dam breached through the 
right abutment. Major damage 
downstream both from flood 
and probably dam failure. The 
dam is a stone and concrete 
dam approximately 20 feet in 
height. Pond size: 18 acres. 
Age of dam: 27 years 
(estimated). It is located near/in 
the town of Hardwick. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MAQUOKET
A MILLDAM 
1927 IA gravity unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Sweetwater 
Main 
1927 CA gravity overtopping unknown  unknown 0 
Dam overtopped causing 
erosion of south abutment. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
St. Francis 
Dam 
1928 CA 
concrete 
arch 
foundation 
poor 
construction 
15,000,0
00 
1,240 homes & other 
buildings destroyed; 
23,500 acres of 
farmland flooded; 4 
railroad bridges, 8 
miles of railroad track, 
unknown miles of 
roads; 10 bridges 
(NPDP estimates 
$20,000,000 damages) 
450 
Collapsed upon being filled for 
first time.  Modifications to 
height had been made to 
increase capacity without 
modifying the base.  Start of 
intense efforts to improve dam 
safety in California, especially 
with respect to new dam 
construction. Multiple 
investigations.  Insufficient 
review by independent experts 
and foundation of the dam was 
weak.  1929, California passed 
a dam safety act which placed 
all dams within the state, 
except those owned by the 
federal government, under 
supervision of the state 
engineer. The supervision 
includes 
design, construction, operation, 
alteration, and repair.  Other 
states were slower to follow. 
NRC, 2012; Rogers, 
2006; Association of 
State Dam Safety 
Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
USBR, 2005; 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Crater Lake 1928 CA 
earth 
rockfill 
unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Spillway became clogged with 
drift, causing dam to be 
overtopped and breached. 
Inadequate spillway capacity, 
possibly due to obstruction by 
debris. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lafayette 1928 CA 
earth 
rockfill 
unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Foundation slide during 
construction 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
NARRAGUI
NNEP MAIN 
DAM 
1928 CO earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
First of two failure incidents at 
this dam. Reference indicates 
failure due to sloughing of 
upstream slope and leakage. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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SCOFIELD 1928 UT earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Partial failure due to piping 
through settlement cracks. This 
dam was built to replace 
Mammoth Dam which failed in 
1917 at a different site. USBR 
replaced this dam with a new 
and larger Scofield dam 800 
feet downstream on Price River 
below the existing unsafe dam. 
According to Ref. No. 1040, 
complete failure was preceded 
by large crest settlements and 
transverse cracks near 
abutments. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Balsam 1929 NH earth unknown unknown 500,000 unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Abenaki Dam 1929 NH earth overtopping ice 
3,500,00
0 
 0   
Alexander 
Dam 
1930 HI earth piping seepage 80,000 
Rapid failure during 
construction killed 
workers 
6 
First earthen dam constructed 
using physio-chemical soil 
stabilization. Failed during 
construction. (HI has history of 
poor performance with 
hydraulic fill due to water 
channels and voids in 
compacted fill - volcanic soils).  
Failure likely occurred due to 
lack of internal drainage. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
Cato and Rogers, 2016; 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LAKE 
VERMILION 
DAM 
1930 IL earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Failure due to sliding on the 
base. There were many visible 
old cracks, and the concrete, 
made of local gravel, was 
thought to be deficient in 
coarse aggregate. Reservoir 
status: drained the reservoir at 
the pumping station. The 
failure did not cause a shortage 
in the water supply because a 
higher dam was built a few 
years before this, and the dam 
was used to reduce suction lift 
and provide storage near the 
pumping plant. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LAKE 
VERMILION 
DAM 
1930 IL earth foundation 
poor 
construction 
 unknown 0 
Failure due to sliding on the 
base. There were many visible 
old cracks, and the concrete, 
made of local gravel, was 
thought to be deficient in 
coarse aggregate. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
 215 
Eastwick 
Railroad 
1932 WA 
earth 
other fill 
overtopping 
spillway, 
debris 
 
destroyed railroad line 
and village of 
Eastwick 
7 
During storm, erosive wave 
action on upstream slope put 
dam in danger. To eliminate 
hazard, owner cut additional 
spillway. Later storm followed, 
making the extra spillway 
inadequate. Open section was 
topped, eroding side toward 
main fill embankment. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
Notable Dam Failures in 
Washington State 
(http://www.ecy.wa.gov
/programs/wr/dams/Rep
orts/damfailure-ws.pdf); 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Little Juniper 1932 CA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
During storm, erosive wave 
action on upstream slope put 
dam in danger. To eliminate 
hazard, owner cut additional 
spillway. Later storm followed, 
making the extra spillway 
inadequate. Open section was 
topped, eroding side toward 
main fill embankment. Breach 
failure. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Mud Lake 1932 CA 
earth 
masonry 
breach seepage  unknown 0 
Dam washed out on both sides 
of rock masonry structure 
located in fill. Breached section 
on each side was backfilled. 
Leakage along face of masonry 
probably caused breach in dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Rye Grass 
Swale 
1932 CA earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Dam failed by breaching. 
Numerous rodent holes in 
breached section. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Castlewood 1933 CO rockfill overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
750,000 unknown 2  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Bostwicks 
Pond Dam 
1934 NJ earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 significant damage 0 
A flood washed out several 
small earth dams along the 
Cohansey River in 
southwestern New Jersey. 
Floodwaters converged on the 
city of Bridgeton, causing 
significant damage. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LAKE 
LUDLOW 
CLUB DAM 
1935 NY 
earth 
rockfill 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 3 
The dam was overtopped and 
failed. Three fatalism as a 
result of the failure. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Francis, Lake 1935 CA earth spillway piping  unknown 0 
Blowout failure under concrete 
spillway weir structure during 
period of heavy spillway flow. 
Spillway failure thought to be 
due to piping in soft saturated 
foundation. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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HERRIN 
RESERVOIR 
2 DAM 
1935 IL earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Dam overtopped and washed 
out. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
PLEASANT 
VALLEY 
1935 CO earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 rodents 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
TROPIC 1935 UT earth overtopping 
spillway, 
poor 
construction 
 
damage to Forest  
Service resources, 
bridges, and roads 
0 
No adequate spillway 
protection from erosion. 
Unapproved poorly reinforced 
wood and log spillway erodes 
and fails dam. 180 acre feet of 
water. Reconstructed in 1936 
with approved plans. Property 
damage included significant 
Forest Service resources and 
bridges and roads. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Black Rock 1936 NM 
earth 
rockfill 
unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lake 
Shaftsbury 
1936 VT 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam failed during a flood 
event. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Miller Pond 1936 VT earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
upstream 
dam failure 
 unknown 0 
The dam failed during a flood 
event. Reportedly caused by 
the failure of upstream 
Shaftsbury Lake Dam 
(VT00103). 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Rye Grass 
Swale 
1936 CA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Rim levee of dam overtopped, 
failed during flood. Breached 
section through right portion of 
levee. Inadequate spillway 
capacity. Second of three 
incidents at this dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
WEARE 
RESERVOIR 
DAM 
1938 NH 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping spillway  unknown 4 
Earth embankment overtopped 
and failed due to insufficient 
discharge capacity. 4 people 
were standing on the bridge 
watching flood wave when the 
bridge collapsed and were 
killed. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Loup Loup 
Dam (Wagner 
Dam) 
1938 WA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
75,000 
Destroyed 25 homes 
and left 75 people 
homeless.  Destroyed 
1/2 mile of state 
highway. 
1 
50 foot high hydraulic fill dam 
failed when emergency 
spillway was undercut during a 
flood. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Brokaw 1938 WI earth foundation 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
700,000 unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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BOLTON 
LAKE 
1938 CT earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, breach 
 unknown 0 
During a Hurricane in 
September 1938 the dam was 
overtopped and breached in 
two places. Upper Bolton Lake 
Dam, about 3,500 ft. upstream 
was also breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
DIXON DAM 1938 IL gravity unknown unknown  unknown 0 washed out 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Fredonia 1938 CA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Dam was overtopped and 
breached during snow runoffs 
in spring 1938. Section of dam 
washed out. Cause of failure: 
no spillway. During repairs, a 
natural spillway was included 
in the dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Horse Lake 1938 CA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Dam was overtopped during 
spring runoff, section of dam 
was washed out. Cause of 
failure believed to be 
inadequate spillway capacity. 
This is the first of two failures 
at this dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lee Lake 1938 CA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Excessive flooding caused 
excess flow to pass over 
emergency unlined spillway. 
Emergency spillway eroded 
down by flow. Combination of 
inadequate capacity of main 
spillway and lack of protection 
of erosive foundation in 
emergency spillway caused 
failure. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Rye Grass 
Swale 
1938 CA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Rim levee again breached due 
to overtopping. Inadequate 
spillway capacity. Third of 
three incidents at this dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Slate Creek 1938 CA 
concrete 
arch 
breach 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Dam was overtopped and 
breached near outlet. Section of 
dam washed out. Cause of 
failure: no spillway provision. 
Dam was not rebuilt. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
UPPER 
BOLTON 
LAKE 
1938 CT earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, poor 
construction 
 unknown 0 
Was first washed out during 
hurricane of 1938. Overtopped 
- faulty construction and 
rebuilt. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BEAVER 
MEADOWS 
1939 PA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 some damage 0 
Temporary spillway 
overwhelmed. Spillway erosion 
from snow melt flood. 
Reservoir status: full. Some 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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downstream damage (not 
specified). 
PARIS DAM 1939 AK earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Heavy rains washed dam out 
while it was still under 
construction (75% complete). 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Breakneck 
Dam 
1940 NJ 
earth 
gravity 
unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Dam was breached and a 
substantial portion of the 
embankment was lost, but the 
brick arch culvert remained 
intact. Reports of damage in 
the downstream area were not 
available. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
FAIRMONT 1940 CO earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Overtop - owner sandbag 
spillway. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BOLTON 
LAKE 
1941 CT earth unknown unknown  damage to property 0 
Faulty construction appears to 
be the cause of the collapse, 
which resulted in damage to 
property. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
GOODENOU
GH #2 
1941 CO earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 Rodent hole washed out. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Jim Falls 1941 WI 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Right embankment failed due 
to overtopping during flood of 
record. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lac Vieux 
Desert 
1941 WI 
concrete 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
foundation 
 unknown 0 
Overtopping failure of 
embankment. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Norton Brook 1942 VT earth unknown unknown  
temporary loss  of 
water supply 
0 
The dam breached full depth 
through dike section. No 
downstream damage reported 
except temporary loss of 
Vergennes water supply. The 
dam is an earth dam 
approximately 34 feet in 
height. Pond size: 15 acres. 
Age of dam: 7 years. It is 
located near/in the town of 
Bristol. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
WILLOW 
CREEK 
1942 UT earth unknown unknown  some property damage 0 
Abutment seepage gypsum 
dissolution. 600 acre feet 
released. Reservoir status: 600 
acre feet. Some property 
damage (not specified). 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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HULET 1943 ID earth seepage 
wave action, 
settlement 
 serious property 
damage 
0 
Full at time of failure, emptied 
in 2 hours. Waves 40 feet high 
in narrow canyons below dam. 
Instantaneous break for full 
length of dam. Saturation. 
Serious property damage. 
According to NPDP 
Ref.No.1040, dam failed 
completely after many years of 
saturation of downstream slope 
and leakage through upper 
portion of dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
GRINDSTON
E RIVER 
1944 MN gravity overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Right earthen abutment was 
overtopped and washed out 
during a flood following a 
heavy rainstorm. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Wewoka Dam 1945 OK unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 8 
April 13-14: 14.6 inches of rain 
at Seminole. 80 people forced 
from homes, town under 4' of 
water * 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Barbours 
Pond Dam 
1945 NJ earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 extensive property 
damage 
0 
The dam failed following a 9 
inch rainfall in the area. 
Floodwaters overtopped a 
reservoir immediately 
downstream, causing extensive 
property damage. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
JOHNSON 
DAM 
1945 NE earth seepage unknown  unknown 0 
This is the second of two 
incidents at this dam. Failure 
the result of loss of filter 
through riprap (not sure if this 
applies to both incidents). 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BLACK 
RIVER 
1947 MN unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
WACO 
LAKE 
1947 TX unknown foundation 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
 unknown 0 
Erosion of shale foundation 
under apron and part of 
overflow section, resulting in 
loss of apron and part of dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Blandin 1948 MN rockfill unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Piping failure of foundation of 
rockfilled timber crib. Rebuilt 
with concrete gravity dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Kern Brothers 
Dam (Harney) 
1949 OR 
earth 
rockfill 
unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Failure due to excessive 
settlement of fill. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lake 
Algonquin 
1949 NY 
concrete 
gravity 
unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Little Juniper 1949 CA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Dam breached during heavy 
floods. Breaching could have 
been caused by inadequate 
spillway capacity. When dam 
was rebuilt, allowed for 
additional spillway capacity. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lake Dawn 
Dam 
1950 WA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
4,000 
1 home destroyed, 
$4000 damage 
0 
Heavy Rains caused 
overtopping and failure of 
earthen dam. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
CALHOUN 
LAKE DAM 
1950 IL earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Failed at previously 
undermined and damaged step 
spillway during flood event. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Merced Falls 1950 CA 
concrete 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Earth levee overtopped during 
flood flow. Washout portion 
stripped clean to slate 
foundation. Inadequate spilling 
capacity. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Stockton 
Creek 
1950 CA earth cracking 
piping, 
settlement 
 unknown 0 
Failed at abutment, probably 
along contact or crack. 
According to NPDP ref 
No.1360, dam failed by 
breaching next to right 
abutment. Possible that piping 
occurred through embankment 
crack, due to differential 
settlement. Nature of fill 
material made it susceptible to 
cracking from stains set up by 
differential settlement 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Vaux dams 1951 MT unknown unknown unknown  family killed ? 
Chronicled in Calamities & 
Miracles (Feb. 2008), by 
Richard P. Warren 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
unknown 1951 KS unknown unknown unknown  unknown 11 Less than 2 hours notice. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; Dekay 
and McClelland 1993 
FRENCHMA
N DAM 
1952 MT rockfill breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Runoff from melting snow. A 
dike section was overtopped 
early morning April 15, 1952. 
Later that day, dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
GENEVA 
DAM 
1952 IL gravity unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Deterioration of the wood 
planking, and its absence in 
some locations, caused the 
failure. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Horse Lake 1952 CA earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Dam breached in same location 
as in 1938 (this is the second of 
two failures at this dam). Dam 
did not overtop. Cause of 
failure believed to be due to 
rodent holes, allowing for a 
piping failure. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Huffman 
Antelope 
1952 CA earth foundation 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Dam failed by breaching 
during period of heavy snow 
melt runoff. Dam was not 
overtopped. Breach 
approximately in center of 
dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Toreson 1953 CA earth foundation corrosion  unknown 0 
Dam failed by breaching. 
Failure very fast. Cause 
unknown. This incident also 
appears in Lessons From Dam 
Incidents USA 
ASCE/USCOLD. According to 
this reference cause of failure 
was chemical drainage 
corrosion outlet pipe. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
GRINDSTON
E RIVER 
1954 MN gravity overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
According to case file, the right 
earthen abutment was 
overtopped and washed out 
during a flood following a 
heavy rainstorm. Also incident 
in 1944. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Crow Creek 1955 SD earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Flood waters undermined the 
spillway which created great 
damage to the concrete on the 
spillway. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Harris Pond 
Dam 
1955 RI earth foundation 
hydrologic 
event 
 town flooded 0 
Failure of earthen 
embankment; disaster inspired 
city’s current flood control 
system. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
MILLARD 
POND 
1955 CT masonry overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
In 1955 the dam was seriously 
damaged by a flood. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Three Mile 
Flat Res 
1955 OR earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Dam breached relatively 
slowly. Failure of dam 
attributed to work of badgers 
and rodents. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Schoellkopf 
Station 
1956 NY unknown unknown unknown 620,000 
destruction of two-
thirds of the 
Schoellkopf Station at 
Niagara Falls 
1  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Baker Pond 1956 VT earth unknown unknown  none 0 
The dam breached at pipe 
spillway. No damages reported 
downstream. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Goodrich 
Reservoir 
1956 OR earth piping seepage  unknown 0 
Limited piping due to seepage 
caused a void and abnormal 
weight of ice or ice pressure 
over void caused failure. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
White Rapids 
Left 
Causeway 
1956 MI 
concrete 
gravity 
foundation 
poor 
construction 
 unknown 0 
a reinforced concrete pier 
failed at a point which 
imbedded a hinge pin common 
to two Tainter gates, causing 
the common ends of the gates 
to pull free. A possible 
contributing cause was the fact 
that four hinge pin reinforcing 
loops were originally installed 
where the design called for six. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Jackson Bluff 1957 FL 
earth 
gravity 
breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
According to Atlanta Regional 
Office Dam Failures breach of 
approximately 1200 feet of 
embankment during normal 
pool as a result of heavy rains. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LEECH 
LAKE DAM 
1957 MN 
concrete 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
upstream 
dam failure 
 unknown 0 
Failure of a sheetpile 
cofferdam led to failure of this 
dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SCSOWL 
CREEK 
SITE07 
1957 OK earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Erosion tunnel emptied 
reservoir. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SCSOWL 
CREEK 
SITE13 
1957 OK earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Failure tunnel travelled along 
right side of conduit. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
ECHO LAKE 1958 CT rockfill piping 
poor 
maintenance 
 unknown 0 
Dam had to be breached so it 
could be drained, but the 
contractor screwed up on the 
repair work and the dam 
washed out. Piping had been 
seen in the four days prior to 
failure. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
ROUNDY 1958 UT earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Currant Creek 1959 OR earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Inadequate foundation 
preparation. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Electric Light 
Pond 
1960 NY unknown unknown unknown  unknown 1  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
ABENIKI 
LAKE DAM 
1960 NH earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
900,000 unknown 0 
The dam failed as a result of 
high waters caused by spring 
thaw and heavy rains. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
 223 
LAKE 
TANGLEWO
OD DAM 
1960 TX earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 damage to Palo Duro 
State Park 
0 
Floodwaters overtopped the 
closure section and washed out 
a 100-foot portion of the dam. 
This caused considerable 
damage to Palo Duro State 
Park downstream. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MAUCH 
CHUNK 
LAKE 
(PA462) 
1960 PA earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Failure was due to rotting and 
wear from ice and lack of 
maintenance. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
PENN 
FOREST 
1960 PA 
concrete 
earth 
piping unknown  unknown 0 
Partial failure. Sinkhole 
occurred in upstream slope of 
dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SCSLITTLE 
WEWOKA 
CREEK 
SITE17 
1960 OK earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Small initial leak observed at 
8a.m. gradually eroded into 
tunnel, and by evening 
reservoir was empty. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
CRYSTAL 
LAKE 
1961 CT earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
The dam was over 100 years 
old and had been leaking for 
some time. It failed suddenly 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
WACO 
LAKE 
1961 TX unknown unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Failure occurred during 
construction when a section 
sagged 19 feet vertically and 
slipped 23 feet downstream. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
WASHINGT
ON COUNTY 
LAKE DAM 
1962 IL earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Piping type failure during 
initial filling. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Spaulding 
Pond 
(Mohegan 
Park) 
1963 CT earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, piping 
6,000,00
0 
NPDP estimates 
$3,053,000 in damages 
6 
From New York Times, 
10/22/00: “Norwich hopes to 
remove dams on Yantic” No 
warning. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; Dekay 
and McClelland 1993 
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Baldwin Hills 1963 CA earth cracking 
piping, 
settlement 
1,106,43
3 
destroyed 65 houses, 
miles of streets, water 
pipes, sewers & gas 
lines, damaged 210 
houses & apartments 
5 
Advanced warning enabled 
evacuation; signaled end of 
urban-area earthen dams in 
CA.  (1.5 hours warning).  
Dam caretaker identified crack 
in wall, notification of operator 
and engineer preceded 
mapping of evacuation zone 
and community alert.  Police 
went door to door.  emergency 
services were mobilized for 
rescue.  Took over 20 years for 
town to recover. Population at 
risk 16,500); subsidence 
caused by exploitation of oil 
field under dam exacerbated by 
reinjection of waste brine - area 
was also atop a fault, 
inadequate piping 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://framework.latime
s.com/2013/12/13/the-
1963-baldwin-hills-
dam-collapse/#/0; 
http://web.stanford.edu/
~meehan/la/baldwin.ht
m; Dekay and 
McClelland, 1993; 
Wahl, 1998; 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Little Deer 
Creek 
1963 UT earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, piping 
 Summer cabins 
damaged 
1 No warning. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; Dekay 
and McClelland 1993 
LAMBERT 1963 TN earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
White Rapids 
Left 
Causeway 
1963 MI 
concrete 
gravity 
poor 
constructio
n 
gate  unknown 0 
a reinforced concrete pier 
failed at a point which 
imbedded a hinge pin common 
to two Tainter gates, causing 
the common ends of the gates 
to pull free. A possible 
contributing cause was the fact 
that four hinge pin reinforcing 
loops were originally installed 
where the design called for six. 
Hold back plates were installed 
on these piers and on all of the 
other piers to prevent any 
further occurrence. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Swift 
Irrigation 
Dam and 
Lower Two 
Medicine 
Dam 
1964 MT 
earth 
rockfill 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
62,000,0
00 
NPDP estimates 19 
killed and $18,500,000 
in damages 
30 
Most fatalities occurred on 
Blackfeet reservation. 
Replaced by concrete-arch dam 
with emergency action plan 
and process. Less than 1.5 
hours notice. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://www.greatfallstri
bune.com/story/news/lo
cal/2014/05/25/50th-
anniversary-1964-
flood/9563135/; 
http://www.greatfallstri
bune.com/story/money/
2014/06/01/swift-two-
medicine-dams-quickly-
replaced/9777069/; 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; Dekay 
and McClelland 1993 
Lower Hell 
Hole Dam 
1964 CA 
earth 
rockfill 
foundation 
hydrologic 
event 
160,000,
000 
Destroyed 2 
suspension bridges and 
1 steel girder state 
highway bridge 
0 
Record rains during 
construction; 410-foot high 
zoned rockfill structure on the 
Rubicon River; a 200’ high 
section of the embankment 
failed upon record rains during 
construction; 30,000 af flood 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LOWER 
MONUMENT
AL LOCK 
AND DAM 
1964 WA 
concrete 
gravity 
breach 
hydrologic 
event, 
upstream 
dam failure 
 unknown 0 
earthfill cofferdam overtopped 
by flood. Project flooded when 
sheetpile cell collapsed and the 
downstream earthfill cofferdam 
was breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MEDICINE 
CREEK 
1964 NE earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SCSCHEROK
EE SANDY 
SITE08A 
1964 OK earth piping seepage  unknown 0 
Tunnel gradually eroded 
following path of initial 
leakage. About 48 hours 
required (after observation of 
initial leak) for release of main 
volume of reservoir through 
gradually eroded failure tunnel. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SCSUPPER 
RED ROCK 
CREEK 
SITE48 
1964 OK earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Reservoir emptied through 
erosion tunnel before failure 
was discovered on 11/18/64, 
probably about 24hrs after 
initial leak. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SKAGWAY 1965 CO rockfill overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 2 
 
The dam failed during a flood 
in 1965. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; Dekay 
and McClelland 1993 
ALTO PASS 
RESERVOIR 
DAM 
1965 IL earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Failed on first filling by piping 
along CMP drop inlet outlet 
pipe. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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FRANKTOW
N PARKER 
FPM1 
1965 CO earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Overtopped during flooding. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Mosinee 1965 WI 
timber 
crib 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Collapse of timber crib needle 
dam during flood. Replaced by 
rockfill dam section. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Emery 1966 CA earth foundation corrosion  unknown 0 
Chemical action and corrosion 
of the outlet pipe caused 
failure. Old dam was removed 
and subsequently replaced by 
an earthfill embankment 
(designed and constructed to 
modern standards). 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LAKE 
LATONKA 
1966 PA earth unknown unknown  livestock drowned 0 
Piping through the 
embankment under the 
concrete spillway resulting in 
the collapse of the spillway. 
Two cows, two horses and a 
sheep drowned. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lake North 1966 NE earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
South and north dikes abutting 
diversion dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LAKE O THE 
HILLS 
1966 AK 
earth 
rockfill 
unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
FAIRHAVEN 
DAM 
1967 MN gravity overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
The concrete spillway and 
earthen embankment washed 
out only several weeks after the 
spillway had been constructed. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
FRD NO 1 1967 KS earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Three piping failures occurred 
just above the contact surface 
of the trench excavations in the 
foundation of the closure 
section. The three failure 
channels were each underlain 
by approx 4 ft of impervious 
embankment lying over the 
natural ground material at the 
base of the dam. Immediately 
above this impervious blanket 
was the nonhomogeneous 
embankment material 
consisting of interconnected 
lenses, pockets and layers of 
gravel between alternate layers 
of well compacted impervious 
layers. Failure occurred thru 
this nonhomogeneous 3 to 5 ft 
thickness which extended thru 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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the dam in the 3 failure 
locations. 
North Star 
Sand & 
Gravel Dams 
1967 WA unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 
Washed out GN 
railroad and derailed 
passing train 
0 
40 foot high dam washed out 
due to lack of spillway. 25 foot 
high dam  rebuilt, also failed 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
SCSUPPER 
RED ROCK 
CREEK 
SITE42 
1967 OK earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Small leak observed at 5p.m. 
on 6/20/67. 24 hours later, 
reservoir was found empty 
from failure. Erosion tunnel ran 
along right side of conduit 
upstream of dam, then crossed 
over and ran along left side. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Fort Meade 1967 FL earth unknown unknown  
250,000 m3 of 
phosphate clay slimes, 
1.8 million m3 of 
water, fish kill 
0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
Lee Lake 1968 MA unknown unknown unknown  
6 homes destroyed, 20 
damaged.  (NPDP 
estimates 2 deaths). 
6 No warning. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; Dekay 
and McClelland 1993 
Virden Creek 
Dam 
1968 IA unknown unknown unknown  unknown 1  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Bridgeway 
Lake Dam 
1968 MI earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
 unknown 0 
The dam failed due to 
overtopping and erosion. This 
was a first filling failure. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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WYOMING 
DEVELOPM
ENT 
COMPANY 
NO. 1 
1969 WY earth unknown unknown 
1,000,00
0 
flooded 10,000 acres 
of cropland 
0 
This earth embankment 
collapsed suddenly, flooding 
10,000 acres of cropland. 
Approximately 9,400 acre feet 
of water was dumped into 
Sybille Creek. The breach 
occurred above the outlet 
works. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
HUMBOLDT 
MILLDAM 
1969 IA concrete overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The island was overtopped and 
washed out during a large 
flood. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Spruce Lake 1969 VT earth unknown unknown  none 0 
The dam breached at pipe 
spillway. No damages reported 
downstream. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MURPHY 1970 WI earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
The dam was overtopped. 
There was debris in the 
spillway. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Pillar Rock 
Dam 
1970 WA 
concrete 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
culvert 
 3 homes and fish 
cannery destroyed 
0 
Logging roadfill culvert 
blocked by debris, overtopped 
and failed, caused 25 foot high 
concrete gravity dam to fail. 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
SCSUPPER 
CLEAR 
BOGGY 
CREEK 
SITE50 
1970 OK earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Bottom of breach well above 
foundation, so failure was 
wholly confined to 
embankment. Vertical walled 
breach. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SHEEP 
CREEK DAM 
1970 ND earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Deformation, conduit. On day 
of incident, reservoir was filled 
with heavy rains for the first 
time; spillway went into 
operation. Failure is believed to 
have been caused by leaks 
from joints in the spillway 
pipe. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BULLOCK 
DRAW 
1971 UT earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
San Fernando 
Dam 
1971 CA 
earth 
other fill 
foundation 
settlement, 
earthquake 
 unknown 0 
Quake caused slide in upstream 
slope that lowered crest 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
Sid White 
Dam 
1971 WA earth unknown unknown  
Debris dumped into 
town of Riversde 
0 
Earthen dam failed, causing 
second dam to fail and dump 
debris into town of Riverside. 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
Fort Meade 1971 FL earth unknown unknown  
9 million m3 of clay 
water released, large 
fish kill 
0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
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Canyon Lake 
Dam 
1972 SD earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
160,000,
000 
1,335 homes and 5,000 
automobiles destroyed 
(NPDP estimates 33 
deaths). 
238 
In the aftermath, interim and 
long-range programs were 
initiated and millions of federal 
dollars were spent in Rapid 
City and the surrounding 
stricken communities, 
including a flood-plain 
management program. (33 
lives lost. According to file 
folder, dam failed near primary 
spillway structure. Also states 
that 300 were killed, but not all 
deaths were due to dam 
failure.)  34-year-old earth 
embankment; Dam size: 20’ 
high, 500’ long; Impoundment 
size: 40 acre reservoir, holding 
132 million gallons  “The 
safety inspection and repair 
program was spurred by the 
collapse of a dam built & 
operated by the city  near 
Rapid City, S.D., in 1972. 
More than 200 persons died 
and damages ran in the 
millions of dollars.” 
Washington Post 7/15/1978. 
Less than 1 hour notice. 
NRC, 2012; Association 
of State Dam Safety 
Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/
fs-037-02/; 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; Dekay 
and McClelland 1993 
Buffalo Creek 1972 WV 
earth 
other fill 
poor 
constructio
n 
hydrologic 
event 
65,000,0
00 
502 houses, 44 mobile 
homes, destroyed, 
1000 cars and trucks , 
several  roads and 
bridges destroyed; 943 
homes damaged -- 
flood of wastewater.  
(NPDP estimates 
$50,000,000 in 
damages). 
125 
Series of 3 non-permitted dams 
built of low grade soils and 
mining debris.  Less than 1 
hour warning.  Population at 
risk 5000.   National Guard 
called in to rescue and recover.  
Despite possible signs of 
danger, the Pittston mining 
company refused to alert 
residents.  In 1973, the West 
Virginia Legislature passed the 
Dam Control Act, regulating 
all dams in the state. However, 
funding was never appropriated 
to enforce the law. In 1992, an 
official with the state Division 
of Natural Resources estimated 
there were at least 400 
hazardous non-coal dams in 
West Virginia, many of which 
were owned by the state.  
heavy rainfall; dams built from 
WV Ad Hoc 
Commission of Inquiry, 
1873; Erikson, 1978; 
National Dam 
Inspection Act, Public 
Law 92-367; 
http://wv.ng.mil/pages/a
bout/history/1972-
buffalo_creek/1972_buf
falo_creek.html; Dekay 
and McClelland, 1993; 
Wahl, 1998; 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
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mining waste products and 
poor soil caused embankment 
failure 
Anzalduas 1972 TX earth unknown unknown  unknown 4  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LAKE O THE 
HILLS 
1972 AK earth foundation erosion  
One child (10-year 
old) drowned from the 
floodwaters and a road 
was washed out as a 
result. 
1 
Due to internal erosion. One 
child drowned from the 
floodwaters and a road was 
washed out as a result. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Barcroft Dam 1972 VA 
earth 
masonry 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Excessive rainfall during 
Tropical Storm Agnes was 
measured at a station 1.75 
miles upstream from the dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
BROWDER 1972 TN earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
A controlled breach of the dam 
was performed following the 
discovery of a piping leak. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
WHITEWAT
ER BROOK 
DAM 
1972 NH 
earth 
gravity 
breach 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
The earth embankment was 
breached in an area adjacent to 
the concrete spillway. Much 
erosion and damage occurred 
to and along the spillway 
channel and on the downstream 
face. Initial cause of the failure 
was thought to be separation 
alongside of the spillway. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Box Lake 1973 UT earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
5,000,00
0 
unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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CARLANNA 
LAKE 
1973 AK rockfill overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
3,200,00
0 
unknown 0 
The dam failed following two 
days of heavy rains. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LITTLE 
MUSKEGO 
1973 WI earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
foundation 
15,000 unknown 0 
An unusually heavy rain 
resulted in the overtopping and 
failure of a low portion of the 
right dike. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BLOTT 1973 WI earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, breach 
 unknown 0 
The earth dikes were 
overtopped and breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Braddock 
Lake Dam 
1973 NJ 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Overtopped 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Carlanna 
Creek Dam 
1973 AK unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
 unknown 0 
Break followed two days of 
heavy rains. Floodwaters went 
into the downtown area and 
forced the evacuation of 50 
residents of a trailer court. No 
injuries or deaths were 
reported. Failure due to 
overflow and erosion on one of 
the abutments, as well as age 
and design deficiencies. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
CAULK 
LAKE DAM 
1973 KY earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
The failure of this dam is 
thought to be the result of loss 
of soil strength due to seepage 
pressure or saturation by 
seepage. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
CENTER 
CREEK NO. 
1 
1973 UT earth overtopping 
spillway, 
piping 
 unknown 0 
The spillway became plugged, 
and the dam was overtopped. 
Piping along the outlet pipe 
may have contributed to this 
event. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
HORSESHOE 
LAKE 
1973 CO earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
This dam was breached in the 
area of the rubble masonry 
high level gate outlet. It is 
believed that leaks in the 
rubble masonry outlet, which 
was used for an emergency 
spillway, piped embankment 
material into the outlet channel. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
IRELAND #5 1973 CO earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Overtopped during flooding. 
Reference 1256 records 
incident as spillway breach. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LOWER 
LATHAM 
1973 CO earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
A small discharge through the 
emergency spillway may have 
led to a piping situation 
between the earthfill and the 
concrete spillway section. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
NEWTON 
GULCH 
1973 CO earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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ROUNDY 1973 UT earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
THOMAS 1973 CO earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Overtop. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Upper Moore 
Pond 
1973 VT earth unknown unknown  none 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
WILCOX 1973 UT unknown unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Davis Lake 
Dam_Okanog
an Co. 
1974 WA 
earth 
rockfill 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam was overtopped and 
failed. A small section of the 
dam eroded down to the 
ground. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
FOOL 
CREEK NO 1 
1974 UT earth unknown unknown  little damage 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
OBERON 
LAKE NO. 1 
1974 CO earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Dam was overtopped and 
middle portion of dam was 
completely washed out. The 
spillway was inadequate to 
handle the large quantities of 
runoff 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
RIDGETOP 1974 TN earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Failure from overtopping. Not 
a full breach. Severe slides on 
downstream slope. Six inches 
of rain in one day. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SADDLE 
LAKE DAM 
1974 NY earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
The dam failed due to piping. 
The joints of a 24 inch 
corrugated metal pipe that were 
not watertight, causing the 
piping failure and subsequent 
embankment slope failure by 
sloughing. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
STONERIDG
E 
1974 ID earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Dam was overtopped and 
middle portion of dam was 
completely washed out. The 
spillway was inadequate to 
handle the large quantities of 
runoff experienced during the 
week of January 11, 1974. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Deneen Mica 1974 NC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 38,000 m3 tailings 
released 
0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
Lakeside Dam 1975 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 1  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
DRESSER 
NO.4 DAM 
(FAILED) 
1975 MO 
earth 
rockfill 
unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Catastrophic failure that 
created a breach 300 feet wide 
in the levee. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
 233 
KARVAL 1975 CO earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Outlet pipe corroded releasing 
entire reservoir. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Mike Horse 1975 MT unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
culvert 
 
Thousands of tons of 
mine tailings washed 
downstream & killed 
most aquatic life in 
upper 10 miles of 
Blackfoot River 
0 
Dam built in 1941. Part of the 
dam washed out when culvert 
became clogged during heavy 
rains. Thousands of tons of 
mine tailings washed 
downstream & killed most 
aquatic life in upper 10 miles 
of Blackfoot River 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Twin Falls 
Auxilliary 
Spillway 
1975 MI unknown unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Failure of a section of the 
upstream cofferdam during 
spillway renovation. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Walter 
Bouldin 
1975 AL unknown piping unknown  unknown 0 
Dam built in 1967; 
reconstructed and stands today. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Walter 
Bouldin 
1975 AL 
concrete 
gravity 
unknown unknown  unknown 0 
The failure occurred after part 
of the upstream side of the 
embankment near the crest slid 
into the water. Outrushing 
water destroyed part of the fill 
and eroded the foundation to 
50 feet below the reservoir 
bottom. The dam may have 
failed due to piping in the 
downstream shell. Flooding did 
not occur as the most of the 
force of the wall of water was 
dissipated along a 5 mile long 
canal below the dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Silverton 1975 CO earth unknown unknown  
116,000 tonnes 
released, tailings flow 
slide polluted nearly 
100 miles (160 km) of 
the Animas river and 
its tributaries; severe 
property damage; no 
injuries 
0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
Mike Horse 1975 MT earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 150,000 m3 release 0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
unknown 1976 CO unknown unknown unknown  unknown 144 
An unnamed dam on the Big 
Thompson River experienced 
an event. The dam did not fail. 
Less than 1 hour warning. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; Dekay 
and McClelland 1993 
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Teton Dam 1976 ID 
earth 
zoned 
foundation erosion 
1,322,00
0,000 
NPDP estimates 14 
killed and 
$900,000,000 in 
damages 
11 
Wall at base of dam was 
composed of volcanic rock 
with large fractures that were 
to be filled with grout.  
Fractures were too numerous to 
fill adequately.  Leaks 
appeared on north side of dam 
that led to erosion.  Designed 
by the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation, failed just as it 
was being completed and filled 
for the first time.  Law 
enforcement was not notified 
until after attempts had been 
made to stop leakage; phone 
calls to  initially impacted 
residents (7 deaths) were made 
less than an hour before the 
collapse.  45 minutes warning.  
Population at risk 2000.  
Subsequent flooding impacted 
another 22,000 people (4 
deaths) who had approximately 
2 hours and 15 minutes 
warning. 
NRC, 2012; USBR, 
2011b; Association of 
State Dam Safety 
Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://www.geol.ucsb.ed
u/faculty/sylvester/Teto
n_Dam/narrative.html; 
Dekay and McClelland, 
1993; Wahl, 1998; 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
New-found 
Creek Dam 
(Bear 
Wallow) 
1976 NC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
500,000 unknown 4 No warning. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; Dekay 
and McClelland 1993 
Mud 
Mountain 
Lake 
1976 WA rockfill unknown unknown  2 children 2  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
IDYLWILDE 1976 CO 
concrete 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Heavy rainfall on a portion of 
the Big Thompson watershed 
caused extreme flooding 
conditions. As a result, the dam 
was completely destroyed. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LAKE 
NANCY 
DAM 
1976 NY earth overtopping spillway  unknown 0 
Concrete spillway undermined 
and failed. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SEYMOUR 
RESERVOIR 
DAM 
1976 IA earth unknown unknown  minor damage 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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LAUREL 
RUN 
1977 PA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
330,000,
000 
washed out highways 
and railroads. The 
downtown area of 
Johnstown, 
Pennsylvania was left 
several feet deep in 
mud. 6 houses 
destroyed, 19 homes 
damages.  (NPDP 
estimates 40 deaths). 
76 
Washed out highways and 
railroads. The downtown area 
of Johnstown, Pennsylvania 
was left several feet deep in 
mud. Some flood victims were 
protected under the National 
Flood Insurance Program; 
President declared the 
Johnstown, Pennsylvania, area 
a major disaster area after a 
flood struck 136 communities 
within eight counties and killed 
76 people, injured or caused 
sickness to 2,700, and damaged 
an estimated $117 million 
worth of property within the 
city and $213 million in areas 
outside the city.  A wide 
variety of assistance was 
available to individual victims 
and State and local 
governments. Twelve agencies 
were responsible for 27 
programs. Other agencies 
became involved through 
mission assignments by the 
Federal Disaster Assistance 
Administration.  A local flash 
flood warning system could 
have alerted authorities to the 
disaster much sooner. An 
improved communications 
system could have 
provided better and quicker 
emergency assistance to the 
disaster area. It took up to 3 
weeks to establish 
communications.  The 
establishment of the 100-year 
floodplain may 
 be inadequate as the criteria 
for floodplain 
 management ordinances.  No 
warning. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
https://www.gpo.gov/fd
sys/pkg/CZIC-hg9983-
u55-1978/html/CZIC-
hg9983-u55-1978.htm; 
Wahl, 
1998;http://npdp.stanfor
d.edu/dam_incidents; 
Dekay and McClelland 
1993 
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Kelly Barnes 
Dam 
1977 GA earth breach piping 
2,800,00
0 
Loss of 39 lives. (9 
houses, 18 house 
trailers and 2 college 
buildings destroyed.) 
39 
Earth dam built over rock crib 
dam.  The Board could not 
determine a sole cause of the 
November 6, failure. It does 
conclude that a combination of 
factors caused the failure. The 
most probable causes are a 
local slide on the steep 
downstream slope probably 
associated with piping, an 
attendant localized breach in 
the crest followed by 
progressive erosion, saturation 
of the downstream 
embankment, and subsequently 
a total collapse of the structure.  
Governor established "Task 
Force on Dam Safety"; Corps 
of Engineers assigned the 
mission of organizing and 
leading a Federal technical 
investigation.  15 minutes 
warning.  Population at risk 
250. 
NRC, 2012; Sanders 
and Sauer, 1979; 
https://ga.water.usgs.go
v/publications/ToccoaFI
BReport/; Wahl, 1998; 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; Dekay 
and McClelland 1993 
unknown 1977 MO unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 20 Less than 1 hour notice. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; Dekay 
and McClelland 1993 
Cedar Hills 
Lake Dam 
1977 NC earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Deer Lake 
Dam 
1977 NC earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Gossett Lake 
Dam 
1977 NC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Primary spillway was plugged 
with erodible soil. Emergency 
spillway carrying all flow. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MIDDLEBR
OOK 
1977 TN earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Modest Creek 
Dam 
1977 VA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Located in a rural area it was 2 
days before the failure was 
discovered. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Winter 1977 WI gravity unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Woodfin 
Reservoir 
Dam 
1977 NC earth 
poor 
constructio
n 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Concrete spillway chute 
washed out during flood. 
Original spillway design had 
been altered after initial 
construction, reducing capacity 
of the spillway control section 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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and reducing the storage 
capacity of the reservoir. 
SANDY RUN 1977 PA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
200,000,
000 
See Laurel  Run 0 
The flood flows breached 
Sandy Run Dam and another 
water supply dam and washed 
out highways and railroads. 
The downtown area of 
Johnstown, Pennsylvania was 
left several feet deep in mud. 
(see Laurel Run) 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
https://www.gpo.gov/fd
sys/pkg/CZIC-hg9983-
u55-1978/html/CZIC-
hg9983-u55-1978.htm; 
Wahl, 
1998;http://npdp.stanfor
d.edu/dam_incidents 
Homestake 1977 NM earth unknown unknown  30,000 m3 released 0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
COON 
CREEK 41 
1978 WI earth unknown unknown 590,000 unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Bartlett 1978 AZ other arch unknown unknown 5,200 unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Allegan City 
Dam 
1978 MI earth overtopping piping  unknown 0 
The dam failed as a result of 
overtopping and piping. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BAD AXE 12 1978 WI earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
A flow of 5 cfs exited from the 
base of the right abutment 
downstream of the dam when 
the flood control pool was half-
full. This was the first time the 
pool was filled to this level. 
The partial failure of the right 
abutment was due to water 
moving in stress-relief cracks 
and joints. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
CAMP 
ERNST DAM 
1978 KY earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
DIAMOND 
MILLS 
PAPER 
COMPANY 
DAM 
1978 NY gravity unknown unknown  unknown 0 
deterioration of side channel 
spillway; outlets inoperable 
and no maintenance performed 
in past 10 yrs. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
DURHAM 1978 WY earth overtopping unknown  unknown 0 
Complete failure of the dam 
due to overtopping. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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MCCARTY 
LAKE DAM 
1978 TX earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, breach 
 unknown 0 
The embankment was 
overtopped by floodwaters 
resulting in a breach at the 
right abutment, partial 
breaching at five separate 
locations and severe erosion 
along about 90 percent of its 
length. Considerable erosion 
damage also occurred in the 
spillway channel. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MONASHKA 
CREEK DAM 
1978 AK earth foundation 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
 unknown 0 
Three inches of rain had fallen 
on October 16, 1978 in the 
drainage (area), resulting in the 
dam's failure. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Myron Isabel 
Dam 
1978 CO unknown piping animal  Insignificant 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
OTTER 1978 TN earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
REYNOLDS 
NO. 1 
1978 WY earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
A partial failure of the dam 
occurred sometime during the 
spring of 1978 as a result of 
overtopping. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SARNIA 
DAM 
1978 ND earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SEWALLS 
SOUTH 
CHANNEL 
DAM 
1978 NY gravity unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Swimming 
Pool Dam 
1979 NY earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 road washed out 4  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MARTIN 
PLANT 
COOLING 
WATER 
RESERVOIR 
1979 FL earth unknown unknown 
4,500,00
0 
unknown 0 
The dam failed due to piping in 
the foundation soils. Complete 
breach and emptying of the 
reservoir. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
FERTILE 
MILL DAM 
1979 IA earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
A section of the earth dike 
washed out, possibly due to 
piping or a seepage-induced 
slope failure. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
GOSHEN 1979 UT earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam overtopped and failed 
due to flooding caused by an 
approximately 0.6 inch rainfall 
on a 15 inch snowpack all at 
once. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Gropps Lake 
Dam 
1979 NJ earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
The dam collapsed as a result 
of both movement of the 
spillway structure along the 
abutment and the spillway 
apron being washed out. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
HUTTOS 
LAKE DAM 
1979 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, breach 
 unknown 0 
The dam was overtopped and 
breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LITTLE 
FALLS 
1979 WI unknown unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Two gates became inoperable 
after concrete shifted. Poor 
quality concrete was used. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MAPLE 
GROVE 
1979 CO 
other 
rubber 
unknown unknown  unknown 0 
The fabric-dam was punctured 
by an unknown, sharp object. It 
was determined to be most 
likely due to vandalism. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Millsboro 
Pond Dam 
1979 DE earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Due to melting snow and heavy 
rain, the water level of the 
pond rose considerably, 
increasing seepage through the 
dam's fill and creating 
washouts behind the culvert 
abutments and under the 16 
foot long sheeting (which was 
supporting box-culvert walls). 
The upstream face of the 
embankment to the left of the 
spillway (looking downstream) 
has been eroded to a rather 
steep slope 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
United 
Nuclear Corp 
1979 NM unknown unknown unknown  
Uranium tailings - 93 
million gallons of 
liquid contaminated 
with low-level 
radiation & ~ 1100 T 
of solid waste  spread 
~ 100 miles 
downstream 
0 
Washington Post 
1987 ASDSO West Conf Proc, 
p. 183 UNC shut down 
operations April 1982. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
VANCE 
LAKE DAM 
1979 MS earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Wiggins Mill 
Pond Dam 
1979 DE earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Church Rock 1979 NM earth unknown unknown  
370,000 m3 of 
radioactive water, 
1,000 tonnes of 
contaminated 
sediment, 
Contamination of Rio 
Puerco sediments up to 
110 km downstream 
0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
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Prospect Dam 1980 CO earth piping unknown 150,000 unknown 0 Less than 30 minutes warning. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; Dekay 
and McClelland 1993 
Clear Creek 
#2 
1980 AZ earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
EAST 
LEMMON 
1980 SD earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Following an 8 inch rainfall in 
approximately 3 to 4 hours, the 
dam failed due to overtopping. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Fairfield 
Swamp Pond 
1980 VT earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
The dam breached under the 
core wall and pipe spillway. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lake Como 
Dam 
1980 DE earth overtopping unknown  unknown 0 
The downstream half of the 
embankment eroded away by 
as much as five feet when the 
dam was overtopped on July 
29, 1980. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
PHELPS 
DODGE 
TAILINGS 
DAM NO. 3X 
1980 NM unknown unknown unknown  
2 million cu yds 
tailings spilt into 
Mangas Creek. 
0 
Section 700 ft wide and down 
to the top of the starter dam 
failed in slightly more than 3 
minutes releasing 2.5 million 
cubic yards of slimes.  (Tyrone 
Tailings Dam No 3) 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
PICKWICK 1980 MN earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
A large flood, many times 
greater than a 100 year event, 
occurred as a result of a heavy 
rainfall of short duration, 
which was preceded by a week 
of intermittent rainfall. The 
flood inundated the dam and 
the entire valley floodplain. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SAINT JOHN 1980 ID earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SNOW BIRD 
LAKE DAM 
1980 NY earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
TANNERSVI
LLE 
RESERVOIR 
#1 DAM 
1980 NY earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Tyrone 1980 NM earth unknown unknown  
2 million m3 tailing 
released, inundated 
farmland 
0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
Coal waste 
impoundment 
t 
1981 KY unknown unknown unknown  unknown 1  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Great Works 1981 ME 
timber 
crib 
unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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JOHNSTON 
CITY LAKE 
DAM 
1981 IL earth 
poor 
maintenanc
e 
unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Ages 1981 KY earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 
96,000 m3 coal refuse 
slurry released,1 
person was killed, 3 
homes destroyed, 30 
homes damaged, fish 
kill in Clover Fork of 
the Cumberland River 
1  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
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BUSHY HILL 
POND 
1982 CT earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, breach 
276,000,
000 
15,000 homes and 400 
commercial and 
industrial 
establishments were 
damaged. The flood 
also resulted in 
damages to 31 dams, 
state and local roads, 
bridges, dams, and 
utility infrastructure. 
11 
Heavy rains in Connecticut 
dumped more than 10 inches of 
water. The resulting flooding 
washed out or partially 
breached 19 dams. (Bushy Hill 
Lake, Clarks Pond, Deer Lake 
Scout Reservation, multiple 
others). 17 dams failed.  The 
regional headquarters, a 
Federal service of the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (N.O.A.A.), is 
housed in a basement suite of 
offices near a creek. By late 
Saturday, water was pouring 
through the walls, soaking 
cables, deactivating computer 
terminals and forcing the 
workers to flee.  There was not 
the same sense of apprehension 
and state of personal alert that 
normally accompanies a 
thunderstorm or a hurricane. 
"'A relatively calm period of 
weather in New England'' has 
created a generation 
complacent and inexperienced 
about the brutal force possible 
when water rises up and rages 
from its allotted course." (Dr. 
David Curtis, one of the senior 
hydrologists).  Dr. Curtis 
believes that the building of 
dams and dikes earlier in the 
century lulled many people, 
including officials, into a false 
sense of security -not realizing, 
as he put it, that ''nature is 
clever and can circumvent our 
best flood measures.'' In this 
case, dozens of tiny streams 
filled up below the dams - 
tributaries that were not 
thought to need control. 
Although the center put out a 
flood warning as early as 
Friday, the public was simply 
not accustomed to responding 
in the way it normally does to a 
snow or hurricane alert, he 
http://www.floodsafety.
noaa.gov/states/ct-
flood.shtml; 
http://www.nytimes.co
m/1982/06/13/nyregion/
the-flood-of-82-why-
did-it-happen; 
htmlhttp://www.ct.gov/
deep/cwp/view.asp?A=2
705&Q=470890; 
http://articles.courant.co
m/2002-06-
06/news/0206062166_1
_tropical-storm-
connecticut-river-flood; 
Dekay and McClelland, 
1993;http://npdp.stanfor
d.edu/dam_incidents; 
Dekay and McClelland 
1993 
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said. 'They did not move their 
cars,'' Dr. Curtis said. ''They 
did not move furniture. And I 
think they did not even take us 
seriously enough.''  2-3 hours 
warning.  Population at risk 
400. 
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Lawn Lake 
and Cascade 
Lake Dam 
1982 CO earth foundation erosion 
31,000,0
00 
Flood waters destroyed 
18 bridges, damaged 
road systems, 
inundated 177 
businesses (75 percent 
of Estes Park's 
commercial activity) 
and damaged 108 
residences. 
3 
62 percent of the merchants 
who were affected by the flood 
either lost their business or 
moved away without 
rebuilding.  Those who stayed 
faced a long, harrowing and 
expensive cleanup process. 30 
minute warning.  Population at 
risk 5000. “…of the 103 
business owners within the 
zone of high flooding on July 
15, 1982, 62% of them have 
moved away or no longer are 
engaged in business.” (From 
the following link, now broken: 
www.estesnet.com/82flood/La
wn%20Lake%20Story%20p7.h
tm) Rocky Mt. News, 6/18/84 
“Fingers Still Pointing in Estes 
Park Flood” 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://www.reporterhera
ld.com/ci_21071062/19
82-flood-changed-
downtown-estes-park; 
https://www.nps.gov/ro
mo/planyourvisit/upload
/flood_2009.pdf; Jarrett 
and Costa, 1984; Dekay 
and McClelland, 1993; 
Wahl, 1998; 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
JOHNSON 
POND 
1982 CT earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
50,000 unknown 1 See other 1982 CT floods 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LEESVILLE 
DAM 
1982 CT concrete overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 1 See other 1982 CT floods 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Howard Dam 1982 ID earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
upstream 
dam failure 
2,100,00
0 
unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
HOLBROOK 
POND 
1982 CT unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
100,000 unknown 0 See other 1982 CT floods 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MILL POND 1982 CT 
earth 
masonry 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
100,000 unknown 0 See other 1982 CT floods 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
CRYSTAL 
LAKE 
1982 CT earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
5,000 unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Alexander 
Lake Dam 
1982 WA unknown unknown unknown  
Caused damage at fish 
hatchery and homes in 
Gorst 
0 
Spillway undermined and 
failed during heavy rains. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
DEER LAKE 1982 CT masonry overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 See other 1982 CT floods 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
GORTON 
POND 
1982 CT unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 See other 1982 CT floods 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Mud Lake 1982 CA earth breach 
wave action, 
erosion, 
settlement 
 unknown 0 
Breach, no evidence of 
overtopping. According to 
NPDP Ref No 1883, most 
likely cause of failure was 
erosion of the upstream slope 
and crest by wave action. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Another incident occurred at 
this dam in 1932. 
UPPER 
MILLPOND 
1982 CT 
earth 
masonry 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 See other 1982 CT floods 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
DMAD 1983 UT earth unknown unknown  unknown 1 1-12 hours notice. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
Dekay and McClelland 
1993 
BEAVER 
LAKE DAM 
1983 IL earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Condit 1983 WA 
concrete 
gravity 
piping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Failed by piping during heavy 
rain. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
INDIAN 
LAKE DAM 
1983 KY earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LAKEVIEW 
RESERVOIR 
DAM 
1983 MS earth unknown unknown  none 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Mallison Falls 1983 ME 
concrete 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Timber crib spillway section 
unraveled during flow over 
spillway. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BASS 
HAVEN 
LAKE DAM 
1984 TX earth 
poor 
maintenanc
e 
unknown  unknown 1 
While attempting to repair a 
low flow pipe, the owner cut 
the dam and water was allowed 
to flow through the cut. 
Erosion and a slide ensued, 
causing the dam to fail and 
resulting in one fatality. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Grettum 
Flowage 
1984 WI unknown unknown unknown 310,000 unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BALLARDS 
DAM 
1984 NY 
timber 
crib 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Top portion of embankment, 
and east control gate were 
washed out during a flood. 
Portion of concrete-capped 
timber crib spillway dam 
collapsed. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
IRELAND #5 1984 CO earth breach spillway  unknown 0 
Dam breached due to erosion 
under the spillway. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Kingsbury 1984 VT 
concrete 
gravity 
breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam failed during a flood 
event at approximately 5:30 
AM. It breached at the right 
abutment. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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MENNO 
DAM 
1984 SD earth foundation 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The combination of the 
saturated conditions inadequate 
freeboard and a steep 
downstream slope all 
contributed to the failure. After 
the incident it was reported that 
both spillways had been 
operating for several days 
before the failure and the 
embankment crest appeared to 
have settled some. The breach 
removed approximately the 
center one-third of the 
embankment and eroded well 
into the foundation. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Roxboro 
Municipal 
Lake Dam 
1984 NC earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Spillway slab had no 
underdrainage. The State had 
noted signs of piping and 
required the owners to have 
their engineers submit a repair 
plan months before the failure. 
The repair plan had been 
approved, but owners had not 
implemented the plan. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Columbia 
Diversion 
Dam 
1985 SC earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Cuero 1985 TX 
concrete 
gravity 
poor 
maintenanc
e 
unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Flowage Lake 
Dam 
1985 MI earth seepage unknown  unknown 0 
The engineer reported that the 
seepage rate was increasing 
with each visit, but that he 
never saw evidence of piping. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Johnny's 
Creek 
1985 AL unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 Hundreds evacuated 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Niagara 1985 VA 
concrete 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
 unknown 0 
Overtopping and erosion of 
embankment section. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
RICHARDET 
DAM 
1985 MO earth breach unknown  unknown 0 
The breach of the dam was 
caused by a slide scarp 
intercepting the water level in 
the lake. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
RIVERVIEW 
DAM 
1985 IL earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
The dam failed through the 
concrete overflow spillway 
during an annual runoff event. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Olinghouse 1985 NV earth unknown unknown  25,000 m3 released 0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
Upriver Dam 
Forebay 
1986 WA 
concrete 
gravity 
overtopping spillway 
11,000,0
00 
damage to facility 0 
Lightning struck the 
transmission line from the 
powerhouse. Loss of load 
caused wicket gate closure and 
immediate onset of increased 
pool levels. Power to the 
spillway gates could not be 
established and the dam 
overtopped. Lightning struck 
hydropower facility, turbines 
shut down. Water rose behind 
dam while trying to restart.  
Backup power systems failed, 
could not raise spillway gates 
in time 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
14 dams 
(Barryton, 
White Cloud, 
Hart Lake, 
Danaher Lake, 
Hesperia, 
Carson City, 
Childsdale, 
Cat Creek, 
Bruce 
Nordland) 
1986 MI unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
upstream 
dam failure 
 
Total flood damages: 
$227 million to homes, 
businesses, public 
property, roads, 
bridges and crops in 17 
of  22 counties 
between lakes 
Michigan and Huron. 
0 
Belding Dam is one that failed 
though it didn't occur until 
January. The investigating 
engineer stated that the failure 
was a delayed response to the 
flooding.  This was one of 
several dams that failed during 
this flood event 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Barryton Dam 1986 MI 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
This was one of eleven dams 
that failed during this flood 
event (see 14 dams - 1986 MI) 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
CEDAR 
LAKE 
1986 OK earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Danaher Lake 
Dam 
1986 MI 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
This was one of eleven dams 
that failed during this flood 
event (see 14 dams - 1986 MI) 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Hart Lake 1986 MI earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
This was one of eleven dams 
that failed during this flood 
event (see 14 dams - 1986 MI) 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Hesperia Dam 1986 MI earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
This was one of eleven dams 
that failed during this flood 
event (see 14 dams - 1986 MI) 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Luther Pond 
Dam 
1986 MI 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
This was one of eleven dams 
that failed during this flood 
event (see 14 dams - 1986 MI) 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Rainbow Lake 
Dam 
1986 MI earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
This was one of eleven dams 
that failed during this flood 
event (see 14 dams - 1986 MI) 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SCSUPPER 
RED ROCK 
CREEK 
SITE20 
1986 OK earth foundation erosion  unknown 0 
The dam failed by internal 
erosion through the 
embankment on or about 
October 3, 1986. The failure 
occurred along a path 
approximately 40 feet left of 
the principal spillway barrel. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SIMPSON 
DAM; 
ALVIN 
1986 ND earth breach 
hydrologic 
event, piping 
 unknown 0 
A partial breach of the 
embankment occurred along 
the low level drawdown pipe. 
The breach occurred following 
a short duration, high intensity 
storm which dumped from 2.75 
to 4.5 inches of rainfall in 
approximately a 2 hour period. 
Apparently, seepage and piping 
were also involved in the dam's 
failure. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
TRIAL LAKE 1986 UT earth piping seepage  unknown 0 
Evidence of overtopping from 
warm rain on snow and 
spillway clogged by snow. The 
dike apparently failed as a 
result of deterioration, 
seepage/piping, and 
overtopping. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
White Cloud 
Dam 
1986 MI 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
This was one of eleven dams 
that failed during this flood 
event (see 14 dams - 1986 MI) 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Tomkins Lake 1987 TN unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
30,000 unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Belding 1987 MI gravity unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Hatfield 1987 WI 
earth 
gravity 
unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Jay 1987 ME 
concrete 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Washout of 100 foot section 
due to flooding. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SCSLITTLE 
WASHITA 
RIVER 
SITE13 
1987 OK earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Montcoal 
No.7 
1987 WV earth unknown unknown  
87,000 cubic meters of 
water and slurry 
released 
0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
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BOG BROOK 1988 WI unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, animal 
100,000 unknown 0 
Beavers plugged the principal 
outlet, working and washing 
out the emergency spillway. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BISCHEL 1988 WI unknown unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MARSCHKE 
LAKE DAM 
1988 MO earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
QUAIL 
CREEK 
1988 UT earth piping seepage  unknown 0 
Discolored water was observed 
flowing around an observation 
pipe. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Wallace Lake 
Dam 
1988 NC earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
WEST DAM 
AT 
POTSDAM 
1988 NY gravity unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Tennessee 
Consolidated 
No.1 
1988 TN earth unknown unknown  
250,000 m3 tailings 
released 
0 
dam wall failure from internal 
erosion, caused from failure of 
an abandoned outlet pipe 
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
Riverview 1988 FL earth unknown unknown  
acid spill, Thousands 
of fish killed at mouth 
of Alafia River. 
0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
Evans and 
Lockwood 
Dams 
1989 NC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
10,000,0
00 
children died 2  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://www.judicial.stat
e.sc.us/opinions/display
Opinion.cfm?caseNo=2
4732; 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Quail Creek 1989 UT unknown foundation 
piping, poor 
construction 
12,000,0
00 
$12 million in 
damages 
0 
3/7/89 report to Gov. Bangerter 
concluded that failure cause 
was the lack of seepage 
protection of materials placed 
on the foundation. 
Design assumption that 
foundation had very low 
permeability was incorrect and 
remedial grouting may have 
aggravated the problem of 
seepage water against 
unprotected foundation 
materials. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Lake 
Spaulding No. 
3 Auxiliary 
1989 CA 
concrete 
arch 
unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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NIX LAKE 
DAM 
1989 TX earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
A resident adjacent to the dam 
reported strong winds and 
noise that sounded like a 
tornado 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Point A 1989 AL 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping spillway  unknown 0 
 
Serious leak developed past 
spillway sluice gate. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Stancil 1989 MD earth unknown unknown  
38,000 m3 tailings 
released 
0 
dam failure during capping of 
the tailings after heavy rain 
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
Kendall Lake 
Dam 
1990 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 3 children 4 
USACE inspected the dam in 
1979 and found it to be unsafe. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Chinook 
Water District 
Dam 
1990 WA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
100,000 unknown 0 
During heavy rains on 
Thanksgiving weekend, a flood 
occurred that exceeded the 
capacity of the project's 
customized spillway. The 
embankment was overtopped 
and the spillway was 
undermined leading to the 
failure of the dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Beaver Pond 1990 VT earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam was overtopped and 
failed during a flood event. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BREWER 
GOLD 
COMPANY 
DAM 1 
1990 SC 
earth 
other fill 
unknown unknown  
Failure of this tailings 
dam introduced 
cyanide and heavy 
metals into the 
Lynches River, which 
seriously damaged the 
aquatic life of the 
river. 
0 
Failure of this tailings dam 
introduced cyanide and heavy 
metals into the Lynches River, 
which seriously damaged the 
aquatic life of the river. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
C. D. Clark 
Dam 
1990 AL unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 
Washed out 50 yards 
of northbound U.S. 
Highway 29 
0 
Lake Tholocco, a 600-acre lake 
on the Fort Rucker reservation  
near Ozark, was also drained 
because of excessive flow 
through its emergency spillway 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Chinook dam 1990 WA unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 ~$100K damage to 
facility 
0 
Heavy rains overtopped 
embankment & undermined 
spillway, leading to failure. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
HESTER 
LAKE DAM 
1990 MO earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Holly Brooke 
Lake Dam 
1990 AL unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 6 families evacuated 0 
Water level on the 55-acre 
pond impounded by the dam 
was lowered 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Kingsbury 1990 VT 
concrete 
gravity 
breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 damaged road and 
power house 
0 
The dam failed during a flood 
event for the second time in six 
years. The dam failed in the 
early AM hours on June 5, 
1990. It breached at the right 
abutment, washing out a town 
road and damaging a power 
house. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LAKE 
CARROLL 
SEDIMENTA
TION POND 
2 DAM 
1990 IL earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The incident was caused by a 
rainfall/flooding event. Four 
inches of rain fell. The breach 
occurred at the same place that 
was overtopped in March 1990. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lake Lonnie 
Dam 
1990 GA unknown unknown unknown  
swept away cars and 
moved several mobile 
homes off their 
foundations (young 
girl swept under 
floodwaters; rescued 
by her Mother) 
0 
21.6’ height, est. 67AF storage 
capacity. Midnight failure 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Landrum Lake 
Dam 
1990 NC earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 road washed out and 
trailer 
0 
The failure appears to be due to 
structural causes during a 
heavy rainfall. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LELAND 1990 WI earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, breach 
 unknown 0 
The dam failed following a six-
inch rain event. The dam was 
overtopped and breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Magnolia 
Shores Lake 
dam 
1990 AL unknown 
controlled 
breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
To prevent a break in the dam, 
a channel was dug around the 
dam to lower the water and the 
lake was then drained by a 
controlled breach of the dam. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Niagara 1990 VA 
concrete 
gravity 
unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Failure of wooden timbers 
covering upstream end of 
closure opening through base 
of dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
TIMPERLEY 
WILDLIFE 
DAM 
1990 NE earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Seminary Hill 
Reservoir 
1991 WA unknown foundation unknown 
3,000,00
0 
2  homes destroyed, 
many homes damaged, 
$3 million in damage. 
0 
Failure along weak rock zone 
in hillside caused massive slide 
that breached reservoir.  3 M 
gallons of water released in 3 
minutes.  No warning. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; Dekay 
and McClelland 1993 
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HESTER 
LAKE DAM 
1991 MO earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
KISATCHIE 
LAKE DAM 
1991 LA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Dam failed after heavy rains. 
Breached at concrete spillway 
structure. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LAKE 
CENTER 
DAM 
1991 TX earth unknown unknown  minor damage 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BILK CREEK 
RESERVOIR 
1992 NV earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 damage to farm and 
ranch land 
0 
Unusual amounts of 
precipitation and runoff led to 
the failure. No damage to the 
embankment itself; however, 
the spillway bed was semi-
consolidated sandstone and 
began head cutting and cut 
back into the reservoir. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LA BLONDE 1992 WI earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Debris plugged the principal 
outlet, working and washing 
out emergency spillway. The 
dam washed out in the area of 
the emergency spillway. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
WYOMING 
HEREFORD 
RANCH NO. 
2 
1992 WY earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
ISP 
MINERALS 
DAM 
1992 MO 
earth 
other fill 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, poor 
maintenance 
 
The erosion feature on 
the waste pile was 
approximately 55 feet 
high, 50 feet wide at 
the top, and 20 feet 
wide at the base. It is 
estimated that 6000 to 
8000 tons of material 
eroded from the pile. 
Approximately half of 
the material was 
transported to Big 
Creek. 
0 
The pipe between the second 
and third settling ponds 
became clogged during the 
night of 6/3-4/92. Water was 
entering the pond at the rate of 
400 gallons per minute. The 
water filled the pond and 
overtopped the berm on the 
north side of the waste pile and 
flowed down the 50 to 60 foot 
high slope. The water and 
waste material was temporarily 
stored behind a rock dike 
between the pile and Big 
Creek. Eventually, the water 
overtopped the dike and flowed 
into Big Creek. Rainfall may 
have contributed to the failure, 
but ISP's operational procedure 
was the primary cause. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Iowa Beef 
Processors 
Waste Pond 
No.1 
1993 WA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
5,000,00
0 
releasing 300 acre-feet 
of wastewater 
0 
Melting of record snowpack 
filled the animal waste pond 
and overtopped the earthen 
embankment. The lack of an 
emergency spillway combined 
with large numbers of animal 
burrows were also factors in 
the breaching of the dam. 
Failure of 15-ft high 
embankment releasing 300 
acre-feet of 
wastewater.attributed to heavy 
snowmelt entering animal 
burrows near embankment 
crest, and eroding dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
BRIGGSVIL
LE 
1993 WI earth 
poor 
constructio
n 
unknown 300,000 unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
ROCK 1993 WI earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, breach 
250,000 road damage 0 
A flood overtopped the dam 
and a roadway downstream. 
The dam was breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
CAMBRIA 1993 WI 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, gate 
200,000 unknown 0 
The dam failed as a result of a 
failure to operate the gates 
during a flood. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Annapolis 
Mall SWM 
Pond 
1993 MD earth piping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
The dam failed during a storm 
event. Complete failure of the 
dam was likely due to piping of 
embankment fill from along 
the large corrugated steel pipe 
spillway conduit. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Bean Blossom 
Lake 
1993 IN earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Earthen dam failed under the 
pressure of heavy rains. Water 
from the 17-acre lake flowed 
over Anderson Road and 
forced one man to leave his 
home. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Bend Hydro 
(MirrorPond) 
1993 OR other unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BOCKELMA
N LAKE 
DAM 
1993 MO earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 property damage 0 
The embankment was 
completely breached, and the 
creek was flowing through the 
structure. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
FAIRCHILD 1993 WI gravity overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
A minor flood caused the 
embankment to be overtopped. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
FREDDIES 
LAKE DAM 
1993 MO earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
 254 
Hatfield 1993 WI 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Heavy rains on Friday, June 18 
and Saturday, June 19 caused 
significant flooding on the 
Black River on Sunday, June 
20, 1993. This was a one 
hundred plus year flood event. 
Late Sunday morning, a 
portion of the embankment on 
the power canal between 
Hatfield and Black River Falls 
failed. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
PARTRIDGE 
LAKE 
1993 WI earth 
poor 
constructio
n 
unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Stanislaus 
Forebay West 
1993 CA 
earth 
rockfill 
unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
STEVENS 
LAKE DAM 
1993 MO earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam overtopped and 
completely failed, draining the 
lake in approximately one hour 
and forty minutes. When the 
dam failed, there was 11.5 
inches of precipitation within 
the previous 18 hours. The rain 
had finally ceased 2 hours 
before the dam failed. At the 
time of the failure, the 
upstream end of the lake was 
receiving water that was 
flowing overland at depths to 8 
feet. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Treasure Lake 1993 KY unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 
residents of 5 houses 
stranded; large 
sections of 2 roads, 
underground phone 
lines, trees washed out 
0 
32’-high dam, 15-acre lake 
30’ x 10’ section collapsed  
(Hassert, Ky Post, 1/07) 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
WEST FORK 
OF BIG 
CREEK C1 
DAM 
1993 MO earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The embankment overtopped 
and failed sometime during 
January 3-4, 1993. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Gibsonton 1993 FL earth unknown unknown  
Fish killed when acidic 
water spilled into 
Archie Creek 
0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
ARROWHEA
D LAKE 
1994 PA earth 
poor 
constructio
n 
unknown 325,000 unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
ABLE 
ACRES 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam breached as a result 
of heavy rains and flooding. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
 255 
ANDREWS 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA unknown breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam breached as a result 
of heavy rains and flooding. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BARNESVIL
LE 
RESERVIOR 
DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam breached as a result 
of heavy rains and flooding. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BROWNS 
MILLPOND 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam breached as a result 
of heavy rains and flooding. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Buck 1994 VA 
concrete 
gravity 
unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
CADE LAKE 
NUMBER 3 
DAM 
1994 TX earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
CARDINAL 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA unknown unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
CLOUD 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam breached as a result 
of heavy rains and flooding. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
COFFIN 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam breached as a result 
of heavy rains and flooding. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Crisp County 
(Warwick) 
1994 GA 
earth 
gravity 
breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam breached as a result 
of heavy rains and flooding. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
ELEVA 
ROLLER 
MILL 
1994 WI gravity piping 
biological 
growth 
 unknown 0 
Massive tree stump roots 
caused piping failure. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
ESPERANZA 
FARMS 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam breached as a result 
of heavy rains and flooding. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Faraday 
Diversion 
1994 OR 
concrete 
gravity 
unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
FISHPOND 1994 PA earth breach spillway  unknown 0 
The dam breached as a result 
of heavy rains and flooding. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
FLAT 
CREEK 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach spillway  unknown 0 
The dam breached as a result 
of heavy rains and flooding. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Flint River 1994 GA 
earth 
gravity 
unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
GARANT 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam breached as a result 
of heavy rains and flooding. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
GOMULAK 
AND 
PROFITT 
1994 WI earth breach 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
A flood caused full breach at 
emergency spillway. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
GOOSE 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
HARPER 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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HOLOKA 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
HORSEHEA
D CREEK 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
HORTMANS 
POND DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
HOUSTON 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA 
earth 
gravity 
breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
KENNEDY 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
KERSEY 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Ladysmith 1994 WI 
timber 
crib 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, breach 
 unknown 0 
The abutment (and 
embankment) breached due to 
an extreme flood (greater than 
100 year) event that caused 
overtopping and erosion. 
Rainfall in the area was 
between 10 and 17 inches. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LAKE 
CLOPINE 
DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LAKE 
TINKLE 
DAM 
1994 TX earth unknown unknown  none 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LAKE 
YOHOLA 
DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LIES LAKE 
DAM 
1994 GA unknown breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LOCH 
HIGHLAND 
LAKE 
(LOWER) 
1994 GA earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LUCY GILES 
DAM 
1994 GA unknown breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MCGILL 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MCKEMIE 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MCKEMIE 
LAKE 
NORTH 
DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MCKNIGHT 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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MERRITT 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Morris 
Sheppard 
1994 TX 
other 
buttress 
unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MOSSY 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Muckafoonee 
Creek Dam 
1994 GA 
earth 
gravity 
breach 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MULKEY 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
PACE LAKE 
DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
PACE LAKE 
DAM SOUTH 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
PHILLIPS 
POND DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
REEVES 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SAXEGOTH
A 
MILLPOND 
DAM 
1994 SC unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, gate 
 unknown 0 
The owner of the dam (new 
owner since last inspection) 
was apparently unaware that he 
needed to open the dam's gates 
to pass floodwaters. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SCNONAME 
32028 
1994 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
upstream 
dam failure 
 unknown 0 
Approximately 5.5 inches of 
rain fell in the dam's 
watershed. Two upstream dams 
failed in succession early in the 
morning on 6/28/94. Flood 
waters from those failures 
overtopped and failed Lake 
Pauline Dam at approximately 
5:30 AM on June 28, 1994. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SHELLHOUS
E LAKE 
DAM 
1994 GA unknown breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Sherry Lake 
Dam 
1994 WA 
timber 
crib 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Timber crib dam failed due to 
overtopping. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SHIPP LAKE 
DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SILBERMAN 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
STATHAM 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
THARPE 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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WHATLEY 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
WHITEWAT
ER CREEK 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
WILKINSON 
LAKE DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
WOLHWEN
DER LAKE 
DAM 
1994 GA unknown breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
YARA LAKE 
DAM 
1994 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Dam breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Hopewell 
Mine 
1994 FL earth unknown unknown  
Nearly 1.9 million m3 
of water from a clay 
settling pond 
0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
Payne Creek 
Mine 
1994 FL earth unknown unknown  
6.8 million m3 of 
water from a clay 
settling pond 
0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
Fort Meade 1994 FL earth unknown unknown  
76,000 m3 of water 
released 
0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
IMC-Agrico 1994 FL earth unknown unknown  
Release of gypsum and 
water into groundwater 
0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
Timberlake 
Dam 
1995 VA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 2  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
APPERT 
LAKE DAM 
1995 ND earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
seepage 
 unknown 0 
A series of rains preceded a 
one-half inch rain on Saturday, 
July 15, 1995. These rains kept 
the dam near full and allowed 
seepage to soften the 
embankment. The rain on July 
15 was enough so that the 
embankment was finally 
overtopped near its lowest 
point, the tallest area of the 
embankment, and it gave way. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Barnes Dam 1995 MI earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The owner of the dam reported 
an intense flood of 11 inches of 
rain in 5 hours (1% chance, 24 
hour rainfall [design storm] is 
approximately 4.8 inches). The 
dam failed as a result. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BOYD 
RESERVOIR 
1995 NV earth piping 
hydrologic 
event, breach 
 unknown 0 
Failure as a result of piping 
through the earthen 
embankment. Apparently, rain 
on snow pack caused the 
stream inflow to increase to the 
point where the dam was 
breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
EUREKA 
HOLDING 
POND DIKE 
1995 MT earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
On the night of June 8, 1995, 
with the storage pond at a level 
of approximately one foot 
above the normal high water 
elevation, a significant 
thunderstorm event was 
experienced in the Eureka area. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Folsom Dam 
Gate Failure 
1995 CA unknown unknown unknown  
Minor damage to dam 
& spillway 
0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
FRENCHMA
N CREEK 
1995 CO earth piping spillway  unknown 0 
The spillway foundation failed 
due to piping. A sinkhole also 
developed in the right 
abutment. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
HAZEL 
LAKE 
1995 WI earth 
poor 
constructio
n 
unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LAKE GARY 
DAM 
1995 MS earth spillway 
upstream 
dam failure 
 unknown 0 
Flows from the upper lake 
caused a spillway failure of the 
lower lake. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lake Lynn 
Dam 
1995 NC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam failed during heavy 
rains on June 19, 1995. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LAKEWOOD 
VILLAGES 
DAM 
1995 MS earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Moose Lodge 
Dam 
1995 NC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
This dam failed as a result of 
heavy rains on June 19, 1995. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MOUNT 
MORRIS 
1995 WI 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
13 inches of rain had fallen on 
the Wautoma area, including 
Mt. Morris. The area 
experienced persistent rains 
over a two week period. The 
dam was drawn down about 1 
1/2 feet prior to the event. The 
dam was undergoing 
reconstruction at the time of 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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the incident. The cofferdam 
was in use. 
Oceanview 
Farms Waste 
Lagoon 
1995 NC unknown unknown unknown  
22-25 million gallons 
of hog waste spilled 
into tributaries of New 
River; millions of fish 
killed; coastal wetland 
contaminated & closed 
to shell-fishing 
0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Timber Lake 
Dam 
1995 VA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, breach 
 unknown 0 
The dam breached due to 
overtopping during the 
evening/night of June 22, 1995. 
Heavy rains were reported as 
high as 13 inches. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
TROY 1995 ID earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Walker Mill 1995 TN earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Ware Shoals 1995 SC gravity unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Wolcott Pond 1995 VT earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam failed during a flood 
event. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Meadow Pond 
(or Bergeron 
Pond) Dam 
1996 NH concrete unknown unknown 
8,000,00
0 
unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
AURORA 
WEST DAM 
1996 IL gravity overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
This is one of many dams that 
were affected by the 1996 
flood event/record rainstorm. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Boeing Creek 
North 
Stormwater 
Pond 
1996 WA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Three heavy snowfalls 
followed by heavy rain and 
warming temperatures caused 
the failure of utilities at NW 
175th and 6th NW, resulting in 
a collapse of the intersection. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BROOKVILL
E 
WATERWOR
KS 
1996 PA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, breach 
 unknown 0 
Embankment erosion and 
breach of dam caused by four 
feet of overtopping during area 
wide flooding. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Bruceton 
Mills Dam 
1996 WV 
concrete 
masonry 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam was completely 
overtopped during a snowmelt 
event. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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CANYON 
LAKE 
1996 MT earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam was overtopped 
during snow melt from the 
mountains. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
CASA 
MONTE 
DAM 
1996 TX unknown breach 
hydrologic 
event, 
undermining 
 unknown 0 
Breach of dam due to a 
combination of overtopping 
and undermining during flood 
conditions. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
CRANBERR
Y CREEK 
1996 WI earth piping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Apparent piping failure at 
CMP outlet during high flows 
due to snowpack melt and 
rains. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Highland 
Lake Dam 
1996 ME concrete overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam failed in conjunction 
with a 20 inch rain event. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MALLARD 
LAKE 
1996 TN earth piping animal  unknown 0 
The dam was covered in 
kudzu, which initially made it 
difficult to determine the exact 
cause of failure. The failure is 
believed to be due to piping 
from animal activity under the 
kudzu or instability, or a 
combination of both. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Nine Mile 1996 WA 
concrete 
gravity 
unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
ROBERTS 
TANK DAM 
1996 TX earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam failed during a 2-inch 
rainfall event. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
VERNON 
MARSHREF.
FLOWAGE 
1996 WI earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
10 dams, 
including 
Charmaine, 
Galahad, 
Tristan, 
Urland 
1997 TX unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
35 dams have failed in TX in 
the past 10 years. In the past 
year, 10 dams collapsed near 
Woodville, 2 failed in the 
Nueces River watershed. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
East Head 
Pond Dam 
1997 MA 
earth 
gravity 
poor 
maintenanc
e 
piping  unknown 0 
The dam failed, apparently due 
to deterioration, seepage, or 
piping. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
FORSYTH 
RESERVOIR 
1997 GA earth breach 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
During heavy rains, the 
reservoir refilled and the 
concrete shell spillway 
activated. The shell was 
undermined and collapsed. 
This was a partial breach of the 
dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Hamilton 
Dam 
1997 MI 
earth 
gravity 
breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Precipitation estimates of 5 to 8 
inches of rain in 5 hours over 
the basin. The right abutment 
breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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HOLLAND 
DAM SITE A 
1997 TX 
other 
buttress 
poor 
maintenanc
e 
unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
JOHNSON 
CREEK # 4 
1997 TN earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LAKE 
VENITA 
DAM 
1997 MO earth piping breach  unknown 0 
The breach grew in size over 
the next hour and the majority 
of the water in the lake had 
drained out by the end of the 
day. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lava Cap 
Mine tailings 
dam 
1997 CA unknown overtopping 
spillway, 
debris 
 
Failure released  
10,000 y3 of arsenic-
tainted tailings into 
Little Clipper Creek & 
Lost Lake 
0 
Failure released  10,000 y3 of 
arsenic-tainted tailings into 
Little Clipper Creek & Lost 
Lake 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Moss Mill 
Lake Dam 
1997 NJ 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Significant rain fell over parts 
of Cape May and Atlantic 
Counties with a maximum 
recorded rainfall of 13.52 
inches at the Atlantic City 
Airport. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SCNONAME 
02021 
1997 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
upstream 
dam failure 
 unknown 0 
The riser on a dam upstream 
(Edisto Lake Dam; SC00361) 
unexpectedly failed and 
released all of its impounded 
water through the barrel. The 
released water caused the 
overtopping and breaching of 
another dam (Brown's Pond 
Dam; SC00377). Water from 
both dams then traveled 
downstream and caused 
overtopping and breaching of 
dam this dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
SCNONAME 
02109 
1997 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
upstream 
dam failure 
 unknown 0 
The riser on a dam 
immediately upstream (Edisto 
Lake Dam; SC00361) 
unexpectedly collapsed and 
released all its impounded 
water through the barrel. The 
released water caused the 
overtopping and breaching of 
this dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Udall 1997 AZ earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Wishkah 
Reservoir No. 
2 Dam 
1997 WA 
timber 
crib 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, piping 
 unknown 0 
Failed during a record rainfall 
event. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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WOODRUFF 
(BREACHED 
1997) 
1997 SD earth breach 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Spring flooding due to record 
snowfall resulted in the breach 
of the dam through the primary 
spillway. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Mulberry 
Phosphate 
1997 FL earth unknown unknown  
200,000 m3 of 
phosphogypsum 
process water released, 
biota in the Alafia 
River eliminated. 
0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
Pinto Valley 1997 AZ earth unknown unknown  
230,000 m3 of tailings 
and mine rock 
released. 
0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
California 
Jim’s Pond 
dam 
1998 RI unknown unknown unknown 650,000 
Roads washed away, 
village flooded; ~ 
$250,000 to rebuild 
dam;  ~ $400,000 
damages – incl. 
$325,000 to town 
property 
0 
Failure prompted development 
of the statewide regulations 
effected 12/07. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
ARCHUSA 
CREEK 
WATER 
PARK LAKE 
DAM 
1998 MS earth breach 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Flows through the emergency 
spillway during a heavy rain 
event caused the spillway to 
erode. Headcutting in the 
emergency spillway eroded 
back through the spillway and 
the dam, resulting in a dam 
breach and complete draining 
of the lake. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BIG SANDY 
PLANTATIO
N, INC. 
LAKE DAM 
1998 GA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, poor 
maintenance 
 unknown 0 
A heavy micro rain event 
coupled with the lack of 
maintenance (deteriorated 
condition of the dam) led to the 
failure of the dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
CAMP 
WEONA 
DAM 
1998 NY earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
A short duration, high intensity 
storm caused the dam to be 
overtopped, resulting in a full 
depth breach. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
CARL 
SMITH 
1998 CO earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Gouldtown 
Mill 5 West 
Channel 
1998 NY 
concrete 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Built-up ice was released and 
went over a retaining wall at 
the West Dam and through the 
concrete block east and west 
walls of the powerhouse. 
Heavy, state wide rains 
occurred. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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HEMATITE 
LAKE DAM 
1998 KY earth piping breach  unknown 0 
The failure is believed to be 
due to piping. The dam was 
breached, with damage only to 
the earthen dam itself. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
JAN LAND 
COMPANY 
LAKE NO 1 
DAM 
1998 TX earth breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Reportedly, the dam breached 
during an October 1998 
regional flood event. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lake 
Runnemede 
1998 VT earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LITTLE 
OCMULGEE 
LAKE DAM 
1998 GA concrete overtopping foundation  unknown 0 
The dam overtopped over its 
entire length. It failed at the left 
abutment. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
NEW SHOAL 
CREEK 
1998 TN earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam was overtopped and 
subsequently failed due to 
heavy rains on July 13, 1998. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
PEACE 
DALE POND 
1998 RI 
earth 
rockfill 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
This earthen dam failed as a 
result of heavy rains (three 
inches in three hours). 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Ramseur 1998 NC masonry overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The owner of the dam 
indicated that the dam was 
overtopped with about 6 feet of 
flood water prior to the failure 
of about 60 feet of the left end 
of the dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Sunset Lake 1998 VT 
earth 
masonry 
unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Talcville 1998 NY 
concrete 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 none 0 
A combined ice storm and high 
flood event on the Oswegatchie 
River after heavy continuous 
rainfall with mild temperatures 
resulted in river flows washing 
out the left and right dam 
abutments of this project. 
Reservoir status: Overtopped 
riverbank elevation above 
633.0 feet. Ice laden high river 
flows caused erosion of the 
immediate left and right dam 
abutments. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Allens Mill 
Dam 
1999 VA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Bostwicks 
Pond Dam 
1999 NJ 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Cabin Creek 
Mill Dam 
1999 MD unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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CHRISTIANS
EN LAKE 
DAM 
1999 MO earth 
poor 
maintenanc
e 
unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
COVEY 
DAM 
(BREACHED 
05/09/99) 
1999 SD earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Covey dam overtopped and 
failed during a thunderstorm on 
May 9, 1999. The reports vary, 
but up to 7 inches of rain was 
reported in the immediate area. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Cow Creek 
Dam 
1999 VA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Dubose Lake 
Dam 
1999 NC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Essex Mill 
Dam 
1999 VA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Foreman 
Branch Dam 
1999 MD earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Frazers Dam 1999 MD earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Haines Pond 
Dam 
1999 VA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Hall Lake 
Dam 
1999 NC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
High Falls 1999 NY 
concrete 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
It was reported that the Deer 
River area sustained a heavy 
rainstorm over the weekend of 
November 27 and 28, 1999, 
resulting in a flash flood at the 
project site. Flows were 
passing over the top of the 
spillway during the 
Thanksgiving weekend. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Jones Lake 
Dam 
1999 MD earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Kellys Pond 
Dam 
1999 NC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lake Bray 
Dam 
1999 MA 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lake Lanahan 1999 MD earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lake Powell 
Dam 
1999 VA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lookover 
Lake Dam 
1999 NJ 
earth 
gravity 
unknown unknown  unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Lower 
Rosegill Lake 
Dam 
1999 VA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Murphy 
Family Farms 
Hog Waste 
Lagoon 
1999 NC unknown piping 
seepage, 
poor 
maintenance 
 
1.5 million gallons of 
hog waste spilled into 
wetlands and a 
tributary to the Cape 
Fear River. 
0 
Owner fined $40,650 for 
breach.  Excessive seepage, 
site left unattended while 
transfer pumps running 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Nagels Mill 
Pond 
1999 MD earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, piping 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Old Forge 
Pond Dam 
1999 VA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
PITTSFIELD 
DREDGE 
DISPOSAL 
POND DAM 
1999 IL earth piping seepage  unknown 0 
The dam failed along a conduit 
placed in a foundation trench. 
The failure and dewatering 
apparently occurred in less 
than two hours. The failure was 
due to seepage/piping. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
POST LAKE 
DAM 
1999 SD earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Post Lake Dam overtopped and 
failed on September 3, 1999, 
when the area received 7 to 10 
inches of rain. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Quaker Mills 
dam 
1999 IA unknown unknown unknown  
About 200 people 
evacuated from 
Manchester 
0 
Private dam impounding 62-
acre lake did not fail. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Riley Mill 
Pond 
1999 MD earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Rolling Green 
Community 
Pond 
1999 MD unknown overtopping spillway  unknown 0 
Corrugated metal pipe spillway 
collapsed and caused partial 
release of reservoir. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Rosegill 
Upper Dam 
1999 VA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Sassafras Mill 
Dam 
1999 MD earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Sydnors 
Millpond Dam 
1999 VA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
TIMPERLEY 
WILDLIFE 
DAM 
1999 NE earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Town Bridge 
Pond Dam 
1999 VA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Tuckahoe 
State Park 
Dam 
1999 MD earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Hurricane Floyd 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Volga dam 1999 IA unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 Littleport, Iowa 
inundated when 
0 
Source: “Residents of town 
destroyed by flood three years 
ago revisit” AP 5/20/2002 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
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upstream dam at Volga 
broke during the night. 
Winkler Lake 
Dam Lower 
1999 NC earth seepage spillway  unknown 0 
The dam failed at 3:00am on 
April 20, 1999 due to seepage 
along the outlet pipe. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
GRAND 
FORKS CO. 
COM. #1 
2000 ND earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 2 
A large rainfall event started on 
June 12, 2000 in northeast 
North Dakota. Some areas of 
Grand Forks County received 
over 12 inches of rain in 24 
hours. The flood upstream of 
this dam was likely greater 
than a 100-year flood. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
ASCALMOR
E 
STRUCTURE 
Y17A11 
DAM 
2000 MS earth unknown unknown  unknown 0 Beavers 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
CAMP LA 
JUNTA DAM 
2000 TX 
concrete 
gravity 
breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam breached due to the 
heavy rains on October 23, 
2000. The middle third was 
washed out completely. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
LAKE PARK 
DAM 
2000 MS earth piping 
biological 
growth 
 unknown 0 
The dam was in an overall poor 
condition due to vegetation and 
animal activity. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Massey 
Energy coal 
waste 
impoundment 
t 
2000 KY unknown unknown unknown  
>300 M gals of slurry 
released into the Big 
Sandy and Ohio rivers. 
0 collapsed into mineshaft 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
MOSS 
CREEK 
LAKE DAM 
2000 TX earth breach 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Spillway and levee damage due 
to the March 22-23, 2000 flood 
event. Not sure if the dam 
breached. Deterioration and 
seepage/piping also involved. 
Area rainfall on March 22 and 
23, 2000: 5 to 6+ inches. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
MOUNTAIN 
LAKE DAM 
2000 NH earth 
poor 
constructio
n 
unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
POWELL 
LAKE DAM 
2000 TX earth breach 
hydrologic 
event, piping 
 unknown 0 
The dam breached due to the 
March 22-23 flood event. 
Deterioration and 
seepage/piping also involved. 
Area rainfall on March 22 and 
23, 2000: 5 to 6+ inches. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Seneca Lake 
Dam 
2000 NJ 
earth 
gravity 
breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
A total of four dams 
completely failed as a result of 
the ensuing floods. The dam 
was inspected on August 14, 
2000, following the flood 
event. A complete failure of 
the earthen embankment. There 
was a 50 foot wide breach 
directly over the location of the 
low level outlet. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Tomahawk 
Lake Dam 
2000 NJ 
earth 
gravity 
breach 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
 unknown 0 
A total of four dams 
completely failed as a result of 
the ensuing floods. The dam 
was inspected on August 14, 
2000, following the flood 
event. A complete failure of 
the earthen dam's embankment. 
There was an approximate 30 
foot wide breach adjacent to 
the low level outlet pipe. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Inez 2000 KY earth unknown unknown  
250 million gallons 
(950,000 m3) of coal 
waste slurry released 
into local streams, 
About 75 miles (120 
km) of rivers and 
streams turned an 
iridescent black, 
causing a fish kill 
along the Tug Fork of 
the Big Sandy River 
and some of its 
tributaries. Towns 
along the Tug were 
forced to turn off their 
drinking water intakes. 
0 
tailings dam failure from 
collapse of an underground 
mine beneath the slurry 
impoundment 
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
Hearns Pond 
Dam 
2001 DE unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
500,000 
$500,000.  60-acre 
impoundment drained, 
washout of U.S. 13A 
near Seaford, 
Delaware. 
0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
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MARSH 
LAKE DAM 
2001 MN 
concrete 
earth 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, ice 
400,000 
emergency repair 
estimated at $400,000 
plus costs of 
contingency actions at 
two urban locations 
downstream (amount 
unknown) 
0 
Winds estimated at 50 mph 
pushed reservoir ice sheets into 
dam during high water event, 
causing loss of embankment 
material. Ice push followed by 
erosion from large waves 
overtopping the embankment. 
Short terms costs consisted of 
emergency repair estimated at 
$400,000 plus costs of 
contingency actions at two 
urban locations downstream 
(amount unknown). 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
FRANCIS 
GALLOWAY 
LAKE DAM 
2001 MS earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Mill Pond 
Dam 
2001 MA earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, ice 
 none 0 
Winds estimated at 50 mph 
pushed reservoir ice sheets into 
dam during high water event, 
causing loss of embankment 
material. Ice push followed by 
erosion from large waves 
overtopping the embankment. 
The earthen embankment 
eroded sufficiently for the 
reservoir to overtop the 
embankment in several 
locations. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
PRITCHARD 
LAKE DAM 
2001 GA earth overtopping spillway  unknown 0 
The principal spillway pipe 
separated at a joint, causing the 
pipe and a large chunk of the 
center downstream slope and 
crest to slide, fall, and wash 
away. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Windy Hills 
Lake dam 
2002 MS unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 1 
*3/03: Man died after driving 
around a barricade placed 
around a washout from the 
failure. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Chatmoss 
Country Club 
dam 
2002 VA unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
10,000 
$10,000 spent on 
emergency repairs 
0 
Notch cut in dam to prevent 
failure. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
BIG SAND 
WATERSHE
D 
STRUCTURE 
Y3232 DAM 
2002 MS earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
DIXIE 
SPRINGS 
2002 MS earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
The dam failed due to 
overtopping during a major 
storm event. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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REFUGE 
LAKE DAM 
EAST 
MISSISSIPPI 
STATE 
HOSPITAL 
LAKE DAM 
2002 MS earth 
poor 
maintenanc
e 
unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Pine Lake 
Dam 
2002 GA unknown unknown unknown  
1 family evacuated; 8 
other homeowners put 
on evacuation alert 
0 
Near failure of 35-foot earthen 
dam impounding 15-acre Pine 
Lake. Dam's ownership 
unclear, county sought repair 
estimate in 2001; balked at 
$885,000 quote. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
ROYAL 
OAKS DAM 
2002 MS earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Smith River 
Log Pond #2 
2002 OR earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Tomkins Lake 2002 TN unknown overtopping spillway  unknown 0 
The cause of the overtopping 
was due to inadequate spillway 
capacity after a timber 
company constructed a logging 
road over the spillway channel 
to have access to the area. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
WINDY 
HILL 
LOWER 
LAKE DAM 
2002 MS earth spillway 
hydrologic 
event, poor 
maintenance 
 unknown 0 
Concrete chute emergency 
spillway with riser & conduit 
primary. Conduit was located 
under the concrete chute of the 
emergency spillway. Both 
failed during a major rain 
event. Both were in poor 
condition prior to failure. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Silver Lake 
Dike 1 
2003 MI 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
102,000,
000 
$102 M, incl $127,000 
in emergency/ public 
safety, 
$3 M in roads/ bridges, 
$10.4 M in utilities, $4 
M fisheries, soils & 
trees & 
$84 M in economic 
loss 
0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Hope Mills 
Dam #1 
2003 NC 
concrete 
gravity 
cracking 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
2,100,00
0 
est. $2.1 M damages; 
1600 evacuated; 
estimated cost of 
rebuilding dam: $6M 
0 
The dam failed following a 
rainfall of 6 to 8 inches in the 
area. Much of the rain fell 
within a 3 hour period. Prior to 
its failure, the dam was 
scheduled to have minor repair 
work done on cracks and areas 
of erosion. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
 271 
Lake 
Upchurch and 
McLaughlin 
Lake Dams 
2003 NC unknown unknown unknown 350,000 
Lake Upchurch dam 
reconstruction costs 
estimated at more than 
$350,000. 
0 
4 additional dams damaged; 
another 16 overtopped during 
rainfall event (4-6” in less than 
24 hrs) 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Rumph's Pond 
dam 
2003 SC unknown unknown unknown 144,000 
Minimal: $400-$500 
estimated damage to 
Norfolk Southern 
Railway property; 
about $144,000 in 
damages to the dam 
and a nearby cornfield 
(unofficial est.) 
0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
LAKE 
FOREST 
DAM 
2003 MS earth breach unknown  unknown 0 
The riser section separated 
from the conduit, leading to the 
loss of the reservoir. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lake Manatee 
gate failure 
2003 FL unknown overtopping gate  
2 upstream homes 
destroyed; 600 homes 
evacuated 
0 
Dam did not fail; gate stuck in 
closed position, causing lake to 
swell beyond its banks.  Diver 
finally opened gate after 
numerous unsuccessful 
attempts. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Marquette No. 
3 (Tourist 
Park) 
2003 MI 
concrete 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
upstream 
dam failure 
 unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Polk 
Township 
dam 
2003 PA unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 20 homes evacuated 0 
Officials also concerned about 
Twin Lakes Dam in Smithfield 
Township; nursing home put 
on alert while the dam was 
stabilized. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
unknown 2003 GA unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 
No injuries, 6 houses 
evacuated, 3 trailers 
damaged. 
0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
unknown 2003 PA unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
upstream 
dam failure 
 unknown 0 
Up to 200 campers left Yellow 
Creek Camp Ground after a 
private dam about three miles 
upstream overtopped. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Birchwood 
Lake Dam 
2004 NJ 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
30,000,0
00 
Extensive, >$30 
million estimate, 350 
homes flooded (see 
other NJ dams) 
0 
The dam failed during heavy 
rains July 13, 2004 several  
dams failed in NJ 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents; 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Big Bay Lake 
dam 
2004 MS unknown unknown unknown 
4,750,00
0 
98 homes, 2 churches, 
fire station, bridge 
damaged or destroyed; 
livestock, pets. SBA 
estimate: 
>$2.2 million.  $2.5 
0 
900 -1,100 acre lake; 3.5 
billion gallons; quarter-mile-
wide flood path extending at 
least 17 miles downstream 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
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million dam, > $50K 
Red Cross 
Lake Powell 
dam 
2004 VA unknown unknown unknown 5,000 
$5,000 for emergency 
repairs 
0 
Dam had suffered extensive 
damage from Hurricane Floyd; 
$55,000 spent on repairs. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
2 dams in 
Powhatan 
Wildlife 
Mgmt Area 
2004 VA unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Adel Island 
Park Dam 
2004 IA unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
 “Adel dam weakens after 
heavy rains” Dallas County 
News, 5/26/04 Iowa 
Whitewater Coalition: 
www.iowawhitewater.org 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Backbone 
State Park 
dam 
2004 IA unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Source: “Campers rescued 
from flash flooding at 
Backbone State Park” KCRG-
TV9 Dubuque, 5/24/2004 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
BENNETT 
YORK LAKE 
NUMBER 2 
DAM 
2004 MS earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BIG BAY 
LAKE DAM 
2004 MS earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
BLUE SPGS 
PWR PLANT 
DAM 
2004 NE concrete overtopping unknown  unknown 0 
A section of the overflow weir, 
about 40 feet wide, washed out 
in the middle of the dam. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Bohemia Mill 
Dam/Bridge 
2004 MD unknown unknown unknown  unknown 0 Low hazard dam 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Callaway 
Dam 
2004 TX unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 Unknown 0 
Callaway Dam was overtopped 
by about 1.5’ before it failed.  
(See next entry.) 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
CALLAWAY 
DAM 
2004 TX earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
A rainfall event of 
approximately 50% of the 
probable maximum 
precipitation (PMP) (15 inches 
in 6 hours) fell in the area. The 
dam was overtopped by at least 
1.3 feet before failing. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
CARTER 
POND, 
UPPER 
(FERGUS) 
2004 MT earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Concrete dam 
on Big Blue 
River 
2004 NE concrete overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Source: “Old dam breaks on 
Big Blue River” (AP) 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
East Lake 
Dam 
2004 AL unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
270 evacuated due to potential 
for dam break. Tropical Storm 
Gaston 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Essex Mill 
Dam 
2004 VA unknown unknown unknown  
Drained small 
recreational lake 
0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
HOOVER 
CREEK DAM 
2004 MT earth overtopping 
poor 
maintenance 
 unknown 0 
Complete failure due to 
clogged fish screen and lack of 
maintenance. Dam overtopped 
and eventually breached. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Keith Lake 
dam 
2004 AL earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 
Decreased property 
values, environmental 
damages, driveways 
covered with mud, 
~20% damage to 
downstream dam, 
downstream homes 
evacuated. 
0 
Lake ~1200 yards long, 450 
yds wide, 40’ deep.  60-70’ 
earth dam. Downstream homes 
evacuated. Earth dam.  Failure 
not covered by media. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
LAKE 
DOCKERY 
DAM 
2004 MS earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lake Idylwild 
Dam 
2004 VA unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 Minor damage to SR 
628. 
0 
Tropical Storm Gaston dumped 
12” rain in 8 hours in 
watershed. Rainfall from storm 
exceeded the dam’s spillway 
capacity. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Lake 
Stockwell 
Dam 
2004 NJ 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 
Extensive, >$30 
million estimate, 350 
homes flooded (see 
other NJ dams) 
0 several  dams failed in NJ 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lake Susan 
dam 
2004 NC unknown unknown unknown  
Several homes 
evacuated 
0 
Near failure: Collapse of a 35' 
section of the dam's upstream 
wall. Residents were allowed 
to return to their homes after 
the lake was drawn down to a 
safe level.  The Montreat 
Conference Center, which 
owns the 79-year-old dam, had 
already planned to repair the 
dam starting in mid-August, 
and has raised $900,000 toward 
the effort. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Lebanon 
Forest #1 
Dam 
2004 NJ 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 
Extensive, >$30 
million estimate, 350 
homes flooded (see 
other NJ dams) 
0 several  dams failed in NJ 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Lower Aetna 
Lake Dam 
2004 NJ 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 
Extensive, >$30 
million estimate, 350 
homes flooded (see 
other NJ dams) 
0 several  dams failed in NJ 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
McGuire Dam 2004 TX unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 Unknown 0 
McGuire Dam is located 
downstream of Callaway Dam.   
It was overtopped by at least 3’ 
before failure.  The sequence 
of failure is not known.  The 
stream does not go through 
Hearne so the flooding in 
Hearne was not from the 
failures. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Piedmont 
Driving Club 
Dam 
2004 GA unknown unknown unknown  unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
SHALE 
CREEK 
2004 MT earth piping corrosion  unknown 0 
CMP pipe Corroded caused 
piping which caused the dam to 
fail. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Simmons 
Dam 
2004 PA unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 
No significant 
damages, no 
mandatory evacuations 
(but some voluntary) 
0 
No failure, dam overtopped.  
NWS issued warning that the 
dam had failed, but later 
retracted the warning. DEP 
ordered owner to drain lake & 
obtain permit for dam 
improvements; dam meets 
regulatory criteria, but had not 
been on state inventory. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Smiths Pond 
Dam 
2004 MA unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Dam overtopped; spillway 
clogged by debris.  Divers 
from the Leominster EMA and 
crane operators worked to clear 
the spillway. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Timber (York) 
Lake dam 
2004 MS unknown 
poor 
maintenanc
e 
biological 
growth 
 unknown 0 improper repair 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Timber Lake 
Dam 
2004 NJ 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 
Extensive, >$30 
million estimate, 350 
homes flooded (see 
other NJ dams) 
0 several  dams failed in NJ 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
unknown 2004 AR earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 At least 5 businesses 
damaged 
0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
unknown 2004 TX unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 Near failure 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
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unknown 2004 MS unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 2 homes flooded, 1 car 
swept off road 
0 
Near Anchor Lake subdivision, 
between Picayune and 
Poplarville 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
unknown 2004 VA unknown foundation erosion  none 0 
State drains dam after 
unsuccessful attempt by  
owner, who had been ordered 
to do so in January 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
unknown 2004 VA unknown unknown unknown  
Minor damage to SR 
301, car swept away 
0 Tropical Storm Gaston 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Upper Aetna 
Lake Dam 
2004 NJ 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 
Extensive, >$30 
million estimate, 350 
homes flooded (see 
other NJ dams) 
0 several  dams failed in NJ 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Victor Lake 
(aka Upper 
Stinchomb) 
2004 GA unknown 
poor 
maintenanc
e 
unknown  
approximately 20 
trailers received 
damage; around 20 
people rescued by 
emergency personnel 
0 
Unregulated dam impounding 
15 acre lake failed suddenly 
and flooded part of a trailer 
park. Approximately 20 trailers 
received damage; around 20 
people rescued by emergency 
personnel; Unregulated dam, 
lack of maintenance, 
vegetation on embankment 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Riverview 2004 FL earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 
60 million gallons 
(227,000 m3) of acidic 
liquid released 
0 
A dike at the top of a 100-foot-
high gypsum stack holding 
150-million gallons of polluted 
water broke after waves driven 
by Hurricane Frances bashed 
the dike's southwest corner 
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
Hadlock Pond 
dam 
2005 NY unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, piping 
1,000,00
0 
At least 4 homes 
destroyed, 
~12  w/ moderate to 
severe damage, roads 
washed out, power 
outages. > $1M 
damages. 
0 
Embk. dam completed 5/2005.  
220-acre lake, 12-15’ deep. 
state Rte 149 closed, major link 
between upstate NY & VT, 
Heavy rain,  first filling, 
piping, suspected const. flaw 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
ALLEN 
SUBDIVISIO
N LAKE 
DAM 
2005 MS earth unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
DENNERY 
LAKE DAM 
2005 MS earth breach erosion  unknown 0 
 
Section near center of dam 
eroded away. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Lower 
Robertson 
2005 NH 
concrete 
rockfill 
overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Left abutment had been 
washed out and high flows 
were still being experienced at 
the site. The Exemptee's 
representative reported that 
there was no downstream 
impact as a result of the 
abutment being washed out. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Simplot 
Wastewater 
Lagoon #1 
2005 OR unknown unknown unknown  
Breach of off-channel 
reservoir resulted in 
breach of canal, loss of 
irrigation water, 
agricultural lands, 
water/mud damage to 
farm houses & 
outbuildings. 
0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Taum Sauk 2005 MO unknown 
poor 
maintenanc
e 
unknown  
Toops family home 
demolished; state 
highway washed out; 
at least 3 trucks swept 
from road. Extensive 
damage to Johnson's 
Shut-Ins, the East Fork 
of the Black River and 
the mountainside. 
0 
In Nov. 2007 the state reached 
a $180 million settlement with 
the utility that owned the 
reservoir. Suspected 
instrumentation failure caused 
water to be pumped into 
reservoir. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Whittenton 
Pond Dam 
2005 MA 
other 
wooden 
unknown unknown  
~2,000 evacuated, 
including a housing 
development for the 
elderly 
0 
173-year-old wooden dam , 
~100’ across, ~12’ high, 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Bangs Lake 2005 MS earth unknown unknown  
approx. 17 million 
gallons of acidic liquid 
(64,350 m3) released.  
liquid poured into 
adjacent marsh lands, 
causing vegetation to 
die. 
0 
Phosphogypsum stack failure, 
because the company was 
trying to increase the capacity 
of the pond at a faster rate than 
normal, according to Officials 
with the Mississippi 
Department of Environmental 
Quality 
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
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Kaloko 
Reservoir 
2006 HI earth 
poor 
maintenanc
e 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 Destroyed an ocean 
reef. 
7 
Poor inspection/maintenance.  
Privately owned.  May have 
been improper maintenance. 
NRC, 2012; Godbey, 
2007; 
http://www.oregon.gov/
owrd/SW/docs/dam_saf
ety/M2_Mills_%20Hist
orical_Dam_Failures_a
nd_Modes.pdf; 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org); 
http://www.croninfried.
com/Articles/Dam-
Probe-Faults-Covered-
Spillway.shtml; 
http://the.honoluluadver
tiser.com/pdf/kaloko/Ka
loko-Report.pdf 
Galestown 
Dam 
2006 MD unknown unknown unknown  
Roads washed out; 
dam replacement cost 
$2.5M 
0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Needwood 
Dam 
2006 MD earth foundation 
hydrologic 
event, 
seepage 
 2200 evacuated for 3 
days 
0 
65’ high, 40-year-old earth 
dam sprang 7 leaks at toe; lake 
reached 23’ above flood stage 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Raeford Dam 
and Fuseplug 
2006 NC 
concrete 
gravity 
breach 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0 
Rainfall backed up water in the 
reservoir, causing a breach of 
the cofferdam protecting the 
labyrinth spillway. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Cole Marsh 
dam NH01042 
2007 NH unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Disrow Pond 
dam 
(Inv#810) 
2007 CT unknown unknown unknown  unknown 0 
Embankment failed  near inlet 
structure. The breach was 
approximately 12 ft high and 
15 ft wide. The dam was 
designed by NRCS. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Hansonville 
Pond dam 
NH01091 
2007 NH unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Hayden's Mill 
Pond Dam 
NH00504 
2007 NH unknown 
controlled 
breach 
hydrologic 
event 
 
Dam severely 
damaged. 12 families 
evacuated. Pond 
supplied water for 
fighting fires; 
replacement will cost 
100s of thousands of 
dollars. 
0 
Sudden structural failure 
averted by controlled breach. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
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Lee's Fishing 
Lake Dam 
2007 WV unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 Nearly 1000 evacuated 0 
Pond had been drained, then 
refilled by new owner. 22’ high 
HH dam 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
McClure 2007 WI 
earth 
gravity 
unknown unknown  none 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Millers Pond 
dam 
Inv#15205 
2007 CT unknown unknown unknown  unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Mossman 
Dam 
2007 NH unknown unknown unknown  
Property owners spent 
~ 
$500,000 on cleanup 
& repairs 
0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Nottingham 
Dam 
NH00522 
2007 NH unknown unknown unknown  
“upwards of 1000 
evacuated” 
0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Oakland 2007 PA other unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Rainbow Lake 
Dam 
2007 NJ earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 
County roadway 
washed out; repair will 
cost “several million” 
– gas main broken. 
0 
From NJ Dam Safety: Sun-
Mon, 4/15-16, “nor’easter” 
dumped up to 10” of rain in 
parts of NJ. Muddy Run 
watershed. Salem Co, 
particularly hard hit w/ high 
flood flows that overflowed 
and failed Rainbow Lake Dam 
on SR 56 in Pittsgrove 
Township. The 20’ high earth 
embankment dam w/ state 
highway atop impounded an 80 
acre lake. Dam owner: NJ 
DOT. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Rogers Pond 
Inv# 12702 
2007 CT unknown foundation 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
 unknown 0 
Part of the embankment failed; 
breach area ~ 15 ft deep and 
30ft wide. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Spit Brook 
dam 165.10 
2007 NH unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Station 26 2007 NY 
concrete 
gravity 
unknown unknown  none 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Whittle Brook 
dam 097.03 
2007 NH unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
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Truckee Canal 2008 NV unknown piping animal 
28,000,0
00 
~600 homes flooded; 
2- month loss of 
agriculture water 
supply to ~3,000 users; 
Dozens evacuated by 
boat & helicopter. Up 
to 3500 people 
stranded; at least 165 
in shelters. Est. 
repair/replacement 
costs: $28 - $390M 
million 
0 
Break occurred just after 4am. 
Dozens evacuated by boat & 
helicopter. Up to 3500 people 
stranded; at least 165 in 
shelters. Est. 
repair/replacement costs: $28 - 
$390M million 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Breedsville 
Dam 
2008 MI unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 Flooded park 0 
Break in earthen part of Black 
River dam built in 1837; dam 
impounded 8-acre pond. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Earlham Lake 
Dam 
2008 IN unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 
Callon Road washed 
out, eliminating road 
access to 78 homes for 
5 days. 
0 
Three others were damaged by 
June floods, >10” rain 
overwhelmed spillways 
previously termed inadequate 
by the state. (3) East Lake Dam 
in Johnson County 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
East Lake 
Dam 
2008 IN unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 
100 homes damaged, 
road access to ~120 
homes cut off; dam 
severely damaged 
0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Graybrook 
Dam 
2008 IN unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 
Dam severely 
damaged; 
~40-acre lake emptied 
0 
Owned by the Graybrook 
Conservation Association 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Hebgen Dam 2008 ID unknown unknown unknown  none 0 
Failure of two hydraulic gates 
released 3,400 cu ft (normal 
discharge: 900 cu ft) water, 
causing 1’ rise in Madison R. 
No evacuations. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Kingston 
Plant coal 
waste dam 
2008 TN unknown unknown unknown  
5.4 million cubic yards 
(> 1 billion gal) of 
sludge damaged 12 
homes and covered 
hundreds of acres. 
Cleanup costing ~$1 
million per day. 
0 
40-acre pond used by the 
Tennessee Valley Authority to 
hold slurry of ash generated by 
the coal-burning Kingston 
Steam Plant. The dam gave 
way just before 1 a.m, burying 
a road and railroad tracks 
leading to the plant. No one 
was seriously injured or 
hospitalized. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Lake Bella 
Vista Dam 
2008 AR unknown unknown unknown  
Washed out road 
across the dam. 
0 
FEMA may grant $ 700,000 
for repairs; reconstruction 
could cost approximately $2.2 
million. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
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Lake Delton 2008 WI unknown unknown unknown  
245-acre lake emptied; 
5 homes destroyed; 
highway washed out. 
20 lakeside resorts 
affected. $Millions 
0 
Lake embankment (a 
peninsula, not the dam) washed 
out. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Locklin Lake 
Dam 
2008 FL 
other 
wooden 
unknown unknown  
Minor damages to 
residential area 
0 
Locklin Lake Committee had 
been in process of replacing 
old wooden dam; awaiting 
approval to finish construction. 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Mill Creek 
Dam 
2008 WA unknown unknown unknown  
Pedestrian bridge 
washed out; residential 
areas flooded; ~12 
homes received flood 
damages 
0 
“…serious situation was 
narrowly averted as a 
pedestrian bridge was washed 
out with children on their way 
to school…” 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Moon Valley 
Lake 
2008 MO unknown unknown unknown  
Emptied 17-acre lake; 
probable decrease in 
property values 
0 Unregulated dam 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Oakland Dam 2008 PA 
timber 
crib 
unknown unknown  none 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Pure Oil (aka 
Rhine) Lake 
Dam 
2008 TX unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 County road closed 0 
350-acre lake. Dam failed at 
spillway. Both drought & 
flooding suspected 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Redlands 
Ranch Dam 
2008 AZ unknown 
poor 
maintenanc
e 
unknown  
Damaged waterfalls, 
pools & trails, repairs 
will take at least 6 
months. 
0 
~ 426 people evacuated by 
helicopter. Previous dam 
(Cataract) failed in 1993, 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Victor 
Conservation 
Club dam 
2008 IN unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 Dam severely 
damaged 
0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Kingston 
fossil plant 
2008 TN earth unknown unknown  
Release of 5.4 million 
cubic yards [4.1 
million m3] of ashy 
slurry. The ash slide 
covered 400 acres [1.6 
square kilometres] as 
deep as 6 feet [1.83 
metres]. The wave of 
ash and mud toppled 
power lines, covered 
Swan Pond Road and 
ruptured a gas line. It 
damaged 12 homes, 
and one person had to 
be rescued, though no 
one was seriously hurt. 
0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
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Etowah 
County, near 
the Gallant 
Community 
2009 AL unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
103,000 
Floodwaters washed 
away a culvert and a 
private dam broke 
producing up to 12 ft. 
of flooding in the area 
causing residences to 
be evacuated. A dozen 
roads were also closed 
due to the floodwaters 
and property damage 
was reported to be 
$100,000 ($103,000 in 
2010 
dollars). 
0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Apple River 2010 WI 
concrete 
masonry 
unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Atkinson Dam 2010 NE unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Sources: 
“Dams monitored after 
failures” Omaha World Herals, 
6/13/2010 “Heavy rains cause 
Ericson Dam to fail” Grand 
Island Independent, 6/14/2010 
“NEMA says 10 Neb. dams 
failed during heavy rains” 
Sioux City Journal, 6/20/2010 
Wikipedia 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Burwell 
Sumter 
Diversion 
Dam 
2010 NE unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Hydro-
Kennebec 
2010 ME 
concrete 
gravity 
unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Lake Delhi 
Dam 
2010 IA unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Lake 
Ponderosa 
Dam 
2010 IA unknown cracking 
hydrologic 
event, 
overtopping 
 unknown 0  
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
Madison 2010 MT 
timber 
crib 
unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Tallulah Falls 2010 GA gravity unknown unknown  unknown 0  
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
Taylor Ord 
Diversion 
Dam 
2010 NE unknown overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
 unknown 0 
Heavy rains led to dam failures 
in Atkinson, Burwell, North 
Loup, Sargent, Scotia, 
Spalding and Taylor. Village of 
North Loupe evacuated due to 
Bredthauer failure 
Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials 
(www.damsafety.org) 
 282 
Ericson Dam 2010 NE earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 
significant flooding, 
roads and bridges 
washed out 
0  
https://www.weather.go
v/gid/53617 
Spalding Dam 2010 NE earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
upstream 
dam failure 
 
significant flooding, 
roads and bridges 
washed out 
0  
https://www.weather.go
v/gid/53618 
Brown Bridge 
Dam 
2012 MI earth foundation erosion  66 properties damaged 0  
https://www.michigan.g
ov/deq/0,4561,7-135-
3313_3684_3723-
331769--,00.html 
Dan River 
Steam Station 
2014 NC earth unknown unknown  
collapse of an old 
drainage pipe under a 
27-acre ash waste 
pond, ash flowing 
through drainage pipe 
into Dan River, about 
82,000 short tons 
[74,400 t] of toxic coal 
ash and 27 million 
gallons [100,000 m3] 
of contaminated water 
0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
Corbett Lake 
SCNONAME 
02027 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
SC NONAME 
02019 (Bailey 
Pond) 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
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Able/Cobett 
Pond Dam 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
Cook Pond 
Dam 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
Clyburn 2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
Old Mill Pond 
Dam 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
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Barr Lake 
Dam 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
Gibson's Pond 
Dam 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
JW Smoaks 
Pond 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
Cary's Lake 
Dam 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
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Lake 
Elizabeth 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
Lower Rocky 
Ford Dam 
/Rocky Ford 
Lake 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
Ulmers Pond 2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
Upper Rocky 
Creek/ North 
Lake/Overcre
ek Rd. 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
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Walden Place 
Dam 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
Beaver 
Dam/Wildewo
od Pond 
#2/Boyd Pond 
Two 
(Controlled 
release) 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
Covington 
Lake Dam 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
Murray Pond 
Dam 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
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Pinewood 
Lake Dam 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
Sunview Lake 
Dam 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
Wilson 
Millpond Dam 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
Semmes Lake 
Dam 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
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Weston Pond 
Dam 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
Clarkson Pond 
Dam 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
Duffies Pond 
Dam 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
O E Rose 
Dam 
(SCNONAM
E 14001) 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
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Lakewood 
Pond 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
Chapman's 
Pond Dam 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
Culler Pond 
(SCNONAM
E 38070) 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
Busbees Pond 
( Hutto's 
Millpond 
Dam) 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
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SCNONAME 
38036 
(Cleveland 
Street) 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
Ellerbees 
Millpond Dam 
2015 SC earth overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
  0 
In October 2015, South 
Carolina received record 
amounts of rainfall which 
caused a 1000-year flood 
throughout much of the state. 
During this flood 
event, emergency orders were 
issued too many dams 
throughout the state, and 36 
dams have been reported to 
have failed, 4 of which were 
unregulated. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/2015_SC_Flood_Failur
es 
New Wales 
Plant 
2016 FL earth unknown unknown  
a 14 metre-wide 
sinkhole appeared in a 
phosphogypsum stack, 
opening a pathway for 
contained liquid into 
the underground; the 
liquid reached the 
Floridan Aquifer, a 
major drinking water 
resource. 840,000 m3 
of contaminated liquid 
released. 
0  
http://www.wise-
uranium.org/mdaf.html; 
U.S. Committee on 
Large Dams; 
Oroville Dam 2017 CA earth fill overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
spillway 
 
damage to spillway 
and emergency 
spillway, 
sedimentation and 
debris 
0 
Prolonged drought followed by 
heavy rain. 
Vahedifard et al., 2017 
Hatfield 1987 WI 
earth 
gravity 
overtopping gate   0 
Collapse of sections of trip 
gates. 
http://npdp.stanford.edu
/dam_incidents 
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Appendix G: Levee Failures  
(see following pages) 
 
Also available in filterable/searchable format at: https://blindreview1.shinyapps.io/levees/  
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Year State Region 
District 
Location 
Total 
Incidents 
Primary 
Cause 
Secondary 
Cause 
Other Factor Cost Fatalities 
Description of Damages and 
Comments 
Lessons 
Learned and 
Comments 
References 
Total 
1993 
Midwest (IL, 
IA, KS, MN, 
MO, NE, ND, 
WI) 
Multiple 1083    15,700,000,000 52 
Regional impacts due to 
extended rainfall and saturated 
upland areas. Record summer 
rainfalls exceeding 300-year 
events. Over 1000 levees 
failed; 75 towns and 15 million 
acres of farmland inundated; 
barge traffic on Missouri and 
Mississippi stopped for 2 
months; highways 35, 70, 29 
closed; 10 commercial airports 
closed; all rail traffic in 
midwest halted; 200-400% 
normal rainfall across region 
for 20 days or more; estimated 
500-year event; soil moisture 
at field capacity; locations 
above flood stage for 150-200 
days; 30,000 jobs and 149,000 
households disrupted for 2 
months; 200 water treatment 
plants impacted; Over 800 
miles rail track damaged; High 
nitrogen levels contributed to 
plankton bloom with 7000 
square mile dead zone in Gulf 
of Mexico; Significant erosion 
and sediment transport; [NWS 
damage estimates by state in 
billions: IL-2.64, IA-5.74, KS-
0.55, MN-0.96, MO-3.4, NE-
0.30, ND-0.41, WI-0.90]. Red 
Cross responded rapidly 
providing shelter for 14,500 
people; served 2.5 million 
meals; National Guard and 
Coast Guard provided rescue 
and security; broad community 
response (sandbagging, 
volunteering, etc.); 6.2 billion 
in property damage reimbursed 
by federal gov; FEMA 
provided 650 million; SBA l 
loans 334 million; 2.85 billion 
in USDA flood disaster 
payments; Over 12,000 
properties mitigated by FEMA. 
Need better 
models for 
failure regarding 
long-term 
flooding; need 
more reliable 
real-time data on 
long-term stream 
flow gaging 
stations and soil 
moisture; need 
improved 
forecasting 
models for 
precipitation and 
river levels; need 
real-time 
streamflow data 
to generate and 
communicate 
better forecasts; 
need better 
streamflow 
monitoring 
network. 
Johnson et al., 
2004; Parrett 
& James, 
1993; 
Southard, 
1995; Perry & 
Combs, 1999; 
Josephson, 
1994; 
Galloway, 
1994; 
Galloway, 
1995; 
Stallings, 
1994; 
Interagency 
Floodplain 
Management 
Task 
Force, 1994; 
Changnon, 
1996; NRC, 
2012; Larson, 
1997; 
Theiling, 1998 
1993 
Midwest (IL, 
IA, KS, MN, 
MO, NE, ND, 
WI) 
St. Paul 3 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, breach 
soil saturation 
and persistent 
nature of heavy 
rainfall 
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1993 
Midwest (IL, 
IA, KS, MN, 
MO, NE, ND, 
WI) 
Rock Island 31 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, breach 
soil saturation      
1993 
Midwest (IL, 
IA, KS, MN, 
MO, NE, ND, 
WI) 
St. Louis 51 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, breach 
soil saturation      
1993 
Midwest (IL, 
IA, KS, MN, 
MO, NE, ND, 
WI) 
Kansas City 816 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, breach 
soil saturation      
1993 
Midwest (IL, 
IA, KS, MN, 
MO, NE, ND, 
WI) 
Omaha 182 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, breach 
soil saturation      
Total 
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
 38    2,000,000,000  
30,000 homes damaged or 
destroyed, 2000 businesses 
damaged or destroyed; 
$690,000 disaster 
unemployment payments; 
80,00 acres of flooded area had 
to be pumped; Only 6% home 
owners covered by NFIP; 
$25.5 million in FEMA and 
state relief for shelter; SBA 
approved $24.7 million in 
loans. 
Need better 
coordination of 
flood releases 
across delta; 
need 
comprehensive 
approach to 
managing 
runoff; need 
removal of 
vegetation 
encroaching into 
floodways; need 
sediment control 
management; 
need information 
dissemination to 
communities to 
better prepare 
and respond to 
flood; needs 
integration of 
seismic 
susceptibility; 
needs channel 
maintenance 
management; 
land use 
planning, 
setbacks, levee 
elevation; better 
maintenance 
practices; Public 
notifications of 
impending 
danger or 
flooding were 
not clearly 
understood by 
the public or the 
media. Terms 
FEAT, 1997; 
Burton & 
Cutter, 2008 
 294 
such as 
"voluntary" and 
"mandatory" 
evacuations were 
not clearly 
defined. 
Evacuations 
ranged from 
very smooth, 
timely 
operations to 
panic; need to 
increase the 
number of 
telemetered 
gaging stations 
for streamflow 
and precipitation 
in the 
Sacramento-San 
Joaquin River 
system and 
otl1er streams. 
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
Sacramento 2 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
damaged trying 
to make cuts for 
pump out lines, 
landside 
wavewash 
erosion 
     
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
Sacramento 1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
wavewash 
landside 
wavewash 
erosion 
     
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
Sacramento, 
East levee 
Feather 
River 
1 sloughing 
hydrologic 
event, relief 
cuts 
damaged trying 
to make relief 
cuts, landside 
and wavewash 
     
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
Sacramento, 
West levee 
of Sutter 
Bypass 
1 sloughing 
hydrologic 
event, 
seepage 
sloughing, 
landside 
wavewash 
     
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
Sacramento, 
Steamboat 
Slough East 
Levee, 
Sacramento 
River West 
Levee, Butte 
Slough 
Levee, 
Colusa 
Basin Drain 
Levee 
4 sloughing 
hydrologic 
event, 
waterside 
erosion 
waterside      
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Sacramento, 
Butte 
1 sloughing 
hydrologic 
event, piping 
at waterside toe, 
boils and 
sinkhole 
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Central 
Valley, CA 
Slough 
Levee 
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
Sacramento, 
West levee 
of Sutter 
Bypass 
1 sloughing 
hydrologic 
event, 
wavewash 
wavewash 
erosion, scour 
hole near levee 
     
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
Sacramento, 
West levee 
Sacramento 
River, South 
Levee Bear 
River, North 
levee of the 
Natomas 
Cross Canal 
3 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
waterside 
erosion 
waterside      
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
Sacramento, 
East levee 
Three Mile 
Slough 
1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
subsidence 
levee crown      
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
Sacramento, 
West levee 
of 
Georgiana 
Slough 
1 sloughing 
hydrologic 
event, 
subsidence 
landside 
subsidence 
     
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
Sacramento, 
Sacramento 
Bypass 
1 sloughing 
hydrologic 
event, 
landside 
erosion 
landside slope 
erosion, boils 
     
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
Sacramento,  
West levee 
Middle 
Creek 
1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
seepage 
seepage, 
wavewash 
erosion 
     
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
Sacramento, 
West levee 
Deer Creek, 
South levee 
Elder Creek 
2 breach 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
erosion, 4 breaks      
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
San Joaquin, 
Lower San 
Joaquin 
North Levee 
(Madera), 
Lower San 
Joaquin 
South levee 
(Fresno) 
2 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
failed in 4 places      
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
San Joaquin, 
East levee 
San Joaquin 
River 
(Elliott), 
East levee 
San Joaquin 
2 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, relief 
cuts 
relief cut, 
landside and 
waterside slope 
erosion, 
wavewash 
erosion, failed in 
5 places 
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River (River 
Junction) 
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
San Joaquin, 
West levee 
San Joaquin 
River  
(Blewett)), 
West levee 
San Joaquin 
River  
(White Lake 
Ranch), East 
levee San 
Joaquin 
River  
(Wetherbee 
Lake), East 
levee San 
Joaquin 
River (River 
Junction) 
4 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
landside 
wavewash 
landside 
wavewash, relief 
cut, failed 2 
places 
     
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
San Joaquin, 
Paradise Cut 
East levee 
(Paradise 
Junction), 
East levee 
San Joaquin 
River 
{McMullin 
Ranch) 
2 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
waterside 
erosion 
waterside 
erosion, cracks 
and holes in 
levee 
     
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
San Joaquin, 
Fresno River 
South levee, 
West levee 
San Joaquin 
River 
(Upper 
Roberts 
Island), East 
levee San 
Joaquin 
River  
(Boggs) 
3 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, 
erosion 
slope      
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
San Joaquin, 
North levee 
Old  River 
1 sloughing 
hydrologic 
event, piping 
erosion, boils, 
seepage, shallow 
inundation, 4 
places 
     
1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
Islands, 
Upper 
Roberts 
Island 
1 seepage 
hydrologic 
event, culvert 
excessive water 
in adjacent 
channels 
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1997 
Sacramento/ 
San Joaquin 
Central 
Valley, CA 
Islands, 
Quimby 
Island, 
Bouldin 
Island, 
Twitchell 
Island 
3 cracking 
hydrologic 
event, 
slumping 
movement of 
landside slope, 
excessive water 
in adjacent 
channels 
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Total 
2005 
New Orleans, 
LA 
New 
Orleans 
13 (of 
suspected 
50) 
   100,000,000,000 1500 
400,000 cars inundated; 25,000 
barrels of crude spilled 
contaminating 1700 homes; 
118 million cubic yards of 
debris; estimated uninsured 
losses at $215 billion, and 
insured losses at $25 billion; 
damaged 19 percent of U.S. oil 
production; of those who died, 
71 percent were 60 years or 
older; half were 75 years or 
more; 124,000 jobs lost. 
Levees 
constructed 
using hydraulic 
fill with high silt 
and sand content 
were severely 
damaged; rolled 
fill  levees 
survived 
overtopping 
without 
breaching; I-
Type floodwalls 
caused 
catastrophic 
flooding in 
Ninth Ward; 
water flowing 
over top of I-
Type wall 
eroded soils and 
stability, also 
issues with 
foundation soils; 
overtopping 
alone would 
have resulted in 
far less flooding; 
breaches due 
soils and fill 
contributed 
significantly to 
damage; worst 
flooding caused 
by levees and 
walls in ninth 
ward area built 
on marsh and 
sand causing 
pressure, 
seepage, sliding, 
and gaps formed 
between sheet 
pile wall and 
canal side 
portion of levee, 
many I-Type 
floodwalls built 
atop levees - 
Earthen levees 
without I-walls 
all around New 
Orleans— 
including the 
levee at the 
Industrial Canal 
West Bank 
South breach — 
Reible et al., 
2006; Sills et 
al., 2008; 
Wolshon, 
2006; Knabb 
et al., 2005; 
Mlakar, 2006; 
Brunkard et 
al., 2008; 
ASCE, 2007; 
USACE, 
2007; Cutter 
& Gall, 2007; 
USACE, 2009 
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were overtopped 
by Hurricane 
Katrina’s storm 
surge. Out of the 
50 total 
estimated levee 
breaches system-
wide, the  
majority  can  be  
attributed  to  
overtopping  and  
erosion. Levees  
constructed  with  
properly  
compacted  clay  
with  a  good  
grass cover  
appeared  to  
have  withstood  
the  storm  the  
best. Levees  
with  higher  silt  
and  sand  
content  in  the  
embankment  
material —or  
levees  built  
with  hydraulic  
fill  (in  which  
the  levee  
material  was  
mixed with 
water to create a 
slurry, then 
pumped or 
flowed into 
place)—
sustained the  
worst  erosion  
damage,  and  in  
some  cases  
were  completely  
washed away. 
2005 
New Orleans, 
LA 
New 
Orleans 
2 sliding 
hydrologic 
event 
I-Type 
floodwalls built 
atop levees 
failed due to 
load 
exceedance, 
weak 
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foundational 
soils, breached 
occurred with 
water below top 
of floodwall, 
gap formed 
between sheet 
pile wall and 
canal side 
portion of levee 
2005 
New Orleans, 
LA 
New 
Orleans 
1 breach 
hydrologic 
event, piping 
breached 
occurred with 
water below top 
of floodwall, 
constructed over 
marsh layer with 
beach and sand 
layer, heaving 
and sand boils, 
seepage and 
piping, gap 
formed between 
sheet pile wall 
and canal side 
portion of levee 
     
2005 
New Orleans, 
LA 
New 
Orleans 
1 piping 
hydrologic 
event, 
seepage 
constructed over 
marsh layer with 
beach and sand 
layer, gap 
formed between 
sheet pile wall 
and canal side 
portion of levee 
     
2005 
New Orleans, 
LA 
New 
Orleans 
2 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, storm 
surge 
overwhelmed by 
surge 
     
2005 
New Orleans, 
LA 
New 
Orleans 
4 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event, breach 
I-Type 
floodwalls built 
atop levees 
failed due to 
load exceedance 
     
2005 
New Orleans, 
LA 
New 
Orleans 
1 breach 
hydrologic 
event, 
floodwall 
small section 
failed, I-Type 
floodwalls built 
atop levees 
failed due to 
load exceedance 
     
2005 
New Orleans, 
LA 
New 
Orleans 
1 breach 
hydrologic 
event, sliding 
break in wall,  
constructed over 
marsh layer with 
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beach and sand 
layer 
2005 
New Orleans, 
LA 
New 
Orleans 
1 breach 
hydrologic 
event, piping 
constructed of 
hydraulic fill 
with sand and 
silt, numerous 
breaches and 
total loss of 
levee wall 
     
Total 
2008 
Midwest Multiple 25 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
extended period 
of heavy rain, 
snowpack 
15,000,000,000 24 
The 2008 flood brought 
similar, and even higher, river 
stages to many areas that were 
devastated in 1993. Damage 
more localized around rivers 
and tributaries as opposed to 
1993.  Multiple rain events and 
higher than average snowpack 
Jan-Sep 2008.  Levees 
breached along Mississippi 
were mainly lower agricultural 
levees.  Overtopping occurred 
in Cedar Rapid IA, causing 
severe damage to populated 
areas.  (IA - 85 of 99 counties 
were declared a Federal 
Disaster Area. IA damage 
alone $10 billion with over 
40,000 people were affected. 
2.5 to 3 million acres of corn 
and soybeans were underwater.  
10-square miles cedar rapids 
and Iowa city inundated 
including downtown areas.) 
See 1993 flood; 
limited river 
gauging 
information 
constrained the 
National 
Weather Service 
and others in 
developing 
timely and 
accurate river 
stage forecasts 
during this 
year’s flooding.  
This experience 
underscores the 
need to reverse 
the trend of 
recent years, 
during which 
federal support 
for the USGS-
operated system 
of river gauges 
has eroded and 
non-federal 
partners have not 
been able to fill 
the gaps 
completely; 
every record 
breaking flood 
event presents a 
need to review 
the accuracy of 
the stage-
discharge, 
discharge-
frequency, and 
stage-frequency 
relations that 
Bernhardt et 
al., 2011;  
Holmes et 
al.,2010; 
Gleason, 
2008; 
Coleman & 
Budikova, 
2010; 
Budikova et 
al., 2010; 
Patricola et 
al., 2015; 
Carter, 2009 
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underpin flood 
control planning, 
floodplain 
regulation, and 
flood insurance 
ratings.  
Considerable 
work was done 
in these areas 
following 1993.  
However, this 
work should be 
assessed against 
our experience 
in 2008, with 
particular 
attention to 
whether changes 
in land use 
patterns and, 
potentially, 
climate are 
fundamentally 
altering any of 
these 
relationships; 
human and 
financial costs 
associated with 
repetitive loss 
structures, which 
again accounted 
for a significant 
share of 
damages.  
Continued 
investment in 
flood damage 
reduction and 
enforcement of 
building 
restrictions are 
critical to 
making progress 
with these 
repetitive loss 
structures. 
 
 
2008 WI 
Lake 
Delton/Wisc
onsin River 
1         
2008 IA 
Two Rivers 
Upper 
1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 IL Keithsburg 1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
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2008 IL 
Henderson 
#3 
1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 IL 
Henderson 
#2 
1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 IL 
Henderson 
#1 
1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 MO 
Mississippi-
Fox 1 
1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 MO 
Mississippi-
Fox 2 
1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 MO 
Mississippi-
Fox 3 
1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 MO Gregory 1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 IL Hunt-Lima 1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 MO 
Union 
Township 
1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 IL 
Indian 
Grave 
Lower 
1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 MO John Reiff 1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 MO 
Pike Grain 
#3 
1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 MO 
Pike Grain 
#4 
1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 MO Kissinger 1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 MO Elsberry 1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 MO Kings Lake 1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 MO Sandy Creek 1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 MO Foley 1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 MO Cap Au Gris 1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 MO Brevator 1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 MO Kuhs 1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
      
2008 MO 
Columbia 
Bottom 
1 overtopping 
hydrologic 
event 
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Total 
2011 
MO Memphis 1 
induced 
breach 
hydrologic 
event 
extended period 
of heavy rain, 
snowpack 
2,800,000,000  
For first time, the Birds Point–
New Madrid and morganza 
floodways and the Bonnet 
Carré Spillway were placed 
into operation during a single 
flood event. Cost estimated as 
damage/repair costs by 
USACE actions to activate all 
3 floodways.  (Actions 
prevented $234 billion in total 
flood damages during the 2011 
flood event. Cumulative 
damages prevented are 
estimated at $612 billion, a $44 
return on every $1 invested, 
based on $14 billion invested 
to date. An estimated 3.6 
million people may have been 
impacted by the 2011 flood 
event without actions taken. A 
total of 43,358 people were 
actually impacted.)  Estimated 
between 3,500 and 22,500 
evacuated from all 3 floodway 
areas. 
Most promising 
technologies was 
developed by the 
U.S. Army 
Corps Engineer 
Research and 
Development 
Center in 
Vicksburg, Miss. 
A new smart 
phone 
application 
provided real-
time GPS 
pinpointing of 
flood-fight 
progress and 
related issues in 
the field, giving 
trained 
floodfighters the 
ability to use a 
phone to upload 
images, 
descriptions of 
flood damage 
and other critical 
data to the 
Command 
Center. The 
experimental 
technology was 
employed by the 
Memphis 
District in the 
flood’s early 
stages as one of 
the first true 
field tests of this 
technology. 
These devices 
were later 
transferred to 
New Orleans 
and Missouri 
flood fighters. 
Enhancements 
and refinements 
of this new flood 
fight tool were 
made from these 
field tests, 
ensuring this 
tool will be even 
more useful for 
the next flood 
fight. 
USACE, 2012 
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Appendix H: CMIP5 Model Sources and Acknowledgment 
 
 
We acknowledge the World Climate Research Programme's Working Group on Coupled 
Modelling, which is responsible for CMIP, and we thank the climate modeling groups for 
producing and making available their model output. For CMIP the U.S. Department of Energy's 
Program for Climate Model Diagnosis and Intercomparison provides coordinating support and led 
development of software infrastructure in partnership with the Global Organization for Earth 
System Science Portals. We further acknowledge: Maurer et al., 2007; Meehl et al., 2007; Hibbard 
et al., 2007; Meehl et al., 2009; Reclamation, 2013. 
  
 306 
 
Appendix I: Analysis of Anomalies Methodology 
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